



That I may dwell in the house of the LORD all the days of my life, 
To behold the beauty of the LORD and to meditate in His temple. 
For in the day of trouble He will conceal me in His tabernacle; 
In the secret place of His tent He will hide me; He will lift me up 
on a rock.
For any reader of Frye (1912–1991), it should be clear that the desire of one of 
the archetypal poets of the European tradition, the Psalmist, has to do with the 
source of verbal meaning. For any student of Frye, for anyone choosing him to 
be a guide in the verbal universe of poetry, it is clear that this desire has to do 
with traversing that world to the very limits of reason and language, the rewards 
of which quest also touch on the unspeakable. To discuss Frye is to enjoy these 
great treats, and the Frye symposium, “Northrop Frye 100: A Danubian Per-
spective”, held in Budapest between 7 and 8 September 2012, that prompted the 
writing of the essays included in this volume, had this very sense of a group of 
people sitting and communing around the table of poetic meaning, theorizing 
in breadth or critically anatomizing in detail, but always with a mind to ultimate 
concerns and informed sometimes by personal gravitas.
The studies in this book illustrate the major directions current Frye studies 
are taking. In theorizing, there is an obvious shift from literature to approaching 
Frye as a major religious thinker and a cultural theorist. Robert D. Denham’s 
finding the Longinian experience ultimately predominating Frye’s literary 
motives is a case in point. The importance of drawing the conclusions of Frye’s 
literary-religious journey for cultural theory obviously cannot be emphasized 
enough, but is also an outcome of an understanding and appreciating of Frye’s 
work from within (Glen). What seems theoretically new and rather compelling 
is the interest in and justification for Frye’s thought on language and metaphor 
coming from “hard-science” linguistics, neural theories of metaphor (Sinding, 
Feltracco). 
Back in 1999, after the publication in Hungarian of the Anatomy (1998) and 
the Bible books (1996 and 1997), I lamented the irresponsiveness of Hungarian 
literary criticism. The Frye conference and the Hungarian material of this book 
have disproved my concern; indeed, Hungarian Frygian scholarship has now 
• 8 •
obviously come of age. Not only have the old Small Fryes (Tóth, Fabiny and 
Kenyeres) and Frye admirers (Dávidházi) continued in their quests, but new ones 
have joined them. We have important theoretical contributions assimilating 
Frye’s notion of metaphor to dialogical and narrative identity (Kovács) and crit-
ical engagements with Frye’s theories that take them seriously in their own terms 
(Kelemen). Perhaps most importantly we have discussions putting Frye’s notions 
to use in critical issues of Hungarian literature: the stature and profundity – the 
timeliness – of Kelemen Mikes (Dávidházi); the contrasting of Freud and Frye in 
nineteenth-century Hungarian national literature and its Hamletism (Hódosy); 
the rehabilitation of Jókai as a foremost writer of romance as propounded by 
Frye and giving the concept a broader theoretical grounding, as well (Nyilasy); 
the discussion of the work of the two major contemporary Hungarian novelists, 
Esterházy and Bodor, replete with Biblical allusions using Frye’s concepts (Hor-
váth); and the ingenious application of Frye’s distinction between epos and fiction 
and notion of displacement to justify the term “balladistic short story”, perhaps 
putting an end to a long-drawn generic dispute (Sinka).
We have also included in the volume a section, Juvenilia, to show how youths, 
scholars in the making, come to grips with the material of their choice, the 
Romanian reception of Frye (Petraru), a Frye-aided distinction between verse 
novel and mock epic (Bácskai-Atkári), and a retelling of a Romanian cosmogo-
nic myth in a Frygian frame (Dullo).
The discussions below—most in English, some, meant mainly for a Hungar-
ian readership, in Hungarian—naturally witness to varying degrees of appropri-
ating Frye, from a profound sharing of outlook to harnessing Frye in concep-
tual worlds quite different from his own. Though it might be claimed this latter 
that such matching would require further theoretical polish, it might be equal-
ly said that it refutes the old objection that Frye’s concepts cannot be used by 
other theoretical frameworks. Nevertheless, all these essays in their varying 
outlooks and programmes make up and substantiate an authentic Danubian 
scholarly perspective on Frye. Yet one can only ponder how it is that two major 
Danubian mythographers, roughly both peers of Frye, Károly Kerényi and Mir-
cea Eliade, have received only passing remarks in this volume. However daunting 
the task might seem, Frye’s and Eliade’s concept of time would certainly need 
contrasting for a proper understanding of the differences between these two 
great modern-day appreciators of myth. The “Danubian perspective” idea also 
called for a comparison with Károly Kerényi, but, alas, it would not come into 
being. It would have been important not only because of its many yields in 
understanding the intellectual history of the time and in grasping the depths of 
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what Emily Dickinson called the refunding of “our confiscated gods”, Greek 
polytheism as Frye understood it, but also because it could have accentuated the 
starkingly shared elements of religious symbolism that Kerényi had found in 
reconstructing the central ancient Greek rite, the Eleusian mystery: burnt grain 










Dedicated to the memory of Domokos Pásztor
There he stood on the renewing crags of time, 
stood on the ringed summit of the sublime universe. 
Ferenc Juhász
The earliest reference to Longinus in Frye’s work is in a 1953 review of books by 
Allen Tate, Herbert Read, and Francis Fergusson, where he says that the theme of 
Read’s The True Voice of Feeling “is essentially the same as the problem of ecstasis 
or ‘transport’ in Longinus,” adding that this “problem” had been “ably handled” by 
Tate. He is referring to Tate’s “Longinus and the ‘New Criticism’” from a collection 
of Tate’s essays, The Forlorn Demon (1953).  About the same time, Frye writes this 
somewhat riddling entry in Notebook 37:
Re the first lecture: sublime process as beautiful product (Longinus on sublime).  Sublime 
includes self-identification (process).  Interest in a convention... more congenial to the 
aesthetic, especially in paradoxical forms of it like T. E. Hulme’s. The rhetorical relation 
expects to instruct & delight. (CW 23: 126)1
The “first lecture” is most likely a reference to the first address Frye gave at Prince-
ton in 1954.  Invited by E. D. H. Johnson of the Special Programs in Humanities 
at Princeton to institute a new series, known as the Class of 1932 Lectures, Frye 
gave four talks at Princeton in 1954: “The Critic and His Public”, “Symbols of Fact 
and Fiction”, “The Language of Poetry”, and “Myth and Society” (Ayre 244). In his 
Preface to Anatomy of Criticism, Frye notes that much of the substance of the book 
came from his Princeton lectures. In any event, Frye seems intent on exploring the 
connection between Longinus’ emphasis on the sublime process and the Aristo-
telian “aesthetic” approach.  The opposition between “convention” and “rhetorical 
1 Internal evidence suggests that Frye began writing in this notebook in 1949, put it aside, and 
then picked it up again in the mid-1950s.  
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relation” is apparently an opposition between final and instrumental value: the 
aesthetic needs no justification beyond itself, whereas rhetoric is concerned with 
the ways and means of instruction and delight. The reference to Hulme seems to 
be that his call for formal restraint and concrete imagery (“dry hardness”), along 
with his attacks on Romanticism, means he is a “classicist” and does not belong to 
the Longinian camp. 
Fictional and Thematic
The notebook entry on “the first lecture” suggests that, in his thinking about the 
beginning of the Anatomy, Frye has in mind two approaches the critic might take 
to literature, one emphasizing process and the other product. And, in fact, this 
opposition turns up at the end of the Anatomy’s first essay where Frye expands 
on the meaning of the terms “fictional” and “thematic” in his theory of modes. A 
“fictional” work for Frye is one that has internal characters, as in novels, epics, and 
plays.  A “thematic” work is one in which there are no characters involved except 
the author and the reader, as in lyrics and essays, or in which the internal characters 
are subordinated to the writer’s argument, as in allegories and parables. The foun-
dational category in the first essay is Aristotle’s ethos, or rather Frye’s expansion 
of this term: even though the meaning of “character” in “fictional” works differs 
from its meaning in “thematic” works, ethos is the constant term in both. Here is 
the key passage at the end of the first essay:
[T]he difference in emphasis that we have described as fictional and thematic corre-
sponds to a distinction between two views of literature that has run all through the his-
tory of criticism. These two views are the aesthetic and the creative, the Aristotelian and 
the Longinian, the view of literature as product and the view of literature as process. For 
Aristotle, the poem is a techne or aesthetic artefact: he is, as a critic, mainly interested 
in the more objective fictional forms, and his central conception is catharsis. Catharsis 
implies the detachment of the spectator, both from the work of art itself and from the 
author. The phrase “aesthetic distance” is generally accepted now in criticism, but it is 
almost a tautology: wherever there is aesthetic apprehension there is emotional and in-
tellectual detachment. The principles of catharsis in other fictional forms than tragedy, 
such as comedy or satire, were not worked out by Aristotle, and have therefore never 
been worked out since. Just as catharsis is the central conception of the Aristotelian ap-
proach to literature, so ecstasis or absorption is the central conception of the Longinian 
approach. This is a state of identification in which the reader, the poem, and sometimes, 
at least ideally, the poet also, are involved. We say reader, because the Longinian concep-
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tion is primarily that of a thematic or individualized response: it is more useful for lyrics, 
just as the Aristotelian one is more useful for plays. (CW 22: 62–3)
Thirtythree years later Frye is still appealing to the Aristotelian–Longinian dia-
lectic. In Words with Power (1990), he writes: “Traditional critical theories, from 
Plato and Aristotle on, look at literature within a mimetic context. We are told in 
both the Republic and in the Poetics that the poet’s work is imitative, though very 
different inferences are drawn from the principle in the two contexts.  What the 
poet imitates is usually assumed to fall within either the phenomena of human 
society or the order of nature.  But the Longinian conception of ecstatic response 
suggests another dimension of imitation” (CW 26: 108–9).
John Stuart Mill reports that “Coleridge used to say that everyone is born either 
a Platonist or an Aristotelian” (262).2 For Coleridge, there was no complementarity 
in this dialectic: if you are a Platonist, you cannot be an Aristotelian, and vice versa. 
“Dialectic” signals the presence of oppositions, and Frye is a dialectical thinker. He 
is forever moving back and forth between opposing poles of reference: knowledge 
and experience, space and time, stasis and movement, the individual and society, 
tradition and innovation, synthesis and analysis, engagement and detachment, free-
dom and concern, mythos and dianoia, the world and the grain of sand, immanence 
and transcendence, and scores, nay, hundreds of other oppositions. But in Frye 
there are few occasions that present us with an either/or choice, and the Aristotle–
Longinus dialectic is no exception. Frye’s world is a both/and world. The two per-
spectives complement each other, or at least they appear to do so.  
The imprint of Aristotle is everywhere in Frye’s work. He sets out in the Anat-
omy to develop a twentiethcentury Poetics, and a number of Aristotelian topoi 
appear with regularity: mythos, ethos, and dianoia are the material cause for much 
of Frye’s analysis in the first three essays of the Anatomy, and melos, lexis, and 
opsis serve the same function in the fourth essay. Frye frequently relies on the 
fourcause method of definition. Aristotelian terms—mimesis, spoudaios and 
phaulos, catharsis, hamartia, and anagnorisis—are scattered liberally throughout 
his writing. More often than not Frye greatly expands the meanings that these 
terms have in Aristotle, as already suggested, but the Anatomy nevertheless would 
have been a very different book had there been no Poetics.  
The occasions Frye has to write about Longinus are far fewer than the Aris-
totelian ones, but they are frequent enough to deserve our attention. I propose 
2 Coleridge had written, “Schools of real philosophy there are but two,––best named by the 
archphilosopher of each, namely, Plato and Aristotle. Every man capable of philosophy at all 
(and there are not many such) is a born Platonist or a born Aristotelian” (33).
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to examine the influence of Longinus on Frye and to speculate on whether or 
not in his both/and world, where Aristotle complements Longinus and vice versa, 
he finally privileges one over the other. In studying the influence of Longinus on 
Frye we have the class notes for his 1954 course in Literary Criticism, recorded 
by his student Margaret (née Kell) Virany,3 a course in which he taught the major 
Classical critics: Plato, Aristotle, Horace, Longinus, and Quintilian. 
The Sublime
Some uncertainty surrounds the translation of Peri hypsous as “On the Sublime.” 
Most agree that it conveys the sense of height or elevation.  The first English trans-
lation by John Hall in the seventeenth century was entitled Of the Height of Elo-
quence. Even the etymology of “sublime,” which comes from the Latin sublīmis, 
is uncertain. The OED speculates that sublimis probably derives from sub ‘up to’ 
plus + līmen  ‘lintel’.  G. M. A. Grube says that the “English translators and editors 
seem to be agreed that sublime is an unsatisfactory translation… but they continue 
to use it; few of them given any clear idea of what Longinus is writing about” (355). 
One of the implicit meanings of hypsous is that of movement or process.  Emma 
Gilby maintains that “Longinus gives us to understand that ‘hypsos’ is best defined 
as a movement, and not just a movement upward (as one might expect from a term 
often translated as ‘height’) but also horizontally toward others” (23).
Etymology and the uncertainties of translation aside, Longinus is relatively clear 
about what he means by hypsous. In his opening paragraph he says to his corre-
spondent Terentianus that the first requirement of a systematic treatise is “a state-
ment of the subject,” and he proceeds to provide just that in his opening chapter. 
Elder Olson is clearly correct in calling our attention to two contexts for the defini-
tion. One is that the ends and means of the sublime are contrasted with those of 
rhetoric; the other is that the definition is presented within the framework of the 
familiar triad of audience, author, and work.4
3 In 1994 Virany sent me her class notes for this and six other courses she had with Frye.  She was 
assisted in her notetaking, written neatly and thoroughly, by her training in Pitman shorthand, 
the keys to which she generously provided.  
4 Olson’s essay is an analytically powerful examination of the argument of On the Sublime.  On 
the Longinian influence on Frye, see Cotrupi and Veggian. 
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From the perspective of the author, sublimity is that which has constituted the 
greatest poets; it is what has given them their high place, their fame.  “[S]ublimity 
is a certain distinction and excellence in expression, and that it is from no other 
source than this that the greatest poets and writers have derived their eminence 
and gained an immortality of renown” (1.3).5
From the perspective of the audience, the “effect of elevated language upon an 
audience is not persuasion but transport [ekstasis]” (1.4). Ecstasy is stronger than 
persuasion because the audience can resist persuasion, but it can’t resist transport. 
The Greek stem for ekstasis means a being put out of its place, and in late Greek it 
acquired the additional meaning, according to the OED, of “withdrawal of the soul 
from the body, mystic or prophetic trance”.
From the perspective of the work, the excellencies of rhetoric are contextual: 
they emerge from the whole and are temporal.  The excellencies of ekstasis emerge 
from the part and are instantaneous: “Sublimity flashing forth at the right moment 
scatters everything before it like a thunderbolt” (1.4).6
Thus, to summarize in a chart:
Author Work Audience
Art of rhetoric rhetorician whole persuasion
Art of the sublime greatest poets & writers part transport
Longinus is a qualitative critic. Whereas Aristotle is interested in artistic wholes 
and the way the parts go to make up those wholes, Longinus is interested only 
in a particular literary quality, sublimity, which can be found in any number of 
genres, including non-literary ones. There are parallels in contemporary criti-
cism: Cleanth Brooks’s concern, for example, with the qualities of irony and 
paradox or Mikhail Bakhtin’s with the dialogical and carnivalesque—qualities 
they discover in a variety of literary forms. 
Class Notes on Longinus from Frye’s Course in Literary Criticism
Margaret Virany’s class notes for Frye’s lecture on Longinus, which are repro-
duced in the appendix, are mostly a rather matteroffact summary of the topics 
Longinus addresses. Frye does remark that Longinus “gets to the heart of great 
writing”, says (in regard to chapter 2) that Longinus is non-committal about 
5 References to On the Sublime are to chapter and paragraph number.
6 Longinus uses the lightning and thunder metaphor on two other occasions: 12.4 and 34.4.
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whether the sublime can be taught, notes in regard to Longinus’ section on 
periphrasis that Molière satirized circumlocution, comments regarding diction 
that “beautiful words are the light of thought (not realized in England until 
Coleridge) / ——cf. stainedglass window and light / ——words and thought 
must be correlated.” He also says that Longinus was the first to point out that 
judicial literary criticism is difficult and can come only after long experience, and 
he points out that the passages Longinus cites are similar to Matthew Arnold’s 
“touchstones.” Finally, he notes that Longinus’ requisites for sublimity—“words, 
thought, conception, imagination, feeling”—make for a “rare combination.” 
“Otherwise, assuming that Virany’s notes are an accurate record, Frye seems 
content simply to mention, with very little commentary, some of the topics that 
Longinus treats. What follows is an outline of the topics Longinus does cover. 




  [missing text]
*3–5  Instances of False Sublimity: Tumidity, Puerility, “Parenthyrsus”
6–7 Definition of Sublimity
8 Sources of True Sublimity
 A. Sources that are innate: common to all art; independent of words
   * 1.  Great Thoughts, Conceptions      
  * 2.  Strong Passion, Feeling 
 B. Sources that are acquired             
 3. Proper Handling of Figures
   (words in connection with thought)
 4. Noble Diction
   (words in connection with one another) 
 5. Elevated Composition
   (words by themselves)
First Source: Thoughts (9–15)
*9 First mode for achieving sublimity: nurturing the soul to great conceptions 
requires the contemplation of great objects: gods, heroes, majesty of nature, etc. 
[missing text between 9.4 and 9.5] 
10 Second mode: selection and integration of characteristics upon which 
a great subject’s sublimity depends
*11 Third mode: Amplification or Magnification
Frye and Longinus
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12 (Third mode, continued)
 [missing text between 12.2 and 12.3]
*13–14 Fourth mode: Imitation of Great Writers
15 Fifth Mode: Invention or Imagination
[Second source: Strong Passion, Feeling. Missing section]
*Third source: Proper handling of figures (16–29)
16–17 Figures of thought: Adjuration (*apostrophe, oath, etc.)
18 Figures of thought: Questions
 [missing section after 18.2]
19–29 Figures of Feeling
19  Asyndeton (omission of conjunction)
20–21 Anaphora (repetitions) and diatyposis (vivid descriptions)
22 Hyperbaton (inversions)
23 Polypota (accumulations, variations, climaxes)
24 Plural to Singular
25 Past to Present
26 Transposition of Persons
27 Change in Narrative Point of View
*28–29  Periphrasis (circumlocution)
*Fourth Source: Choice of Words (30–38)
30 Introduction to Diction
 [missing text after 30.2 and before 31]
*31 Use of Common Language
*32 Metaphors
33–36 Digression on Genius (though not without fault) vs. the Commonplace
37 Similes
 [missing text in 37 and beginning of 38]
38 Hyperbole                  
Fifth Source: Elevated Composition (39–43)
 *39 Rhythm
*40 Shape of Sentence
*41–43 Features Antithetical to Sublimity: rhythmic affectation, “cut up” style, 
excessive concision, trivial expression
*Reasons for the decay of great literature (44)
The Aristotelian and Longinian Dialectic
Robert D. Denham
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If we assume that Margaret Virany gives a fairly complete account of Frye’s lec-
ture on Longinus, there is little evidence to suggest from his rather unexceptional 
summary of topics that Longinus would come to represent for him one of the 
two central approaches to literary criticism, first articulated in “Towards Defining 
an Age of Sensibility”, a paper he presented in 1955, only a year after he gave his 
literary criticism lectures. Frye’s thesis is that Aristotle and Longinus represent 
complementary approaches to literature. He returns to this proposition at the end 
of his theory of modes in the passage quoted above from Anatomy of Criticism 
(CW 22: 62–3), written about the same time, and then again in The WellTempered 
Critic, lectures delivered in 1961. From these three sources we can abstract the key 
elements in the opposition Frye sets up between Aristotle and Longinus. These are 
summarized in Figure 1. Except for what Frye says in his lecture about true sub-
limity involving a meeting between or a union of the poet and the reader, there is 
nothing in the class lecture that anticipates this broad critical dialectic.
We should note that the Longinian context for the sublime is different from the 
eighteenthcentury one in which the sublime, distinguished from the beautiful, is 
identified by Shaftesbury, Dennis, Burke, Kant, and others with the picturesque in 
nature. This is the context in which Frye discusses Blake’s view of the sublime, 
especially in reference to Burke, in Fearful Symmetry.  The rhetorical context for 
the Longinian sublime emphasizes the effect of the qualities found not in nature 
but in thought and language.7
Figure 1. Complementary Approaches to Literature
ARISTOTELIAN (POEMA) LONGINIAN (POIESIS)
VIEW OF 
LITERATURE
Aesthetic: literature as prod-
uct (“hieratic”)
Creative, psychological: litera-
ture as process (“demotic”)
NATURE OF Techne or artistic artefact; poem as product; imitation
Poem as process; expression; 




SPECTATOR Detached from work of art and from author
Identification of reader, poem, 
and poet; individualized 
response, based on participa-
tion
7 On this distinction, see CW 17: 110–11.
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CHIEF INEREST Fictional forms (more useful for plays)




Of objective order; 
natura naturata
Of organism, genesis, and 
elevation; natura naturans
NATURE OF TEXT Text as single form; unified story
Text as sequence of epiphanies; 
series of ecstatic moments or 
points of expanding compre-
hension
EMPHASIS Classical Romantic
POETIC IMAGERY Images or order and purpose Images of mystery and vagueness
As already said, Frye is a dialectical thinker, frequently seeking to unify the many 
oppositions contained in his criticism as a matter of course. In his late work this 
is often achieved through the method of the great synthesizer, Hegel, who takes 
the contraries to another level through a process he calls Aufhebung. Frye almost 
always resists the Kierkegaardian either/or solution. But unity is not achieved at the 
expense of variety, and in his notebooks he never tires of insisting that opposites 
are never resolved by reconciliation, harmony, or agreement.  Such terms relate to 
propositional language and are forms of what he calls “imperialistic compulsion” 
(CW 6: 653). In one of his notebooks from the mid-1960s Frye writes: “I have always 
distrusted what I call Reuben the Reconciler in thought: the syncretism that ‘rec-
onciles’ Plato & Aristotle or St. Thomas & Marx.  I think every great structure of 
thought or imagination is a universe in itself, identical with and interpenetrating 
every other, but not similar or harmonizable with any other” (CW 9: 39). At about 
the same time Frye wrote in his “Letter to the English Institute, “I wish we could 
throw away the notion of ‘reconciling,’ and use instead some such conception as 
‘interpenetration’. Literature itself is not a field of conflicting arguments but of 
interpenetrating visions” (CW 27: 216). Earlier—in the Anatomy—Frye had taken a 
different position regarding reconciliation. The Bible, he writes, may “be examined 
from an aesthetic or Aristotelian point of view as a single form, as a story in which 
pity and terror, which in this context are the knowledge of good and evil, are raised 
and cast out. Or it may be examined from a Longinian point of view as a series of 
ecstatic moments or points of expanding apprehension—this approach is in fact 
the assumption on which every selection of a text for a sermon is based. Here we 
have a critical principle which we can take back to literature and apply to anything 
we like, a principle in which the ‘holism’, as it has been called, of Coleridge and the 
discontinuous theories of Poe, Hulme, and Pound are reconciled” (CW 22: 305). 
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Complementarity, Ekstasis, and the Kerygmatic
To reconcile means to restore to a unity, or to make things compatible or agreeable 
with each other. After the Anatomy did Frye change his mind about the possibil-
ity of reconciling the holistic approach of Aristotle with the discontinuous one of 
Longinus? It is difficult to see how the two ways of seeing a text—as an organic 
whole or as a series of ecstatic moments—can be brought together as a single “criti-
cal principle.” Frye does say in an endnote in the Anatomy that the “conception 
of Aristotelian aesthetic catharsis and Longinian psychological ecstasis... [are] 
complementary to one another” (CW 22: 411), complementarity suggesting that 
what is missing in one approach is supplied by the other. Whatever the reason for 
Frye’s both affirming and denying the principle of reconciliation, it is clear that 
as he moved beyond the Anatomy, interpenetration did become an increasingly 
important principle for him. He uses interpenetration to define a kind of experi-
ence, a way of understanding, a process of enlightenment, a religious final cause, 
and a visionary perception. Around the word “interpenetration” cluster a host of 
additional verbal formulas that help to define it, and it is a function of the Hegelian 
Aufhebung, too.
“Complement” comes from the Latin meaning to fill up or complete. Two years 
after the Anatomy was published, Frye defined a “complete” theory of criticism in 
these terms: 
There are traditionally two main centres of emphasis in the theory of criticism, some-
times described by the words poesis and poema. The former, or Longinian, centre is 
primarily an interest in the psychological process of poetry, and in the rhetorical re-
lation (often arrived at by indirection) set up between poet and reader. The latter, or 
Aristotelian, centre is primarily an interest in the aesthetic product, and is based on a 
specific aesthetic judgment, detached by catharsis from moral anxieties and emotional 
perturbations. Any complete theory of criticism needs both, but in a complete theory 
the aesthetic judgment takes precedence, for the Longinian interest is in enthusiasm, 
or what  ‘carries us away’, in other words in what uncritical feelings we may trust to 
afterwards.  (CW 21: 277)
We encounter here Frye’s privileging, in the 1950s, the Aristotelian over the Longin-
ian approach: the aesthetic view takes precedence over the enthusiasm of ecstasis, 
as the feelings generated when we are transported are not subject to critical scru-
tiny. But as Frye continued to reflect on the complementary critical approaches, 
he leaned more and more in the Longinian direction. In one of his late notebooks, 
he has this reprimand to himself for not including Longinus in his account of the 
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oracular, kerygmatic mode of language: “Longinus, you idiot. Why did you leave 
him out of chapter four? Most of him is the fragmentary, oracular, individualized, 
that’s-for-me kerygma” (CW 5: 343). Frye is referring to chapter 4 of Words with 
Power. In chapter 2 and 3 he has been exploring the relation between the rhetorical 
and the poetic. He then turned to the relation between the poetic and kerygmatic, 
mending his omission by saying this about Longinus:
[W]e need the guidance of a critic who understands what we have called the ecstatic 
state of response, and the difference, or contrast, between the ideological rhetoric that 
persuades and the proclamation that takes one out of oneself. The best of such critics is 
the first- or second-century writer whom we know only as Longinus. The title of Longi-
nus’ treatise, Peri Hypsous, is usually translated On the Sublime, which refers to an 
eighteenth-century adaptation of his ideas.  The most effective part of On the Sublime 
deals with brief passages—‘touchstones’, as Matthew Arnold would call them—which 
stand out from their context.  This we may call the oracular or discontinuous prophetic, 
the passage in the text where we suddenly break through into a different dimension of 
response. Longinus’ examples come from Greek literature, but one—he was probably a 
Jew or a Christian—is the ‘Let there be light’ verse from Genesis. (CW 26: 106)8
The “proclamation that takes one out of oneself” is what Frye calls kerygma, a 
term he introduced in The Great Code, meaning the rhetoric of proclamation. 
But in Words with Power he expands the meaning of kerygma far beyond what 
it had meant in The Great Code. It now becomes synonymous with the pro-
phetic utterance, the metaliterary perception that extends one’s vision, and the 
Longinian ecstatic response to any text, sacred or secular, that “revolutionizes our 
consciousness”.9  Kerygma takes metaphorical identification “a step further and 
says: ‘you are what you identify with’” (CW 26: 110). We enter the kerygmatic realm 
when the separation of “active speech and reception of speech” merges into unity 
(CW 26: 111).
Frye’s late work often focuses on ecstatic states and the revolutionizing and 
expanding of consciousness that results from the experience of ecstasis.  Kerygma 
moves beyond the poetic, embracing the reader’s existential experience.  The high-
est states of this experience are a function of what Frye calls existential or, follow-
ing Heidegger, ecstatic metaphor.  In one of his Words with Power notebooks Frye 
writes: “Metaphor is the attempt to open up a channel or current of energy between 
8 The passage from Genesis is quoted by Longinus in 9.9.
9 For these expansions of kerygma, see CW 26: 105–8.  For a more detailed discussion of Frye’s 
use of “kerygma,” see Denham, 65–9. 
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subject and object.  It begins in ecstatic metaphor (Stone Age painting and ‘primi-
tive’ music), and literature develops in proportion as the sense of a split between 
subject and object becomes habitual.  The link with religion is there because met-
aphor creates a ‘Thou’ world between the ‘I’ and the ‘it,’ and the god is the stabilized 
metaphor” (CW 6: 537).  In Words with Power, Frye proposes three levels of met-
aphorical experience: the imaginative, the erotic, and the existential or ecstatic.  As 
we move up the ladder of metaphorical experience, the difference between identity 
and difference continues to lessen until we arrive at the highest level, an ecstatic 
state in which, Frye says, “there is a sense of presence, a sense of uniting ourselves 
with something else” (CW 26: 85).  Such a state is Longinian ekstasis or transport—
a being put out of its place.  “In the ecstatic state,” Frye writes, “there is a sense of 
presence, a sense uniting ourselves with something else” (ibid.)
Moments of intense consciousness for Frye move us beyond time and space 
into a world of pure identity that is an altogether different order of experience:
Continued study of literature and the arts brings us into an entirely new world, where 
creation and revelation have different meanings, where the experience of time and 
space is different. As its outlines take shape, our standards of reality and illusion get 
reversed.  It is the illusions of literature that begin to seem real, and ordinary life, 
pervaded as it is with all the phony and lying myths that surround us, begins to look 
like the real hallucination, a parody of the genuine imaginative world.  The glimpses 
that I have had of the imaginative world have kept me fascinated for nearly half a 
century. (CW 7: 567)
If we step back from the total body of Frye’s work, we can see how the Aristotelian 
and Longinian complementary approaches play out in his own career.  The first 
phase, in which the Anatomy looms large, is schematic, analytical, systematic, and, 
like the first chapters of the Poetics, given to taxonomy.  The Anatomy appropriates 
and redefines, as indicated above, a host of Aristotle’s central terms.  Its focus is on 
the conventions of the aesthetic product as an object.  But, once Frye turned his 
attention to the Bible, Longinian ekstasis became the focus of his attention.  Frye 
himself notes the change in emphasis:
[M]any of the most intense forms of human experience take some form of ecstatic meta-
phor.  The hypothetical nature of literature, its ironic separation from all statements of 
assertion, was as far as I got in my Anatomy of Criticism, published nearly thirty years 
ago. The literary imagination seemed to me then, as in large part it does now, to be pri-
marily a kind of modelthinking, an infinite set of possibilities of experience to expand 
and intensify our actual experience.  But the Anatomy had led me to the scripture or 
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sacred book as the furthest boundary to be explored in the imaginative direction, and I 
then became increasingly fascinated with the Bible, as a book dominated by metaphor 
throughout, and yet quite obviously not content with an ironic removal from experience 
or assertion.  Clearly one had to look at other aspects of the question, and reconsider the 
cultural context of metaphor, as something that not only once had but may still have its 
roots in ecstatic experience. (CW 18: 348–9)
In his late work Frye repeatedly explores those moments of intense conscious-
ness that move us beyond time and space into the mythical world of pure iden-
tity.  The key issue here is the experience of myth and metaphor.  It is possible, 
Frye feels, to recapture the intensity of perception that was available to people 
in what Vico called the age of the gods.  These are what he calls “moments of 
ecstatic union,” or what we refer to as peak experiences—epiphanic moments 
that take us away from ordinary waking consciousness.  Here are two typical 
accounts of such experience:
The poem or painting is in some respects a “hallucination”: it is summoned up out of 
the artist’s mind and imposed on us, and is allied to delirium tremens or pretending 
that one is Napoleon.  Blake would say that such creative hallucinations are spiritual 
visions, and that what they present is more detailed, more vivid, and more accurate 
than anything that normal eyesight affords.  In other respects a work of art is like a 
dream, but it does not introduce us to the ordinary dream world, where we retreat 
from reality into our withdrawn selves.  It takes us into the world of social vision that 
informs our waking life, where we see that most of what we call “reality” is the rubbish 
of leftover human constructs.  It speaks with authority, but not the familiar authority 
of parental or social conditioning: there will always be, I expect, some mystery about 
the real source of its authority. (CW 7: 566–7)
Moments of ecstatic union... may come and go, like flashes of lightning, but some mo-
ments are... the frozen or simultaneously grasped aspects of a mythos or continuous 
narrative.  Within the limitations of human life, the most highly developed human types 
are those whose lives have become, as we say, a legend, that is lives no longer contemplat-
ing a vision of objective revelation or imprisoned within a subjective dream.  The New 
Testament presents the ultimate human life as a divine and human Logos, but the Logos 
has transcended its relation to logic and has expanded into mythos, a life which is, so 
to speak, a kind of self-narration, where action and awareness of action are no longer 
clashing with each other. (CW 18: 325)
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Such ecstatic moments transport one into a purely symbolic world that is given 
to recording “portents or auguries of what life could be.”  “It is worth any amount 
of commonplace life,” Frye says, “to purchase one of them” (CW 18: 336).  He 
remarks that we try to capture the intensity of experience involved in the iden-
tification of metaphor with such words as “magical” and “religious” (CW 18: 
294).  These moments of intense perception are what Blake calls seeing with a 
twofold vision.  When such perception takes place, Frye says, “the whole world 
is humanized” (CW 4: 183).  Or again: 
Metaphor, as a bridge between consciousness and nature, is in fact a microcosm of 
language itself.  It is precisely the function of language to overcome what Blake calls 
the “cloven fiction” of a subject contemplating an object.... Language from this point 
of view becomes a single gigantic metaphor, the uniting of consciousness with what 
it is conscious of.  This union is Ovid’s metamorphosis in reverse, the transfigur-
ing of consciousness as it merges with articulated meaning.  In a more specifically 
religious area this third order would become Martin Buber’s world of “Thou”, which 
comes between the consciousness that is merely an “I” and a nature that is merely an 
“it” (CW 18: 349)
Transport in Frye’s Late Writings
Longinian ekstasis has a central role to play in what Frye refers to variously 
as the transfiguring, the intensifying, the revolutionizing, or the expanding of 
consciousness.  Beginning in the late 1950s he devoted a great deal of energy to 
designing a framework for the development of the stages of religious conscious-
ness.  He referred to these stages as the three awarenesses.  He even contem-
plated writing a book about the topic, and he speculates about a somewhat mys-
terious fourth awareness.10  Awareness as a category, however, tends to disappear 
from Frye’s vocabulary in the 1980s.  The fourth awareness of the notebooks is 
transformed into speculations about higher levels of consciousness.  For Frye 
one of the central archetypal scenes of the intensity of consciousness that arises 
from the desire to identify is found in the Paleolithic cave drawings, references 
to which appear on more than thirty occasions in his work. The cave drawings 
represent “the titanic will to identify” (CW 18: 346).
When one considers the skill and precision of these works, and the almost impossible 
10  On the three awarenesses, see Denham, 76–9, 276–81.
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difficulties of positioning and lighting surrounding their creation, we begin to grasp 
something of the intensity behind them to unite human consciousness with its own 
perceptions, an intensity we can hardly imagine now.  Magical motives, such as main-
taining a supply of game animals by picturing them on the cave walls, seem utterly 
inadequate: for one thing, many of the figures are evidently human beings in animal 
skins.  In any case such caves are the wombs of creation, where conscious distinctions 
have no relevance and only pure identity is left. (CW 26: 215–16)
The cave drawings at Lascaux, Altamira, and elsewhere are an example of what 
Lévy-Bruhl called participation mystique, the imaginative identification with 
things, including other people, outside the self, or an absorption of one’s conscious-
ness with the natural world into an undifferentiated state of archaic identity.11  In 
such a process of metaphorical identification the subject and object merge into one, 
but the sense of identity is existential rather than verbal (CW 6: 503).
But what does the intensity or expansion of consciousness entail for Frye? 
Answering this is something of a challenge, for Frye reflects on the implications 
of the phrase only obliquely. But let us take the clues Frye does provide and see 
how they align with the Longinian perspective.
1. Expanded consciousness is a function of kerygma.  Ordinary rhetoric “seldom 
comes near the primary concern of ‘How do I live a more abundant life?’  This 
latter on the other hand is the central theme of all genuine kerygmatic, wheth-
er we find it in the Sermon on the Mount, the Deer Park Sermon of Buddha, 
the Koran, or in a secular book that revolutionizes our consciousness.  In 
poetry anything can be juxtaposed, or implicitly identified with, anything 
else.  Kerygma takes this a step further and says: ‘you are what you identify 
with.’  We are close to the kerygmatic whenever we meet the statement, as we 
do surprisingly often in contemporary writing, that it seems to be language 
that uses man rather than man that uses language” (CW 26: 110).  This is a 
principle that Longinus affirms in his account of the excellencies of Demos-
thenes, “allied to the highest sublimity and perfected to the utmost.”  His 
“mighty gifts,” which were “absorbed bodily within himself,... we may deem 
heaven sent (for it would not be right to term them human)” (34.4).
2. Expanded consciousness does not necessarily signify religion or a religious 
experience, but it can be “the precondition for any ecumenical or everlasting-
11 On participation mystique see CW 22: 276; CW 5: 16; CW 6: 503; and CW 18: 347.  There is no 
evidence that Frye had read Lévy-Bruhl. His source for participation mystique was doubtless 
Jung, a considerable portion of whose work Frye knew well.
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gospel religion” (CW 5: 17).  Moreover, the raising of consciousness is revela-
tion (see CW 5: 61). Longinus does not speak directly about religion, though 
he does say that the true sublime uplifts the soul (7.2) and elevates the spirit 
(33.4), and that sublimity raises human beings “near the majesty of God” and 
so “transcends the human” (36.1, 3).
3. Whatever the techniques used to expand consciousness (e.g., yoga, Zen, psy-
chosynthesis, meditation, drugs), or whatever forms it takes (e.g., dreams, 
fantasies, the “peak experiences” described by Abraham Maslow, ecstatic 
music), the language of such consciousness always turns out to be metaphor-
ical.  Thus literature is the guide to higher consciousness, just as Virgil was 
Dante’s guide to the expanded vision represented by Beatrice (CW 6: 717; CW 
26: 40–1).  Still, Frye believes that language is the primary means of “inten-
sifying consciousness, lifting us into a new dimension of being altogether” 
(CW 6: 717).  For Longinus, language is also one of the keys to the sublime—
the third source for the poet who wants his work to transport the reader—and 
he devotes chapter 32 to metaphor.  After an extensive catalogue of metaphors 
in Plato, he concludes that “figurative language contains great natural power, 
and that metaphors contribute to the sublime” (32.6).
4. Vision is the word that best fits the heightened awareness that comes with the 
imagination’s opening of the doors of perception.  What the subject sees may 
be “only an elusive and vanishing glimpse.  Glimpse of what?  To try to answer 
this question is to remove it to a different category of experience.  If we knew 
what it was, it would be an object perceived in time and space.  And it is not 
an object, but something uniting the objective with ourselves” (CW 26: 83). 
The “kerygmatic breakthrough,” Frye writes, “always contains some sense of 
‘time has stopped.’ The sequential movement has become a focus, or fireplace. 
In intensified consciousness the minute particular shines by its own light (or 
burns in its own life-fire)” (CW 5: 290).
Again, ekstasis means a being put out of its place, which Longinus eloquently 
captures in this passage:
Nature has appointed us men to be no base nor ignoble animals; but when she ush-
ers us into life and into the vast universe as into some great assembly, to be as it 
were spectators of the mighty whole and the keenest aspirants for honour, forthwith 
she implants in our souls the unconquerable love of whatever is elevated and more 
divine than we.  Wherefore not even the entire universe suffices for the thought and 
contemplation within the reach of the human mind, but our imaginations often pass 
beyond the bounds of space, and if we survey our life on every side and see how much 
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more it everywhere abounds in what is striking, and great, and beautiful, we shall 
soon discern the purpose of our birth. (35.2–3)    
5. The principle behind the epiphanic experience that permits things to be seen 
with a special luminousness is that “things are not fully seen until they become 
hallucinatory.  Not actual hallucinations, because those would merely substi-
tute subjective for objective visions, but objective things transfigured by iden-
tification with the perceiver.  An object impregnated, so to speak, by a per-
ceiver is transformed into a presence” (CW 26: 87).  This is analogous to 
Longinus’ view that the sublime casts a spell over us (1.4).
6. Intense consciousness does not sever one from the body or the physical roots 
of experience. “The word spiritual in English,” Frye writes:
may have a rather hollow and booming sound to some: it is often detached from the 
spiritual body and made to mean an empty shadow of the material, as with churches 
who offer us spiritual food that we cannot eat and spiritual riches that we cannot spend. 
Here spirit is being confused with soul, which traditionally fights with and contradicts 
the body, instead of extending bodily experience into another dimension.  The Song of 
Songs... is a spiritual song of love: it expresses erotic feeling on all levels of conscious-
ness, but does not run away from its physical basis or cut off its physical roots.  We have 
to think of such phrases as “a spirited performance” to realize that spirit can refer to 
ordinary consciousness at its most intense: the gaya scienza, or mental life as play.... 
Similar overtones are in the words esprit and Geist. (CW 26: 119)
Or again, St. John of the Cross makes “a modulation from existential sex metaphor 
(M2) to existential expanding of consciousness metaphor (M1)” (CW 5: 120).  As 
in Aufhebung, things lifted to another level do not cancel their connection to the 
previous level: “M2” is still present at the higher level.  Chapter 6 (“The Garden”) 
of Words with Power “is concerned partly, if not mainly, with getting over the 
either–or antithesis between the spiritual and the physical, Agape love and Eros 
love” (CW 6: 451).  Still again, “spiritual love expands from the erotic and does not 
run away from it” (CW 26: 195).
The best account in Longinus of the uniting of soul and body is his analysis 
of Sappho’s “Peer of Gods” lyric: “Are you not amazed how at one instant she 
summons, as though they were all alien from herself and dispersed, soul, body, 
ears, tongue, eyes, colour?  Uniting contradictions, she is, at one and the same 
time, hot and cold, in her senses and out of her mind, for she is either terrified 
or at the point of death.  The effect desired is that not one passion only should 
be seen in her, but a concourse of the passions” (10.3).
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7. Intensified consciousness is represented by images of both ascent and descent: 
“[I]mages of ascent are connected with the intensifying of consciousness, and 
images of descent with the reinforcing of it by other forms of awareness, such as 
fantasy or dream. The most common images of ascent are ladders, mountains, 
towers, and trees; of descent, caves or dives into water” (CW 26: 138).  These 
images, which arrange themselves along the axis mundi, are revealed with excep-
tional insight in some of Frye’s most powerfully perceptive writing—the last four 
chapters of Words with Power.  In these concentrated chapters Frye illustrates 
how four central archetypes connect the ordinary world to the world of higher 
consciousness: the mountain and the cave emphasizing wisdom and the word, 
and the garden and the furnace emphasizing love and the spirit.
 Longinus focuses on elevation, though he does remark on the sublimity of Ajax’s 
silence in the underworld (9.2), and he notes that we admire the imagery of both 
the “celestial fires” and the “subterranean fire” of the craters of Etna (35.4).
The notion of expanded consciousness, which appears everywhere in Frye’s late 
work, is related to many things other than Longinian ekstasis.  It is linked to the 
thesis of his final book, The Double Vision, to Patanjali’s yoga, to the German mys-
tics (especially Eckhart and Boehme), and to other forms of the visionary and keryg-
matic breakthrough that was the goal of Frye’s quest.  But of the two approaches 
to criticism—the Aristotelian and the Longinian—Frye ends up decidedly in the 
Longinian camp.  This does not gainsay the insights of the Anatomy, which contin-
ues to have widespread interest and application.  But the Longinian thrust of The 
Great Code, Words with Power, The Double Vision, Myth and Metaphor, and the 
three volumes of his notebooks on the Bible suggest that Frye did not try to resolve 
the Aristotle–Longinus antithesis with still another of his many applications of the 
Hegelian Aufhebung.  The two approaches remain complementary, but the final 
accent of Frye’s own allegiance is to Longinus.
Appendix
Margaret (née Kell) Virany’s Class Notes on Longinus from Frye’s 1954 
Course in Literary Criticism
Dec. 10.
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—“Sublime”—this really means anything that can raise anything up
—written to Terentianus—to correct a lost work of Sicilius
—1–6 and 41–43—false sublimity
—7—grandeur of conception
 —vehement, deep feeling





—he gets at the heart of great writing
Purpose of sublimity
—Not persuasion but transport.  Appeal of writing is immediate, not reasoned 
out
—can it be used for teaching  ?
 —noncommittal
 —need for some teaching
—missing section
Defects of Style
 —puerility—learned trifling, insipid
 —parenthyrsus—uncalled for display of emotion
  —more in speaking than writing
 —comes from a craze for novelty
Needed for the Sublime
 —lofty thought and lofty words
 —submission to great predecessors
Figures of Speech
 —amplification
 —rhetorical treatment of the commonplace
 —images—writer has clear picture and gives it to readers
 —no arbitrary devices
 —artificial ring in figures—harmful
  e.g., from Demosthenes and others
 —apostrophe—emotional appeal
Periphrasis
—round about way of saying things
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 e.g., death = destined path
 —warned that it could fall flat
 —Molière satirized this.  Popular in the eighteenth century
Diction
—lost section
*beautiful words are the light of thought (not realized in England until Coleridge)
 —cf. stainedglass window and light
 —words and thought must be correlated
 —twenty metaphors could be good in a passage.  One could spoil it; i.e., 
the number doesn’t matter
Rhythm
—can be too pronounced
Literary Criticism
—difficult.  First to point this out
“crowning fruit of long experience”—Can person get it by study?  Thinking of 
criticism as judicial rather than historical.  Fewer critics than creative artists.
False sublimity
—the true lifts up
 —two minds meet—creator and reader
 —immediate response of the reader
 —what appeals to all men at all places and times.  Universal appeal
 “Men” = men of literary taste
 —test—wanted to read it again
 —suggestive powers
 —test—lasting comparison with the recognized great
  —e.g., Matthew Arnold’s “touchstones”
Sublimity—words, thought, conception, imagination, feeling
 —a rare combination
—prefers Iliad to Odyssey
 —typical Greek fear of so much fantasy in the Odyssey
Faultlessness
 —greatness not to be confused with accuracy.  The former appeals while 
the latter never can.  A touch of genius can overcome defects.  “Faultless medi-
ocrity” versus “genuine greatness.”  Perfection annoys us in life or literature. 
Great poet (1) ability—feel and experience (2) ability to communicate feeling (3) 
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METAFORA ÉS IDENTITÁS:  
NORTHROP FRYE IDŐSZERŰSÉGE
[…] a szavak nemcsak egy dolgot azonosítanak 
egy másikkal, hanem mindkettőt 
valami olyasmivel, ami belőlünk származik 
[…] 
Northrop Frye
Tapasztalat és tudás között
Az identitás kérdése az irodalomban sokféle megközelítést tesz lehetővé, kulturá-
lis, szociális, pszichológiai, nemi vagy egyéb nézőpont érvényesítésétől függően. 
Tekintettel arra, hogy az irodalom közege a nyelv, nagyon produktív elképzelések 
fogalmazódtak meg a szöveg létmódjára épülő identitásmódok vizsgálatában. 
Elsősorban a dialogikus és a narratív azonosság képletei nyertek meggyőző kidol-
gozást, különösen Mihail Bahtyin és Paul Ricœur jóvoltából. A magam részéről 
külön értekezést szenteltem egy olyan megoldás kidolgozásának, melynek közép-
pontjába a diszkurzus szubjektuma került (Kovács 2004). A könyv integrálni 
igyekszik mind Bahtyin, mind Ricœur eredményeit, tehát a cselekvés és a dialó-
gus, illetve a cselekvés és az elbeszélés kölcsönhatásának leírásait. Mindkét eset-
ben más-más metaforafogalom kidolgozására került sor az említett kutatóknál. 
Magam az „intonációs metaforát” (Bahtyin) és az „élő metaforát” (Ricœur), azaz 
a jelképző és a jelentésképző alakzatokat vettem figyelembe, amikor a diszkurzív 
metafora kidolgozására vállalkoztam. Ez a megközelítés megkövetelte, hogy a 
szemantikai újításokat ne csak a tonális artikuláció, illetve a szemantikai feszül-
tség szintjén elemezzem, hanem előírta azt is, hogy a diszkurzusként felfogott 
szöveg műfaji sajátosságait is bevonjam az identitás kérdéskörébe. Ennek a prob-
lémának szenteltem a perszonális elbeszélésről szóló könyvemet (Kovács 1994), 
melyben a személyes alanyiság a „saját nyelv”, a műfajalkotó írásmű eredmé-
nyeként fogalmazódik meg. Említett kutatásaim során bebizonyosodott, hogy 
minden szemantikai újítás a poétikai szövegben műfaji innovációt is maga után 
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von. Csak ennek eredményeként jöhet létre a személyes beszédmódon alapuló – 
nevezzük így – participatív identitás, pontosabban: identitáskeresés.
Vizsgálódásaim közben ezen a ponton találkoztam Northrop Frye egészen 
eredeti koncepciójával. Felismerését az „egzisztenciális metafora” képződményéről 
értekezve fejtette ki Az Ige hatalma című könyvének „Azonosság és metafora” 
című fejezetében. Ebben a tanulmányban megkísérlem rekonstruálni ott előadott 
álláspontját. Továbbá szeretném bemutatni e képződmény produktivitását a drá-
mai szövegképzés természete kapcsán. Majd kitérek röviden A kritika anatómiá-
ja című könyvének vonatkozó megállapításaira is, mivel a folytonosság ténye 
megállapítható.
A kanadai irodalomteoretikus felfogása szerint az irodalmi szövegben funk-
cionáló metaforát nem tárgyalhatjuk a társas beszédben rögzített, triviális 
alkalmazások mintájára. Vagyis – a retorikai vagy kognitív megközelítést követve 
– úgy, mint két jelentő vagy fogalom esetleg alogikus összekapcsolását. A köl-
tészet területén semmiképpen sem, mivel a költői művek olyan nyelvi alkotások, 
amelyekben nyilvánvalóvá válik, hogy minden fogalom jele, minden szó már 
eleve, önmagában is figurális eljárás eredménye (szarv > szarvas; fog > fogalom). 
Továbbá azért sem, mert nem a fogalmak, hanem a szöveg szintjén található 
verbális kontextusuk, ahol feltárulhat a metafora kiterjesztésének utalásiránya, 
igazságigénye, a narratív beszédprodukciótól eltérő szemantikai potenciálja.
Tudjuk, az irodalmi szöveg a megnyilatkozások másodfokú – látható/olvasható 
– státuszát képviseli; a poiésziszt közvetítő megnyilatkozások diszkurzust alkot-
nak, ahol megjelenik a ritmus két válfaja. A ritmus szerepe az, hogy a jelölőnél 
elemibb és a mondatnál magasabb nyelvi szinteken tagolja újra a beszéd egységeit 
(mint a versben), illetve minden referenciális összefüggést destabilizáljon annak 
érdekében, hogy korreferenciális (és dialogikus) szintre emelje a szöveg jelentés-
potenciálját (mint a prózában). Éppen ennek köszönhetően az irodalmi szöveg 
„szemléletessé” – az olvasó számára érzékletessé és elsajátíthatóvá –  képes tenni 
az innovatív nyelvi képződményeket, demonstrálni tudja a szemantikai újí-
tásokat. Mégpedig azért, mert a nyelvi világlátás alakzatai megelőzik a logikai 
vagy a lexikai szemantika formáit, a közvetlen állító kijelentésekét éppúgy, mint 
a figuratív kijelentések átvitelen alapuló alakzataiét. A metaforával kapcsolatos 
fundamentális nyelvi esemény akkor következik be az irodalomban, amikor a 
jelentő-jelentett konvencionális kapcsolatát a konstitutív verbális „ősformák” 
(rím, ritmus, refrén, dallam, intonáció, invokáció, alakzat stb.) megbontják. Ezál-
tal ugyanis megakadályozzák azt, hogy a nyelv alapelemei, a szavak, illetve a 
jelölők az alany, az állítmány és a deixis funkciójába kényszerüljenek, s ezzel a 
tapasztalat közvetítését az objektum és a vele szembeállított szubjektum képzelt 
viszonyára, a reflexív tudat reprezentációira szűkítsék. Ily módon a dolog fogal-
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mi-logikai azonosítását (predikatív kijelentésbe foglalását) meg tudja előzni a 
nyelvi identifikáció. 
Kérdésünk mármost az: miféle inspirációt ad a költészet által felkínált lété-
rtelmezés megújításának az, hogy vagy a ritmuselv, vagy a soknyelvűség – és a 
következményük, a korreferenciális világtapasztalat –  rátelepszik a fogalmi 
megkülönböztetés predikatív nyelvére vagy e logikai művelet retorikai használa-
tára? Más fogalmazásban: szembesít a szemantikailag improduktív társas és 
professzionális beszédmódok hatalmi aspirációival. 
Erre az identitászavart okozó helyzetre különösen hatékony ellenszert talált 
metafora-elméleti vizsgálódásai során a jeles kanadai gondolkodó, aki a költészet 
szövegeit a személyes fölismerésre s ezen keresztül a létértelmezésre inspiráló 
aktusnak, vagyis az egzisztenciális megértés orgánumának tekintette. Ezzel 
magyarázható, hogy elméleti vizsgálódásai végső soron az arisztotelészi anag-
nóriszisz köré csoportosulnak, melynek a tragédia műfaján kívüli, általános poé-
tikai alkalmazását látja indokoltnak. Az egzisztenciális metafora végső soron a 
heurézis, az egyszeri fölismerés releváns nyelvi képződményének bizonyul.
A költészet nyelvi alkotásai azért képesek az önmegértésre irányuló felis-
merés, az eszmélet működését inspirálni, mert a szöveg metaforikus 
képződményei fel tudják függeszteni a reprezentált dolog és a reprezentáló esz-
köz között fennálló megszokott, rögzült, konvencionális kapcsolatot. A poétikai 
funkció meghatározásakor Roman Jakobson is erről értekezik a nyelvi megny-
ilatkozás önreferenciális természete kapcsán. Hiszen ez az eljárás – a jelentő és 
jelentett párhuzamosságának felfüggesztése – nemcsak a szótestet teszi kie-
melten érzékelhetővé, de az általa jelölt dolgot is újra eleven tapasztalat tárgyává, 
sőt, az újramegnevezés impulzusává változtathatja. 
Ezzel kapcsolatban indokolt a Frye által preferált Arisztotelész azon tételére 
hivatkozni, miszerint a cselekvés (praxisz) és a cselekvésből nyerhető tapasztalás 
egyszeri aktus, ami igaz a létrehozásra is.1 A primordiális tapasztalat 
eseményszerűségét – meglehet – épp ebben kell keresni. Már csak azért is, mert 
az egyszeri cselekvés egyfelől maga képezi az esemény szubsztrátumát, másfelől 
temporalitásának in actu hordozójában, annak megváltozó diszpozíciójában 
testesül meg, amelynek megjelenítéséért már nem a narratív beszédmód, hanem 
a metaforikus digresszió felelős. Frye kifejtésében a figuratív kifejezést inspiráló 
diszpozíciónak a „mood” felel meg.
Az interpretáció feladata ebből fakadóan az, hogy keresse az esemény egysz-
1 Ezt írta: „[…] a tapasztalat az egyes esetekre vonatkozó tudás, a tudomány pedig az általánosra 
vonatkozik, – a cselekvésnek és a létrehozásnak pedig mindig egyes esettel van dolga”( 2002,38). 
Mint tudjuk, a Poétika szerint is a cselekvés képezi a történet konstrukciós tényezőjét, legalább 
is a tragédiában, persze a cselekvés itt nem más, mint az utánzás műve. 
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erisége és a műalkotás szövegének egyszeri nyelvi képződményei között fennálló 
korrelációt. Az elbeszéléselméletek többsége szerint eseménynek általában az 
tekinthető, ami a narratív közvetítés következtében egy történet alkotórészévé 
válik: az elbeszélés az eseményt történetbe integrálja, amit görög elődje nyomán 
Frye müthosznak nevez. A metafora pedig a szemantikai innovációk szférájába, 
a poétikus jegyekkel felruházott szöveg szintjére emeli át. 
Arisztotelésznél a poétikai eszközökkel rekonstruált cselekvés (praxisz) 
eseményszerű; a cselekmény (pragma) itt egy tettnek más cselekedetekkel való 
összekapcsolásán (szüsztaszisz) alapul, mely megköveteli, hogy a cselekvés saját 
ellentétébe forduljon át (például: „bűn és bűnhődés”; „háború és béke”; „büszke-
ség és balítélet”; „szerelem és kolera”). Ezáltal ugyanis nemcsak egy egyszeri tett 
leképezésének bizonyul a dramatizált végrehajtás, hanem a „teljes és egész cse-
lekvés” minőségére tesz szert. Ám éppen ezért már nem pusztán egy jellem, 
hanem az „élet utánzása”2(Arisztotelész 1997, 37). A tragédia a cselekvésben az 
életvilág sejtjét, létvonatkozását, egzisztenciális alapelemét ismerteti föl.
Tegyük hozzá, hogy a „teljes és egész”, tehát egy cselekménybe ágyazott cse-
lekvés mintájához odatartozik ezen egység visszatekintő-felidéző megismétlése, 
amit a cselekvő magánbeszéde valósít meg a felismerés szóbeli képződményeként, 
egy kis elbeszélésben3. Mivel ez a rend – Arisztotelész felfogása szerint – for-
dulattal, felismeréssel és szenvedéssel jár, létrejön egy tragikus modalitású tör-
ténet alapszerkezete. Ez a történetalkotó művelet – a müthosz – avatja a színpa-
don imitált cselekvést verbális eseménnyé, de csak akkor, amikor a szereplő saját 
nyelvre tesz szert az első személyű elbeszélésben. Nos, az imitált cselekvésnek 
ez a másodfokú – nyelvi – prezentációja, azaz a színpadtéren látható cselekede-
tek verbális újrarendezése mint drámai beszédmű, már nem írható le a müthosz 
fogalmával. Ezért maga a rekonstrukciót megvalósító mimézis – az, hogy a 
színész a cselekvésével egy másik ember cselekvését adja elő a látványban és 
annak értelmezésében, a szóban –, a sorstörténetre összpontosító Arisz-
totelésznél nem számít eseménynek, amit a cselekményalkotás szintjén közelít 
meg; „a történet elemei: a fordulatok és felismerések”, amelyek affektusa akkor 
katartikus és hiteles, „ha az események a várakozás ellenére, de egymásból 
következőleg történnek”. Arisztotelész ugyanakkor megengedi „a jelek általi 
felismerés” jogosságát is, sőt „a költő által kitalált jelek” alkalmazását nem kevés-
bé (1997, 67). Nem köti ugyan össze az anagnóriszisz váratlansági követelményét 
2 
3 Lásd Oidipus fölismerés utáni monológját arról, ami vele megtörtént és ezt megelőzően már 
előadatott. A tragikus cselekvés személyes elbeszélésbe, a felismerést demonstráló önelbes-
zélésbe való kifutása történetileg a modern ön-narráció műfaji előzményének tekinthető. 
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a jelek kapcsolatának váratlanságával, mindazonáltal a metaforáról szóló 
fejtegetései a Poétikában ezt a lehetőséget nem zárják ki. Az analógián alapuló 
metafora ugyanis akkor bizonyul hatásosnak, ha a jelek kapcsolata „idegenszerű”, 
tehát akkor, ha az esemény a nyelvi jelentésújítás szintjére helyeződik át. Gon-
doljunk olyan képződményekre, mint az Oidipus király fordításában található 
babitsi neologizmus: „szörny testvér-apa”4. Vagy József Attila címadó jelzőjére: 
tószunnyadó.
A metaforikus digresszió
A görög gondolkodó művének eredeti továbbgondolója, Northrop Frye határo-
zottan felvállalja ezt a feladatot: „Kritikai gondolkodásom jórészt Arisztotelész 
anagnóriszisz fogalmának kettős értelme körül forog: »felfedezés« vagy »felis-
merés«…” (IH 21). Minden valódi tudáshoz hozzátartozik a felismerés, bárh-
ogy értelmezzük is. Frye könyve, Az Ige hatalma a nóvum helyett inkább az 
újramegjelenés mellett érvel. És a megjelenés– mint epifánia – metaforaelmé-
letének központi kategóriáját alkotja. Ezzel már megközelítettük azt a külön-
bséget, amely a mimészisz és az epifánia között áll fenn: a cselekvés utánzása 
helyett Frye a cselekvés megjelenésének módját („mood”) állítja előtérbe. S míg 
az elsőről elmondható, hogy a cselekményszövésben játszik szerepet, a másikról 
az, hogy a metaforikus digresszió szövegeiben tárul föl, mégpedig e megnyilat-
kozások késztetéseként. A cselekvés epifániája eseményként tudatosul, ha nyo-
mon követjük, amint az alany a szöveglétesülés aktusában metaforikusra váltja 
a narratív beszédmódot. Frye ebben az eseményben éri tetten az egyéni identitás 
megvalósulását, melynek szüzséje tehát a tettből kisarjadva, a megjelenés révén 
a jelenbe helyeződve, egyszeri metaforikus kijelentésben testet öltő önprezen-
ciához vezet. 
Kezdem a köznapi, a mitikus és az egzisztenciális metafora különbségével. 
A köznapi nyelvhasználat – a hasonlóság alapján – két különálló dolgot közelít 
egymáshoz: ez a szokványos „mint”-modell, amikor egy dolgot olyannak láttat 
a nyelv, mint egy másikat – valamely közös tulajdonságuk alapján. 
A mitikus azonosítás nem hasonlóságot, hanem megegyezést feltételez: az 
észlelet tárgya ugyanaz, mint aminek látszik. A dolog és reprezentációja itt nem 
válik el egymástól.
Az egzisztenciális metafora esetében a két dolgot nem a hasonlóság, nem is a 




megfelelés, hanem a radikális azonosítás kapcsolja össze: nem a mint, hanem az 
est. Ha valaki Saulus, a logikai rend szerint nem lehet Paulus. És megfordítva. 
De ismerünk egy esetet, egyetlen konkrét történetet, amelyben ez mégis így van. 
Itt nem arról van szó, hogy A olyan, mint B, hanem arról, hogy azonos vele: A 
est B.
Az egzisztenciális metafora az egyszeri esemény nyelvi formája, mely révén az 
egyszeri tapasztalat az általános tudás szintjére emelkedik, s nem ritkán a 
kultúrába is beíródik. Épp azért, mert az egyedi eset nem értelmezhető sem a 
leíró, sem a retorikai megnyilatkozások nyelvén– sem állítmánnyal, sem alakzat-
tal nem közelíthető meg –, éppen ezért releváns diszkurzusa a történetmondás, 
az elbeszélés. A történet középpontját alkotó konfiguráció Frye elképzelésében 
is fordulatra és felismerésre épül. Hangoztatja: minden valódi tudáshoz hozzátar-
tozik a felismerés, bárhogy értelmezzük is. 
Az egzisztenciális metafora azonban egy rejtett állítást is magába foglal, éspe-
dig azt, hogy a létigével összekapcsolt két dolog egy eddig nem ismert tartomány-
ba tartozik, más világra utal, amely ugyan érzékileg és intellektuálisan nem 
fogható meg, de a cselekvést kísérő diszpozícióban benne szunnyad in nuce, 
csíraformában. A világ nem annyi, amennyit átéltünk eddig és átélünk most, 
hanem az is hozzá tartozik, ami be fog következni. A jövő már mindig is 
elkezdődött, vagyis a mindenkori jelenvalóság konstituense.
Az egzisztenciális metafora azt a nyelvi lacunát tölti ki, amely azért lép fel, 
mert vonatkozási tárgya nincs adva – ugyanis a dolog, melyre irányul, a megny-
ilatkozás pillanatában éppen a keletkezés, illetve megjelenés fázisában van. Ily-
enkor a szó konstituálja – s ezzel egyúttal elővételezi – a dolgot, melyre referen-
ciája – a kibomló szövegegész utalásrendje – vonatkozik majd. Az 
egzisztenciális megnyilatkozásban a szó nem jelöli a dolgot, hanem tételezi, 
megelőlegezi megjelenését, s ezért megkívánja azt a beszédmódot, amelyben a 
cselekvésnek, a cselekvés tárgyának és nevének keletkezése egyazon történet-
mondásban bontakozik ki. Frye szerint ilyen a költészet. Nem analitikus, nem 
szintetikus ítélet, hanem thetikus kijelentés: a költő a „metafora hipotetikus 
azonosságát alkalmazza, így legalább a lehetőségét érdemes megfontolni annak, 
hogy A és B ugyanaz a személy, hiába tudjuk, hogy nem ugyanaz…” (114). Ezzel 
a bekövetkező – a költészet által referált – világgal kiegészülve válik az élet a lét 
egységévé, ahol feltárul értelme. Az egisztenciális metafora az emberi élet és a 
halál határain túl is fennálló lét nyelvének – az értelem létének – sajátosságát 
prezentálja.
Most ejtsünk szót a metafora kontextusáról.
Frye gondolkodásában a metafora nem a név vagy a mondat szintjén 
értelmezhető. Ebben a vonatkozásban eltér a szemantikai „átvitel” vagy „feszül-
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tség” fogalmaival leírható típusaitól. Lényege az, hogy az alogikus azonosítást 
kiterjeszti a szöveg – egy teljes megnyilatkozás – egészére. Ennek következtében 
a szövegben szereplő minden szó a lexikai kódjától eltérő jelentésekre tesz szert. 
Frye szellemében például „A semmi ágán ül szívem” olyan sora a metaforikus 
jelentésújításnak, melyben egyetlen szó sem felel meg szótári jelentésének. 
Hiszen csak a metaforikus kód, a beszélő alanynak a fával és a levéllel való 
egyedülálló azonosításának felismerése nyomán tudjuk értelmezni.
A következő kérdés a metafora optikai nézetének, azaz olvashatóságának 
többletével kapcsolatban merül föl. Az opszisz a tragédiában is alkotórészét 
képezi a megjelenítésnek: a cselekvés teljességéhez – túl a cselekményalkotó 
funkción és utólagos verbális felidézésén – odatartozik a végrehajtás szomatikus-
motorikus-mimikai megmutatása is.
A fenti példából az is jól kivehető, amit Frye „látomásnak” nevez, és a meta-
fora szemantikai újításain túl annak tulajdonít, ami írásos megjelenésmódjával 
függ össze. A szövegben ugyanis nyomon követhetővé válik az a művelet, amely 
révén megképződött és a megnyilatkozásba beépült az alakzat. Olvasása során 
feltárul továbbá a nyelv különös működése, miközben éppen megképzi a meta-
forát. Nyilvánvaló, hogy ezzel a nyelvi rendszerben eseményt indukál. Az egzisz-
tenciális metafora kontextusa a szöveg, közege az írásmű, egy olyan megnyilat-
kozás, amely már nem az alkotás, hanem a befogadás horizontjába helyezi át az 
elbeszélt történet affektusát.
A kanadai gondolkodó szerint az olvasás két aktusból áll. A lineáris olvasás a 
történet kibontakozását követi nyomon; az ismételt olvasás során viszont az 
elbeszélt eseményeket „az egész történet egyidejű látomása közvetítheti”. A Frye-
féle látomás lényegében a szöveg tematikus egységének felel meg, amit Gad-
amer vagy Ricœur a „szöveg világának” nevez. Az egzisztenciális metafora a 
történetet közvetítő lineáris elbeszélést szövegművé, azaz vertikális 
képződménnyé transzformálja. Ez a kétszintű olvasás eredménye, minek követ-
keztében az elbeszélés nemcsak szöveggé, de verbális ikonná, a történet pedig 
példázattá lényegül át. Ám egyúttal megváltozik utalásiránya is: a hősök világa 
szövegvilággá, a szövegvilág pedig az olvasó világává minősül át. Utóbbi pedig 
a saját szöveg megképzésére irányuló késztetésnek bizonyulhat.
A bemutatott koncepció lényeges hozadéka az, hogy túllép az alakzat vagy a 
modell fogalmaival operáló elméleteken, a retorikai és logikai felfogásokon. Frye 
– mint már említettem – az olvasás felől közelíti meg a metaforikus megnyilat-
kozásokat, ami A kritika anatómiájából még hiányzott. Az olvasást pedig nem 
hajlandó sem a tárgy objektív ábrázolása, sem a psziché narcisztikus gyönyörkö-
dése felől értelmezni. A szöveg olvasóra tett hatását a részesedés viszonylatában 
értelmezi: az olvasó nem kutatóként, nem is hedonisztikus játékosként viszo-
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nyul a szöveghez. Az olvasó a szöveg értelmezéséről át kell hogy térjen saját 
tapasztalatának értelmezésére, ami – felfogásom szerint – a saját nyelv 
kiművelésének igényét veti föl. 
De ezzel újabb vetülete tárul fel a metafora teljesítményének, jelesül: 
szubjektumképző funkciója. Ezt írja Frye:
Így meg kell vizsgálnunk a metaforahasználatnak azt a kiterjesztését, amelyben a 
szavak nemcsak egy dolgot azonosítanak egy másikkal, hanem mindkettőt valami 
olyasmivel, ami belőlünk származik: amit nevezzünk időlegesen egzisztenciális meta-
forának. (109)
A meghatározás arra utal, hogy az olvasás aktusában létesülő szubjektum nem 
azonos az ismeretelméleti ego vagy a deiktikus én alakjával, illetve fogalmával: 
„Az azonosulás minden ilyen esetben tagadja az énközpontú vagy szubjektív 
azonosságot” (116).
Az alanyi jelenlét szimbolikusan közvetített létmód, ami egyfajta külponto-
sítást feltételez: „Azt a fajta azonosulást, amelyet egzisztenciális metaforának 
nevezünk, Heideggert követve »extatikusnak« is mondhatjuk” (117). Ilyen 
például, amikor Hamlet egyfajta új beszédmód kipróbálása révén, szakítva „én”-
azonos nyelvi identitásával, az őrült helyzetébe transzponálja megjelenésmód-
jának alakzatait. Itt az egzisztenciális tapasztalatot az garantálja, hogy miközben 
önmagán kívül teremti meg a cselekvés centrumát – azaz úgy cselekszik, min-
tha színész volna (hiszen valójában nem őrült) – eközben elsajátít egy költői 
diszkurzust – a drámáét. Megállapíthatjuk: a metaforikusan szabályozott gon-
dolkodás révén kívül helyezzük magunkat a test által határolt és a tudat által 
reflektált egyedi létezésünk keretein, s individualitásunkon. Mint például a festő, 
amikor önarcképet fest vagy a színész, amikor – például – Gábor Miklósként 
úgy tesz, mintha Hamlet volna. Vagyis magát nem központként, hanem egy 
másik, különálló létező jeleként működteti. Ily módon részesül a „másik” egysz-
eri tapasztalatából. Ebből következik, hogy az egzisztenciális metafora nem az 
átviteles, nem a hasonuló, nem az analógiás, hanem a participatív jelenlét mod-
ellje. Nézetem szerint éppen ennek köszönhetően egy nagyobb, végtelen egész 
részeként képes láttatni magát az ember, aki tagja is meg jele is ennek a hipote-
tikus egésznek. A külpontosítás eseményt alkot a történésben, amelyet a deikti-
kus „én”-ekkel való szakítás, az alany narratív transzcendálása hoz létre. Ennek 
alapján mondja Northrop Frye a szereplők metaforikusan megképzett valóságáról: 
„Egyének, nem ének világa ez” (124).
A külpontosítás aktusaival – a meglátással és a nyelvi láttatással – Frye össze-
kapcsolja a jelenlét problémáját. Az egzisztenciális metafora, azzal, hogy hason-
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lóként vagy éppen különneműként észlelt két dolgot indoklás nélkül azonosít, 
megváltoztatja magát a befogadást. Egyrészt nem izoláltan, saját alakjára 
redukálva, hanem egy másik dologgal való kölcsönhatásában láttatja a dolgot, 
másrészt mindkettőt egy elbeszélt cselekménybe és egy személytörténetbe 
ágyazza.
A rutinszerű észlelés, érzéki adatokra támaszkodva, egy képzetre, egy 
reprezentációra korlátozza a dolgot, aminek a kijelentés révén jelentést tulaj-
donít. Azonban, rögzítve ezt a tulajdonságot vagy minőséget, magát a dolgot – a 
dolog létszerűségét – éppenséggel elvéti. Visszanyeréséhez az szükséges, hogy 
felismerjük a dolog és észlelt aspektusa – kinézete – közötti különbséget, illetve 
magát az észlelési aktust, azt az érzékcsalódást, amely a hasadást okozta, s ezzel 
működésbe hozta a szubjektum-objektum viszony ismeretelméleti modelljét. 
A metaforikus kifejezés révén – Frye szerint – a közvetlen érzéki észlelés 
meghaladását, a szemlélet és a felfogás dezautomatizálását, az újra-meglátás 
késztetését éri el az elme, mivel az érzéki benyomásokat a személyes tapasztalat-
tal társítja. A tudós irodalmár ebben az öneszmélési folyamatban három esemé-
nyfázist különböztet meg: a látást, a meglátást és a látomást. 
A közvetlen látás a dolog térbeli-szemléleti formáját állítja az értelem elé. Egy 
felhőt az égen, amely alakilag különbözik a havas hegycsúcs képétől. A meglátás 
nem az alakra (a részek viszonyrendjére), hanem kinézetére vonatkozik: a felhőt 
láthatjuk fátyolfelhőként vagy bárányfelhőként. De ahhoz, hogy így lássuk meg, 
már szükség van a nyelvre, amelynek révén az azonosítást végrehajtottuk. Egy 
közös alaki ismérv kiemelésével: hol a fátyol, hol a bárány szavunk utalása alap-
ján. Látomással akkor van dolgunk, amikor – váratlanul – nem érzéki valóságra 
alkalmazzuk ezt a képződményt. Petőfi a Felhőkben – például – a költői 
diszpozíciója metaforájaként, az alkotó invenciót serkentő valósághiány föltáru-
lásának alakzataként használja. 
Ernst Cassirer nyomán Frye azt vallja, hogy minden észlelés szimbolikusan 
közvetített aktus. Ilyen közvetítés az elbeszélés is. Giambattista Vico nyomán 
pedig azt, hogy az ember a költői elbeszélésben – azaz történetet alkotva – 
másképpen azonosul életével, mint a fogalmi azonosítást eredményező predi-
katív állítás vagy akár az egzisztenciális kijelentés esetében, mivel csak arról tud 
hitelesen tanúskodni, aminek ő maga cselekvő alanya volt. Vagyis nem a tudáson, 
hanem a személyes tapasztalaton alapul a költői történetmondás. 
A metaforikus kifejezésen alapuló felismerést – mint már említettem – Frye 
látomásnak nevezi, ami nem észlelés, hanem meglátás eredménye. Az észlelés, 
az érzékszerv által belülről irányított tekintet produkciója a tompa nézés – ez az 
eltakaró művelet, amely magát a nézés eseményét nem képes láttatni. Ezért 
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állíthatja Frye középkori gondolkodók nyomán: „Az ember azzá válik, amit meg-
lát” (122). Ennek megértéséhez azonban túl kell lépni a meglátáson.
A meglátásként kezelt felismerést a jeles gondolkodó összefüggésbe hozza a 
dologi lét reprezentációival és prezentumával: „A dolgokat nem lehet valójában 
látni, amíg nem válnak érzékcsalódásossá […] A tárgy, amelyet így, úgyszólván, 
áthat a megfigyelő, átalakul jelenlétté” (123). Az áthatolás arra a közvetítésre van 
ráutalva, ami a különnemű dolgok kölcsönhatásba emelését alkalmas biztosíta-
ni, vagyis a költői szóra mint „egzisztenciális metaforára”. Ugyanis ez az alakzat, 
egy egész narratívára kiterjesztett változatában, vagyis műalkotássá átalakulva, 
identitást eredményez: „[…] a következetes és fegyelmezett látomás olyan azo-
nosuláshoz vezet, mint amit az egzisztenciális metaforának tulajdonítunk” (122). 
A látomás műfaja akkor lehet a személyes identitás közege, ha elbeszélt törté-
netbe illeszkedik, melyet olvasható médium, azaz költői műalkotásként értett 
szövegmű közvetít. 
A cselekvés metaforája és Hamlet öneszmélése
Az egzisztenciális metafora referenciája az észlelés tárgya helyett a konkrét 
cselekvésből származó tapasztalat világára vonatkozik – annak megtörténése, 
az aktus pillanatában; vagyis azt megelőzően, hogy motívuma és produktuma 
reflektálható lehetne. Ez általában a válsághelyzetek ideje, egyfajta abszolút 
jelenbeliség, amikor az időt a cselekvés maga inkarnálja. Tehát nem a megis-
merés, hanem a praxis.
Illusztrálandó a mondottakat, tennék egy kisebb kitérőt Hamlet nagymon-
ológjának rekonstrukciója érdekében – a lét, az egzisztencia, a cselekvés és a 
kölcsönhatásuk metaforikus megjelenítésének bemutatása végett. Hiszen itt 
annak lehetünk tanúi, ahogyan a cselekvő a tett és a lét paradox összefüggéséről 
beszél, ami az ő egzisztenciális helyzetében, személyes életének válságpillana-
tában állt elő. A monológ szubjektuma extatikus a királyfi vagy a fiú vagy a 
szerelmes alakjához képest. Miközben két változatát vázolja föl e konkrét válság 
megoldásának, létrehozza a színen a helyzet elbeszélésére alkalmazható nyelvet 
– a konfesszió drámai beszédmódját. E szöveg közegében teremti meg a „tett 
neve” helyett a tett radikális – és egészen egyedülálló – metaforáját. Miközben 
ezt végrehajtja a beszédben – a saját nyelv teatralizálása révén – egyúttal kiműveli 
személyes identitását is, mely jelen esetben a perszonális drámai monológ 
műfajának elsajátítását feltételezi.
A monológ mint perszonális megnyilatkozás drámai-teátrumi artikulációja 
nem a „vagy”, hanem a vágy – az elementáris létvágy – megnyilvánulásáról 
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tanúskodik. A „koponya” – a módszeres kétely szimbóluma – a reflexió hor-
dozója. De a kétely diszkurzusát – pontosabban metanyelvét – előadó drámai 
monológ már másra irányul: egy bizonyos észjárás – nevezetesen a kétely – lét-
jogát és az elme létstátuszát értelmezi. Végső soron azt az érlelődő kérdést köz-
vetíti, hogy vajon tényleg a módszeres kétely karteziánus eljárására redukálható 
a lét értelmét feszegető gondolkodás? A színen elhangzó monológ nem pusztán 
egy kételkedő figura spekulációját és mentális vívódását jeleníti meg, hanem 
magát a beszédmódot demonstrálja annak köszönhetően, hogy a versnyelvi köz-
vetítés – átkódolván a szóbeli megnyilatkozást – distanciát teremt a kétféle ver-
balitás, a filozófiai elmélkedés nyelvezete és a költői szöveg diszkurzív rendje 
között. Ezzel megvalósul a reflexiós tudat uralkodó beszédmódjának eltávolí-
tása. Ennek következtében itt a nyelv már nem a reflexió kifejezését szolgálja, 
hanem a kifejezés nyelvének reflexióját. 
Ennek a hasadásnak és interakciónak azonban van még egy lényeges hoza-
déka, amely eseményként tudatosulhat. Tudniillik, a belülről kétszólamú drámai 
monológ egyúttal azt is érzékletessé teszi, ahogyan a létesülő diszkurzus, az új 
nyelvi azonosság alanya kibontakozik a színen, levetvén a „dán királyfi” és a 
„módszeres kétely” szociális, illetve intellektuális maszkját. A közönség előtt 
nyilvánosan elmondott szöveg a beszélőt legott saját szavainak hallgatójává, a 
hallható szót értelmezhetővé avatja. Ily módon Hamlet hangja, a kételyben kétel-
kedni kezdő ember személyes artikulációja, ténylegesen magának a szkepszisnek 
a beszédmódját jeleníti meg és vonja be a közönséggel való párbeszédbe, miáltal 
egyben az elme játékát teszi külsővé, s leplezi le. A versnyelvben alkalmazott 
metaforikus digresszió viszont Hamlet diszpozícióját hivatott megjeleníteni, azt 
az egyszeri krízis-hangoltságot, amely a gondolat gondolásáról a létre vonatkozó 
kérdésre helyezi át az intellektuális érdeklődést.
A kételkedést eltávolító – a szkepszis fogalmait elemző – beszédalany 
értelmezése szerint a „lenni” hordozójának a lélek felel meg, de egy bizonyos 
diszpozíció jegyében: „a lélek, ha tűri”. (A „lét türelme” József Attilánál ugyanc-
sak a lélek egzisztenciális megnyilvánulását minősíti.) Ennek terméke a beszéd 
végén megismételt és nyomatékosított elem, a jelen kihívásaira válaszoló létbá-
torság érvényességének bevallása: „inkább tűrni”. Ez az „inkább” a lenni vágyának 
és a lenni-vagyok felismerésének a megnyilvánulása, míg a „nem lenni” egyálta-
lán nem a léttagadás vakmerőségéről tanúskodik, sokkal inkább az akarás rövide-
sen fölismert elégtelenségéről. Ezért van, hogy a monológ szövege egyértelművé 
teszi: a nem-lenni választójának „bátorsága” valójában az akarathiányt kompen-
zálja; valójában a tett elmulasztásából fakad, ami viszont „Belőlünk mind gyávát 
csinál”. Ebben a személyes beszédben a tett – az idézőjellel kiemelt „tett” név 
nyelvi kontextusa, a hamleti elbeszélésben kialakuló cselekvésmodell – az, ami 
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valójában formálja a szubjektumot, nem a kétely. Éppen ezért tagadja meg Ham-
let a „»tett« nevét” a nemlétet reflektáló, identitását elvesztő észlény csele-
kvésmódjától. Ezzel áll szemben a személyes szöveg (s egyben az elszánás) szub-
jektumaként, aki a Lenni és a Tűrni radikális azonosítása révén megalkotja a 
tragédia központi alakzatát, az egész szöveget és cselekményt generáló egzisz-
tenciális metaforát. Hamlet – mielőtt megvalósítaná tervét – a nyelv szubjektu-
maként cselekszik, azaz a cselekvés aktusában a cselekvés új verbális modelljét 
alkotja meg, s mindjárt gyakorolja is, amikor belép a színre Ophelia. 
A tett, a tett neve, a tett metaforája és a viszonyukat kifejtő drámai monológ 
versnyelvi demonstrációja a tűrést és az elszánást avatja cselekvésmintává, mely 
megszüli a lenni-vagyok tevékeny alanyát, „az elszántság természetes szinével” 
fölruházott személyt. Ebben a felfogásban a tett létiniciatívát is jelent: „sok 
nagyszerű / Fontos merény”5 ténylegesítését. Frye szellemében azt mondhat-
nám, hogy az egzisztenciális kijelentés („Lenni vagy nem lenni”) helyére egzisz-
tenciális metafora akkor kerül a szövegbe, ha a metaforaképzés, az új név kere-
sése (itt a türelem) és átvitele válaszként jelenik meg egy cselekvéshiányos 
válsághelyzet – egyszerre gyakorlati, intellektuális és nyelvi – kihívására. Ekkor 
a történetben két nem kompatibilis egység összekapcsolása, a szemantikában 
pedig két összeférhetetlen jelentésmező kölcsönhatása válik szükségszerűvé. A 
személyes identitás feltétele tehát a narratív és a metaforikus jelentésképzés 
kölcsönhatását megteremető diszkurzív azonosság, azaz a műfaj és a metafora 
nyelvi képződményeit egységesítő művészi szöveg, jelen esetben a drámai mon-
ológot manifesztáló verses írásmű.
Hamlet története egyszeri eset imitációja, cselekvése nem ritualizálható, mint 
ahogy – mondjuk – a példázat vagy a varázsmese esetében ez megtörténik. Frye 
írja: „Magát az egyedit soha nem ismerjük: az egyediség kizárólag a tapasztala-
thoz tartozik” (112). Az irodalmi szerkezet a tapasztalatot és a tudást egyesíti. 
Az egyszeri cselekvés végrehajtásnak a modellje – Frye szerint – „a személyes 
részvételre késztető metafora” (uo.). Az egzisztenciális metafora nem leírja, nem 
ábrázolja, nem elbeszéli a cselekvést, azaz nem a funkcióját mutatja be, mint a 
narráció, hanem konstituálja, mégpedig az extatikus, részt vállaló tett létesíté-
sével, létbe inkarnálásával. Ily módon az egész embert, a személyt inspirálja a 
tett végrehajtására – nem pusztán az elméjét, a kezét és a kardját. Fordulatot és 
felismerést visz ezáltal a személytörténetbe.
5 Fontos lehet Arany János kifejezése, a merény, mert a merész, bátor tett, a nem kockázatmentes 
próbálkozás, a fenntartások nélküli vállalás jelentéskörével ruházza föl jelöltjét.
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Exkurzus
A fentiekben Az Ige hatalma című könyv alapján tárgyaltam Frye felfogását, 
mivel ebben a művében vezeti be az egzisztenciális metafora fogalmát. Ám már 
a Kritika anatómiájában is nagy teret szentel a probléma kifejtésének. A leg-
fontosabb különbséget abban láthatjuk, hogy korábbi könyvében a szimbólumok 
kapcsolatrendjének szintjén vizsgálódik, míg Az Ige hatalmában számba veszi a 
szövegmű autonómiáját, amelynek látomása verbális ikonná avatja az elbeszélt 
történetet. Hiszen „az egész történet egyidejű látomását” az elbeszélés olvasható 
nyelvi közege teszi lehetővé. Erről – Derridára hivatkozva – így ír: „ha az írá-
son belül megmarad a személyes beszélő konvenciója, akkor a szavakat magzati 
állapotukban hordozza magában a beszélő” (101). Ebből Frye levonja azt a követ-
keztetést, hogy a költészet a metafora révén „egyfajta még meg-nem-született 
világba kalauzol bennünket” (uo.). 
De a radikális metafora csak az írott, olvasható szövegben tudja egzisztenciá-
lis hatását érvényesíteni: „a tapasztalat és a tudás egyesítéséhez nyomtatott 
szövegekre […] van szükség” (109). Az írásmű olvasója saját tapasztalatának 
megfogalmazására alkalmas nyelvvel szembesül az elbeszélő beszédmódot meta-
forikus jelentésmódosításokkal társító költői diszkurzusban. 
A kritika anatómiájában a szimbolikus jelentésalkotás öt válfaját különböz-
teti meg a szerző: betű szerintit, leírót, formait, archetipikust és anagogikust.
Az itt tárgyalt metafora az utolsó fázis alakzata, az anagogikus diszkurzus 
konstitutív tényezője, ahol a dianoia poétikai státuszra tesz szert, mivel a „sza-
vak totális rendjét” hozza működésbe. Ez a rend különbözteti meg az előző fázis 
archetipikus jelentésképzésétől, mivel ez nem a nyelvi univerzumot, hanem az 
irodalmi konvenció és műfaj területét fogja át. Az anagogikus a „totális irodalmi 
tapasztalat” formája, amit a „totális Szó” garantál, azaz a teremtésben részesülő 
kreatív szó, amely felfogható Logoszként. De sajátos értelemben, minthogy nem 
a természetet, hanem „az emberi elme gondolkodását utánozza”. Itt a „természet 
tartalmazóból tartalmazottá válik” (104), de az élet sem tárgya, hanem 
alkotórésze ennek a nyelvi univerzumnak. A képzeleti tartalom az egziszten-
ciálisban van megalapozva, mint az álom esetén. Azaz, nem a fantázia műve. 
Ezért az irodalmi univerzum középpontja nem pusztán az elbeszélt történet vagy 
az elbeszélő szó, hanem a „szavak totális rendjének individuális megnyilvánu-
lása” (105). A radikális metafora a szimbólumot monáddá avatja: az irodalmi 
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POSZTMODERN BIBLIA:  
NORTHROP FRYE MÍTOSZ- ÉS METAFORA 
KONSTRUKCIÓJÁNAK KRITIKAI MEGKÖZELÍTÉSE
There is No Natural Religion
The Prophets Isaiah and Ezekiel dined with me.
William Blake (1886; 1994, 200)
A bölcsészettudomány alapvetően metaforikusnak tekinthető: metaforákat és 
mitológiákat használ, akkor is, amikor nem tud róla. Ez a megállapítás jelenlegi 
kijelentéseimre is igaz. Az emberi tudásról és gondolkodásról való egzakt gon-
dolkodás szeretetének vizsgálata szempontjából veszem kritika alá Northrop 
Frye Bibliával kapcsolatos két művét, a Kettős tükört és Az Ige hatalmát. Kritikán 
ezúttal a jelentés és az összefüggései megfigyelésének módszerét értem. Frye, 
jóllehet vizsgálódásai során megtartja a szakrális alapot, végső következtetéseit 
mégis szinte mindig esztétikai (hermeneutikaiak vagy recepcióesztétikaiak), 
illetve szekularizált összefüggésbe helyezi el (KT 377). A (szerinte) legalapvetőbb 
emberi érdekekből összeállított inerciarendszerbe illesztve próbálja megérteni, 
illetve sokkal inkább megértetni a Szentírást (IH 183-184), de ennek az igyekezet-
nek a klasszikus zsidó-keresztény mitológia retorikáján belül sincs biztosítéka. 
Pontosabban már ez az egyetlen mitológia is sokkal gazdagabban strukturált, bár 
a Jorge Luis Borges-féle négyes történettipológiával (illetve annak antitéziseivel) 
kétségkívül leírható lenne, annál is inkább, mivel Borges fölosztása esztétikai 
(184–186), míg a Frye-é társadalmi-biológiai. Frye első Biblia-könyvének, a 
Kettős tükörnek az eredeti címe, a The Great Code William Blake Laokoón-
metszetének egyik sorára megy vissza: „The Old and the New Testaments are the 
Great Code of Art” (Konopacki 20), s bár tudjuk, hogy Frye jelentős mértékben 
kiterjeszti a Blake-mondat jelentését, a Szentírás föltehetőleg az információs 
kultusznak megfeleltethető elméleteknél is gazdagabb jelentéstartalmakkal bír 
(KT 16-17). Frye fontos megállapítást tesz a Kettős tükör bevezetésében, midőn 
az irodalom mítoszteremtő jelentőségéről elmélkedik, s Claude Lévi-Strauss 
bricolage-elméletét idézi, nemcsak Blake művészete kapcsán, de a Szentírás sze-
rkezetét illetően is (23–24). Műve felépítésében ugyanakkor több helyen mellőzi 
Lévi-Strauss nézeteit, jóllehet azokkal a freudizmus gyakorta sematizáló elkép-
zelései mellett árnyalhatta, bővíthette volna okfejtését. A semmi teológiai és 
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bölcseleti eszmetörténetének kifejtése Eckhart mester nézetein alapul a nyugati 
gondolkodás történetében, de helyette Frye Jakob Böhmét említi (IH 353), s akár 
a vízözön-, akár a kovácsmitológiák tárgyalását gazdagíthatta volna Mircea Eli-
ade kutatásainak hasznosításával (KT 82, 143, 248-250; IH 359-361; Eliade 1997, 
161-229; 2004). Főképp a kovácsmesterséghez kapcsolódó mítoszok esetében 
igaz ez, hiszen a zsidóság technikai civilizációval szembeni aggályai a barbár 
fundamentalizmus felől éppúgy értelmezhetőek, mint a vívmányokat használó, 
de jogosultságuk fölött alaposan eltöprengő intellektus felől.1
A metaforát Frye eleve a mitikusból, közelebbről a mítoszból származtatja 
objektum és szubjektum interakcióján keresztül.2
A mi nyelvfelfogásunk szerint csak a metafora fejezheti ki azt az érzést, hogy a szub-
jektumnak és az objektumnak van közös energiája. A metaforikus nyelvhasználat 
központi kifejezése az ’isten’, az a lény, amely […] valamely személyiségformát azonosít 
a természet valamely tulajdonságával. (KT 36-37)
Érdemes kitekinteni ehelyütt például a görög mitológia, illetve tudományosság 
közös, kozmogonikus gyökereire (lásd Kirk 37–122), főképpen azért, hogy látható 
legyen: a személyiség mint a kozmosz fölismerésére tett első kísérletek formája 
nem általános mitologikus jelenség (illetve metafora). Ráadásul (mások mellett) 
a görög hagyomány a kozmosznak a viszonylag egyszerű kezdetből mint opti-
málisan axiomatikusból kiinduló születését növekedésként írja le,3 másrészt a 
zsidó-keresztény mitológiától és szakrális hagyománytól döntő módon külön-
bözve az általában etikainak nevezett kérdéseket nem a kozmogóniai mítoszok 
között tartja számon, hanem kevésbé szakrális jellegüknél fogva a költői hagy-
omány mitikus emlékezetébe utalja (Kirk 39). Később, Az Ige hatalma című 
munkájában Frye is bemutat egy ehhez némileg hasonló mítoszinterpretációt 
(57-58, 60). Amikor az etika kilép a társadalmi interakciók viszonyából, és az 
absztrakció követelményét próbálja alkalmazni, a zsidó-keresztény mitológia 
számára is elveszti a jelentőségét: „a bizonyítás olyan igazságkritérium, amely 
idegen a Bibliától, és amelyet maga a Biblia nem ismer el” (KT 95). Amellett, 
hogy a mitológia episztemikus folyamatát Frye is a görög hagyományra való 
kitekintés segítségével írja le, következetesen alkalmazza szubjektum és objek-
tum kölcsönösségének aktusát mint magyarázatot. Így érkezik el a platóni νόησις 
1 A közvetlen kritikai észrevételekkel kapcsolatban lásd Frye reakcióját: IH 7-8.
2 „[A] szubjektumot és az objektumot közös hatalom vagy erő köti össze. Sok »primitív« társada-
lom külön szóval jelöli az emberi személyiség és a természeti környezet közös energiáját.” (KT 
35)
3 A φύσις, ’természet’ és a φύσει, ’növekedés’ összefüggése ezúttal különösen fontos.
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νοησεως egyéni értelmezéséhez, mely ismét közösség és egyén kérdéseként merül 
föl, nem pedig episztemológiai vagy esetleg fenomenológiai szempontból (37-
38).4 A személyiség a vízválasztó a görög típusú mitológiák kultuszai és a zsidó-
keresztény hagyomány között: az utóbbi a személyiség követelményét támasztja, 
míg az előbbi absztrahál (KT 154).
A metafora jelentése Frye érvelésében olyan retorikai alakzatokban gazda-
godik – és ezáltal változik-újrafogalmazódik, mint a folyamatos próza kialaku-
lásában szerepet játszó allegorikusság (42–43). Érvelése végén Frye visszatér az 
energia fogalmán keresztül a jelölő és jelölt viszonyára. Véleménye szerint az 
anyag illúzióját keltő energia közös az objektumban és a szubjektumban (49). Az 
ένέργεια nem más, mint megvalósulás, tehát objektum és szubjektum közös 
megvalósulásáról van szó, s ennek a megvalósulásnak a pillanatában jelentkezne 
a metafora, mely egyre inkább nyelvi és egyre kevésbé teológiai vagy szakrális 
jellegű (52). Ugyanakkor Frye egyértelműen utal arra, hogy Isten és nyelv viszo-
nyában az utóbbi eszközei elégtelenek az előbbi kifejezésére, pontosabban, hogy 
Isten eredeti igei természetéhez hűen fogalmazva: a nyelv eszközei Istennel kapc-
solatban folyamatosan kimerülőben vannak. Ennek a tapasztalatnak a leginkább 
gondolatébresztő kifejeződése az, hogy János evangélista Logosz-himnuszát 
képtelenség értelmezni a fogalmi nyelv szintjén (53–55). Továbbsúlyosbítja az 
olvasó helyzetét, ha már csupán ennek a fogalmi nyelvnek van a birtokában. 
Hogy a kozmogónia és a kozmogóniai mítoszok milyen távol állnak a zsidó-
keresztény hagyomány gyökereitől, az világossá válik Frye véleményéből, mely 
szerint a kozmogónia nem egy mitológia születésének pillanatában bontakozik 
ki, mint ahogy például a görög mitológiában, hanem holt emlékezetté válásakor. 
A Biblia mitológiája éppen azért áll távol a kozmogóniától, mert középpontjában 
nem a világ létrejötte és későbbi struktúrájának törvényei állnak, hanem az a 
tapasztalat, hogy „az élet elidegenedés nélküli energia” (144), pontosabban emez 
ideális állapot megvalósulásának látomása. Ezzel szorosan összefügg a nyelvi 
mozzanat, amennyiben a Szentírás a természet vertikális fejlődését annak meg-
váltásaként előlegezi, a néma természet legjellemzőbb mozzanata pedig az Igé-
ben való közvetlen részesülése (175). Így a teremtés sem születésként, hanem 
ébredésként értelmeződik (189–190).
Egy teremtésmítosz elsősorban nem attól drámai és erőteljes, hogy valamiképpen 
elmondja a természet rendjének létrejöttét, hanem attól, hogy elmondja a tudatos 
4 Később a Bibliát mint tipologikus szöveget határozza meg, szembeállítva Platón műveivel, bár a 
tipologikusság kérdése Platón kapcsán nem tűnik elsőrendűnek (149). Később így ír: „A platóni 
bölcselet legfennköltebb szárnyalásaira is lakmározás közepette került sor” (IH 314).
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elme ráébredését a természet rendjére. […] [A] teremtés aligha meggyőző, ha olyan 
eseménynek tüntetik föl, mint amely az idők kezdetén következik be, minthogy a 
képzelet számára az időnek nincs kezdete. (IH 201)
A természet az otthon, melyben Ábel és juhai éltek. Ábel, a jó pásztor vezeté-
sével a juhok mehetnek bárhová, mindenhol otthon lesznek. Káin testvérgyilko-
sságával ez szűnik meg. Káin vándorlása száműzetés, s a száműzött mindenhová 
mehet, csak haza nem (235).
A mítosz mint a metafora eredete Frye számára nyelvi aktusban gyökerezik: 
szavak sorba rendezésének gyakorlata (KT 76).5 Ez tulajdonképpen maga a 
beszéd, az elbeszélés folyamata.
[J]elen munkámban nem tudok úgy tekinteni az irodalomra, mint a mítosz romlására: 
az irodalom a mítosz fejlődésének benső és elkerülhetetlen része. […] valamely mí-
tosz […] egy irodalomkritikusnak […] mindazt jelenti, amivel később az irodalom 
felruházta. (80)
Az irodalom, ha arra nem kizárólag mint nyelvi, hanem mint esztétikai objek-
tumra tekintünk, láthatólag csak annyiban képezi benső és elkerülhetetlen részét 
a mítosz fejlődésének, amennyiben a képzőművészet, a zene, de különösen az 
építészet is. A mítoszok öntörvényűsége és önmagáért valósága jól beleillik ebbe 
az elméletbe (81),6 s a nyelvi megvalósulásuktól elkülöníthető megjelenésük 
(86–87) sem tűnik lehetetlennek. Frye a mítosz értelmében fölfogott Biblia meg-
kerülhetetlen lényegének tartja a metaforát, amennyiben elsődleges jelentése 
(szép)irodalmi. „A Bibliában a betű szerinti jelentés megegyezik az irodalmi 
jelentéssel”, és ebben az értelemben nevezi egységesnek is a Szentírást, mégpedig 
szövegösszefüggéseinek és utalásrendszerének egész, fenségesen beláthatatlan 
mivoltában (121-123). Erre az utaláshálóra is igaz azonban, hogy a Bibliának 
nincs szüksége bizonyítékokra, külsőkre pedig végképp nem.7 Saját szövege 
azonban szétárad az emberiség írásbeli és szóbeli hagyományában, és minden 
elbeszéléstípusba beépül. Mindez a Frye által a Bibliát fölosztó hét szakasz eseté-
ben fokozottan igaz (186). Később, Az Ige hatalmában Frye már láttatja azt a 
5 „[N]ekem e két állítás: »a Biblia történetet mond el« és »a Biblia mítosz«, lényegében véve egy” 
(77).
6 Lásd még Frye csillagászati példáját (84).
7 „Honnan tudjuk, hogy az evangéliumi történet igaz? Onnan, hogy igazolja az ótestamentumi 
próféciákat. De honnan tudjuk, hogy az ótestamentumi próféciák igazak? Onnan, hogy igazolja 
őket az evangéliumi történet. (…) A két testamentum afféle kettős tükröt formál, egyik a másikat 
tükrözi vissza, de a külvilágot egyik sem.”(146)
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történeti-recepcióesztétikai folyamatot, amelyben az evangéliumok anyaga, a 
krisztusi tanítás, eredeti ótestamentumi utaláshálójából kiemelve egyértelműen 
a κήρυγμα jellegét veszi föl (157).
Frye számára elsődleges mítosz és irodalom kitüntetett viszonya, s ez az 
elképzelés Az Ige hatalmában nyeri el végső, rendkívül következetesen végig-
gondolt formáját (8–9). A kettős tükör metaforája ennek megfelelően jelentős 
változáson esett át: a Biblia szervező struktúrái és az irodaloméi tükrözik 
egymást, ahelyett, hogy a Szentírás két része között működne a tükrözés (19). 
Ugyanitt kerül sor – föltehetőleg bizonyos recenziók föltevéseit pontosítandó 
– a mitológia definíciójának megtisztítására mindattól az ideologikus 
szennyeződéstől, mely a huszadik század derekán rárakódott (52–53). „Nem 
arról van szó, hogy a mítosz meghamisítja a történelmet, hanem arról, hogy a 
történelem, az uralkodó ideológiák tetteinek krónikája meghamisítja az 
elsődleges érdekeket” (93). Az Ige hatalma egyértelmű szándéka, hogy a mítoszt 
fölváltó logosz paradigmaváltását a Szentírásban kimutassa, ilyen értelemben 
olvassa például János evangélista Logosz-himnuszát (61, 143). Célja a Bibliát 
mint irodalmat, pontosabban mint az irodalom „egyik” origóját vizsgálat alá 
venni (134).
A bűnbeesés kérdését Frye rendkívül részletesen taglalja. Értelmezését – igen 
problematikusan – szinte kizárólag a szexualitással hozza összefüggésbe: a bűn 
nem más, mint a nemiség tapasztalata, a jó és a rossz tudás is szexuális jellegű 
(KT 191–192). Pedig éppen a bűnbeesés mozzanatában mutatkozik meg az igei 
és a nyelvi mint probléma vagy hiány. A bűnbeesés után az ember elveszítette 
halhatatlanságát, ami lehetséges, hogy a halál bűnéről való tudás (bűntudat) 
hiánya volt. A bűn és bűnhődés pillanatában androgén paradicsomi létezőből 
nem pusztán férfi és nő lett, hanem az értelmi és természeti szakadás is bekövet-
kezett. Az első bűn éppen az ontológiai különbség felismerése volt, a tudat nem 
más, mint a bűn tudata, a különbözés tudata. A büntetés a halandóság, mivel a 
harmónia megbomlott, létrejött az idő. A helyzetet bonyolítja a bűnbeesés 
aktusával kapcsolatban, hogy Lucifer a szellemet jeleníti meg. A szellem aján-
dékai tehát a bűn forrásaivá is válhatnak. Frye különbséget tesz bölcsesség és 
tudás között. A bölcsesség nem képesség tekintetében áll a tudás fölött, hanem 
annyiban, amennyiben folyamatosan a ténylegesen megvalósuló élet változó 
viszonyaihoz igazítja a gondolkodást, mindig készen a megváltozó jelenségekre 
való gyors és megfelelő reakcióra. Ez a bölcsesség a teremtés gyökereinek megé-
rtéséhez vezetheti el az embert, ahol a fény és a levegő mint a lélek (πνεϋμα) 
metaforái jelennek meg. Egyiket sem tapasztaljuk magánvalóságában, viszont 
kettejük segítségével tapasztalunk meg egyáltalán bármit is (212-215, vö. 237). 
A szexuális magyarázat jogosultsága amúgy is megkérdőjeleződik a paráznaság 
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teológiai és szakrális vonatkozásainak kapcsán (240).8 Sehol sem megy azonban 
olyan messzire a szexuálpszichológiai következtetésekben szerzőnk, mint amikor 
az Oidipusz-mítoszt a teremtéstörténet vagy Krisztus származásának démoni-
kus paródiájaként olvassa (264–265). Valójában semmi sem áll távolabb ettől az 
értelmezéstől, mint éppen a zsidó-keresztény mitológia két említett reprezen-
tánsa, és egyáltalán nem a szexuális vonatkozások miatt, mint ahogy Claude 
Lévi-Strauss kutatásai nyomán gyanítható: az eredeti Oidipusz-mítosz sem sze-
xuális alaphangoltságú volt. Lévi-Strauss a párhuzamos antik mítoszok, valamint 
az azonos szimbolikájú és történetű-ikonológiájú nem-európai mitikus törté-
netek közös vizsgálatával arra a következtetésre jutott, hogy az emberi közös-
ségek kölcsönösségeken alapulnak, amelyeket a nők, a javak és a szavak cseréje 
hoz létre, szavatol és tart mozgásban, vagyis őriz meg, tehát az a durván 
egyszerűsítő megközelítési mód, amely az incesztus puszta tényéből indul ki, 
aligha tartható. Ebből az következik, hogy ezek az ősi mítoszok az emberi 
öneszmélés talán legkorábbi időszakából származnak. A mítosz, írja Lévi-
Strauss:
[a]zt a lehetetlen helyzetet fejezné ki, amelybe az ember autokhthon voltába 
vetett hitet […] hirdető társadalom kerül, ha át kell térnie erről az elméletről 
annak a ténynek a beismerésére, hogy valójában mindegyikünk egy férfi meg 
egy asszony egyesüléséből született. A nehézség leküzdhetetlen. Oidipusz mí-
tosza azonban egy sor olyan logikai eszközt kínál, amelyek lehetővé teszik, 
hogy hidat verjünk a kiinduló probléma – egy vagy két lénytől születünk? – 
és a származékos probléma közé, amit körülbelül így fogalmazhatnánk meg: 
ugyanaz ugyanattól születik-e, vagy pedig mástól? Ezzel a módszerrel egy 
korreláció bontakozik ki: a vérrokonság túlértékelése úgy viszonylik annak 
alábecsüléséhez, mint az autokhthóniától való megszabadulásra tett kísérlet 
és annak lehetetlensége. A tapasztalat meghazudtolhatja az elméletet, ám a 
társadalmi élet igazolja a kozmológiát, amennyiben egyik is, másik is ugyanar-
ról az ellentmondásos struktúráról árulkodik. A kozmológia tehát igaz. (I., 172)
Egyrészt tarthatatlanná válik a növényi vagy egyéb, khthonikusnak tekinthető 
eredet tételezése (ennek a kozmikus formákba történő kivetítése azonban mint 
mitikus feszültség tovább él, talán éppen az európai Mária-kultuszokban), más-
részt a talány, a rejtély megfejtése idővel éppen a megoldás illuzórikus voltára 
ébreszti rá a megfejtőt, s a talány és az incesztus fogalmisága együtt vezet el a 
8 Megjegyzem, Frye-tól nem idegen a szinte már New Age-szerű magyarázat sem, ha a primitív 
szexualitást és szakralitást kell közös nevezőre hozni (251).
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nyomozás kényszerítő erejű szükségszerűségéhez. A nyomozás lesz a megismerés 
egyik legfontosabb mitikus formája, s ez a tragikus megismerési forma vezet el 
véleményem szerint az elbeszélés megszületésének pillanatához. Tragikusnak 
azért nevezném, mert saját magunkat nyomozzuk, akárcsak Oidipusz, hiszen 
a megismerési folyamat a megismerő megismerésével fonódik egybe. A zsidó-
keresztény mitológia két ideillő aspektusa: a bűnbeesés és a Krisztus megtes-
tesülésének mítosza gyökeresen eltér Oidipuszétól, s ez éppen Frye későbbi 
elemzéséből derül ki egyértelműen: a patriarchátus a bűnbeesés következménye, 
a természet, az Éden pedig lehetséges, hogy Évával azonosítható (IH 241–242, 
245, 254–255). Oidipusz mítosza ennek ellenére olyan bölcseleti ihlető erővel bír, 
amely alól Frye nem vonja ki magát. Ennek bizonyítéka Az Ige hatalma Krisztus-
Oidipusz párhuzama (272–273), melyet indokolatlannak tartok mind vallástörté-
neti, mind mitikus, mind irodalomelméleti, de legfőképpen szakrális szempon-
tból. Esetleges, hogy miért éppen Oidipusz lenne Krisztus mitikus párhuzama. 
Miért nem Héliosz Apollón, Dionüszosz, Zeusz vagy Mithrász? Ráadásul Frye 
maga a munkáiban éppen elég világosan bizonyítja, hogy a zsidóság szakrális 
rituáléi és a khthonikus mítoszok nemigen egyeztethetők össze.9 Ehhez kapc-
solódhat Frye-nak Az Ige hatalmában kifejtett Blake-értelmezése, amely amel-
lett, hogy nyíltan rámutat a költő-festő föl nem ismert zsenialitására, igazo-
lásképpen(?) a huszadik század freudizmusát, illetve marxizmusát is beemeli 
méltatásába, holott nem mulasztja el megállapítani, hogy Blake bibliai gyökerei 
Miltonéhoz mérhetőek (302–303).
Meglepő módon a forradalom megjelenését Frye a Szentírásban a szövetségek 
mítoszaihoz köti (KT 198–200), pedig első olvasásra a törvény egzakt és a for-
radalom különös volta ki kellene, hogy zárják egymást. A forradalom definíciói 
közül ezúttal Bernard Lewisét idézem, mivel kellően szigorú és következetes. A 
francia és az orosz, illetve az iráni iszlám forradalmat tekinti mint nemük letisz-
tult képviselőit, hozzájuk képest az összes többi forradalom – főképp a polgári 
forradalmak – különösek, esetlegesek. Ez a három forradalom nemcsak saját 
hazájának, de a világ legnagyobb részének történelmére jelentős hatást gyakorolt. 
Hatalmas remény- és lelkesedéshullámukat mindenütt terror és intervenciós 
háború követte, melynek folyamán a jakobinus, bolsevik vagy fundamentalista 
forradalmi vezetők következetesen irtották a modernizmus és az ésszerű csele-
kvési lehetőségek csíráját is (48–49). Persze ha a szakralitásnak a Frye által inter-
pretált izraelita meghatározását tekintjük, akkor az iszlám fundamentalizmus 
vagy a paranoid forradalmi direktíva valóban nem tűnik távolinak: „nem anny-




ira abban hittek, hogy az ő Istenük az egyetlen igaz isten, hanem inkább abban, 
hogy minden más isten hamis” (KT 200, vö. 207).10 Mindenesetre Izrael istene 
nem látható, de hallható, mégpedig nem azért mert láthatatlan lenne, hanem, 
mert látására tabu vonatkozik, s Frye számára ez a tény is a forradalmiság bizo-
nyítéka, hiszen a hallás újfönt az Ige jelenésével vonható párhuzamba, Ezékiel 
látomása Isten szekeréről pedig az igei szakralitás elméletét erősíti: a szent az, 
ami folyton mozgásban van, pontosabban: Isten maga a cselekvés (201–202). A 
törvény mint alaptörvény, mely a nemzet közvetlen nemzője lesz, ebben az 
értelmezésben forradalmi, s itt derül ki, hogy mit ért Frye forradalmon. A kife-
jezést nem alapvető történeti-politikai értelmében használja, sokkal inkább a 
bibliai „kezdet” kifejezés egyik metaforájaként, s ennek olyan profán allúzióit is 
kimutatja, mint az Amerikai Egyesült Államok létrejötte (206). Megjegyzem, 
Frye gyakran nem oszlatja el az allúziók keltette homályt, időnként még növeli 
is (253). A forradalom metaforája sikerrel alkalmazható a Biblia történeti vonat-
kozásaira, mint ahogy ezt Frye meg is teszi, midőn a Szentírás szöveghelyei 
kapcsán annak a hatalmas, térben és időben egyaránt hosszan elnyúló társadal-
mi kataklizmának szakrális vonatkozásairól ír, amely a nomád társadalmaknak 
a földművelés agrárforradalmával való szembesülése kapcsán következett be 
(243–244). A földművelés mint életforma minden kísérő szimbolika dacára a 
zsidóság számára idegenként, mi több ellenségesként fogalmazódik meg a 
Szentírásban. Frye rámutat: a nomadizálás után (sőt Káin mítoszát tekintve: 
előtt) a falusi közösségek kihagyásával társadalmilag a város mint település-
forma jelentkezik az Ószövetségben (243–246), a vegetáció szakrális kultuszának 
elutasítására még a hellenizmus idején is hangsúly esett, az evangéliumok szerzői 
esetében is (259). Izráel alapvetően törzsi jellege Frye szerint később is meg-
maradt, s hogy ezt a jelleget ő nem találta ellentétesnek a városi kultúrával, azt 
mi sem bizonyítja jobban, mint hogy a perzsák ellen sikeresen harcoló görög 
poliszokat is törzsi szerveződésűként mutatja be (IH 210). A forradalom meta-
forájának egyebek mellett a prófétai tevékenység látszik ellentmondani a 
Szentírásban. Elsősorban azért, mert a szakrális által kitüntetett próféták rendre 
a fönnálló „forradalmi” rezsimmel szemben, a Szent mellett foglalnak állást, 
másrészt a tudat és a tudatalatti normálistól eltérő közvetlen kapcsolata miatt 
(KT 219, vö. 221). Az evangélium a próféciák különös, minősített esete:
E látomásnak […] két szintje van: a jelen szintje és az a szint, mely ennek felette 
áll. Ez a magasabb szint egyaránt jelenti az eredeti azonosságot, melyet az 




Édenkert […] szimbolizál, és a végső azonosságot, melyeket az ezekhez való 
visszatérés jelképez az „Úrnak Napja” és Izráel helyreállítása után. (223)
Az Ige hatalmában Frye Ámos kapcsán a próféta és a primitív ember között von 
párhuzamot (83), bár ismerve Ámos könyvét, a nonkonformista lázadás talán 
pontosabb meghatározás lehetne. Végül Frye új értelmet ad a forradalomnak: 
az új, keresztény forradalom a soha meg nem valósuló jövőbe helyeződik (372).
Tudat és tudatalatti közvetlen kapcsolata ellentmondhat az elfojtás bevezeté-
sének a diskurzusba, különösen akkor, ha tudható, hogy az elfojtás mint meta-
fora a freudi pszichoanalízis révén termékenyítette meg az irodalomelméletet. 
További értelmezői zavart okozhat ugyanitt az apokalipszis szó eredeti jelenté-
sének az άλήθεια hibás – egyébként Martin Heideggertől származó – eti-
mológiájával történő összevetése, és nem csupán azért, mert ez további látszóla-
gos bizonyítékokkal szolgál az elfojtás elméletének alkalmazhatósága mellett a 
Szentírás kapcsán (233).11 Frye elképzelése szerint a történelmi „valóság” létre-
hozása azt a célt szolgálja, hogy elfödje az apokalipszis valóságát (234),12 s ezzel 
a magyarázattal legmesszebb menőkig egyet lehet érteni, de nem szükséges a 
feledés kategóriáját az elfojtáséval szemben háttérbe szorítani, hiszen a közel-
keleti magaskultúrák kulturális emlékezetét kutató szakirodalom jelentős része 
használja az emlékezés ellentétét, még olyan leíró esetekben is, amelyekben a 
társadalom kollektív tudatának emlékezőtechnikái szándékosan szelektívek.13 A 
kulturális emlékezet írásbeli jelentkezésének minősített esete Jósiás története 
(335–337). Ebben a történetben az emlékezés politikai, szakrális és társadalmi 
követelménye a történelmi formáltságtól függetlenül világosan kivehető, s talán 
ez lehet legfontosabb tanulsága is. Ennek az elképzelésnek messzemenő követ-
kezményei vannak a Biblia egészének formálására vonatkozóan. Amennyiben a 
kanonizált szöveg létrehozása ihletett tevékenységnek tekinthető, annyiban a 
szöveg további formálása, gondozása szintén az (339–340). Ebből az ezredforduló 
irodalomelméleti iskoláinak a szerzőség kérdését kritikával illető elképzeléseihez 
nagyban hasonló következtetést von le:
11 A hibás etimológiát az I H is átveszi (21).
12 Ahogyan megjegyzi: „Bizonyos értelemben tehát Jób szabadulása szabadulás tulajdon 
történetéből, az időbeli mozgásból” (331).
13 Lásd erről a teljesség igénye nélkül: Arendt, Hannah. Múlt és jövő között. Budapest: Osiris és 
Readers International, 1995; Assmann, Jan. A kulturális emlékezet. Írás, emlékezés és politikai 
identitás a korai magaskultúrákban. Budapest: Atlantisz, 1999; Uő. Mózes, az egyiptomi. Buda-
pest: Osiris, 2003.; Uő. Uralom és üdvösség. Politikai teológia az ókori Egyiptomban, Izraelben és 
Európában. Budapest: Atlantisz, 2008; Bultmann, Rudolf. Történelem és eszkatológia. Budapest: 
Atlantisz 1994; Huizinga, Johan. A történelem formaváltozásai. Budapest: Maecenas, 1997; 
White, Hayden. A történelem terhe. Budapest: Osiris, 1997.
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Megszállottan ragaszkodunk ahhoz a modern felfogáshoz, hogy mindaz a 
minőség, amelyet az irodalomban csodálunk, az író egyéniségéből származnak, 
és ezért nehezen ismerjük fel, hogy a könyörtelen egyéniségrombolás több 
elevenséget és eredetiséget tudott teremteni, mint kevesebbet. (340)
Egyéniség, egyediség, különösség és eredetiség definíciói így egyre inkább 
magára a szövegre irányulhatnak, ez pedig a jelentés, akár metaforikus jelen-
tés egzakt megközelítését szolgálja, egyúttal nyilvánvalóvá teszi a Máté evan-
gélista korabeli és a jelenkori recepció közti jelentős különbségét, hiszen az 
előbbi fókuszában Frye számára a pszeudonímia áll, amely a szájhagyomány 
és az írásbeliség szakrális értelemben vehető fordulópontját képezi, és amely 
föloldja a szakrális szöveg szájhagyományra vonatkozó kötöttségének mitikus 
követelményét (341).14 A teremtő kompiláció elve Az Ige hatalmában további 
jelentésegységekkel bővül (142). Ehhez kötődik a szerző értelmezésében a szöve-
gromlás kérdésköre, melyre továbbgondolásra serkentő, termékenyítő s egyút-
tal merész választ ad: „nyugodtan mondhatjuk, hogy mindaz, ami elromolhat 
könyvben, valahogyan el is romlott benne” (379). Legalább ilyen jelentőségű a 
Biblia rhizómatikusságának felismerése, mely amellett, hogy gyökeresen szakít 
a „modern” vagy újkori értelmezői elképzelésekkel, merészen régi (szándékosan 
használom a jelzőt az új helyett) egységbe téríti vissza a Szentírással kapcsolatos 
befogadói gondolatokat: „az egész bibliai szerkezet középpontja az a mondat, 
amelyet éppen olvasunk […] eszményi esetben minden mondat kulcs az egész 
Bibliához” (347-348) Így válhat a Szentírás szövege valójában egy folyamatosan 
önmagát át- meg átszövő hypertextté, sőt így válik a Biblia végtelen világegy-
eteme gömbbé, melynek középpontja, az ember éppúgy bárhol és mindenhol 
egyszerre ott van, mint pereme, az Isten (IH 235–236).
14 . „[A] Biblia minden fordulatában megtaláljuk azt, amit a jelenlét metafizikájának neveznek, 
továbbá, hogy a kimondott szónak mindig elsőbbsége van az írotthoz képest, de legalábbis 
mindig ott van a közelében. (…) A Biblia az írást (…) gyakran tekinti átmenetinek. Isten szól, 
és igéje örökkévaló: az írásba foglalás már eleve óriási engedmény, de azt, amit Isten tulajdon 
kezével írt még a II Mózes 32,16-ban, három verssel később, a 19-ben már el is pusztítja. Jézus 
azt mondja, hogy beszéde túléli az eget is, a földet is (…) de őt magát csak egyszer látjuk írni, 
akkor is a földre (…) és amit írt, nyilván nyomtalanul eltűnt. (…) az archetipikus próféta, Illés 
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NORTHROP FRYE A ROMANCE-RÓL ÉS A REGÉNYRŐL
(a frye-i művészetfilozófia és a romance)
Hogy a románc fontos, hatékony irodalmi terminus lehet, hogy kiterjeszté-
sével, megfelelő használatával az irodalom lényegi folyamataiba nyerhetünk 
betekintést, azt az angolszász kritika már a tizennyolcadik században sejteti, 
szuggerálja. 1785-ben már az első románcmonográfia is napvilágot lát – Clara 
Reeve párbeszédes értekezésében két irodalomszerető asszony és egy férfi 
beszélget, disputál a novelről és a romance-ról. S az idevágó töprenkedéseknek, 
tisztázó kísérleteknek azóta se szeri, se száma. 2007-ben például Corinne Saun-
ders szerkesztésében a romance családfáját, ágbogait időben-térben kiterjedten 
feltérképező, sokszerzős, hatodfélszáz oldalas monográfia látott napvilágot.
A műfaj legeltökéltebb és leghatékonyabb apologétájának mindazonáltal 
alighanem Northrop Frye-t tekinthetjük. A kanadai irodalomtudós számára a 
romance kezdettől elsőrendű fontosságú műforma. Döntő szerepet játszik már 
az Anatomy of Criticism archetipikus-szkematikus műfajrendszerében, s a 
kutató későbbi tanulmányaiban is rendre felbukkan, legyen szó az antik hagyo-
mányról, a Shakespeare-vígjátékokról vagy a fikció alapvető formáiról (lásd még 
Frye 1950, 1965, 1988). A megközelítések során Frye szokása szerint sokfelé 
ágazó, a problémasíkokat, nézőpontokat meglehetősen szabadon váltogató gon-
dolatmenetet alkalmaz, így a románc differentia specificája minden írásában 
másként-másként mutatkozik meg. Koncepciójának bemutatásakor épp ezért 
célszerű válogatnunk művei között, s a választás indokoltan esik 1976-ban 
megjelent „románcmonográfiájára”, a The Secular Scripture-re. 
A Harvard-előadások nyomán született könyvében összegzi és foglalja össze 
Frye a románchoz fűződő nézeteit, s a recepciós történet legkiterjedtebb, 
legkimunkáltabb „romance-apológiáját” bontakoztatja ki az olvasó előtt. A 
műfajt a legfontosabb fikciós formának állítja: „Romance is the structural core 
of all fiction […]”(15), mondja, és előítéletként leplezi le a szűkösen elgondolt 
„valószerűség” körül kereskedő – sok évszázados – kritikusi meggyőződéseket. 
Az irodalomantropológiai alapok iránt közismerten érdeklődő tudós a művészet, 
az irodalom beágyazottságával, rendeltetésével kapcsolatos kérdésekre is kitér a 
könyvében. Az alkotás lényegi vonásait keresve a művészi képzelőerő, az „imag-
ination” és a realitáselv, valóságelv harcára mutat rá. A teljes vágyteljesülés áté-
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lésére, elgondolására képes imagináció számára a reális világ idegen vagy lega-
lábbis elégtelen entitás, s a képzelőerő éppen az alkotás által harcol folyamatosan 
ezzel a világgal – fejtegeti (37). A vágytól hajtott, szabadságteremtő imagináció 
s a külső, determináló világkörnyezet konfliktusát megjelenítve Northrop Frye 
egyértelműen a képzelőerőnek ad igazat. „Reality, we remember, is otherness, 
the sense of something not ourselves” – jelzi, hogy a realitás mindenkor másfé-
leség, másneműség, idegenség az emberi vágy számára. „Literature is an aspect 
of the human compulsion to create in the face of chaos” – adja meg a jogot az 
irodalomnak, hogy a mindenség, a valóságelv formátlanságába formát vigyen 
(60, 31), a művészet mellett egyébként a vallást, a művészetet és a tudományt is 
ebben az összefüggésrendszerben, egyazon humanitás analóg jelenségeiként 
gondolva el. 
A Northrop Frye-i művészetfilozófiából, mondhatni, evidensen, logikusan 
következik a romance kultusza, hiszen a valóságerő támadásait ez az irodalmi 
forma utasítja el legkövetkezetesebben. A románcvilágot az idill, a beteljesült 
vágyak világa, a paradicsomi ártatlanság atmoszférája uralja. Hősei az ártatlan-
ság állapotából cseppennek a káosz világába, hogy aztán a viszontagságos, 
erőszakos, kalandos szakaszt túlhaladva újfent visszanyerjék a harmonikus egy-
ensúlyt. A mintateremtő (még a tizenhetedik-tizennyolcadik században is széles 
körben utánzott) antik románc hőse, Kharikleia a tengeri utazás, hajótörés, 
kalóztámadás, fogságba esés, a szerelmestől való elválások stációin át sodródik 
előre. Szüzességét folyamatosan fenyegetik, s származásának talánya, identi-
tásának bizonytalansága is állandóan kínozza, míg végül fény derül királyi 
származására és a beteljesítő nászban egyesül párjával, Theagenésszel. Frye is 
tudja persze, hogy a valóságerőt az irodalom sem háríthatja el teljesen magától, 
s a kutató kísérletet is tesz a fokozatok, árnyalatok jelzésére. A „naiv”, folklorisz-
tikus románcformát, a Märchent, a tündérmesét a totális vágyteljesítés 
műfajaként mutatja be (a skála másik végére a naturalista regényt helyezi), egyéb-
ként pedig displacementek sokaságával számol. A displacement, az átalakítás, 
átformálás már csak azért is fontos számára, mert az összekapcsolódás és kül-
önbözés dialektikáját jeleníti meg, s a konkrét irodalmi művek mögöttes struk-
túráit fürkésző tudós a fogalom által tudja szemléltetni a struktúra-összefüg-
géseket. „The fundamental technique used is what I call displacement, the 




(regényelmélet a displacement jegyében)
A freudi Verschiebung nyomán megalkotott szakszó, az ember szellemi világából 
fakadó mítoszhoz (archetípushoz) kapcsolódó struktúrák és a hihető, reális világ 
között közvetítő displacement a Frye-i fikciós és regényelmélet kulcsfogalma. A 
terminus bemutatásakor a kutató egy kreatívírás-tanár szellemes ötletére hivat-
kozik. A kurzuson részt vevő diákok azt kapták feladatul, hogy egy Grimm-
mesét valószerű történetté írjanak át a mű eredeti alapmotívumait megőrizve. 
A bevezetés után Frye mindjárt saját példával is él. Ibsen 1858-as Helgelandi 
harcosokját értelmezi a displacement jegyében, a Sigurd saga „átalakításaként”. 
A sagabeli legyőzendő sárkány-szörny, Fafnir a norvég író művében minden-
napibb állattá szelídül: óriási – a hősnő, Hjördis ajtajánál őrködő, csak a lánynak 
engedelmeskedő – medvévé lesz (36-37). Az újkori regény születését és a realiz-
mus kialakulását Northop Frye a romance és a displacement optikáján keresztül 
jeleníti meg. „It is clear that the novel was a realistic displacement of romance 
[…]”– bocsátja előre alaptételét. Az angol regény alapítóatyái, a Robinson Cru-
soe, a Pamela és a Tom Jones írói szerinte a románcstruktúrát használják, csak 
éppen a mindennapi tapasztaláshoz igazítják. Austenben a kutató jóval több 
romantikus vonást lát, mint az irodalomtörténet általában, Scott Waverley-
románcait pedig a románcba oltott realisztikus displacement példáiként tartja 
számon. Az irodalomtörténész az új elbeszélő műfaj kiformálódásában a paródiát 
(Ortega és Bahtyin regényelméleteivel egybehangzóan) központi fontosságúnak 
tartja, de e jelenséget is a romance-hoz kapcsolt displacementként kezeli. A 
paradigmateremtő Don Quijote a lovagi románcok paródiája, a Joseph Andrews 
a Pameláé, a Northranger Abbey a gótikus regényé – szögezi le.
(a „realista” irodalomértés kritikája)
A realizmus egyoldalú képviseletével a The Secular Scripture lapjain North-
rop Frye már kezdetben, a romance elvi megalapozásakor vitába bonyolódott. 
A szerző nem fukarkodott a platóni és a keresztény esztétika bírálatával sem, 
mert ezek az eszmerendszerek az irodalmat, úgymond, csupán magasabb 
igazságok hordozójaként, s nem saját státusában, rendeltetésében méltatták 
figyelemre. Romance- és displacement-centrikus regény- és realizmuselméletét 
kifejtve azonban a kutató újabb vitára kényszerül, hiszen elképzelései sok-sok 
angolszász beidegződéssel, standarddal, ideologémával ellenkeznek. Frye rendre 
előítéletként leplezi le a mimétikus, „valószerűségre”, „külsőleges valószínűségre” 
törő tételeket, premisszákat. Meglehetős iróniával kezeli a konvencióhasznála-
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tot elfedő, teljes formálási szabadságot tettető realista ideologémákat, tagadja a 
karakterekből következő történésszervezés abszolút érvényét, a „»given these 
characters, what will happen?«” elvét, és rehabilitálja a mellérendelő, additív 
kompozíciót a célratörő szerkesztés föltétlen elsőbbségét valló vélekedésekkel 
szemben. (A két kompozíciós mód jelölésére szellemes kifejezéseket alkalmaz. Az 
előzőt ”hence narrative”-nak nevezi, az utóbbit pedig az „and then” kifejezéssel 
konceptualizálja [47].) A tudós az irodalomtörténeti folyamatokról szólva sem 
fukarkodik az iróniával. Kritikusan szól arról a processzusról, amelynek során az 
angol irodalomértésben a realizmus (a korról és az emberi természetről tudósító, 
komoly fikció) elsőbbsége evidenciaként kristályosodott ki a „mesélő”, „sztori-
elvű”, „populáris” románchoz képest. Ironikusan kezeli Northrop Frye azt a tényt 
is, hogy Dickens (hosszabb ingadozás után) végül kikerült a csekélyebb minőségű, 
szórakoztató íróknak szánt rekeszből, s méltatlannak tartja, hogy Walter Scott 
viszont belehelyeztetett. A realista hegemóniát kodifikáló F. R. Leavis könyvét, a 
The Great Traditiont a kutató az átgondolatlan, esetleges kritikai paradigmater-
emtés példájaként idézi meg, s egyetértően hivatkozik Oscar Wilde The Decay of 
Lying című írására, amely realizmus kodifikációját, úgymond, elsőként rendítette 
meg. (A realista hagyomány elsőbbségi pozíciójához Northrop Frye szerint az is 
hozzájárult, hogy az irodalomkritika mindenkor szívesebben beszél az alkotások 
„üzenetéről”, társadalmi funkciójáról, mint a tényleges prezentációról, a mű által 
megjelenített irodalmi konvenciók értelméről és összefüggéséről, s e beszédmód 
a realista elbeszélésekhez kétségkívül jobban illik, mint a románchoz, az utóbbi 
ugyanis rendszerint szembeötlően konvencionalizált struktúrát mutat [41-46].)
(secular scripture, cselekményelvű popularitás)
A mesélő, sztori-elvű, populáris irodalom védelmére a kutató ugyancsak gon-
dot fordít. E gondolati ösvény már csak azért is nélkülözhetetlen, mert könyve 
indításakor Frye a romance más szempontú megközelítését is felvázolta. A tudós 
szerint az irodalom évszázadai során létrejött művek alapvetően két nagy cso-
portot alkotnak. 
Bizonyos történetek, úgy tűnik, fontosabbak a többieknél: ezek azok, amelyek a tár-
sadalom elsőrendű érdekeltségi köreit jelenítik meg. Ezek a társadalom moráljának, 
vallásának, szociális struktúrájának, környezetvilágának, történelmének, koz-
mológiájának bizonyos vonásait segítenek megmagyarázni. A többi történet, úgy 
látszik, kevésbé fontos, és e történetek egy részéről azt szoktuk mondani, hogy szóra-
koztatnak és gyönyörködtetnek. (6)
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Az előbbieket, a fontosabbakat (a „magtörténeteket”) a szó eredeti jelentését kissé 
elmozdítva mitikus történeteknek nevezi Frye, míg a második csoportot a „fabu-
lous” értelmező jelzővel látja el. Az írások egyik nagy csoportja a „sacred scrip-
ture”, a szakrális írás, a másik pedig (mint a könyv címe jelzi) a „secular scripture”, 
a szekuláris írás fogalmával ragadható meg.1 A szekuláris írás maga a románc, 
amely tehát „világi”, „populáris”, „fabulózus”, azaz meseszerű, cselekményelvű, 
s ezt elsődlegesen a történet kedvéért, a szórakoztatás, gyönyörködtetés végett 
mondják.2 A románc differentia specificájának e nézőpontból tehát a szórakoz-
tató jelleg, a cselekményesség, kalandosság (az olvasói elvárásokat leginkább 
kielégítő szerelmi történetszál, a látványos, közvetlen izgalmi effektusok) 
látszanak3, s e popularitást az irodalomtörténésznek valahogyan igazolnia kell, 
hiszen a műfajt a fikciós irodalom magjaként, alapformájaként prezentálta. A 
populáris irodalom védelmében Frye először is műfajfejlődési érveket hoz fel. Az 
irodalom mindig a populáris, periferikus, folklór tradícióból újul meg – hang-
súlyozza Mihail Bahtyin is az orosz formalizmus nyomdokán haladva, s több 
illusztratív példát sorakoztat fel: Shakespeare és Marlowe a populáris színházra 
építettek, a nagy paradigmaváltó verseskötet, Wordsworth és Coleridge Lyrical 
Balladse evidensen a népies balladákra támaszkodott, ahogyan a tizennyolc-
tizenkilencedik századi angol prózának a populáris Deloney és nem az arisz-
tokratikus Sidney mutatott utat (28).
(mögöttes struktúrák és individualitás)
A sémaszerűség vádjának kivédésére a kutató szintén gondot fordít. A Frye-
ban roppantul erős struktúrafeltáró, szkémákat, formulavariációkat felfedő 
érdeklődés e ponton kapóra jön. A kutató nemcsak azt hangsúlyozza, hogy 
voltaképpen minden fikció sémákra épül, de azt is, hogy az irodalmi elemzés 
elsődleges feladata éppen e „sémák” vizsgálata. „Hence in the criticism of 
romance we are led very quickly from what the individual work says to what the 
entire convention it belongs to is saying through the work” (60) A romantikus, 
individualitáselvű esztétikák eredetiségigényével szemben Frye tehát a „művön 
1 A „scripture” szó természetesen’írást’, ’szent írást’ jelent, s Frye munkája kezdetén azt a látszatot 
kelti, hogy a secular scripture szakrális vonatkozásait, biblikus leszármazását rendre be fogja 
mutatni, de ez az összefüggés a későbbiekben jórészt elsikkad.
2 „[P]rimarily for the sake of the story ”, „to entertain or amuse”( 41, 6).
3 Frye románcdefinícióiból nem is hiányzik ez az aspektus. A szerző elsődleges célja a szóra-
koztatás – mondja Chaucer meséiről és Shakespeare vígjátékairól, míg másutt a „love story” 
kifejezéssel határozza meg a romance műfaji karakterét (7, 83)
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keresztül beszélő hagyomány” jelentőségét hangsúlyozza. „Literature is made 
out of earlier literature”, „[t]he work of art is made of other works of art, and 
other works of art are made of the mythic archetypes”– utal a kanadai tudós 
struktúrakeresésére, szkematikus érdeklődésére nem csekély iróniával W. K. 
Wimsatt is (Krieger 77, 85). 
(a frye-i romance-elmélet kritikai vizsgálata)
A leíró, megjelenítő bemutatást záró utolsó mondatok ironikus hangsúlya 
némileg már átvezet az értékelés világába. Írásom utolsó ízületében végül is 
ide érkezünk; a frye-i románcelméletet ismertetve néhány latoló, értékelő megj-
egyzéssel még mindenképpen tartozom. Tegyük hát egy pillanatra mérlegre az 
értékeket, hozadékokat és az esetleges problematikusságokat! Először is ki kell 
mondanunk, hogy e mérleg egészében messzemenően pozitív. A romance-ot 
energikusan képviselő kutatónak nagyon sok kérdésben igaza van. A realista 
regény sajátságaiból elvont féligazságoknak és téveszméknek valóban van mit 
tanulniuk a románc felismerése, elfogadása által kialakítható (jóval arányosabb, 
teljesebb, korrektebb) szemlélettől. Az újkori elbeszélő irodalom formáit sem 
érthetjük meg csupán a realizmusból; a novel előtti idők (több ezredév) elbeszélé-
sei hősének- és romance-karakterűek, s e tradíció a tizennyolc-tizenkilencedik 
században sem semmisül meg, hanem változatos formákban tovább él.4 
Rokonszenvesnek és termékenynek látszik a tudós irodalomantropológiai 
elképzelése is. A vágy, a teljes emberi átformálás, beteljesülés és az ellenerőt 
jelentő környezet kettőssége, nekem úgy tűnik, alkalmas fundamentum a 
művészetfilozófia számára. A harmadik évezred elején, a szélsőséges nyelvi, 
anyagi, környezeti determináltság fétisét mindenek elé helyező posztmodern 
elméletek évtizedei után különös örömmel nyugtázhatjuk az irodalom 
„humánküldetését” evidensen megőrző frye-i gondolatokat.
Fontosak, helyénvalóak az irodalomtörténeti kánonképzésre utaló vagy a 
4 A korokon áthúzódó nagyműfaj értelmében felfogott szentimentális románc Frye szerint a kései 
antikvitásban születik meg. Első megjelenési formája a görög regény (Héliodórosz, Longosz, 
Achilles Tatius, epheszoszi Xenophón), majd a római Apuleius kapcsolódik hozzá. A közép-
kori romance-ot a Barlám és Jozafát története, a szentek legendái fémjelzik. A tizenhatodik 
századi angol románcot Sidney Arcadiájával szemlélteti Frye, majd a gótikus regény, Walter 
Scott és a viktoriánus románcírók következnek. A preraffaelita William Morris az egyik legé-
rdekesebb romance-szerző a kanadai irodalmár szerint, de az időben továbbhaladva Tolkient 
és a tudományos-fantasztikus regényt is egyértelműen idekapcsolja. (SeS 3-4, 5). Meg kell 
jegyeznünk azt is, hogy a hősének és a romance elkülönítésére Frye nem fordít gondot, s az 
ezzel kapcsolatos nem csekély szakirodalomra sem utal.
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középszintű regénypoétikához kapcsolódó Northrop Frye-i észrevételek is. A The 
Secular Scripture okos, korrekciós megjegyzései nemcsak a leavisi (George Eliot, 
Henry James, Joseph Conrad elsőbbségét kodifikáló) kánont érvénytelenítik, de 
a klasszicista, realista gondolkozásmód által oly tartósan befolyásolt magyar 
irodalomértés számára is sok-sok tanulsággal szolgálhatnak. A polarizáló, 
„fekete-fehér” kontrasztot teremtő alakformálás alsóbbrendűségét, a lélektani 
motivációkhoz illeszkedő cselekményvezetés föltétlen fölényét mai irodalomtör-
ténet-írásunk is evidenciaként vallja, Jókai Mór írásművészetét is csak valamiféle 
infantilis naivság jegyében (enyhítő, mentegető gesztusok kíséretében) tudja 
értelmezni, s e premisszák a kanadai tudós útmutatásait követve nagyon is rela-
tivizálhatók, megkérdőjelezhetők.
Termékeny és tanulságos a Frye által előszeretettel használt displacement-
nézőpont is. A szemlélő e látószögből eredetet és következményt mintegy együtt 
lát, a felbukkanó, megmutatkozó sajátságot a magasabb stádium fényében, annak 
„deformációja”-ként ragadja meg. Korlátlan, túlfeszített alkalmazását illetően 
azonban már némi fenntartással élhetünk. A terminus érvényét némi szkepszis-
sel fontolgatva azt mondhatnánk, hogy csaknem minden irodalmi struktúrát 
kezelhetünk egy másik, előző struktúra átalakításaként, a kérdés csak az, hogy 
az átformáltság fokát, mértékét miként jelöljük ki, s ez akár olyan tág is lehet, 
hogy a viszonylatjelző egybevetés végül semminemű tartalmas igazsághoz nem 
vezet. Frye fentebb idézett egybekapcsolását, a Sigurd saga–Ibsen összevetést, a 
sárkány–medve analógiát is alighanem e túlfeszítés példájaként tarthatjuk szá-
mon. S a kutató néhány későbbi példája is ad okot a szkepszisre. A The Secular 
Scripture harmadik részében felbukkanó egybevetések sora például (Meredith 
Az Önzője „more displaced”, mint Sheridan Le Fanu Uncle Silasa, bár az előbbi 
is kései átdolgozása a Bibliából és a görög mítoszokból is ismert szakrális áldozat-
történeteknek) számomra legalábbis nem tűnik reveláló erejűnek (81).
(W. K. Wimsatt korábban már megidézett Criticism and Myth című tanul-
mányában ugyancsak számos példával szemlélteti Frye displacement-tech-
nikájának „vadhajtásait”. Erős iróniával utal arra, hogy a kanadai tudós Tom 
Sawyer és Becky Thatcher barlangi kalandját Thészeusz, Beowulf és Szent Györ-
gy mítoszával kapcsolja össze, a megkötözött Gulliverben Prométheuszra utaló 
paródiát lát, a Fürtrablás Belindáját pedig Proserpina elrablásához társítja 
[Krieger 95].)
Az eredetet és következményt együtt láttató displacement, nem vitás, termé-
keny szerepet tölthet be a műfajtörténeti alakulástörténet terepén is, de e 
szélesebb, átfogóbb terrénumon a korlátok még markánsabban, nyilvánvalóbban 
ütköznek ki. Bizonyos értelemben nagyon is igaz, hogy a cervantesi, defoe-i, 
fieldingi, richardsoni, austeni, dickensi regény a romance displacementjeként 
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tartható számon. De az sem igen vitatható, hogy a két struktúrát egymásra vetítő 
látószög az eredetiséget, sajátszerűséget már kevéssé képes feltárni. A frye-i 
„regényelmélet” e ponton nagyon is kiegészítésre szorul. Chrétien de Troyes és 
Henry Fielding között túlságosan nagy a különbség, ahhoz, hogy a displacement-
technikát egymagában elégségesnek gondolhassuk. A modern fikció és az irodal-
mi realizmus az egyedítő konkretizálás, individualizálás jegyében teljesen áta-
lakítja nemcsak az irodalmi művek idő- és térkezelését, környezetábrázolását, 
tárgyias, megjelenítő technikáját, de narrációját is, amint ezt már Ian Watt 1957-
es, paradigmaváltásra koncentráló klasszikus regényelmélete hitelesen 
megjelenítette.
A struktúrákat egybemontírozó displacement-nézőpont s az egyediség mögött 
szkémákat, átfogóbb struktúravariációkat kereső, univerzalizálásra törő frye-i 
szemlélet nem tud egykönnyen bánni a történetiséggel sem. Az irodalmi műfajok 
quest-mítoszból való levezetése a logikai műveletek, s nem a történetiség szfé-
rájához kapcsolódik – jelezte a történetiség elsikkadásával kapcsolatos aggályait 
már 1966-ban is a Frye irodalmi munkásságát vizsgáló Wimsatt (97). S a törté-
neti megjelenítés hiánya a modern fikció terepén kalandozva még szembeötlőbb, 
hiszen a modern regény és a realizmus nyilvánvalóan történeti fenomén. Daniel 
Defoe és társai azt a nagy paradigmaváltást reprezentálják, amelynek során az 
univerzália-elvű, tradícióhoz kötődő, „középkori” világkép empirikusabb, indi-
viduálisabb, reflektívebb gondolkozási, kifejezési formáknak adja át a helyét. Frye 
mindössze pár lapos „regényelméleté”-től természetesen nem kérhetünk számon 
részletesebb művelődéstörténeti, kulturális háttérrajzot, de valamelyes utalást, 
jelzést azért talán elvárhatnánk.
A történelmi dimenzió érvényesülhetne kissé erőteljesebben a korokon átívelő 
romance-formákat felvázoló katalógusokban, felsorolásokban s az újkori, tizen-
kilencedik-huszadik századi műfajváltozatok elgondolásakor is. Ha ugyanis a 
realizmus hátterében új művelődéstörténeti szituáció áll, akkor maga a románc 
is aligha marad érintetlen ennek következményeitől. Jómagam éppen ezért állí-
tottam műfajtörténeti töprengéseim centrumába a „modern romance” kifejezést, 
s mutattam be a tizenkilencedik századi elbeszélők által kimunkált műformát 
az évezredes műfaj legérdekesebb, legszínvonalasabb műcsoportjaként, karak-
teresen innovatív műfaji változataként. A modern romance, úgy látom, nyilván-
valóan őrzi a nagy tradíciót: a vágyelvű világteremtés pozícióit nem adja fel, az 
értékbizonytalanság világába nem lép át, a létnek értelmet adó próbatételhez 
ragaszkodik, a centrált, képességes, önazonos, magasabb entitásokkal kapcso-
latot tartó pszichikum látomását nem cseréli le a manipulációktól uralt, decen-
trált lélektanra, a szerelem azonosságteremtő szimbolikáját felhasználja, a jól 
végződő történetet igényli. Ugyanakkor a műforma mélyen beágyazódik ama 
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kor problémavilágába, amelyben az ember végletes környezeti meghatározott-
ságának és szabadságakaratának, a szimbolikus rendek szétesésének és a szilárd 
szimbolikus rend igényének, az identitásvesztésnek és identitáskeresésnek, az 
elidegenedett, lenyomat-létnek és az énazonosságot adó próbatétel-vágynak, a 
rosszul végződő történeteknek és a jól végződő emberi történet akarásának a 
dilemmája minden addigi korhoz képest nyíltabban, kiterjedtebben, egy-
etemesebben tárul fel. A negatív valóságerő és az affirmatív vágy feszültségében 
pulzáló modern romance műfaji elődeihez képest fokozottan korkifejező érvényű: 
ahhoz a kultúrtörténeti szituációhoz tapad, abban a korban emelkedik ki 
kontúrosan, amelyben a pozitív, rendező világvízió nem adottságként, ter-
mészetes lehetőségként, hanem az akadályok sokaságával szembekerülő vágyként 
írható le, s a kor gondolkozási, művészi lehetőségrendszerében már hangsúlyosan 
fölbukkan az emberrel szemben közömbös, idegen világ, a determináló környeze-
tiség, a rendezetlen, kaotikus lét, az értékcentrumoktól elvágott pszichikum, a 
„rosszul végződő történet” alternatívája.
A modern romance feltételezése már csak azért is hasznos volna Frye számára, 
mert a történeti, korkifejező tartalmasság tételezésével hidat építhetne az 
értékelés irányába is. Az axiológiai dilemmákkal a kanadai tudós egyébként sem 
igen tud megbirkózni. A rá jellemző, szkémákat, struktúrákat, mítoszi alapváza-
kat föltáró gondolkozásmód az értékelést természetszerűleg igyekszik kiküszö-
bölni, félretolni, semlegesíteni. Az irodalomkritikát meg kell szabadítanunk a 
provinciális értékelési kényszerektől – hajtogatja mindegyre Frye, s a szkéma- 
mítosz- univerzália-megjelenítéseket összemossa a tulajdonképpeni értékkel. A 
románcos strukturális séma föllelése imígyen involválja az értéket, tartal-
masságot, s kiküszöböli, nem létezővé teszi az esztétikai individualitás elvét. Az 
esztétikum individuális szerveződése, egyszeri, megismételhetetlen rétegkapc-
solati sajátszerűsége és az ehhez kapcsolódó meditációs horizont nemigen jelenik 
meg Northrop Frye gondolkozásban.
Ráadásul, mint már jeleztem, a kutató a sacred–secular, serious–fabulous, 
ellentétpárok felállításával tovább nehezítette a maga dolgát. A románc voltakép-
pen a szórakoztató céllal elmondott történet – fejtegette könyvének alapveté-
sében a tartalmasság, az egzisztencialitás, a mélyebb dimenziók feltételezéséről, 
feltárásáról lemondva. A kanadai tudós gondolatait követve némi aggodalommal 
konstatálhatjuk, hogy az antik románcok, a Robin Hood-ponyva és a gótikus 
regény, a Conan Doyle-i detektívtörténetek, a Stanislaw Lem-i sci-fik és a tolki-
eni regényfolyamok, a Wordsworth-i és William Morris-i balladák egyként és 
egyenlő ranggal románcok, s hogy egyáltalán nincs módunk értékkülönbséget 
tételezni a Jules Verne-i és Charles Dickens-i, Alexandre Dumas-i és Victor 
Hugo-i elbeszélések, a Hüvelyk Matyi s a Diótörő és az egérkirály grimmi és 
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hoffmanni meséi (a P. Howard-i légiós regények és az Arany János-i balladák) 
között. Nem az a fontos, hogy a detektívregény és a western a maga individu-
alitásában szkematikusnak, sémaszerűnek tűnik, hanem az, hogy a műfaj sémái-
nak vizsgálata feltárja előttünk a történetek szervezésének eljárásait – fejtegeti 
Frye, s a detektívregény elemzésekor sem a krimi és a „komoly” irodalmi formák 
közötti értékkülönbségeket érzékeli, hanem azt tudatosítja, hogy minden fikció 
konvencionalizált (60, 45). Az argumentáció, mint Frye-nál általában, ezúttal is 
érdekes, figyelemre méltó, de az érvek a maguk egyoldalúságában azért 
meglehetősen problematikusnak tűnnek.
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THE DIALECTICS OF MYTH:  
NORTHROP FRYE’S THEORY OF CULTURE
The year 2012 carried with it a number of interesting eschatological expecta-
tions. In the realm of new-age spirituality and superstition, 2012 marked the end 
of the ancient Mayan calendar and so was reputed to conclude with a worldwide 
apocalypse (a prediction fuelled, alas, by misreadings of the Mayan Popol Voh 
and other early Mesoamerican almanacs; see J. G. Macdonald and Webster). At 
the other end of the spectrum of rationality were the array of economists, politi-
cal analysts, and technologists who, asking no suspension of disbelief, pointed 
to hard data that 2012 would conclude various inevitable developments in our 
uncontrollable social machinery (as samples, see Farrell, Gibson, MacWhirtir, 
and Tully), and bring economic collapse and another Great Depression, open 
class warfare, long-predicted revolutions in Europe and the Arab world, and/
or the disappearance of biological humanity into a cybernetic union with the 
computer. What these divergent expectations actually represent are the two 
dominant attitudes and approaches toward myth in contemporary and even 
critical culture: the first clings against all reason to fantastic representations or 
interpretations of myth as actual events that will somehow resolve the vagar-
ies of history, while the second, claiming to have nothing to do with myth, is 
implicitly and unknowingly arguing for events of the same type. Together these 
two perspectives cast a cold light on another of 2012’s unique distinctions; as the 
centenary of the birth of the literary and cultural critic Northrop Frye, arguably 
the most influential intellectual in Canadian history1 and one of the most sig-
nificant theorists of myth and culture of the last hundred years. Since his death 
in 1991 and thus far in the twenty-first century, Frye’s reputation seems to have 
1 An issue of Maclean’s commemorating Canada Day, 1998, nominated Frye as the second most-
influential Canadian in history, and placed him at the top of its list of the ten most-influential 
Canadian thinkers and writers. In 1980, a survey of 950 academic journals found Frye to be 
the eighth most-cited author in the arts and humanities, after such giants as Marx, Aristotle, 
Shakespeare, Lenin, Freud, Plato and Barthes (see Garfield). 
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suffered the same two fates as myth itself, doubtless because of his work’s con-
stant consideration of that subject. Like myth, Frye’s work is sometimes regarded 
as hoary and far-fetched, purely literary in reference, dangerously metaphysical, 
and belonging in any case to a more primitive phase of critical culture (mere 
“genre theory”, or a “structuralism” yet to develop its coveted post-prefix) or a 
marginal, retrograde subculture (often called, with pejorative simplicity, “myth 
criticism”); or else it has been omitted from consideration altogether by an intel-
lectual establishment that rationalizes cultural phenomena in terms which are, 
unbeknownst to it, historical or political analogues of mythical events explored 
in his work. A realization born of the serious study of myth, and the serious 
reading of Frye, is that between naïve belief and dismissal lies the truth of the 
matter: that the study of myth and Frye enables a more profound understanding 
of the sources and nature of human creativity and culture, and the processes by 
which they develop. The centenary of Northrop Frye afforded us an opportunity 
to consolidate and re-assess his theory of myth, a theory which, like myth itself, 
is more complex, coherent and constructive than most recognize, and which 
clarifies otherwise obscure operations of thought, language, and culture. 
The reductive repute of Frye is partly the result of an overemphasis on the 
singular impact of a single text—Anatomy of Criticism (1957)—which remains 
one of the most influential long treatises of literary criticism, narrowly defined, 
and which does indeed track the mythic origin and development of the purely 
literary symbol. If any one of Frye’s works is cited, it is usually the Anatomy, and 
often in the mistaken impression that it represents the essence or pinnacle of 
his thought. Over the second half of his career, however, Frye produced a body 
of work which theorized more broadly and thoroughly the transformative func-
tion of myth and literature in human life and culture at large, and it is this 
larger, existential, pragmatically-visionary Frye and his writings that have suf-
fered most by our contemporary myth-conceptions and the pre-eminence of his 
presumed masterwork. Other texts in his canon,2 like The Modern Century 
(1967), The Critical Path (1971), his study of the Bible, The Great Code (1982), 
and the book that constitutes his summa, Words with Power (1990), amid his 
educational and other late essays and notebooks, have been and continue to be 
regarded as statements by and for specific fields and schools of criticism, when 
in fact they speak to the central issues in cultural theory and philosophy. Through 
such works, especially when taken together, one sees that Frye’s great achieve-
ment was to theorize and indeed demonstrate that the whole verbal and sym-
2 A canon which, as of 2012, has been completely compiled, edited, annotated and reprinted by 
the University of Toronto Press in the 30 volumes of the Collected Works of Northrop Frye.
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bolic field we call culture consists of the interrelations of myth—its creation, 
systemization, revision, adaptation, even its opposition—so that myth itself is 
revealed to be the alpha and omega of human thought: a symbolic process that 
draws it out of its material berth in nature, and takes it through the discourses 
and institutions of culture to the verge of a real (which is to say, existent, because 
created) spiritual world. In this process, the discourse and institution of criti-
cism, which Frye defines as the study of these interrelations of myth, takes on a 
special function as the increasing awareness of consciousness itself, or the devel-
opment of true self-consciousness. It is through this discourse that a redemptive 
and genuinely apocalyptic potential, which he calls kerygma, is realized, present-
ing the possibility that this process may unfold to the greater comprehension 
and amelioration of culture altogether. While a single paper cannot hope to 
clarify all these interrelations and aspects of his thought, it should be sufficient 
to show that Frye’s theory of myth may be the closest the humanities have come 
to producing what could be called, paralleling a development in the sciences, a 
unified field theory of culture.  
The cornerstone of Frye’s theory is the recognition that the birth of conscious-
ness, the origin of culture and the genesis of myth are one and the same moment: 
the moment the human animal, uniquely abled with language, realizes its state 
of Heideggerian geworfenheit,3 its inexplicable alienation in objective nature, 
and speaks over and against it. The motivation for this, Frye says even in the 
Anatomy (following Freud and others) is desire, specifically for the objects and 
goals of survival (97), which the word then comes to represent in and to what is 
a new dimension of thought, an extended subjectivity consisting of verbal and 
symbolic relations. This primal word is thus a metaphor, which Frye defines in 
one of his notebooks as a “verbal energy-current carrying out the first act of 
consciousness, trying to overcome the gap between subject and object” (LN 426). 
When an object “is given a name and made a noun, it becomes a potential object 
of perception”, Frye writes, which accumulate to create a “radius of verbal infor-
mation…run[ning] between the human body and its environment as perceived 
and experienced by that body” (WE 252). This creates a new realm between 
physical subjects and objects consisting of expressions of the perceived and, 
indeed, desired relations between them. This metaphoric extension of the con-
scious body is thus the verbal “big bang” out of which the entire symbolic uni-
verse of consciousness and culture emerges.4 It is mythic because its first stable, 
3 See Heidegger passim. In Words with Power, Frye uses its accepted English translation, “thrown-
ness” (34). 
4 “Every creation myth is some form of big bang theory”, Frye writes; “the something-nothing 
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shared unit is invariably the god, a metaphor which not only symbolizes but 
personifies some element of nature in the hope that a personal relationship 
(which Frye, following Buber, calls a “I-Thou” dialogue5) can be established, in 
which desire can be expressed with the prospect of reciprocity. This not merely 
amends the original alienation of nature but projects upon it or discovers in it 
(the difference will ultimately become irrelevant) an intelligible, numinous qual-
ity, and a spiritual dimension of existence in which narratives and the lineaments 
of eternity (the so-called archetypes) are imagined. The key point is that the 
symbolic creations and relationships that emerge from this, the founding mode 
of consciousness and discourse of culture, are myths proper. As metaphors their 
meaning is neither true nor false; their validity extends simply from being potent 
verbalizations of desire, which through the elaborations of consciousness become 
what Frye in his later work calls (borrowing a term from existential theology) 
expressions of concern.6 “A myth… is an expression of man’s concern about 
himself, about his place in the scheme of things, about his relation to society and 
God, about the ultimate origin and the ultimate fate, either of himself or of the 
human species generally”, Frye writes; “the language of concern is the language 
of myth”, and myth “is thus a product of human concern”, becoming “the struc-
tural principle… that enters into and gives form to the verbal disciplines where 
concern is relevant” (NFMC 59; WE 275). These consist chiefly of the humanities, 
and particularly religion, art and literature, but can include empirical philosophy 
and the sciences. 
Myth, then, expresses “what is particularly urgent for the community”, in the 
form of “the recognized gods, the legendary history, the origins of laws, class 
structure, kinship formations, and natural features” (SeSCT 313). The first major 
development in the cultural process is when myths “expand into a mythology” 
and develop “an encyclopedic quality” so that it can “cover all the essential con-
cerns of its society” (GC2 69). In doing so, a “huge mythological structure” (WE 
275) is created; “a temenos or magic circle is drawn around that culture” which 
then “develops historically within a limited orbit of language, reference, allusion, 
explodes into manifestation or phenomenal existence” (LN 58). For a more detailed discussion 
of this process, see Gill 107-121.
5 See Buber. In Words with Power, Frye writes: “Gods repeople, so to speak, nonhuman nature: 
sun-gods and sea-gods and storm-gods being nature back to a personal habitation, and provide 
it with what has been called…an ‘I-Thou’ relationship, in place of the environment of ordinary 
consciousness where everything is an ‘it’” (36). 
6 Frye appears to have adopted the term “concern” primarily from theologian Paul Tillich, much 
of whose work is founded upon the concept of “ultimate concern” (see Tillich 211-215). Frye’s 
reduction of this to just “concern”, or “primary concern” in Words with Power, implies a physical 
or material grounding of the concept. 
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belief, transmitted and shared tradition” (CPCT 22). This mythology soon devel-
ops a basic religious function, in the original sense of the word as “religio, the 
binding together of the community in common acts and assumptions”, a “social 
contract with gods, ancestors, and the order of nature” (CPCT 23, 240). The 
Biblical genres of law and wisdom, which Frye sees also as elements or phases 
in Judeo-Christian culture at least,7 develop from this aspect of mythology, and 
suggest something of the seriousness with which it is approached. The problem, 
however, is that “the more seriously the mythology is taken, the more it acts as 
a conservative braking force on social change” (CPCT 240); “it is quickly discov-
ered”, Frye writes, “that a unified mythology is a powerful instrument of social 
authority and coercion” (GC2 69). The inevitable tension between the authority 
of mythology and the need for social change is a dynamic which Frye has often 
been accused of ignoring,8 but which is actually central to his theory of myth 
and culture, in which it is shown to be contentious but ultimately productive. 
In The Modern Century, Frye calls the culture of compulsory belief and action 
that results from the authoritarian use of mythology a “closed mythology”. Its 
statements are presented as both “what is believed to be true and what is going 
to be made true”, “a body of premises which is superior in authority to scholar-
ship and art”. A closed mythology, Frye writes, “already contains all the answers, 
at least potentially; whatever scholarship and art produces has to be treated 
deductively with the mythology, or if irreconcilable, suppressed” (NFMC 66). A 
closed mythology, in other words, transforms mythology’s expressions of con-
cern into religious doctrine and ideology. Frye cites scholarship and art, con-
versely, because when it is conceded that other discourses speak the mythic 
language of concern, and when it is acknowledged that this “may alter the whole 
mythological structure at any time and must be allowed to do so”, it instead 
creates an “open mythology”, which ensures the continued creative expression 
of concern. Frye sees this as the great corrective that the liberal political, philo-
sophical and artistic revolutions of the Romantic period applied to the closed 
mythology of the conservative Christianity of the Middle Ages.9 Through such 
7 Discussions of the Biblical genres or phases of law and wisdom are found throughout Frye’s 
writings, but chiefly in The Great Code, and specifically 138-145. 
8 See, for instance, the influential critiques of Frye: Eagleton 80-92 or Lentricchia 9-16. 
9 In A Study of English Romanticism, Frye writes: “The Christian mythology of the Middle Ages 
and later was a closed mythology, that is, a structure of belief imposed by compulsion on every-
one. As a structure of belief, the primary means of understanding it was rational and concep-
tual, and no poet, outside of the Bible, was accorded the kind of authority that was given to the 
theologian. Romanticism, besides being a new mythology, also marks the beginning of an ‘open’ 
attitude to mythology on the part of society, making mythology a structure of imagination, out 
of which beliefs come, rather than directly one of compulsory belief… [T]he new mythology 
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a process, mythology retains or resumes its function as “an imaginative structure 
which, whether true or not, has imaginative consistency and imaginative inform-
ing power”, and makes it possible for religion to continue to “make its essential 
appeal as myth or possible truth” (NFMC, 67). Additionally, it permits the com-
mon descent of art and religion from mythology to be recognized, and the con-
nection between them: “The alliance of religion and art is based on the fact that 
religion deals with transcendent conceptions and that the arts, being imagina-
tive, are confined, not by the limits of the possible, but by the limits of the con-
ceivable.” Art and religion are thus able to continue speaking the same mythical 
language of concern, and, Frye says, “perhaps, if we think of the reality of religion 
as mythical rather than doctrinal, religion would turn out to be what is really 
open about an open mythology: the sense that there are no limits to what the 
human imagination may conceive or be concerned with” (NFMC 68). 
In The Critical Path, Frye theorizes this paradoxically self-corrupting and 
self-correcting quality of mythology in an even broader cultural context. There 
he calls the vast verbal temenos of mythology simply “the myth of concern”, and 
reiterates that it will inevitably become a tool of authoritarian compulsion; the 
result, he now specifies, of its creative expressions of concern becoming expres-
sions of “anxiety”. At the same time, however, myth contains within itself the 
seed of an opposition to this tendency, a compensatory counter-impulse that 
ensures the annunciation of concern. In its very nature, Frye reminds us, myth 
possesses a hypothetical quality that can be allied to and even be central to 
scientific and technological interests, and which allows them to interrogate the 
myth of concern from an external, objective perspective, as well as creating 
subversive political, philosophical and artistic movements within it. In his early 
writings on education, Frye calls this impetus simply “speculation”,10 but in The 
Critical Path he sees it as producing an opposed structure called “the myth of 
freedom”. There and in his late essays on education, he sees the cultural tension 
between these factors as a necessary process, which he refers to as “the dialectic 
of concern and freedom”:
“When we look at whatever it is in our own world that makes it not quite [an] abhorred 
world, but something we can live with in the meantime, we find that one of the most 
important elements is the tension between concern and freedom. When a myth of 
concern has everything its own way, it becomes the most squalid of tyrannies, with 
caused old things to be believed in a new way, and thus eventually transformed the spirit of 
their belief. It also made new types of belief possible, by creating a new mythical language that 
permitted their formulation.” (CW 17: 102) See also CW 29: xxxv-xxxvi.
10 See particularly “Speculation and Concern” (CW 7: 242-260). See also WP2 26. 
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no moral principles except those of its own tactics, and a hatred of all human life that 
escapes its particular obsessions. When a myth of freedom has everything its own 
way, it becomes a lazy and selfish parasite on a power structure….They both must be 
there, and the genuine individual can only exist when they are.” (CPCT 37)
In addition to creating a more equitable social contract which shares authority 
(usually in the form of democracy), this dialectic limits the authoritarian com-
pulsion of belief in the myth of concern by ensuring that an aspect of mythology 
remains free to continue formulating and articulating metaphors of concern. 
Initially, this allows mythology to develop socially-cohering religion on the one 
hand, and creative art and literature on the other. Later, in the area of religion 
itself, for instance, it allows theology and mysticism to develop while religious 
doctrine goes its own way. When it comes to the function of literature in a 
mature society, this dialectic allows literary criticism to discern between an 
aspect of literature that endorses belief in the closed mythology of concern and 
an aspect which invites us to recognize the metaphors of the open mythology 
of freedom, with our possession of (and our possession by) the latter as such 
opening new possibilities of experience: 
“Literature expresses the preoccupations of the society that produced it, and it is 
pressed into service to illustrate other social values, religious or political… But when 
we pass from the study to the possession of [it] a dialectical separation of a permanent 
imaginative structure from a mass of historical anxieties takes place.” (CPCT 159)
Recognizing the presence of such a dialectic in culture deepens our understand-
ing of how myth functions in it. In short, the loss of unified social authority and 
belief and a unified perspective on nature—which conservatives, reactionar-
ies, royalists and religious apologists of all kinds have often interpreted as the 
historical analogue or equivalent of an exilic myth, a “fall” into the unguided 
vagaries of history—is shown in Frye’s work to be rather a sort of cultural felix 
culpa; merely a phase in a purgatorial progress of myth in culture, suggesting 
a possible redemption from the limitations of the historical perspective in later 
developments of myth in culture. 
In Words with Power, Frye aspires to fully theorize this process, working out 
his suspicion that the workings of myth in culture, and misunderstandings of it, 
are ultimately “of a linguistic origin” (9). Since the Anatomy, Frye had pursued 
his intuition that most critical problems are the result of misconstruals of the 
polysemous nature of words, the literary contexts of which he delineates in that 
book’s “Second Essay”. Later in his career, this task was also broadened to culture 
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at large, resulting in the three contexts or types of word-usage that he discusses 
in The Educated Imagination (1962), and the three modes or phases of language 
in The Great Code. In Words with Power, Frye begins by providing a detailed 
excursus of the linguistics of the cultural process, which sees it as developing 
four modes of language with the possibility of a fifth; a prolegomenon to his 
overall theory that remains one of the unheralded triumphs in the history of 
semiotics. 
Frye’s use of a typology of language to examine the cultural process is, of 
course, adapted from Giambattista Vico’s The New Science (1744), and, like Vico’s 
scheme, is intended less to explain the evolution of language-types than to plot 
the sequence of their historical ascendancy (very likely all the types are always 
present in some form). Culture emerges, as Frye had argued previously, through 
the metaphoric or imaginative mode, which produces myths and mythology. Its 
content is not merely concern, but what Frye now specifically calls primary 
concern, which: 
“may be considered in four main areas: food and drink, along with related bodily 
needs; sex; property (i.e. money, possessions, shelter, clothing, and everything that 
constitutes property in the sense of what is ‘proper’ to one’s life); liberty of move-
ment. In origin, primary concerns are not individual or social in reference so much 
as generic… The axioms of primary concern are the simplest and baldest platitudes it 
is possible to formulate: that life is better than death, happiness better than misery, 
health better than sickness, freedom better than bondage, for all people without sig-
nificant exception.” (WP2 52) 
The metaphoric extension of the physical body sees these material needs develop, 
or develop into, imaginative or spiritual dimensions or ideals on the cultural 
plane. Essentially, the concern for food and drink develops (through rituals of 
consumption or “communion”, for instance) into a sense of community; the 
concern for sex expands into love; the concern for shelter and property creates 
the processes or institutions of technology, education, and the arts; and the 
concern for freedom of movement yields communications and intellectual and 
religious freedom. These physical needs, and the cultural aspirations and ideals 
they create, are what is expressed in myth and in the mythic dimensions of art 
and literature, if they can be discerned. 
A social authority anxious to compel belief in some aspect of myth, however, 
cannot present it merely as an imaginative or spiritual dimension or ideal; it 
must rationalize or even literalize it as truth, even fact. This means dividing 
mythology into mythos or narrative, and logos or truth, and insisting only on the 
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latter. This in turn means translating metaphor into another language which 
still figuratively addresses the human subject, but points to a separate, a priori 
or in futuro (hence objective) reality. The result is the ascent of the ideological 
or rhetorical mode, which has the effect of subordinating the goals of primary 
concern to what Frye calls secondary concern, which “arise from the social con-
tract, and include patriotic and other attachments of loyalty, religious beliefs, 
and class-conditioned attitudes and behaviour” (WP2 51). In other words, 
mythology is transformed into the discourses of ideology and religion (which 
Frye thus refers to as “applied mythology”). These serve a cultural function, of 
course; the problem lies in their tendency to obscure or at least rationalize the 
deferral of primary concern:
“An ideology normally conveys… ‘Your social order is not always the way you would 
have it, but it is the best you can hope for at present, as well as the one the gods have 
decreed for you. Obey and work.’ Persecution and intolerance result from ideology’s 
determination, as expressed through its priesthood, or whatever corresponds to its 
priesthood, backed up by its ascendant class in general, to make its mythological 
canon the only possible one to commit oneself to, all others being denounced as he-
retical, morbid, unreal, or evil.” (37)
In presuming the possibility of attaining truth in language, however, the ideo-
logical mode enables another that genuinely aspires to truth apart from the 
anxieties of social authority; the “speculation” Frye spoke of in his educational 
writings. This results in the ascendance of the conceptual mode, which claims 
to articulate whatever objective truth exists beyond the problematics of human 
subjectivity. This produces the discourses of philosophy and the sciences, greater 
and lesser systems of physics and metaphysics which, explicitly or implicitly, 
either support or refute the secondary concerns of ideology. In doing so, however, 
they assume the existence of a truth over and above the world of actual objects 
and attainable only through abstraction. When it is emphasized that abstrac-
tions cannot be aligned with such objects, it prompts the ascendancy of the 
descriptive mode, the use of language as a utilitarian lowest-common-denomi-
nator of reference to create a discourse of “common sense”. Words in this mode 
are presumed to function accurately as “servomechanisms of reality” (GC2 245) 
and to have finally attained their necessary relationship with the objective world 
(a type of meaning we paradoxically call “literal” even as it rejects the inherent 
ambiguity of letters for the supposed clarity of things). Despite the fact that, as 
the theories of post-structuralism have shown, the nature of words precludes 
their alignment with objective reality (and that expecting as much undermines 
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the concerns and truths expressed in the other modes), the descriptive mode 
nevertheless remains the dominant mode of language in our culture at present. 
From its perspective, the myths of the metaphoric mode are absurdities, and the 
derivation of the other modes from it is obscured: hence the opposition noted at 
the outset of this paper, the contemporary misconceptions that myth is either 
irrational or irrelevant. 
There is, however, another element in the cultural process; a catalytic element, 
for as Frye remarks at the outset of Words with Power, “if those who [held these] 
views… were to turn their conceptions of language inside out, something quite 
interesting might happen” (11). This catalytic element is criticism, which, Frye 
says, begins in the awareness of language itself, and that while “the awareness 
of language may begin with ordinary consciousness… it soon becomes clear that 
language is a means of intensifying consciousness” (40). As its awareness of 
language develops, criticism becomes “both the controlling and directing force 
within each verbal mode and the power that enables us to travel between the 
modes in both directions, until we reach the limit of what words can do” (41). 
Such movement allows criticism to tend to what Frye sees as its main ethical 
obligation: “to distinguish ideology from myth, to help reconstitute myth as a 
language, and to put literature in its proper cultural place as the central link… 
between society and the vision of its primary concerns” (NFR, 355). How pre-
cisely does criticism accomplish this? It does so, essentially, by demonstrating 
that the descent of the modes of language from the metaphoric does not obviate 
myth and is in fact reversible, and therefore that the consciousness or experience 
of myth remains accessible.11 This requires the use of a principle that Frye, adapt-
ing what would seem to be a potent tactic of post-structuralism, calls the exclud-
ed initiative (see WP2 25). Its operation makes use of the subverting logic of 
deconstruction in order to move beyond it: each of the modes of language, in 
descending from the previous, claims ascendency over it, but in emphasizing or 
extending some aspect of its usage actually affirms it even as it aims to supplant 
it. Identifying the excluded initiative of one mode thus reveals the efficacy and 
necessity of the previous one. 
This creates a counter-dialectic, which “progresses from the less to the more 
inclusive” (22) as it reveals that each antecedent mode is actually a fuller realiza-
tion of language’s creative potential. A critical approach to the descriptive mode, 
in which language is used to create an accurate verbal replica of a reality assumed 
to exist outside it and to which it ostensibly refers, recognizes that its excluded 
11 “Myth is the unfolding of enfolded metaphor”, Frye writes; “criticism tries to reverse the process 
and reconstitute the ‘original’ undisplaced form” (LN 108). 
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initiative is the reconstitutive word-ordering process of language itself; the fact 
that language really does require us to “put things into words”, and that our 
perception of reality actually depends on its presentation in language. A critical 
approach to the conceptual mode then observes that, by withdrawing from the 
world of objects to engage in an abstract word-ordering process, its excluded 
initiative is the human subjectivity that it necessarily conceals behind its pre-
sumably objective posture (but reveals, “on the other hand”, in subtle orientating 
expressions, verbs, even simple prepositions). A critical approach to the rhe-
torical or ideological mode then notes that this hidden subjectivity is its focus, 
as language is used to articulate and rationalize structures of social authority to 
the subject, but that its excluded initiative is, of course, myth, the metaphors of 
which ideology manipulates and selectively literalizes, but thereby preserves. 
Through this dialectical process of criticism, myth is finally revealed to be pre-
sent and potentially operative in culture and consciousness at any time. 
This conception of myth as accessible and representable by criticism at any 
point distinguishes Frye’s work from most if not all other theorists of myth, who 
tend to locate it, like Mircea Eliade or Claude Lévi-Strauss, in primitive culture, 
or, like Freud or Jung, in primitive psychological processes. While these thinkers 
also theorize the recognition or recovery of myth in culture, often in productive 
and even epiphanic breakthroughs or discoveries, what is discovered or recov-
ered is conceived as the remnant of a fading,12 problematic,13 or elusive14 dis-
course or mode of thought, not the emergence or fulfilment of one: thus their 
theories ultimately reassert the notion of myth as retrograde and render it the 
broken object of cultural salvage. For Frye, “the real meaning of a myth is 
revealed, not by its origin, which we know nothing about, but by its later literary 
career, as it becomes recreated” (SeSCT 251). There was no “golden age of pure 
mythology and primary concern”, he writes in his notebooks (LN 86), and that 
“myths complete themselves as they go on” (605). “Myths are not merely ‘tales 
of the fathers’… but confrontations with a present significance”, Frye explains 
also stating that “myth exerts a counterbalancing force to… history” by “repeat-
ing… ancestral myths” and “working out their decreed meanings” (WP2 39). 
To fully represent myth as this counterbalancing force to history and work 
out its meanings, however, one further critical act is required, which reveals the 
potential for a fifth mode of language, and constitutes the zenith of Frye’s the-
ory of culture. In revealing the presence of myth in culture, criticism resurrects 
12 As, for instance, in Eliade or Lévi-Strauss. 
13 Or more, specifically, neurotic, as per Freud. 
14 As in Jung’s complex process of individuation (1921, 1958, and 1959). 
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the metaphoric mode and must necessarily ask the question: what is its exclud-
ed initiative? In articulating the primary concerns in the imagined relations of 
metaphor, myth consists of the hypothetical (and, as per the myth of freedom, 
must remain so in literature for it to thrive amid the other modes). But what 
efficacy does this hypothetical condition conceal? The excluded initiative of myth 
can only be that its metaphors are posed not merely as hypothetical, but with 
the intention of some aspect of them being made “real”. Such a notion seems 
radical if not impossible until we recall our critical first principle that the per-
ception of reality is actually dictated by our arrangement of and approach to 
words. A critical process that began with an act of deconstruction thus proceeds 
to an act of recreation. 
This final, existential or phenomenological, leap can be taken only by the 
subject as such; the critic only guides the counter-historical process of increas-
ing self-consciousness that leads to it. But in doing so, and in pointing to its 
destination, criticism performs a sort of Mosaic function in culture, leading it 
through the labyrinthine wilderness of history and manipulated or deferred 
concern. One of Frye’s late essays, “The Responsibilities of the Critic” (1976), 
specifically focuses on this issue, and suggests that both the role that criticism 
plays, and the creative power it seeks to reveal, should be understood as pro-
phetic. In Western culture, at least, Frye writes, we develop “three elements of 
mythology”: “the two centrifugal elements of law and wisdom”, which are adapt-
ed in religion and ideology, and “an inner imaginative restructuring of the orig-
inal myth in prophecy”.15 While the former “assume… great differences of wealth 
and station in society… the prophetic insistence on preserving the form of the 
original direct relation to the god exerts an equalizing force” (SeSCT 162). Frye 
reminds us that:
“The word ‘critic’ is connected with the word ‘crisis’, and all the critic’s scholarly 
routines revolve around a critical moment and a critical act… This act, I have so 
often urged, is not an act of judgement but of recognition. If the critic is the judge, 
the community he represents is supreme in authority… all human creation must 
conform to the anxieties of human institutions. But if the critic abandons judgement 
for recognition, the act of recognition liberates something in human creative energy… 
If the critic is to recognize the prophetic, of course, he needs to be prophetic, too: 
15 In The Great Code, Frye writes: “Tolerance for creative minds as potentially prophetic, even 
without ready-made standards and certainly without any belief in their infallibility, seems to 
be a mark of the most mature societies. In the modern world, therefore, what corresponds to 
prophetic authority is the growth of… a cultural pluralism, where, for example, a scientist or 
historian or artist may find that his subject has its own inner authority.” (148)
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his model is John the Baptist… whose critical moment came with recognizing a still 
greater power than his own.” (166) 
Frye concedes that “every body of words is an ideological document, a product 
of the specific social and historical condition”, and that “[i]n this context, there 
is nothing really prophetic about any human utterance”. But the word “crisis”, 
he wants us to recall, means “turning point”, and thus:
“What the critic tries to do is to lead us from what the poets and prophets meant, or 
thought they meant, to the inner meaning of what they said. At that point, the verbal 
structure turns inside out, and a vortex opens out of the present moment, from the 
world of the [historical] cycle to the created world… It thereby suggests that the real 
course of human life may be neither a closed circle or a straight line going off into 
unknown directions… but an expanding and open-ended cycle… [The] prophetic 
keeps echoing the sense of the infinite and the eternal, not as what is meant, but as 
what is said in spite of what is meant.” (168)
The prophetic potential of the critical act is why Frye claims, as he often did, 
that “Vico’s axiom verum factum, that what is true is what we have made true” 
is the “essential axiom of criticism” (WP2 124); culture, ultimately, “ought to be 
totally intelligible to criticism [as] a cosmos of human phenomena” (137). It is 
little wonder that Frye would inquire in one late notebook entry “[w]hy I am I 
so respected and yet so isolated?” and realizes that it is “because I take criticism 
more seriously than any other living critic” (LN 120).16 
This final mode or power of language that a prophetic criticism enables is what 
Frye in Words with Power calls kerygma (Greek, “proclamation”) or the keryg-
matic. “[T]he principle that opens the way to the kerygmatic”, Frye writes, “is 
the principle of the reality of what is created in the production and response to 
literature.” Such a reality “would be neither subjective nor objective, but essen-
tially both at once, and would, of course, leave the old opposition of idealism and 
materialism a long way behind”, as well as “abandon the schizophrenic efforts 
at faith in the… sense of a simulated knowledge,… [of] ‘believin’ what you know 
ain’t so’” (119). Kerygma is instead the successful conclusion of the disciplined 
16 The rest of this notebook entry leading up to these remarks is worth considering in the context 
of the present paper: “I’m told that the structure of the Anatomy is impressive but futile… 
People don’t realize that I’m building temples to—well, ‘the gods’ will do. There’s an outer court 
for casual tourists, an inner court for those who want to stay for communion (incidentally, the 
rewards for doing so are very considerable)… It’s not a tower of Babel: that tries to reach some-
thing above itself: I want to contain what, with a shift of perspective, contains it.” (LN 120) 
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critical effort to reunite mythos and logos, myth and truth; it amounts to a reac-
quiring or fulfilment of the creative Word that humanity has traditionally attrib-
uted to God, the culmination of a process Frye elsewhere calls “the recovery of 
projection” (ENC 100). The substantiation of metaphor in kerygma reveals lan-
guage to be “an instrument of spirituality” that allows “the direct transmutation 
of desires and emotions into presences and powers that become realities in them-
selves” (WP2 11917); kerygmatic metaphor “extend[s] bodily experience into 
another dimension”, thus developing the subject’s being into what St. Paul in 
Corinthians calls the soma pneumatikon, the spiritual body, and creating a state 
in which the spiritual dimensions of primary concern can be realized (114-119). 
In kerygma, myth ceases to be an abiding or informing structure and becomes 
a “myth to live by”, and the cultural “dialectic of concern and freedom” becomes 
what Frye calls “the dialectic of Word and Spirit” (LN 100), as the call of myth’s 
creative power finally meets with a spiritual response, and the “I-Thou” dialogue 
with the numinous Other begins (WP2 232). In the last half of Words with Power, 
Frye explains that four such dialogues are possible, produced by the distinctive 
metaphors of the four primary concerns, which realize the four levels of the 
traditional axis mundi of myth in the vast imagistic clusters he labels the Moun-
tain, the Garden, the Cave, and the Furnace.18 The last of these, significantly, 
presents the revelation that our vast social and technological machinery is not 
objective to us but a collective self-extension (born of the power Frye calls “the 
titanic”, see 236-65), and thus enables our seizing and reversing of its mecha-
nistic wheel of fortune, so that it serves our needs and drives the spiral ascent 
of the infinite and eternal mentioned earlier.19 All of the dialogues combine to 
transform nature and culture into an “apocalyptic…cosmos constructed accord-
ing to the categories of human creative energy” (99), demonstrating finally that 
the real apocalypse is not some objective event in an imminent future, but the 
moment, which could be any, that our true creative potential is realized. It hard-
ly matters that it would require a worldwide paradigm-shift in cultural and 
17 Frye is quoting a phrase of Mallarmé here. 
18 Frye calls these clusters or arrays of metaphorical images “variations”, and devotes one chapter 
to each in the second part of Words with Power. In general, the images of the Mountain varia-
tion express the primary concern for freedom of movement, the image of the Garden express 
the primary concern for sex and love, the images of Cave to the primary concern for food and 
drink, and the images of the Furnace express the primary concern of shelter and property. 
Frye’s organization and discussion of these huge patterns of imagery, which is one of the more 
impressive feats in the history of comparative mythology, does much to substantiate the theory 
presented in the first part of the book. For a fuller summary, see Gill 195-199.
19 “Myth contracts time: metaphor contracts space,” Frye writes. “They lead ‘upward’ in a narrow-
ing spiral.” (LN 46)
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linguistic consciousness to bring this about; the significance of Northrop Frye 
may be that his work, like that of quantum physics on the black hole, demon-
strates that the disappearance and transformation of objects into such an event-
horizon is a theoretical possibility, if not a likelihood, given our understanding 
of the phenomena involved and our observation of their apparent inclination 
toward it.20 
If Frye’s extensive theoria, produced over fifty years in a career unparalleled 
in Canadian letters, were distilled into one central idea, it would be, as he put it 
in Words with Power, this: that “mythological thinking cannot be superseded, 
because it forms of the framework and context of all thinking” (11); likewise 
metaphor is “a primitive form of awareness, established long before the distinc-
tion between subject and object became normal, but when we try to outgrow it 
we find that all we can do is rehabilitate it” (16). Turning and returning to Frye’s 
work serves to remind us of this fact, and that even efforts to deny it may play a 
role in its process. And while Frye was constrained by our objective predilections 
to use spatial terms, to speak of myth as creating an “order of words”, of becom-
ing “total mythopoeic structure of concern” (SeSCT 254), he saw it as much as 
a process, at one with that of culture. Myth, for Frye, is the Word in all its con-
texts, descending into a structure of culture and history that it itself creates, 
until it unites with it in a fusion of process and product, and ascends to create 
something else again. The obvious analogy with religion only reflects its myth-
ic origin and the shared aspiration of myth and religion for the infinite and the 
eternal. Frye had no qualms, therefore, in admitting that while “[n]ot all of us 
will be satisfied in calling the central part of our mythological inheritance a 
revelation from God… I cannot claim to have found a more acceptable formula-
tion” (43). Given all this, it is safe to say that the misunderstandings of myth and 
the aggressive contestation of discourses, even the dismissal of Frye’s own work, 
that characterizes our present cultural milieu would not have vexed Frye, so long 
as there remained the words of myth itself, a criticism that explores the nature 
of language and thought, and the ability to speculate that a dialectical relation-
ship between them could be unlimited.
20 The quantum singularity or “black hole” cannot, of course, be directly observed or demonstrated 
since it permits the escape of no light. It can only be inferred by the observation of physical 
phenomena inclining toward it by virtue of its intense gravity. Interestingly, the first observa-
tion of the presence of a black hole is attributed to another University of Toronto professor, 
Tom Bolton, who did so at the David Dunlop Observatory north of Toronto in 1971. See Bob 
MacDonald. Physicist Stephen Hawking theorizes that matter drawn into a black hole emerges 
in a different form in a “white hole” in an alternate universe, see Hawking. 
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THE SHAPING SPIRIT AND ROUSSEAU:  
LITERARY COSMOLOGY, COGNITION, AND CULTURE
Northrop Frye had a remarkable talent for connecting the very large with the 
very small, the macrocosm with the microcosm, and the encompassing spans of 
histories of cultures and worldviews with the details of particular works of litera-
ture, even particular lines of poetry. Indeed he insisted, against those who dis-
liked either end of this spectrum of focus, that the two were inseparable. I would 
like to explore ways to connect large-scale cultural history with small-scale 
textual analysis more fully and explicitly, by developing principles for studying 
both cultural and cognitive aspects of what Frye calls “literary cosmology”. As 
an example of the big end of the spectrum, here is a key step in Frye’s cultural 
history of the Western world picture:
Rousseau is a herald of the collapse of the old dominant four-level structure 
[of the axis mundi], the ideological adaptation of the symbolism of a world “up 
there”, and the coming into being of a more revolutionary cosmos where the 
driving energy comes from below, and thrusts upward from suppressed elements 
in man’s nature. (WP 241)1At the small end of the spectrum, here is the conclu-
sion of Rousseau’s Discourse on the Arts and Sciences, an apostrophe to Virtue: 
“O virtue, … are your principles not engraved in all hearts? To learn your laws 
is it not enough for us to withdraw into ourselves and listen to the voice of our 
conscience while our passions are silent?” (227). I suggest that we may develop 
a cognitive approach to cultural cosmology that would show how the second 
passage illustrates the first by integrating Frye’s theories of literature and culture 
with those based in recent cognitive linguistics. I begin with the notion of “liter-
ary cosmology”, discussing what it is and why it’s important. I then offer a prim-
er in “poetics of mind” as a promising source of concepts and methods for stud-
ying literary cosmology. Here I emphasize analysis of metaphor in experience, 
1 As Marx and Freud would consolidate the political and psychological aspects, respectively, of 
this revolution (WP 241-42).
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conceptualization, language, reasoning, and culture; and focus on “image sche-
mas” and “force dynamics” as key conceptual structures of metaphor. Finally, I 
synthesize cosmology, cultural history and text analysis by tracing how image-
schematic metaphor patterns in Rousseau’s Discourse on the Arts and Sciences 
register the large-scale eighteenth-century reorganization of Western cosmol-
ogy that Frye describes.2 
Literary Cosmology: What & Why? 
Defending the Anatomy’s critical principles against charges of over-systema-
ticity, Frye said he thought of it as schematic rather than systematic, because 
“poetic thinking is schematic. The structure of images C. S. Lewis called ‘the 
Model’ in The Discarded Image was a projected schematic construct which pro-
vided the main organization for literature down to the Renaissance: it modulated 
into less projected forms after Newton’s time, but it did not lose its central place 
in literature” (1966 136). This encapsulates some of the major concerns Frye held 
pretty consistently throughout his career. He wanted to describe the “total form” 
of a “grammar of literary symbolism”—that is, the underlying basis of all cultural 
thought and expression; including art, philosophy, science, and everyday life. 
The Anatomy details Frye’s sense of this schematology as a “coordinating 
principle” (16) for literary criticism. “Poems of immense scope” like Dante’s 
Commedia or Milton’s Paradise Lost are central to literary and cultural mean-
ing, and lead us into studying cosmological thinking as a “schematism of cor-
respondences” which may be “a branch of myth” and hence “a structural prin-
ciple of poetry”. It is a “whole pseudo-scientific world” that: 
[B]elongs in fact, as it does in practice, to the grammar of literary imagery. It has long 
been noticed that the Ptolemaic universe provides a better framework of symbolism, 
with all the identities, associations, and correspondences that symbolism demands, 
2 Hamilton’s Anatomy shows how Frye’s approach reacted against two main critical approaches of 
his time, the historical approach that tended to reduce texts to the contexts of literary-cultural 
sources and influences, and the New Critical approach that tended to ignore such contexts, 
instead reading individual literary experiences in terms of their linguistic-rhetorical intricacies. 
Cognitive poetics, in turn, reacts against tendencies in post-structuralism to see language or 
discourse as autonomously constructing subjects and their worlds, free of relation to the realities 
of the body, the brain, and the world, and tendencies in new historicism and cultural studies to 
reduce language and literature to some form of ideology. Both Frye and the cognitive poeticians 
stress that analyses of literature and culture must integrate bodily, cognitive, semiotic, social 
and historical factors. 
Michael Sinding
• 90 •
than the Copernican one does. Perhaps it not only provides a framework of poetic 
symbols but is one, or at any rate becomes one after it loses its validity as science, 
just as Classical mythology became purely poetic after its oracles had ceased. The 
same principle would account for the attraction of poets in the last century or two 
to occult systems of correspondences, and to such constructs as Yeats’s Vision and 
Poe’s Eureka. (160–161)
Thus Dante and Milton share a schematic overall “ground plan”: “The conception 
of a heaven above, a hell beneath, and a cyclical cosmos or order of nature in 
between” (161). Comparable studies contextualize texts in specific cosmological-
cultural “backgrounds”, but Frye broadens the idea, specifying a generic poetic 
cosmology (a “ground plan”) and the organizing principles behind total forms 
(“identities, associations, and correspondences”).3 This is fundamental scaffold-
ing, which creates locations, relations among locations, and directions within 
which many other myths may unfold and metaphors may take form. In the 
Notebooks, this is Frye’s Holy Grail:
All my critical career has been haunted by the possibility of working out a schematol-
ogy, i.e., a grammar of poetic language… the kind of diagrammatic basis of poetry 
that haunts the occultists & others… I have a hope of reviving or making precise and 
detailed suggestions about—let’s say the diagrammatic basis of schematology. (NB12, 
335, 1968-70, quoted by Dolzani 23)
The search is still going strong in Words with Power. As in the Anatomy’s con-
cluding remarks on “conceptual rhetoric”, we move from the Western cosmos 
to cosmology in general, then from conceptual systems to their “diagrammatic” 
principles.4 Specific cultural mythologies create cultural cosmologies, mental 
frameworks or “envelopes” through which all members of a culture perceive and 
act on the world. It is very difficult to see around, or even see, such envelopes, 
3 Frye traces the general project of a grammar of symbolism back to Vico, and associates it with 
scholars exploring links among psychology, myth and ritual, such as Jung, Robert Graves, Joseph 
Campbell, James Frazer, Oswald Spengler, and Ernst Cassirer. Prominent studies of how the 
Western world picture serves as the background for philosophy, art and literature include Arthur 
O. Lovejoy’s Great Chain of Being, Émile Mâle’s Gothic Image, Lewis’s Discarded Image and 
Tillyard’s Elizabethan World Picture.
4 For cognitive studies that echo Frye’s ideas about conceptual rhetoric, see Turner’s proposal for a 
“cognitive rhetoric”, worked out in studies of how metaphor and other figures inform argument, 
categories and conceptual connections, and cultural literacy (Reading); Sweetser’s studies of 
image-schematic metaphor in etymological history and in mythology; and Lakoff’s proposals 
for a view of rationality that recognizes its imaginative aspects (e.g. Thinking 39-41). 
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because they are also what we see with. To illustrate, ask yourself how far it is 
possible to avoid using metaphors of some form of location or motion in space 
when talking or thinking about temporal processes (time passes, flies or drags, 
times come and go, time can be out or up), or human values (we look up to or 
follow ideals, regard them as advanced or foundational or original). Frye insists 
that such cosmologies are central to human thought and experience, and hence 
to history: “very few people even today understand how much of what has hap-
pened in the last two centuries was an effect of a change in man’s mythological 
and metaphorical picture of reality” (WP 245). Presumably Frye is thinking 
of what other scholars call the transition from “traditional” to “modern” cul-
ture, including the very widespread revolution in political thought and practice 
(towards democracy) beginning in America and France, and its ramifications 
through twentieth-century wars involving fascism and communism (arguably 
perversions of democracy, in which dictators ruled under claims to embody the 
will of the people, instead of the will of God). Beyond culture-specific cosmolo-
gies there are cross-cultural patterns of cosmological structure. Literature is 
intelligible overall because it presents a coherent human cosmos (epitomized 
in the Bible in the West), not a mere map but “a world of powerful conflicting 
forces” (xxii). “Literary cosmology” is then generalized to all schematic thinking: 
“naked formal systems” may grow out of spatial (diagrammatic and connective) 
metaphors, as with the divided line of Plato’s metaphysics. Frye suggests the 
basis of such spatial metaphors is the human body’s spatial orientation, and 
he specifies their main dimensions or types: “the metaphors that lift us up or 
bring us down, that oppose one hand to the other, look in or out, go forward or 
back” (150).
Critics should “look into” these conceptual systems and their spatial schemas, 
Frye advises, and his studies of the axis mundi provoke the question of how those 
other schemas play roles in cosmologies, literature and beyond. Frye gives some 
hints. Words with Power considers how in/out spatial relations interact with up/
down spatial relations in cosmological structure. The Romantics finalized a 
revolution in the cosmological model, locating divinity not at the upper and 
outer limit of human reality, but as a force buried within, held down by worldly 
forces (inner and outer)—we find this in Blake, Rousseau, Marx, Freud, Darwin 
and others (172-74; 239-52).5 We may examine how such cosmological struc-
5 For an earlier analysis of this pattern, see Frye’s “Drunken Boat” (StS 200-217). It may be worth 
elaborating on Frye’s account of his approach to cosmological patterns (WP 242-43). He rec-
ognizes that “bald summaries of complex thinkers” may sound “glib” and is frustrated with the 
“academic tunnel vision” that sees them only as “sweeping generalizations”. He is identifying 
similar underlying “shapes”, not similar messages. We should note that summary schematic 
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tures operate in texts, with help from recent “poetics of mind”, where Frye’s 
“diagrammatic principles” of thought are addressed explicitly and studied direct-
ly and in intriguing detail.
Poetics of Mind: A Primer
Research in the cognitive sciences has exploded recently, and there is now a small 
mountain of scholarship devoted to cognition and the arts. I cannot adequately 
summarize this mountain into a molehill, but in essence, cognitive poetics uses 
recent discoveries about the mind to illuminate the literary imagination. The 
main inspiration for this endeavour is the fairly recent branch of linguistics 
known as cognitive linguistics, but critics also use research on categorization, 
mental models, framing, perception and imagery, simulation, emotion, social 
cognition (e.g. Theory of Mind), consciousness, philosophy of mind, evolutionary 
psychology, various levels of brain structure, and more. 
Metaphor became a cornerstone of cognitive linguistics with the publication 
of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By in 1980. This “con-
ceptual theory of metaphor” was applied to literature by Lakoff and Mark Turn-
er in More Than Cool Reason in 1989. The key idea is that metaphor is a matter 
of thought more than of language: “the essence of metaphor is understanding 
and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” (Lakoff and Johnson 
2003, 5). A metaphor is a “mapping” from a “source” conceptual domain to a 
“target” conceptual domain: language, imagery, and inferential structure are 
projected from one to the other. Thus the basic metaphor “Life is a Journey” 
looks something like this:
– The person leading a life is a traveler.
– His purposes are destinations.
– The means for achieving those purposes are routes.
– Difficulties in life are impediments to travel.
– Counsellors are guides.
– Progress is the distance travelled.
– Things you gauge your progress by are landmarks.
models are psychologically real, commonplace, and necessary for thinking about complex reali-
ties (experience, ideas, and representations). The study of such “folk models” of various domains 
(e.g. physics, biology, psychology) is a major endeavour in cognitive science. These models are 
highly simplified, approximate reality only as far as needed for the thinker to get something 
done, and even experts use them. 
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– Choices in life are crossroads.
– Material resources and talents are provisions. (Lakoff and Turner 3-4)
The mapping underlies many expressions: “we’ve come a long way”, “we’re at a 
crossroads”, “stop and smell the roses”, etc. Different expressions focus on differ-
ent aspects of source and target, but they all draw on experiences of journeying 
and knowledge of how that can connect with life. Different metaphors for the 
same target are coherent to the extent that their source domains have overlap-
ping structure. Lakoff and Turner show how in Shakespeare’s Sonnet 73 meta-
phors of life as a day, a year, and a fire cohere by virtue of sharing a structure of 
waxing and waning cycle of light and heat (88).6 
Lakoff, Johnson, and Turner referred to the quasi-spatial conceptual struc-
tures of metaphor as “image schemas”—that is, “recurring, dynamic pattern[s] 
of our perceptual interactions and motor programs that give […] coherence and 
structure to our experience”, consisting of “a small number of parts and rela-
tions, by virtue of which they can structure indefinitely many perceptions, imag-
es, and events” (Johnson 1987, xiv, 29). For example, the path image schema has 
a source, a goal, and a linear trajectory from one to the other. The container 
image schema is a bounded space with an interior and an exterior. These sche-
matic concepts structure more complex concepts. The path schema is central to 
the concept of journey, a sequential linear movement following a trajectory from 
a source to a goal. The container schema is central to the concept of a body 
(human or otherwise), a physical object with a boundary containing substance, 
which can encounter other bodies (which may move in and out of one another). 
Lakoff and Johnson’s Philosophy in the Flesh argues that image-schematic met-
aphor is central to human conceptual systems, hence central to rationality, basic 
philosophical concepts, and philosophical systems. For example, we infer that 
if you’re moving along a path from A to Z, you have to pass through B, C, and D 
before getting to E. Once you start moving, you’re no longer at the source; once 
you reach the goal, you stop moving; and so on. This applies to concepts that are 
metaphorically paths, such as time (to get from time A to time C, we must pass 
through time B), and reasoning itself (to get from premise A to conclusion B, we 
must interpose the premise “if A then B”). To take another example, if con-
tainer B is in container A, and container C is in container B, then C must also 
6 Further work in this linguistic vein often goes under the name of cognitive poetics or cogni-
tive stylistics (and has tended to be European: see Stockwell; Gavins and Steen, ed.; Semino 
and Culpeper, ed.; Semino and Steen; and Fludernik, ed.). Studies addressing a broader range 
of literary and cognitive subfields often go under the name of cognitive criticism or literary or 
cultural studies (and has tended to be American: see Zunshine, ed., Jaén and Simon, ed.). 
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be in A. This applies to categories, since categories are conceived as metaphori-
cal containers. Subcategories are “inside” larger categories; so a bulldog must be 
a dog, a dog must be an animal, and an animal must be an entity. There is a 
quasi-standard list of image schemas, also including scale, link, force, balance, 
centre/periphery, near/far, etc. But the list of image schemas and the analyses of 
their roles are starting points: more such structures are out there, and there is 
much more to discover about just what they are and how they work (see Hampe 
and Johnson 2007 for recent perspectives).7 
Consequently, image schemas start looking like Frye’s spatial/diagrammatic 
metaphors, especially in accounts of how they interconnect in patterns of force-
relations to give shape and meaning to experience:
By virtue of [image-schema] superimpositions our world begins to take shape as a 
highly structured, value-laden, and personalized realm in which we feel the pull of 
our desires, pursue our ends, cope with our frustrations, and celebrate our joys. Much 
of the structure, value, and purposiveness we take for granted as built into our world 
consists chiefly of interwoven and superimposed schemata […] (Johnson1987, 125-
126)
In a remarkable parallel, we hear that a class of orientational metaphors guides 
this interweaving, and
organizes a whole system of concepts with respect to one another. […] [M]ost of them 
have to do with spatial orientation: up-down, in-out, front-back, on-off, deep-shallow, 
central-peripheral. These spatial orientations arise from the fact that we have bodies 
of the sort we have and that they function as they do in our physical environment. 
(Lakoff and Johnson 2003, 14)
To take just one example of an orientational metaphor, up is conventionally asso-
ciated with an interrelated set of metaphorical targets: happy, conscious, health, 
life, control or force, more, good, and reason; while down conventionally means 
sad, unconscious, sickness, death, lack of control or force, less, bad, and emo-
tion (15-17). The reader may share my sense that, in conjunction with the Frye 
passages above, this has a very familiar ring (perhaps “Déjà vu all over again” if 
not Kierkegaardian “repetition”). Hence my conviction that research into image-
schematic conceptual structures and their uses shows considerable promise for 
7 Concepts of force often interact crucially with what I am calling spatial schemas, as we shall 
see below. See Talmy’s study of “force dynamics” in language and thought. 
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adaptation to the study of mythology and cosmology. Image-schemas appear to 
be an important part of the “diagrammatic basis of schematology”, the nuts and 
bolts of formal systems and literary cosmologies. But how exactly can we better 
integrate them, to work towards fulfilling that promise?
Literary Cosmology as Cultural History
I propose the following rapprochement for analyzing the interplay of cognition, 
cosmology, and culture. First, we can use Frye’s analyses to specify: 1. image 
schemas relevant for cosmological structure and organization; 2. patterns of 
image schemas that define particular cosmologies and cosmological shifts in 
cultural history; and 3. how particular texts register those cosmologies and 
shifts. Second, we can bring in cognitive linguistics and poetics to refine how we 
identify and interpret image schemas in language—that is, 1. how they appear 
and operate in words; 2. how they form patterns in texts; and 3. how those pat-
terns function to conceptualize and reconceptualize worldviews. Accordingly, 
bringing these two frameworks together, I suggest that to analyze how a text like 
Rousseau’s Discourse engages with cultural history, we examine the language of 
key steps of the argument for image-schematic metaphors, and consider how the 
trajectory of those metaphors relates to organizing elements of the cosmology. 
There are a number of ways to carry out this kind of analysis of image schemas 
in discourse. In order to be relatively clear and explicit about how I identify 
image schemas, and how I analyze their operation in this text, I will underline 
terms in the quoted passages whose meanings have image-schematic qualities, 
and I will italicize terms in my own interpretations that translate the terms from 
the passage into more explicit image-schematic patterns. However, image sche-
mas are primarily mental entities with which we structure perception and 
thought, and they are more analog than digital. So they are not directly “in” 
words, but rather are evoked by words, and are manipulated, combined and 
transformed by other words as discourse proceeds. Thus I caution that this is a 
convenient means of clarification, not a well-developed method for image-sche-
ma analysis, and there is room for reasonable disagreement over analytical judg-
ments. 
The full title of Rousseau’s discourse supplies some of its basic context: Dis-
course Which won the Prize of the Academy of Dijon in the year 1750, on this 
question Proposed by the Academy: Has the restoration of the arts and sciences 
[i.e. since the Renaissance] been conducive to the purification of morals? To sum-
marize, Part I gives the basic argument about how the arts and sciences are 
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corruptive rather than beneficial; then adduces historical examples of cultures 
that either indulged in the arts and sciences, lost all their virtues and were 
enslaved; or rejected them and were virtuous, strong and free. Part II presents 
a deeper “philosophical investigation” (216) elaborating on the origins, objects, 
and effects of the arts and sciences. For purposes of demonstrating how image-
schematic metaphor in argument registers cultural cosmology, I will focus on 
the more detailed argument in Part II, which sets out the psychosocial mecha-
nism of how the arts and sciences are corruptive. In particular, I consider a 
passage early in Part II answering the essential question: “Is it better for an 
empire to be brilliant and short-lived, or virtuous and lasting?” (219). I then tie 
this into the opening historical-mythical account of the social dynamics of civ-
ilization, and the concluding apostrophe to virtue. 
Answering the question he sets himself, Rousseau says, paradoxically, that 
individual brilliance is impossible in an empire that favours brilliance. Once 
brilliance becomes a popular and rewarded value, it becomes trivialized, as a 
“taste for ostentation […] excludes a taste for honesty”: “souls that have been 
degraded by a multitude of trivial concerns can never rise to anything great; and 
even if they had the strength, they would lack the courage to do so” (219). The 
argument is a metaphoric image-schematic myth: the soul’s energies are pulled 
down and away from attachment to its true inner feelings (honesty) by many 
small attachments to external surfaces (ostentation). By contrast, rising to great-
ness by strength involves a unified energy breaking from attachments that would 
disperse it. Rousseau then links this scenario with what I’ll call other-orientation. 
The artist’s need for applause is directly connected to bodily power and thus to 
a social hierarchy based on sex. In civilized cultures men defer to the “faint-
heartedness” of female taste. To win praise, therefore, artists sacrifice “strong 
and manly beauties” to “false delicacy”, and “great things” to “small ones” of “the 
spirit of gallantry”; he “lower[s] his genius to the level of his age”. That is, giving 
in to the pull of the preferences of outside others for the small, fine and faint 
also leads to weakness and lowering of inner energies (linked to femininity), 
which leads to dependence on those outside opinions. Thus “the dissolution of 
morals, the necessary result of luxury, in turn brings about the corruption of 
taste” (219). 
The argument indicates that even concepts like “luxury” and “corruption”, 
while not self-evidently image-schematic in the way that words like “rise” and 
“lower” (and to a lesser extent “trivial” vs. “great” as small and low vs. large and 
high) are, appear to have image-schematic interpretations not too far away. This 
is because they are causally connected with more clearly image-schematic terms 
like “dissolution”, which evokes something like a solid mass melting into fluid or 
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breaking apart into many small pieces. Those imagistic interpretations are pow-
erful aspects of word meanings, guiding how words may be connected with other 
words, in thought and in discourse (and presumably in other modalities, such 
as the visual). And “luxury” and “corruption” are key concepts in the cultural 
vocabulary of the period, and played major roles in the discourses (in the Fou-
cauldian sense) and symbolism that drove major cultural and political change.8 
We may now put this psychosocial argument in the context of the opening 
and concluding discussions of various types of people. The opening attacks the 
source and effects of this other-orientation for non-artists. The supposed advan-
tage of the arts in making men more sociable “by giving them a desire to please 
one another with works” (207) is actually a liability. Society’s needs are bodily; 
only its amenities are mental. The arts and sciences only “civilize” people by 
strewing “flowers on the iron chains that bind them”, making them forget their 
“original freedom” and causing them to “love their slavery”. A “delicate, refined 
taste”, a gentle character and urbane manner provide only a false “appearance 
of all virtues” (208). It would be pleasant if “our outer appearances always mir-
rored what was in our hearts, if decorum were virtue” (208). But virtue dislikes 
pomp: “Luxurious clothes may indicate an opulent man, and elegant ones a man 
of taste, but a healthy and robust man is recognized by other signs: It is beneath 
the rustic attire of a plowman, not the gold braid of a courtier, that bodily 
strength and vigor are to be found.” (Here I also underline terms for images that 
are conventional markers for image-schematic metaphors, such as “heart” for 
inner self or feeling, and “clothes” and “attire” for external surface properties 
and behaviour that cover up self/ feeling to present a crafted public persona to 
the world.) He makes the moral metaphor explicit: “Finery is equally alien to 
virtue, which is the strength and vigor of the soul.” Thus the “upright man is like 
a wrestler who prefers to fight naked: He scorns all those vile trappings which 
would hinder the use of his strength and were invented […] only to hide some 
deformity” (208). The image-schematic complexes of inner body substance with 
an inner source vs. artificial surface applied from without are predominant here. 
But there are also the axial aspects that Frye emphasizes: virtue-strength is 
“upright”; and there is a contrast of gentle slavish deception vs. strong honesty 
8 For example, Maza argues that the concept of “luxury” was crucial for French revolutionary 
polemics against the ruling classes. Luxury was a selfish mentality resulting from commerce. It 
started at the top of society and flowed to the bottom, leading to moral decay and decomposi-
tion of the bonds of love and duty holding society together. The fear of social dissolution was 
heightened in an age when “desacralization” was destroying traditional belief in the monarch 
as the unifying heart of society. I find strong image-schematic qualities in Maza’s account of 
luxury, which might help account for its easy communicability and emotional power. 
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that is linked with a wealth/class scale (upper vs. lower) via images of clothes 
and body.
The conclusion accepts that a few great talents can and should pursue knowl-
edge on their own, those who can “cover […] immense distances”, who are “strong 
enough to follow their predecessors’ footsteps alone, and go beyond them” (226) 
regardless of praise and blame. But “ordinary men” should break their other-
orientation by ignoring the arts and sciences that foster it. “Why should we seek 
our happiness in the opinion of our fellow men if we can find it in ourselves? […] 
[We should] limit ourselves to fulfilling our own [duties].” Again, virtue’s prin-
ciples are “engraved in all hearts” so let us “withdraw into ourselves and listen 
to the voice of our conscience while our passions are silent” to find them (226-
27). Those with extraordinary force are encouraged to follow paths of achieve-
ment, beyond the limits and goals others have arrived at. The ordinary should, 
by contrast, renounce the urge to move outwards for others’ goals, and stay 
within limits of the self, moving inwards to perceive direction (read virtue’s 
engraving, hear conscience’s voice) and pursue goals of duty and happiness. 
Conclusions
The schematic imagery in the text’s language and argument focuses on the 
inner/outer contrast more than on an axial above/below contrast. Causal rela-
tions among souls depend primarily on the attachment or detachment of inner 
substance to outer surfaces: attached soul-substances get pulled apart, weaken, 
decline, and dissolve; while the detached soul, contained in and oriented to 
itself, remains solid (integrity) and (if ordinary) attends to words within, or (if 
extraordinary) rises up strongly and attaches to great things above and beyond. 
The axis is there, but axis-inversion is only implicit, in Rousseau’s elevation of 
lower classes over higher classes: praise of hardy, substantial, ignorant, pure 
rustic forebears as more virtuous than luxuriously corrupted, superficial, and 
flimsy but sophisticated upper-class contemporaries. (The lower have purity of 
heart, while the upper have deceptive fancy dress.)
It would be worthwhile to analyze other texts in the revolutionary tradition 
in these terms. One would expect to find a range of variation of the overall 
schematic structure, within a broader coherence of “world picture” (as with 
Frye’s comparison of Rousseau and Blake with other thinkers). But we might use 
the analytical framework and terminology of image schemas and conceptual 
metaphors to specify both the coherence and the variation between the struc-
tures analyzed. More importantly, this reading shows, I hope, that the diagram-
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matic principles used to structure images, word meanings, concepts, and dis-
course (both narrative and argument) are connected to one another—for 
example, upwards is also outwards and downwards is also inwards, and they 
change in tandem. It also shows that powerful and flexible tools are available for 
analyzing image-schematic and diagrammatic structure in texts and cosmolo-
gies, and that such analyses may be geared to one another for purposes of cul-
tural history—for tracing the development of literary cosmologies across tex-
tual traditions. 
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NORTHROP FRYE  
AND THE NEURAL THEORY OF METAPHOR
The main objective of this paper is to examine how the concept of metaphor in 
Frye’s theoretical architecture can be related to the recently emerging neurosci-
entific studies. In particular, I suggest analyzing Frye’s theoretical statements 
on metaphor in Anatomy of Criticism and the Late Notebooks, and relate them 
to the current stream of innovative research viewing rhetoric—and some of its 
key concepts, such as the metaphor—as a neural-based complex system. To this 
purpose, I will examine Frye’s fundamental concepts searching for elements 
contemporary scholars—such as George Lakoff—have grounded their theories 
of neurorhetorical on.
The concept of metaphor as identity is one of the tenets in Frye’s theoretical 
architecture. It is therefore apposite to consider the definition given in the “Glos-
sary” of his Anatomy of Criticism. According to it, a metaphor is a relationship 
between two symbols, and it can be literal (based on juxtaposition and stating 
that A is B), descriptive (based on similarity and stating that A is in some respects 
comparable to B), formal (based on four terms and stating that A is to a certain 
quality as B is to the same quality), anagogic (based on the potential global 
identity of everything within the frame of literature) (366). This universal aspect 
of metaphor seems to lead to a clearer understanding of the connection between 
Frye’s concept of metaphor and the neuroscientific analysis of metaphor. More 
deeply, if we read his speculations in his Late Notebooks, we find an illuminating 
explanation as he specifies the steps leading to the definition of the Anatomy:
Metaphor is the statement “A is B” which carries with it the realization that A is not 
in the least B. It is logical & a statement of difference in what it expresses; it is anti-
logical in what it asserts. So it’s counterlogical, creating an identity, opening a current 
of energy between personal (subjective) and impersonal (objective) worlds. ( 3-4)
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Frye investigated and defined metaphor essentially as a linguistic phenomenon,1 
while some scholars have recently tried to demonstrate that metaphor lies at the 
basis of our thought: in other words, metaphor is thought itself—not merely a 
linguistic element, but a neural process of human understanding. Frye maintains 
the controversial and exceptional nature of metaphor, its extraordinary status as 
a figure of speech with a special, inherent quality. In the in the Late Notebooks, 
he himself points out: 
Every one of the standard figures of speech, except metaphor, draws attention to the 
fact that it’s “just” a figure. The simile has its reassuring “like”, the oxymoron draws 
attention to its self-contradiction; the hyperbole to its excess; the synecdoche to its 
deficiency; the metonymy to its “signified”. Only the metaphor says “This is {not}”. 
Juxtaposition of two images suggests identity, whether asserted by “is” or not; the fact 
that there are two images to be juxtaposed suggests the “is not” counterpoint. (171)
In other words, metaphor as a concept encompasses the linguistic terms, but 
covers a wider field of knowledge. It is precisely at this point—the point of the 
cognitive status of metaphor—that the neuroscientific perspective comes into 
play. In particular, George Lakoff and some fellow scholars based at the Univer-
sity of Berkeley, California, have recently delved into a neural theory of meta-
phor. Starting from a cognitive approach, they have identified root (or primary) 
metaphors as conceptual instruments the individual uses to encode and organize 
knowledge about the external world. In other words, they state that metaphor 
is a tool of knowledge, or that the individual knows through metaphor. In these 
terms, metaphors are essential to the individual’s processes of conceptualization 
of abstract domains. To summarize their theory: metaphor is an instrument for 
knowledge and especially of generalization from a concrete, material element 
leading to an abstract idea of that (Knowles and Moon 54)2. In fact, considering 
the importance of basic sensorial experiences in the individual’s early life, there 
are some equally basic metaphorical processes that everyone activates to build 
some knowledge along a path leading from the materiality of the senses to the 
abstraction of the concepts. “Purposes are destinations, Difficulties are impedi-
1 “Metaphor, then, suggests a state of things in which there is no sharp or consistent distinction 
between subject and object. […] Metaphor, as a bridge between consciousness and nature, is in 
fact a microcosm of language itself” (MM 7, 115). 
2 Comparing the processes underlying metonymy and metaphor, Knowles and Moon explain 
that “metonymy is about referring: a method of naming or identifying something by mention-
ing something else which is a component part or closely or symbolically linked. In contrast, 
metaphor is about understanding and interpretation: it is a means to understand or explain one 
phenomenon by describing it in terms of another”. (54)
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ments to motion, Intimacy is closeness” (Lakoff) are some of the most familiar 
primary metaphors that have been accounted in an inventory. Such conceptual 
metaphors are mainly learned and used automatically by the individual who uses 
them to define reality. This is to say that they are universal and independent of 
human control. 
Even more recent realizations in the field of neurosciences have shown that 
complex metaphors are made up of simple metaphors. In his 2009 paper “The 
Neural Theory of Metaphor”, Lakoff discusses the example of the “Love is a 
Journey” metaphor as a compound of conceptual metaphors and commonplace 
knowledge. He emphasizes that each element of the compound represents a node, 
that is to say a group of neurons that activates or inhibits the function of other 
neuronal groups. The production of “Love is a Journey” entails the activation of 
complex neural circuits as “a given node may occur in many circuits made active 
by the metaphor”. He then goes on to state that “a metaphor mapping is a com-
plex circuit which, when activated, activates many other circuits via linking and 
binding circuitry”3.
According to Lakoff, a complex mapping corresponds to the basis of the pro-
cesses of human understanding and coincides with the complex net that under-
lies also metaphor production. We could simplify this by saying that we know 
through metaphor. It is precisely this special status of metaphor that was rec-
ognized in the seventeenth century by the Italian scholar Giambattista Vico and 
subsequently revived by Frye. In her Northrop Frye and the Poetics of Process, 
Nella Cotrupi makes it clear that: 
According to Giambattista Vico the world is not discovered through language; it is 
called into being in language in the metaphorical identifications of the poetic genera, 
and gradually, through the animation and nomination of matter into a heap of “un-
related synechdochies and metonymies”—by the invention of a “god for each identi-
fied aspect of nature or experience”… Vico underscores the corporeal, sensory, and 
concrete ground of language and thought by noting that “in all language the greater 
part of expressions relating to inanimate things are formed by metaphors from the 
human body and its parts and from the human senses and passions. Thus, head or top 
for beginning; the brow and shoulders of a hill” and so on. (73)
3 Moreover, Lakoff underlines that such a tightly integrated neural system helps us define meta-
phorical inference as new activations that happen through prior activations.
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Vico’s words point to the cognitive status of metaphor and the process of gen-
eralization from the concrete to the abstract level, which much of Frye’s critical 
studies revolved around. Indeed, the Late Notebooks echo Vico:
Metaphors are not attempts to force identity through overstrained analogies that leave 
out everything important. They are verbal energy-currents carrying out the first act 
of consciousness, trying to overcome the gap between subject and object. Creation 
wasn’t necessarily made for the sake of human consciousness, but consciousness is 
the human response to creation. (426)
I know that the theory of metaphor is very complex, or has been made so by exuberant 
philosopher-critics, but I want to explain its basic principle very simply. A statement 
of identity like A is B introduces us to a universe in which unity and multiplicity are 
alternating aspects of the same phenomena. ( 619)
Though no definite conclusions can be drawn from considering Frye’s theory 
of metaphor in the light of recent neuroscientific achievements, the subtle fil 
rouge connecting Frye’s—and Vico’s—meditations on the complex processes of 
understanding and the creation of knowledge might be recognized in current 
neuroscientific research. We could even dare to consider Frye and Vico as ante 
litteram cognitive scholars.
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A TRIBUTE TO THE GREAT CODE
Voltaire’s Lisbon Poem, Mikes’s Letter CXCVIII and the Book of Job
Comprehensive as his view of art is, Blake does not exactly 
say that the Bible is a work of art: he says “The Old & New 
Testaments are the Great Code of Art.” The Bible tells the 
artist what the function of art is and what his creative 
powers are trying to accomplish.
 Northrop Frye, 1951
“The Old & New Testaments are the Great Code of Art,” 
Blake says, and he thinks of the framework of the Bible, 
stretching from Creation to Last Judgement and survey-
ing the whole of human history in between, as indicating 
the framework of the whole of literary experience, and 
establishing the ultimate context for all works of litera-
ture whatever.
Nothrop Frye, 1963
But the Bible is just as obviously “more” than a work of 
literature […] Even Blake, who went much farther than 
anyone else in his day in identifying religion and human 
creativity, did not call it that: he said “The Old and New 
Testaments are the Great Code of Art,” a phrase I have 
used for my title after pondering its implications for many 
years.
Northrop Frye, 1982
Referring to “the Great Code” is not the same as talking about The Great Code, 
but using that resonant phrase in any way one is paying tribute to the Bible, to 
William Blake and, inevitably, to Northrop Frye. No matter how often Frye’s 
specific views have been contested in literary criticism and biblical scholar-
ship, or how persuasively his conclusions have been refuted in some particular 
instances, on the centenary of his birth his legacy is still as inspiring as ever, and 
his methodological innovations are still applicable when we are trying to explore 
the biblical connections of a literary text or the literary connections of a biblical 
Péter Dávidházi
• 108 •
text. In order to demonstrate the relevance of his œuvre from the “Danubian 
perspective” of a Budapest conference in 2012, and to attempt yet another answer 
to the question “what work might scholars now take up in light of that legacy?” 
(Kee 2002, 1), this case study investigates how much a scholar may benefit from 
applying Frye’s insights to a comparative analysis of two classic literary works 
with a common, if latent, biblical subtext. Both Voltaire’s Poëme sur le désastre 
de Lisbonne ou examen de cet axiome: tout est bien and Kelemen Mikes’s letter 
CXCVIII in his Letters from Turkey were prompted by the Lisbon earthquake 
of 1755 (Voltaire 2009, 335–349; Mikes 2009, 248–249), both responded to the 
problems of theodicy, and both alluded to the Book of Job. However, the arche-
typal method is adapted here so as to reveal not only similarities, but also to 
highlight (and celebrate) characteristic differences that may refine some of our 
expectations about Voltaire and, even more surprisingly, may also refute the 
usual classification of Mikes as the foremost Hungarian representative of early 
Enlightenment literature. They reveal another Mikes, but one who is no less 
worthy of the Europe-wide scholarly attention he has just begun to receive.
Retrieving a Much-disputed Method: 
How to Use Archetypes for Interpretation
Though originally Frye’s archetypal method was not meant to substitute for 
other approaches to literary texts, and indeed it was humbly suggested as merely 
one of the diverse methodologies peacefully complementing each other for the 
benefit of the discipline (Frye 1963a), it has become customary to ignore the fact 
that a distribution of labour was intended, and to chastise archetypal criticism 
for being too devoted to abstractions to cope (alone) with all the significant tex-
tual details of literary works. Moreover, Frye’s remark that “[t]he literary universe 
[…] is a universe in which everything is potentially identical with everything 
else” was often and triumphantly paraphrased with complete disregard to its 
context in Anatomy of Criticism, a carefully guarded argument which was meant 
to expound “A is B” so as to epitomize the radically metaphoric nature of poetry 
(124, 136), and it was taken invariably as a give-away of Frye’s own disregard of 
concrete particularities. When levelled against his last three books that were 
focusing on biblical matters (The Great Code, 1982, Words with Power, 1990, 
The Double Vision, 1991), the charge sounded plausible enough partly because 
his expertise in the minutiae of ancient cultures and languages was admittedly 
inadequate for autonomous biblical scholarship. “I don’t know how much Greek 
& Hebrew I’m going to have to pretend to know” (2003, 251), Frye wrote in his 
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notebook in the mid-1970s when planning the chapter on biblical language for 
The Great Code, and the book’s introduction makes no less sincere admissions 
of his own “lack of scholarly competence in the primary fields” (xiv), which his 
critics were quick to corroborate, mercilessly exposing the flaws of even Frye’s 
notebooks from the period when he wrote the book (Munk 570–572). 
But the charge of insensitivity to concrete details sounded plausible also 
because it had a familiar ring. Robert Alter, eminent scholar and translator of 
the Hebrew Bible, complained recently that “[t]he essential weakness of Frye’s 
critical system, which is particularly transparent in his treatment of the Bible, 
is that it is interested in the individual literary text chiefly as a confirmation of 
the general pattern, and hence it has no adequate instruments of attention for 
the compelling or surprising peculiarities of the individual text” (2002, 14–15). 
This critique was freshly documented, more amply and perhaps with more exper-
tise than ever before, yet it revives and recontextualizes the objection of the New 
Criticism, formulated most succinctly by W. K. Wimsatt half a century ago, to 
Frye’s tendency to study each literary utterance “under the most universal 
aspects possible”, and to his penchant for a schematism that unifies diverse and 
disparate elements, as well as to his over-reliance on “this ruthless, categorizing, 
assimilative, subsuming drive of his theory” (90). Though Anatomy of Criticism 
(1957) was quickly and widely acknowledged as a milestone in the history of the 
discipline, and enraptured reviewers called it the first book that opened up new 
perspectives since Aristotle (Raditsa 18, Corke 81), several major historians and 
theorists of literature spelled out their serious reservations about Frye’s method. 
David Daiches admitted that his categorizations and classifications were “fasci-
nating”, but he hastened to add that ultimately “such a method is bound to be 
reductive, subsuming different works in a class, […] always pointing to what a 
given work has in common with others rather than revealing its special differ-
entiating qualities” (345, 349, cf. Kenyeres 92–93). René Wellek likewise noted 
with dismay that Frye’s speculations are “completely uncontrollable” (meaning 
that they are both unverifiable and unfalsifiable), and he castigated several man-
ifestations of the levelling tendency: “all distinctions of artistic value disappear: 
the simplest folk tale will fit just as well as Hamlet” (1963, 337–338), in this grand 
scheme “all distinctions between periods and styles are abolished” and “the old 
distinctions between myth, symbol, and allegory disappear” (1970, 102–103). 
Ironically, Wellek, whose opinion is the final proof of how diverse the critics were 
who opposed this aspect of Frye’s method, at the beginning of his own career, 
back in 1937, had been similarly castigated by F. R. Leavis for the same meth-
odological heresy, that is, for being too much of a systematizing philosopher to 
recognize the ultimate concreteness of any work of art, and for overlooking the 
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essential difference between the respective kinds of reading suitable to poetry 
and to philosophy. The literary critic, riposted Leavis in their Scrutiny debate on 
literature and theory, “must be on his guard against abstracting improperly from 
what is in front of him and against any premature or irrelevant generalizing” 
and should not forget his first and foremost concern, that is, “to enter into pos-
session of the given poem (let us say) in its concrete fullness” (32). As Frye’s 
opponents reverberate these charges up to this very day, and their truth is taken 
so much for granted that his defenders look for compensating merits elsewhere 
in his work (cf. Cording 161, Kenyeres 44, 92–93), it is time to reverse the logic 
of reassessment and look for the saving grace in the much-disputed frailty itself.
If lack of concreteness is the malady, it can also be used as a recipe for the 
cure. Surprisingly, there may be great potential in what is usually considered the 
most disabling aspect of archetypal classifications: their obsessive, almost exclu-
sive focus on similarities. Undeniably, such a predilection for resemblances 
requires a relatively distant point of view: the closer we look, the more differ-
ences become discernible, and our refined methods of seeing would magnify 
these inequalities even further, as Coleridge’s haunting metaphor reminds us: 
“[t]he razor’s edge becomes a saw to the armed vision” (68). No wonder that Frye 
called our movement towards the archetype a “backing up” from analyzing ver-
bal structure, a step-by-step growing of our distance from the concrete surface, 
just like when we back up from studying the brushwork of a painting to see its 
overall composition. Using Frye’s own example, the grave-digger scene in Ham-
let, this process of gradual distancing leads through a series of stages belonging 
to their respective methodologies: first we may study the scene in its actual words 
and gestures, then we back up to look at its imagery, we back up further to its 
psychological relations, even further to its genre, finally to its archetype (1963a). 
But if so, one may add, then of course none of these methodologies can be expect-
ed to deliver all we need to know. The microscopic view of a study of verbal 
meaning (aptly called “close” reading) cannot move far beyond the immediate 
local texture; the other extreme, an account of the archetype of a literary work 
can rarely, if ever, be expected to match up completely with the whole array of 
minute details, and it always will, inevitably, skip some of them. This is not to 
say that anything goes; evidently, whenever a supposed archetype would be 
incompatible with a relevant lexical item, we would insist on its use at our own 
peril. 
But sheer difference is not necessarily incompatibility. If chosen well and 
applied carefully, an archetype can be a good heuristic device precisely because 
of its shortcomings: when juxtaposed with the text, it can reveal the extent and, 
more importantly, expose the limits of similarity, thus it can highlight those 
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ultimate differences that could not have been perceived and analysed in any 
other way. As T. E. Hulme once noted, the variety of curvatures offered by the 
wooden set called “the architect’s curves” can only approximate “the exact curve 
of the thing” that any real artist would uncompromisingly want (132–133); but, 
one should add, in literary scholarship we have good reasons to choose the arche-
type closest to the exact curve of the work of art in question, not as a compromise 
but as the best means to reveal the residual differences that characterize the 
work. The archetype is always to be chosen from several possibilities and for 
specific purposes, hence to some extent it is always self-serving and even arbi-
trary, but if well-chosen, the similarities and differences it exposes are equally 
relevant for the ensuing interpretation. Sometimes a sheer discovery of compet-
ing rival archetypes may lead to an insightful interpretation; a good example is 
Frye’s contention that Job misreads the nature of his situation: whereas Job 
assumes that he gets his ordeal due to a retrospective trial, in which case his 
suffering must be punishment to make any sense at all, his ordeal is much more 
probably due to a prospective, forward-looking trial that is meant to precipitate 
his improvement in the future. “Job does not know either that there are two kinds 
of trial, the purgatorial trial which is a testing and refining operation, and which 
is directed toward what one can still be, and a trial of accusation like the ‘last 
Judgement’, which pronounces on the past. It is the former that he is really 
involved in, not the latter as he thinks.” (1990, 310–311, cf. 2003a, 559, 562) In 
this case the actual phrases, similes and metaphors in the Book of Job support 
the testing and refining trial as the archetypal situation chosen for comparative 
analysis. But in other cases, when we see minor discrepancies between word and 
archetype, we may find them worth studying because they can provide, at the 
very least, a basis for negotiation, which, in turn, tells us more about the text in 
question than any (seemingly) neat correspondence and (seemingly) flawless 
interpretation ever would. 
Hence any critique is welcome because it refines rather than discredits. Users 
of the archetypal method should be grateful to Alter’s objections and cannot 
afford to ignore them; indeed “[h]is argument may inspire Frye’s readers to artic-
ulate how precisely identities discerned relate if at all to the differences adduced; 
they will need to consider how to make those identities palatable to those who 
find the differences paramount” (Donaldson 13). True, Frye’s reference to the 
Leviathan in his account of the Book of Jonah does not exactly dovetail with the 
dag gadol (גדל דג) meaning simply “a big fish” in the Hebrew text (Alter 16), and 
Frye was either not aware of the discrepancy or did not consider it serious enough 
to worry about its consequences. The same applies to the ketonet passim (פסים 
 in the story of Joseph, a phrase in Gen 37,3 that Frye, following the King (כתנת
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James Bible, translates as a ‘coat of many colours’ and takes as belonging to 
fertility-god imagery (1982, 176), which Alter considers arbitrary, partly because 
he does not see any evidence for this connection, partly because the Hebrew 
term, translated as “a coat of many colours” in the King James Bible, probably 
refers to ornamental strips and not to colour. Alter recalls that in 2 Sam 13,18, 
where Tamar wears it, the narrator notes that “the virgin princesses did wear 
such robes”, so the tunic, whether coloured or ornamental, “is thus identified by 
the Bible itself not with pagan ritual but with social status” (2002, 15). But the 
either/or is slightly misleading here, and much as we have to be grateful for 
Alter’s austerely positivist question (“Is there really a documented correspond-
ence between fertility gods and particoloured coats?”), it turns documentedness 
into an absolute criterion that would make any interpretive statement well-nigh 
impossible. One of the questions we should ask in the light of Alter’s philologi-
cal correction is whether the ketonet passim even as an indication of the social 
status of royal virgins might not also signify (on another level) a promise of 
fertility as well. Maybe the two interpretations are compatible because the robe’s 
ornamental strips or colours could also herald or indeed celebrate the future 
fertility of those virgin princesses. By the same token, shouldn’t we ask whether 
the big fish, despite (or because of) the generic universalism of the term, and (let 
me add) by the playful yet fearful symmetry of the chiastic consonants in dag 
gadol, may also be taken as a metaphor of the sea monster? Are they simply dif-
ferent or are they incompatible as well, even on different levels? Trying to answer 
these questions may improve our method because it can reveal (or refute) the 
heuristic propriety of the archetype chosen. Although there is much truth in 
Alter’s complaint that “[t]hrough centuries of Christian supersessionism, Hebrew 
Scripture was systematically detached from the shifting complications of its 
densely particular realizations so that it could be seen as a flickering adumbra-
tion of the Gospels that were understood to fulfill it” (2002, 21), identifying this 
strategy of appropriation with Frye’s method is a little unfair, and the flat dis-
missal of both as “hardly a reading practice we want to revive, either for the Bible 
or for secular literature” (2002, 21) would throw out the baby with the bathwater. 
Critical remarks about the residual discrepancies between an archetypal inter-
pretation and the verbal details of the text are always welcome correctives, but 
one could also argue that those discrepancies are inevitable consequences of the 
very nature of archetypes and may provide an opportunity to refine our under-
standing. 
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“What dreadful news have we heard?” 
In Search of the Best Heuristic Archetype
On November 1, 1755, the Lisbon earthquake devastated a huge part of a popu-
lation mostly in the churches for the mass of All Saints Day. The horrible news 
reached Voltaire in Geneva in about three weeks, and Mikes in Rodosto, Turkey, 
in more than two months. Both authors started to work on their respective works 
soon enough, and although we don’t know (and most probably they did not know) 
just when their spontaneous responses to the news turned into the planning and 
writing of their respective literary compositions, their finished works seem to be 
very near to what was (or may have been) the gist of their spontaneous responses. 
Of course one should not hasten to identify the emotions of Mikes’s fictive let-
ter (addressed to a non-existent aunt) with the actual responses of the author 
himself, and we don’t know whether the date of the letter, “Rodostó, 1756, 15. 
Januarii.”, can be considered reliable at all, yet the account given in Mikes’s letter 
is so vivid that it seems to be very near to what it pretends to convey, that is, the 
spontaneous thoughts, feelings and associations evoked by the reported events. 
Dear Aunt, what dreadful news have we heard? That on the first of November 
the city of Lisbon sank in a terrible earthquake and was destroyed. A large part 
of it was consumed by the fire of the earth. The churches were full of people, for 
it was a feast-day, and they fell on them. The whole city was changed in an hour 
into a cemetery, and buried its inhabitants. Carriages with men and horses sank 
in the streets. What a terrible scourge did God wield against that city? For not 
only was there the movement of the ground, but also the subterranean fire erupt-
ed into the streets. Therefore the tremendous wealth of that rich city is lost for 
ever. We are of the earth, and earth we must become. (2009, 248–249) 
Whereas this fictive letter in Mikes’s Letters from Turkey is the only extant 
text by him about the Lisbon earthquake, in Voltaire’s correspondence we have 
ample evidence to prove that his immediate reactions anticipated the main 
themes of his poem to come, Poëme sur le désastre de Lisbonne ou examen de 
cet axiome: tout est bien. The first letter, on November 24th, in which he respond-
ed to the news alludes to Leibniz’s doctrine: “On sera bien embarrassé à devin-
er comment les lois du mouvement opèrent des désastres si effroyables dans le 
meilleur des mondes possibles” (Voltaire 1978, 619). Four days later he refers to 
Pope’s thesis: “Si Pope avait été à Lisbonne aurait-il osé dire, tout est bien?” (1978, 
620). In subsequent letters he keeps returning to his attack on optimism (622, 
625), still questioning the validity of Leibniz’s dictum but targeting mostly Pope’s 
formula (624, 626, 695). His passionate dissatisfaction with the latter dovetails 
with his marginal note in his copy of An Essay on Man, opposite the line “One 
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truth is clear, Whatever is, is right”, summing up his main query in a simple 
rhetorical question: “What can I hope if all is right?” (Niklaus 1970, 181). If 
Leibniz justly calls this the best of all possible worlds, and if Pope justly thinks 
that here everything is right, what space is left for hoping anything better than 
this? Voltaire’s poem is a series of eloquent variations of this objection, partly to 
Leibniz (“Leibniz ne m’apprend point par quels noeuds invisibles, / Dans le mieux 
ordonné des univers possibles, / Un désordre éternel, un chaos de malheurs, […] 
Ni pourquoi l’innocent, ainsi que le coupable, / Subit également ce mal inévita-
ble”), partly to those who accept Pope’s answer (“Vous criez »Tout est bien« d’une 
voix lamentable, / L’univers vous dément, et votre propre cœur / Cent fois de 
votre esprit a réfuté l’erreur. […] Il le faut avouer, le mal est sur la terre”). The 
main concern of the speaker in this poem, a witness of the disaster, is how to 
retain or retrieve the possibility of hope after Lisbon; this problem and desire 
surfaces in several parts of the poem and culminates in its very last line, imply-
ing that the answer can not be taken for granted any longer. 
The responsive nature of both Voltaire’s poem and Mikes’s letter calls for a 
suitable biblical archetype, one that is more than a mere description, however 
fitting in scope or imagery, of an earthquake. Of course we need something more 
articulate here than just a fleeting reference to an earthquake, and more situa-
tional than the general image of an earthquake whereby Job illustrates God’s 
mighty power: “He is wise in heart, and mighty in strength: who hath hardened 
himself against him, and hath prospered? Which removeth the mountains, and 
they know not: which overturneth them in his anger. Which shaketh the earth 
out of her place, and the pillars thereof tremble.” (9,4–6) We could easily find a 
more detailed narrative that would be much closer to Mikes’s account of how 
the earth opened up in Lisbon and swallowed houses full of people. One could 
find a passage that implies the usual notions of divine trial and punishment, 
hence it would provide an archetypal situation close enough to be used in a 
comparative analysis so as to ascertain some characteristic similarities and dif-
ferences. One could take the memorable scene from Numbers where Moses tells 
the people that the Lord wants them to turn away from the wicked Dathan and 
Abiram who worshipped Korah, and adds that if those two die a natural death, 
his message was not from the Lord. 
But if the LORD make a new thing, and the earth open her mouth, and swallow them 
up, with all that appertain unto them, and they go down quick into the pit; then ye 
shall understand that these men have provoked the LORD. And it came to pass, as 
he had made an end of speaking all these words, that the ground clave asunder that 
was under them: And the earth opened her mouth, and swallowed them up, and their 
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houses, and all the men that appertained unto Korah, and all their goods. They, and 
all that appertained to them, went down alive into the pit, and the earth closed upon 
them: and they perished from among the congregation. (Num. 16,30–33) 
Close enough in some sense, and an obvious text to associate (cf. Georgi 2005, 
89), but unlike Mikes’s letter or Voltaire’s poem, this narrative lacks the com-
mentaries or symbolic gestures of the viewer, it abstains from expressing subjec-
tive emotions, and it is devoid of any explicit reflection or value judgement, be it 
a statement, a qualifying simile or a mere adjective. It depicts what happened but 
it takes its implied divine justice so much for granted that it does not allow us 
to hear the voice of those doomed to being buried alive, or to see the expressive 
body language of the suffering human subjects, or anything that could in any 
way make us sympathize with their point of view and problematize the issue. 
Although the Old Testament narratives rarely and sparingly use similes or even 
adjectives, they have their own subtle means, as in 2 Sam 3,16, of indicating 
the human cost of any event (Alter 1999, xxiii–xxiv), so we can hope to find an 
archetypal situation in the Bible where an earthquake is represented together 
with the reaction of the sufferer. As both Voltaire and Mikes received the unex-
pected news of the Lisbon earthquake and they responded to the unprecedented 
large-scale destruction by expressing their feelings, we need a similarly complex 
biblical account of somebody responding to the news of an earthquake, a well-
known and emblematic biblical narrative that can be used as a tertium compa-
rationis for revealing the differences between our two literary narratives of what 
happened in Lisbon. What is more, for a truly heuristic archetype we would need 
a biblical narrative that raises (or prompts us to raise) the crucial problems of 
evil, justice, origin and responsibility (human and/or divine), to serve as a foil 
enabling us to discern Voltaire’s and Mikes’s respective takes on matters that had 
been highly debated in the eigtheenth century and became especially relevant 
after Lisbon. For these purposes the most suitable biblical passage is Job 1,18–22: 
While he was yet speaking, there came also another, and said, Thy sons and thy 
daughters were eating and drinking wine in their eldest brother’s house: And, behold, 
there came a great wind from the wilderness, and smote the four corners of the house, 
and it fell upon the young men, and they are dead; and I only am escaped alone to tell 
thee. Then Job arose, and rent his mantle, and shaved his head, and fell down upon 
the ground, and worshipped, And said, Naked came I out of my mother’s womb, and 
naked shall I return thither: the LORD gave, and the LORD hath taken away; blessed 
be the name of the LORD. In all this Job sinned not, nor charged God foolishly.
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On receiving the news that the great wind made the house collapse and bury 
all his children Job is shown here trying to respond, in words and ritual, to his 
enormous loss, and trying to cope with it by searching for (or inventing) the 
most efficacious consolatory idea offered by (or compatible with) the tradition 
of his faith. In the end we hear the narrator’s explicitly approving comment 
on Job’s response, a final validation of his choice at this particular stage of the 
story, a declarative authorization not directly from, yet on behalf of, the divine 
authority that is the ultimate standard of judgement in the text. However, the 
heuristic value of this passage taken as the archetypal situation whereby we can 
discern the characteristic divergences of Voltaire’s and Mikes’s texts comes not 
only from what Job says but also what he conspicuously abstains from saying: 
though acknowledging (and accepting) that it was the Lord who took away all his 
beloved children, at this point he is not asking why, and not trying to attribute 
any meaning to his great loss. 
 
From Allusions to Subtext:  
the Book of Job in Voltaire’s Poem and Mikes’s Letter
Job 1,18–22 is especially appropriate for providing the tertium comparationis 
because both Voltaire’s poem and Mikes’s letter CXCVIII (and other passages in 
his Letters from Turkey) allude to Job at key points, and although they interpret 
the Jobian problem differently, we can consider the Book of Job as their common 
subtext here and a mutual point of reference in some other works of theirs. The 
most conspicuous difference here and elsewhere is that whereas Mikes’s Job is 
an example to follow, Voltaire’s Job is an example to contest. The first explicit 
reference to Job in Mikes’s Letters from Turkey, in letter LXIV dated 23 Septem-
ber 1725, is elicited by the sight of Lord Bercsényi’s painful gangrene and points 
towards a saintly ideal to live up to. 
God preserve us from that. But, if God does visit that upon us, we must follow the 
example of Job. How many sufferings and illnesses did God send upon the saints, who 
loved and served Him, in order that the wicked like myself might see that if such saints 
were made to suffer, what suffering do I not deserve? They suffered in order to be an 
example, and that they might be better purified, like gold in the fire, but I must suffer 
in order that even against my will I may make an end to my wickedness. (2009, 93) 
Mikes interprets Job’s ordeal as a parabolic exhortation for sinful human beings 
to accept their own suffering as a God-given means of purification; the justifying 
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logic of his argument is akin to the reasoning of seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century theodicy (Dávidházi 2002), and it anticipates Frye’s contention that 
Job is involved in a “purgatorial trial which is a testing and refining operation” 
instead of the trial of retrospective accusation Job assumes it to be (1990, 310–
311; 2003a, 559, 562). The notion of testing or purifying gold or silver is used 
in several books of the Bible, but in the context of Mikes’s letter his simile “like 
gold in the fire” points to the Book of Job, where gold figures in various contexts 
(3,15; 22,24; 23,10; 28,1–6; 28,15–17; 28,19; 36,19; 37,21; 42,11), most relevantly 
in chapter 23 when Job, confident in his innocence, is longing to appear before 
God and let his worth be severely tried. Trial or being tried is meant here in the 
legal sense of the word, fitting the lawsuit metaphor that plays a crucial role in 
the book (cf. Segal 146–153); nevertheless, it is coupled with the analogy of gold 
in fire, implying the value of endurance. “But he knoweth the way that I take: 
when he hath tried me, I shall come forth as gold” (Job 23,10). The last phrase 
(quoted here from the King James Bible), need not suggest that the only outcome 
of the trial is the proof that Job’s character is like gold (and not some baser 
metal): his claim in its original Hebrew (Brown and Smith 2008) יננחב בהזכ אצא 
may mean not only that he would come out of the examination as gold but also 
that he would shine forth like gold, which some translators rightly associate with 
pure gold or gold purified by fire (Saadiah 312.; Gordis 272; Pope M. 170, 172). 
The image lurking in the background of this verse would make no sense without 
fire, and the missing element had been interpolated by the Vulgate, a translation 
Mikes used alternatively with a Hungarian Bible first published in 1626 by János 
Káldi (cf. Fröhlich 246), thus completing the simile Job is supposed to have had 
in mind: “ipse vero scit viam meam et probavit me quasi aurum quod per ignem 
transit” (Weber and Gryson 2007). Mikes may have found the same in Káldi’s 
Hungarian version, most probably in its 1626 first edition, which follows the 
Vulgate and renders the simile as closely as possible; hence it leaves the notion 
of purity implicit: “Ő pedig tudja az én utamat, és megpróbált engem, mint az 
aranyat, mely átmegyen a tüzön” (Káldi 1626). Unlike in the King James version 
where the second half of the verse is conditional (even if its casus realis type) 
and Job is just yearning for a purgatorial trial instead of the trial of retrospec-
tive accusation, the Job of both the Vulgate and Káldi’s translation claims that 
his character has already been tried by God as gold is tried when it has gone 
through fire. All in all, their version is much closer to Mikes’s notion of pain as 
purification, an interpretation that he continued to explore in letter LXVI, dated 
29 October 1725, using the theological concept of Purgatory. 
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Today we visited poor Lord Bercsényi, who is now in such a state as was Job, except 
that he is lying in bed and not the midden; for there is no part of his body that is sound 
in the least. The fluid has run out of his legs and putrefaction set in. One’s heart goes 
out to him when one sees how the rotten flesh is cut from his legs. And as we hear him 
groan and cry out in agony it seems that I see the martyrs of old in their pain. Truly, 
I cannot express to you how repulsive it is to see it; and yet in what pain is he that 
suffers it? But the soul is cured by the pains of the body, and God the merciful has put 
Purgatory into his legs, wishing to save him from that in the next world. (2009, 95–96) 
The sight presumably evoked Mikes’s memories of the emblematic scene in Job 
2: “So went Satan forth from the presence of the Lord, and smote Job with sore 
boils from the sole of his foot unto his crown. And he took him a potsherd to 
scrape himself withal; and he sat down among the ashes.” (7–8) Compared to 
this, however, the new element introduced by Mikes is the sufferer’s otherworldly 
reward, that is, his escaping from the Purgatory of the next world, a theological 
interpolation taken from a different tradition, or a different stage of the same 
tradition, because Purgatory, a realm of space and time after death where suffer-
ing may purge us of our sins before we can ascend to Heaven, is alien from the 
Book of Job where Job does not believe in life after death (although he is yearning 
for it), and at the end of the story we read that the compensation for his suffering 
and bereavement is granted to him in his lifetime. 
Mikes’s letter CXCVIII does not refer explicitly to Job’s name, but its argument 
points towards the same example to follow, and one can find several latent cor-
respondences with the Book of Job, culminating in the final sentence which 
comments on the loss of the great wealth of that city in a Jobian manner, spell-
ing out the moral of unconditional acceptance. “We are of the earth, and earth 
we must become” (2009, 248–249). This may remind us of several verses in the 
Book of Job, such as Elihu’s sentence about death: “All flesh shall perish togeth-
er, and man shall turn again into dust” (34,15). Mikes’s closing formula, “We are 
of the earth, and earth we must become”, sublime and familiar as it is at the same 
time, foregrounds the image of earth for the last time in the passage (the Hun-
garian word “föld” figures no less than six times in this letter, cf. Mikes 1966, 
289), and evokes further biblical associations of dust and ashes, several of which 
play important roles in Job. In Hebrew the two words, ָעָפר (afar) and ֵאֶפר (éfer), 
sound almost like variations of the same idea; they are often mentioned togeth-
er (as in Gen 18,27) and have a similarly symbolic role in grief and especially 
mourning “and shall cast up dust upon their heads, they shall wallow themselves 
in the ashes” (Ezek 27,30). More to the point, they become dominant in Job’s 
speeches, whether he is asking for mercy (“Remember, I beseech thee, that thou 
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hast made me as the clay; and wilt thou bring me into dust again?”,10,9), or is 
talking about his origin (“He hath cast me into the mire, and I am become like 
dust and ashes”, 30,19) or his repentance (“Wherefore I abhor myself, and repent 
in dust and ashes”, 42,6). More importantly, however, Mikes’s closing sentence 
can remind us of Job 1,18–22, the passage I chose as the most telling arche-
typal subtext of Mikes’s letter, the narrative about Job’s response to the news 
that his children died under the collapsing house in the storm. Here, because of 
its similar ideal of resignation, the most relevant part of the passage is the 
response itself : “And said, Naked came I out of my mother’s womb, and naked 
shall I return thither: the LORD gave, and the LORD hath taken away; blessed 
be the name of the LORD” (1,21). It is this Job, the paragon of resignation, that 
Mikes uses as the final arbiter of how to respond properly to the sudden devas-
tation of Lisbon. 
By choosing this piously resigned attitude for his ideal when contemplating 
the fall of a great city, Mikes is eager to defuse any latent theological problem of 
the disaster, and, unlike Voltaire, to re-establish the transcendental framework 
in such a way that would immediately preclude contesting voices of doubt or 
despair. There is no room left here for the objection that Mikes’s last sentence, 
for all its biblical or liturgical solemnity, is too general in this context to provide 
any consolation for the bereaved. Silenced is the obvious retort that even if eve-
rything of earth is bound to return to earth there is a great difference between 
having to return to it late in life (as Eliphaz says to Job: “Thou shalt come to thy 
grave in a full age”, 5,26), as eventually Job himself was allowed to die, “being 
old and full of days” (42,17), or in infancy, as many of the Lisbon victims. More-
over, the general and universal character of the rule cited by Mikes’s last sentence 
reveals that for him the Lisbon earthquake could seamlessly fit into the usual 
scheme of life, and could be seen as no more than yet another example of the 
universal law of mortality. This view is very far from considering such an earth-
quake something extraordinary, an exceptional divine intervention to punish 
those who provoked the Lord (as in Numbers 16,30), but had Mikes’s response 
adopted that view, he, too, would have had to face the question why the Lord 
wanted to intervene. Mikes is doing his best not to blame the earthquake on the 
victims, and stops short of explicitly blaming the “terrible wealth” of that city as 
the sin that resulted in due punishment, yet he does not find the annihilation of 
that prosperous city theologically scandalous either. 
For Voltaire, on the other hand, the Lisbon earthquake is a baffling, extraor-
dinary event, a problem that offers no easy solution and cannot be explained 
away. Although the analogy of man and worm, discussed in the Book of Job, is 
used by Mikes, too, long before the Lisbon earthquake, he employs it only to 
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demonstrate the insufficiency of human beings without divine aid. As he says in 
Letter LIV, dated 19 July 1724, “we are of such wretched worms that we cannot 
bring anything to a good conclusion unless we receive help from Heaven” (2009, 
72). He must have remembered the argument of Bildad who tried to console Job 
by reminding him that man is but a worm and there is no chance for human 
beings to attain perfection in God’s eyes: “the stars are not pure in his [God’s] 
sight. How much less man, that is a worm? And the son of man, which is a 
worm?” (Job 25,5–6). But for Voltaire, trying to secure hope for mankind against 
all the odds, this simile was more controversial, probably because Job’s own point 
that to accept the idea of such a kinship can be self-destructive: “I have said to 
corruption, Thou art my father: to the worm, Thou art my mother, and my sister. 
And where is now my hope?” (17,14–15). Both sides of this debate are echoed in 
Voltaire’s Lisbon poem. First it is part of a dubious consolation to the victims 
(“Dieu vous voit du même oeil que les vils vermisseaux / Dont vous serez la proie 
au fond de vos tombeaux?”), but then it is promptly dismissed by the narrator 
as an insensitive idea. A similar polemics is repeated in greater detail later in the 
poem: “‘Ce malheur, dites-vous, est le bien d’un autre être.’ / De mon corps tout 
sanglant mille insectes vont naître; / Quand la mort met le comble aux maux 
que j’ai soufferts, / Le beau soulagement d’etre mangé des vers!” Right after this 
Voltaire’s ad hominem retort resembles that of Job when refusing his comforters: 
“Tristes calculateurs des misères humaines, / Ne me consolez point, vous aigris-
sez mes peines”. Voltaire’s poem claims like Job that in such a disaster the com-
plaint of the victim is innocent and his or her cries are rightful (“Croyez-moi, 
quand la terre entr’ouvre ses abîmes, / Ma plainte est innocente et mes cris 
légitimes”), and refuses the pathetically speculative consolation that adds insult 
to injury: “A des infortunés quel horrible langage! / Cruels, à mes douleurs 
n’ajoutez point l’outrage”. This refusal of the comforters as cruel was to be refused 
by Rousseau in his letter to Voltaire on 18 August 1756, arguing that Pope’s and 
Leibniz’s optimism was much less cruel, and much more consoling, than Vol-
taire’s description of the horrible scenes (Larrimore 210–215). Although Voltaire 
depicted the infants on their mothers’ breast in shocking detail (“Quel crime, 
quelle faute ont commis ces enfants / Sur le sein maternel écrasés et sanglants?”), 
these pictures were meant to demonstrate the innocence of the sufferer, the very 
claim Kant’s 1791 critique of theodicies admired as an indication of Job’s intel-
lectual honesty as opposed to the servility of the comforters (Kant 194–225). 
Similarly, Voltaire refuses the arrogance of the comforting arguments in his 
article on Job in his 1764 Dictionnaire philosophique (2010, 352–356). 
It is in the context of these controversial sentiments that Voltaire comes close 
to Mikes’s (Jobian) idea that God tries man. Although Voltaire does not compare 
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the human condition to the trying of gold in fire, he points towards a transcen-
dental framework, implying the possibility of a final compensation: “Ou bien 
Dieu nous éprouve, et ce séjour mortel / N’est qu’un passage étroit vers un monde 
éternel.” Voltaire’s readiness to let the troubling latent implications surface is no 
less conspicuous when it comes to the relation between man and his maker, and 
he uses the biblical simile very differently from Mikes’s handling. The potter’s 
making, destroying and remaking a vessel is used as an analogy of God’s treat-
ment of men in the Book of Jeremiah as well (18,1–17), and a part of the same 
metaphor of man as a pot created by God is discernible in Job 17,7 (“all my 
members are as a shadow”; here the Hebrew word for limbs or members יצרי or 
 that denotes the shaping work יצר means form and is cognate with the verb יצרים
of the potter and with the participle or noun יוצר denoting the potter himself). 
Yet the relevant subtext of Voltaire’s passage is Job 10,7–9, where man, visualized 
as the vessel made by God, does speak: “Thou knowest that I am not wicked; and 
there is none that can deliver out of thine hand. Thine hands have made me and 
fashioned me together round about; yet thou dost destroy me. Remember, I 
beseech thee, that thou hast made me as the clay; and wilt thou bring me into 
dust again.” When Mikes reveals the limits of this metaphor in his letter dated 
17 December 1717: “Dear Aunt, the pot must conform to the will of the potter, 
and cannot say to him: why have you sent me to Adrianople? I would rather have 
been a cabbage pot in Transylvania than any coffee cup of the Sultan’s” (2009, 
259), his text alludes to several biblical places, including Job 10,7–9, but his 
lighthearted tone responds to the similarly ironical rebuke of the Lord in Isaiah 
45,9: “Woe unto him that striveth with his Maker! […] Shall the clay say to him 
that fashioneth it, What makest thou? or thy work, He hath no hands?” Isaiah’s 
God is briefly and sarcastically playing with the absurd idea, and Mikes’s brief 
variation is similar in length and tone, but Voltaire’s poem seriously challenges 
the justice of it all, and resembles Job’s appeal to, and his protest against, the 
potter.
Instead of using pottery as a momentary image, Voltaire turns it into a sus-
tained conceit that is able to highlight the ultimate difference between the vase, 
mute and insensitive as it is, and human beings who feel and express their tor-
ment. First Voltaire is setting the scene of the creature appealing to the creator, 
and although here it is only the notion of shaping that prepares us for the potter-
simile to come, the text is hinting at the basic contradiction between divine 
omnipotence and human misery. “Mais je vis, mais je sens, mais mon cœur 
opprimé / Demande des secours au Dieu qui l’a formé. / Enfants du Tout-Puis-
sant, mais nés dans la misère, / Nous étendons les mains vers notre commun 
père.” Then, comparing the fragility of man to a pottery created by its craftsman, 
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Voltaire’s poem adapts Job’s simile for spelling out its controversial implications 
in the argumentative style of his philosophical poetry. “La vase, on le sait bien, 
ne dit point au potier: / »Pourquoi suis-je si vil, si faible et si grossier?« / Il n’a 
point la parole, il n’a point la pensée; / Cette urne en se formant qui tombe fra-
cassée, / De la main du potier ne reçut point un cœur / Qui désirât les biens et 
sentit son malheur.” Thus, while Mikes uses the imaginary speech of the created 
vessel to its maker just in order to ridicule its absurdity and thereby (indirectly) 
approve of God’s dispensation, for Voltaire it is a means of protesting, at least 
until the poem’s final gesture of resignation. Just as Job is trying to secure an 
explanation from God himself (13,18; 13,22), insisting that He must listen to 
him because only He could answer him, Voltaire’s poem depicts a situation in 
which only God could give a satisfactory answer to the great riddle of the Lisbon 
disaster in the world He created, otherwise men, abandoned, would be lost in 
doubt and error. “Quelque parti qu’on prenne, on doit frémir, sans doute. / Il 
n’est rien qu’on connaisse, et rien qu’on ne redoute. / La nature est muette, on 
l’interroge en vain; / On a besoin d’un Dieu qui parle au genre humain. / Il 
n’appartient qu’à lui d’expliquer son ouvrage, / De consoler le faible, et d’éclairer 
le sage. / L’homme, au doute, à l’erreur, abandonné sans lui, / Cherche en vain 
des roseaux qui lui servent d’appui.” Yet just as Job, humbled by God, ceases to 
protest at the end and silently submits himself to God’s authority with the ritu-
al of repentance (“now mine eye seeth thee. Wherefore I abhor myself, and repent 
in dust and ashes”, 42,5–6), the speaker in Voltaire’s poem eventually submits 
himself to suffering and does not want to oppose God any more: “Les sages me 
trompaient, et Dieu seul a raison, / Humble dans mes soupirs, soumis dans ma 
souffrance, / Je ne m’élêve point contre la Providence. […] Dans une épaisse nuit 
cherchant à m’éclairer, / Je ne sais que souffrir, et non pas murmurer.” These 
lines, originally intended to be the closing passage of the poem, were made all 
the more significant by the contrast of the preceding passages of problematiza-
tion and protest. Whereas Mikes’s response to the Lisbon news is dominated by 
resignation from start to finish, Voltaire’s final resignation has been earned by 
a long and fierce protest. 
Theodicy in a Metaphor:  
the Lisbon Earthquake as the Scourge of God
“What a terrible scourge did God wield against that city?” (Mikes 2009, 248–249) 
Crucial as it is in this post-Lisbon context, the scourge of God is one of those 
familiar images Mikes would often use with implications of divine justice con-
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sidered so unquestionable that it does not require any explicit theological rea-
soning. As he takes God’s justice for granted, Mikes does not feel the need for 
theodicy proper, that is, for argumentative justification, and he need not try to 
elaborate any reasonable explanation for the deaths of those multitudes praying 
in the Lisbon churches or the deaths of their children. He simply mentions, albeit 
with great trepidation, that the churches fell on the congregations, and he uses 
the scourge of God metaphor as well-known shorthand for a ready-made answer 
that precludes any problematization of the event. It is by sheer repetition (“föld”, 
the Hungarian word for “earth” or “ground”, is repeated no less than nine times 
in the passage) and by a few choice adjectives (“what dreadful news”, “a terrible 
earthquake”), that he pays tribute to the unprecedented scale of the disaster, 
adjectives that depict and dramatize the impact of the event on the receiver of 
such news (this is even more so in the Hungarian: “irtóztató” news is news that 
makes you horrified, “rettentő” is something that makes you terrified, frightened 
or overawed). Moreover, instead of using “terrible” only twice (“a terrible earth-
quake”, “a terrible scourge” and “tremendous wealth”), in Mikes’s Hungarian 
text “rettentő” (‘terrifying’) is used at all the three places, silently pointing to 
the extreme wealth of that city as the unnamed but inevitable sin that must have 
called for the punishing scourge of God (Mikes 1966, 289; Mikes 2009, 248–249). 
In Letters from Turkey Mikes uses the scourge of God metaphor in various 
contexts, even its key-words differ (ranging from the Hungarian noun ostor, 
‘whip’ and the verb ostoroz ‘whips’ to vessző ‘cane or rod’) but its reference to 
divine justice is always evident. In letter XXXVI, dated 24 April 1720, an ana-
gram of Rodosto, the name of the little Turkish town, makes him ponder on the 
noun, indirectly associated here both with providential care and divine punish-
ment. “Suffice it to say that God has brought us all hither in safety. And as soon 
as Lord Bercsényi arrived, he straight away made an anagram of the name of the 
town, and it came out as: Ostorod. That is eminently suitable for exiles. Suffice 
it that one could philosophise at length about that, but I will leave it for another 
occasion […].” (2009, 40) The Hungarian “ostorod” means “your whip” or (as 
here) “the whip for you”. Mikes postpones the philosophical answer to the obvi-
ous implied question why he thought this anagram “eminently suitable for 
exiles”, and although he will often return to the special fate of exiles in this work, 
this anagram is not mentioned ever again. When confronted with Bercsényi’s 
painful disease and death, Mikes meditates on his life at considerable length, 
and refers to Job as a parallel, but he does not mention the whip of God, does 
not interpret Bercsényi’s torment as divine punishment, nor does he say that it 
fulfilled the prediction implied in Bercsényi’s ominous anagram. In other con-
texts, as in letter LXXXV dated 8 November 1727, he is trying to reconcile 
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himself with his own lifelong exile by interpreting it as the rod (“vessző”) of God. 
“But I have been an exile all my life, and left my native land for ever at the age 
of 16, and it is certain that the search for freedom was not then in my mind, and 
if my exile has lasted until the present, truly, it is blind love for my lord that has 
caused it. So I may say according to my nature; but in Christian terms it is the 
dispensation of God, and I must kiss the rod with which He beats me.” (2009, 
130) After Rákóczi’s death the metaphor becomes more badly needed than ever. 
In letter CXIV on 17 May 1735, it becomes part of a perfectly balanced scheme 
of divine justice. “For more and more we are aware of what a father we have lost, 
and what a shepherd has deserted us. But if our good Lord holds in one hand the 
rod [“vessző”], in the other He holds consolation.” (2009, 172) 
Vintage Mikes, the metaphor occurs in the same spirit not only in his Letters 
from Turkey but in one of his most revealing personal letters as well. Addressed 
to Baron József Huszár (Boér) on 25 March 1760, this text turns the rod of God 
metaphor into the core of Mikes’s most elaborate spiritual formula for his entire 
life. Wanting to explain why he does not appeal for mercy to Maria Theresa again 
(after her previous refusal with the memorable phrase “ex Turcia nulla redemtio”, 
“from Turkey there is no return”), he starts with the admission that although 
personally he had never sinned against his revered monarch either in thought 
or deed, “the gate of mercy” was justly closed in front of him because of “the 
original sin so to say”, that is, his participation in the Rákóczi uprising, hence 
this life-long exile is his due punishment coming ultimately from God. “My 
punishment by her Majesty, which is temporary, must be respectfully considered 
the will of God the Sacred Sovereign, His scourge [“ostorának”] for my sins, and 
I ought to keep kissing that scourge until I die, hoping that He will turn this 
cross to my salvation. He did not take anything from me after all, and as He 
possesses the whole earth, I am on His ground even here, and if He will give me 
eventually a few feet of that, it will suffice.” (1966, 307–308; my translation – PD.) 
Thus Maria Theresa’s verdict, as any other event (including the Lisbon earth-
quake), is but a stroke of God’s scourge or rod, intended to distribute moral 
justice in the universe. The matter-of-fact tone and habitual application of the 
phrase “His scourge for my sins” (“bűneimért valo ostorának”) here and else-
where reveals Mikes’s firm conviction that in God’s created world there can be 
no such thing as undeserved punishment, though he claims that his own sin was 
indirect and unintentional. 
As was pointed out by a pioneering study, he fully accepted Saint Augustine’s 
tenet that under the just God nobody can be miserable without having deserved 
it (Zolnai 1924–1925, 39), or as Leibniz quoted Augustine’s formula in his Theo-
dicée: “neque sub Deo justo miser esse quisquam, nisi mereatur, potest” (Leibniz 
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1996, 300). Ironically, the whip of God, a metaphor that used to be applied to 
the formidable barbarian forces of Attila the Hun all over civilized Europe, is 
applied here to a verdict coming from the very European reign of Maria The-
resa; nevertheless, Mikes’s implied (and most probably unintended) parallel 
highlights the same instrumental function of any ruler in God’s hands. Moreo-
ver, here the scourge of God is no longer a solitary metaphor; it is used as one of 
the key images (and basic concepts) in a systematic Christian allegory, together 
with the cross and salvation, all the three belonging to the same theological 
pattern. Mikes’s ultimate interpretation of exile is thoroughly religious: for him 
exile, as everything else, is of transcendental origin, in sharp contrast with the 
modern view “that exile is irremediably secular and unbearably historical; that 
it is produced by human beings for other human beings” (Said 2000, 174). Prob-
ably this is why his letters, far from the stubborn unpleasantness and wilful 
exaggerations that Edward Said claimed to be the characteristic style of exiled 
authors, can achieve what Said least expected of exiles: composure, serenity, and 
genuine contentedness – traits rarely found among exiles who are the nay-sayers 
of society, “adept mimics and secret outcasts” (2000, 182; 1994, 49, 52–53). 
Though exiled because of taking part in an uprising against the Habsburg 
Empire, Mikes is ultimately a resigned but resolute yea-sayer, both socially and 
cosmically.
Moreover, calling the Lisbon earthquake the scourge or rod of God, Mikes 
uses an image that figures in several books of the Bible and becomes crucial in 
the Book of Job. The same differences of phrasing survive in most translations 
of the Old Testament and can be traced back to the Hebrew Bible. There we can 
find both the scourge (שוט) of God (Isaiah 10,26; 28,15; 28,18) and the rod (שבט) 
of God (Isaiah 30,31), and both were used figuratively for the chastisement of 
the nation or an individual. The metaphorical sense of these phrases was so 
widespread and inevitable that the Old Testament has to specify when it is used 
in a somewhat more (yet not entirely) literal meaning of the word, for example 
in 2 Samuel 7,14 where the Lord promises David that after his death He will 
chastise his son as a father would, with the rod of men (אנשים בשבט) and the blows 
of mortals. (The same implied domestic scene gets spelled out in Greek by Paul 
in Hebrews 12,6, pointing to a stern yet loving divine father: “For when the Lord 
loveth he chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom he receiveth.”) Seamlessly 
continuing this biblical tradition, Mikes often declares or implies that some 
misfortune is but a due chastisement by a loving God, yet it is more relevant to 
his application of the scourge of God metaphor in letter CXCVIII that the phrase 
figures in Job 9,23 and 21,9, used by Job himself in close connection with the 
ultimate question of divine justice. Answering Zophar (21,9), Job talks about the 
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anomaly that the wicked may prosper and their sins go unpunished. “Their 
houses are safe from fear, neither is the rod of God upon them.” Here Job explic-
itly refers to “the rod of God” (אלוה שבט), but uses the phrase so as to confront its 
implication of justice with his actual experiences in the world. As can be inferred 
from the previous verse (8), “houses” here mean ‘families’, hence the image of 
God’s rod being or not being on people resembles Mikes’s response to the Lisbon 
earthquake. Although the English translation uses a different preposition and 
hence a different spatial arrangement (“What a terrible scourge did God wield 
against that city?”), Mikes’s Hungarian text is talking about the terrible whip of 
God being on the town, just as Job 21,9 in Káldi’s Hungarian translation of the 
Bible, used by Mikes, tells us that the houses of the godless are safe and God’s 
rod is not on them. (“Házaik biztosak, és békében vannak, és nincs az Isten 
vesszeje rajtok.”) In 9,23 Job is less explicit, comparing the unexpected blows of 
fortune to the way a scourge lashes the good and the evil alike, but here, too, the 
implication is that the scourge is wielded by God. “[…] He destroyeth the perfect 
and the wicked. If the scourge slay suddenly, he will laugh at the trial of the 
innocent” (9,22–23). (In Káldi’s Hungarian translation the last sentence is con-
ditional and expresses desire: “[…] ő mind az ártatlant, mind az istentelent 
megemészti. Ha ostoroz, bár ölne meg egyszerre, és ne nevetne az ártatlanok 
büntetésein.”) Here the scourge (שוט) is applicable to any disaster, including those 
that are not man-made; yet a commentary is right to insist that here Job attrib-
utes even the natural disasters to God (Reichert 43). This verse stirs indignation 
in pious commentators even today (cf. Peters 129), mainly because it insinuates 
that God is amused by human suffering, but for Mikes the real stumbling block 
would be the mere assumption that the scourge of God can be anything but just. 
Mikes’s firm belief in the inevitable justness of the scourge of God precludes 
the Jobian insistence on innocence and evokes the opposite motif of the Book of 
Job: the questioning of the very possibility of human innocence. Admitting that 
“the gate of mercy was closed in front of me just as I deserved” (1966, 307), Mikes 
is ready to acknowledge his own culpability as the ultimate cause of Maria The-
resa’s inexorable refusal of clemency, ready to search for a latent sin, however 
indirect and unintended, behind his own apparent goodwill, and ready to confess 
it when found. Unlike Job, he is ready to accept the counterarguments of the four 
friends; like them, he would always doubt the assumption that a human being 
can be entirely innocent. At Count Bercsényi’s bedside it was probably out of 
sheer tact that he was trying hard to suppress the issue, although it surfaced 
irresistibly in his remark that God ordained this extremely painful disease for 
Bercsényi’s purification and to exempt him from the even greater pain of Purga-
tory (2009, 95–96); probably it was for the same reason that he had to refrain 
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from vitriolic comments even when he learned, right after Bercsényi’s death, that 
the Count (who had snatched his beloved Zsuzsi) bequeathed to him the riding 
cane of his former wife. Mourning over the deceased was not the right moment 
to ponder upon the possible justness of his fate, but one feels that Mikes could 
not avoid such conclusions for long. He was firmly convinced that such a painful 
disease and death must have been the deserved scourge of God. His Augustin-
ian tenet that under a just God there can be no undeserved misery is comple-
mented by Eliphaz’s conviction that it is not possible for a mere human being to 
be utterly sinless in front of his maker and to deserve no punishment. In Job 4,17, 
Eliphaz, in great trepidation, hears the still voice of a spirit raising the issue in 
a rhetorical question: “Shall mortal man be just before God? Shall a man be pure 
before his Maker?” (Reichert 1965). The implied answer is no (see 4,18–19; 15,14–
16), and judging by Mikes’s characteristic comments on human life, he could not 
agree more.
Much as Mikes tried to be impeccable in all his dealings, he was always will-
ing to blame himself for any ultimate imperfection. His humble resignation in 
front of God resembles that of Bildad when (in Job 25,4) asking another rhe-
torical question with a similar implication: “How then can man be just with God? 
Or how can he be clean that is born of a woman?” He simply cannot, because in 
God’s sight even the moon is not bright and the stars are not pure, how much 
less can be attained by a man, who is but a worm (25,4–6). Both Eliphaz and 
Bildad think that the blows of misfortune cannot be anything but due punish-
ment, hence Job must have committed something grave to deserve such harsh 
measures. Even Job himself, wavering between the persuasive logic of this gen-
eral principle and the persistent awareness of his own innocence, accepts that 
his guiltless conscience may not suffice and God is bound to see him differently. 
“Of a truth I know that it is so; And how can man be just with God?” (9,2) “Who 
can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? Not one.” (14,4) Job accepts these as 
general philosophical or theological truths from God’s superhuman point of 
view, yet in his particular situation he clings to the conviction of his own inno-
cence, come what may (9,20–21), because to give up this without being per-
suaded would be to betray himself (27,5–6). It is this integrity, both intellectual 
and moral, that Kant admired in Job (1791, 194–225), but Mikes’s attitude to the 
same dilemma is different. When he applies the whip of God metaphor to the 
Lisbon earthquake, his implication is that the disaster must have been a just 
punishment, unlike the way this image was problematized in Job 21,9, where “the 
rod of God” was mentioned so as to confront its virtual implication of justice 
with the injustice of its actual wielding. For Mikes the meaning of the earthquake 
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as punishment is as firm as in Numbers 16,30 where being swallowed by the 
earth is taken as a supernatural indication of sins duly punished by death. 
Unlike Job, Mikes refers to the scourge of God without bitter irony, and this 
in itself signals his great distance from Voltaire and from other sarcastic con-
temporaries. He is far from Swift who used to read the desperate Job of chapter 
3 on his birthdays (1963–1965, vol. 5, 128), and in Verses on the Death of Dr Swift 
he resorted to the ominous metaphor when deploring the hypocrisy of the pious: 
“When We are lash’d, They kiss the Rod; / Resigning to the Will of God” (1966, 
vol. 2, 561). Whereas Mikes is promptly trying to explain away the problem of 
the Lisbon earthquake with ready-made formulaic solutions (ranging from this 
metaphor to the pious sentence that whatever comes from the earth must return 
to it), in Voltaire’s Lisbon poem the image of the whip is evoked for its visual 
associations of cruelty. The contrast between their uses of the image is enhanced 
by the same adjective attached to the nouns “ostor” and “fléau”: Mikes calls it 
“rettentő” (terrifying), Voltaire calls it “terrible”. Whereas in Mikes’s letter 
CXCVIII the terrifying scourge represents a punishment of divine origin and 
unquestionable, if unfathomable, justness, in Voltaire’s poem it is but a formi-
dable instrument to inflict sheer pain. “Quand l’homme ose gémir d’un fléau si 
terrible, / Il n’est point orgueilleux, hélas! il est sensible.” For Voltaire the idea 
that God punishes mankind (“et Dieu punit sa race”) is no more than a bitterly 
ironical hypothesis, indeed his whole poem is protesting against such routine 
interpretations of the disaster. The scourge, or its even more cruel version meant 
by the French fléau (also the French name of a medieval weapon, coming ety-
mologically from the agricultural instrument of flailing), looms large in Vol-
taire’s poem and is emblematic of the human condition: “O malheureux mortels! 
ô terre déplorable! / O de tous les fléaux assemblage effroyable! / D’inutiles 
douleurs éternel entretien!” To demonstrate how far this is from any serious 
identification of an earthquake with the scourge of God, let it suffice to quote 
Voltaire’s Candide, where the frame of mind responsible for such interpretations 
of a disaster as fléau is ridiculed as both hypocritical and manipulative, serving 
the worst practices of the Inquisition. “Enfin, pour détourner le fléau des trem-
blements de terre, et pour intimider don Issacar, il plut à monseigneur l’inquisiteur 
de célébrer un auto-da-fé” (1836, 383). 
The contrast between their uses of this key motif is even more telling when 
viewed in the context of eighteenth-century theodicy, not only theodicy proper 
as a specific genre in theological and philosophical discourse, but also some relat-
ed arguments in diverse literary genres from fictive letters to philosophical poems. 
The great difference between Mikes’s work and the theological or literary theodi-
cies of the eighteenth-century is that whereas they employ the scourge of god 
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metaphor as part of a rational argument, Mikes does not feel the need to persuade 
himself by argumentative devices any more. Like Mikes’s letter CXCVIII, William 
Warburton’s sermon responds to the Lisbon earthquake in terms of the scourge 
of God, but he hastens to add that the Lisbon earthquake was meant to be a 
scourge of moral disorders in order to make an example that would warn and deter 
potential sinners. “The teacher of religion […] will be naturally led to inculcate 
this truth, that general calamities, though events merely physical or civil, were 
[…] ordained by the Author of all nature to serve for the scourge of moral disor-
ders”. Warburton argues that not to consider an earthquake like this the divine 
scourge of moral evils would be to suppose that the Almighty is incapable of mak-
ing the natural world an instrument for the regulation of the moral system; accord-
ing to this reasoning the victims of Lisbon or of any such earthquake are meant 
to be “exemplary warnings”, their death is not a punishment for their own sins but 
an example for others not to break God’s law (Warburton vol. X, 2; cf. Lamb 1995, 
91). A different but no less detailed argument occurs in Alexander Pope’s An Essay 
on Man, written two decades before the Lisbon earthquake yet referring to the 
scourge of God in the context of diverse harmful forces such as devastating earth-
quakes and ferocious rulers. “If plagues or earthquakes break not Heaven’s design, 
/ Why then a Borgia, or a Catiline? / Who knows but he, whose hand the light’ning 
forms, / Who heaves old Ocean, and who wings the storms, / Pours fierce Ambi-
tion in a Caesar’s mind, / Or turns young Ammon loose to scourge mankind?” 
(Epistle I, lines 155–160, Pope 1950–1951, 34–35) This passage alludes to the Book 
of Job, too, because the line “Who knows but he, whose hand the light’ning forms,” 
refers to God’s unfathomable design in much the same terms as does verse 28,26 
there (“When he made a decree for the rain, and a way for the lightning of the 
thunder”) and verse 37,3 (“He directeth it under the whole heaven, and his light-
ning unto the ends of the earth”), as well as echoing Psalms 97,4 and 135,7. As was 
rightly observed, the “appropriateness” of such allusions to the Old Testament 
God are remarkable throughout the poem (Pope 1950–1951, 35). Likewise, the 
scourge of God metaphor in the line “Or turns young Ammon loose to scourge 
mankind” is akin to the scourge used in Job 9,23 (“If the scourge slay suddenly, he 
will laugh at the trial of the innocent”) and the rod of God used in 21,9 (“Their 
houses are safe from fear, neither is the rod of God upon them”), because the 
obvious difference between these statements cannot obliterate the same expecta-
tion of divine justice. 
Yet it is more relevant to note that Pope’s stance is similar to Mikes’s and both 
differ greatly from Voltaire’s. The conciliatory logic of Pope’s argument exhorts 
us to accept the contradiction between our shock at the sight of raging human 
monsters and a devastating earthquake or plague that does not break God’s 
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design. This logic is familiar for its biblical lineage as well; it is built on the same 
assumption as the ultimate lesson taught to Job: the human mind cannot fathom 
either the motives or the consequences of God’s measures. Pope (like Mikes) is 
convinced that we have to resign to being scourged by God even in cases when 
we cannot understand it, that is, in all cases. If we read Pope’s above quoted 
passage in its wider context in An Essay on Man, we see that they (especially the 
lines “Who knows but he, whose hand the light’ning forms, […] Or turns young 
Ammon loose to scourge mankind?”) lead to the conclusion that in all things 
moral or natural “to reason right is to submit” (Epistle I, 157–164). This argu-
ment is very close to God’s ultimate point in the Book of Job, and the exhortation 
to accept our place, whatever and wherever it may be, is Pope’s final practical 
conclusion at the end of the first epistle: “Submit — In this, or any other sphere, 
/ Secure to be as blest as thou canst bear: / Safe in the hand of one disposing 
Pow’r”. These lines by Pope would perfectly encapsulate Mikes’s philosophy of 
resignation as thematized and reiterated many times and in various forms 
throughout his Letters from Turkey and other writings. But for Mikes, charac-
teristically, the terrible news of the Lisbon earthquake did not call for elaborate 
arguments of theodicy, only for a metaphorical reminder of divine justice, and 
a final sentence, hardly an argument either, about the return of everything to 
dust. Theodicy had become his second nature; he felt no urge any more to con-
vince himself of its truth or to spell it out for others.
Uses of Job after Lisbon: 
Unlike Voltaire, Mikes does not Represent the Enlightenment
To conclude, both Voltaire and Mikes considered Job the archetypal sufferer but 
they used (and implicitly interpreted) this archetype in different ways. Whereas 
for Voltaire it posed a challenging problem, for Mikes it was a sublime parable 
about a saintly figure suffering for his (further) purification and setting us, fallen 
men, an example. The same applies to the 1755 Lisbon earthquake: whereas 
for Voltaire it was a problem too troubling for pious ready-made solutions; for 
Mikes it was too obviously divine to leave room for any crucial problem, and it 
was yet another example to demonstrate that nothing but due punishment can 
come from God’s inevitable, if inscrutable, justice. Calling that disaster the whip 
of God, he implicitly attributed divine meaning to the great destruction it had 
caused, and thus he shrugged off the great dilemma that would haunt, albeit in 
different guises, many generations up to our own day. Two centuries later the 
question was whether one should attribute any meaning to a very different kind 
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of mass-destruction, yet in 1946 a funerary oration over the Hungarian Jewish 
victims of the Nazi concentration camps still referred to the Lisbon earthquake 
as a parallel, concluding that after such horrors, whether caused by geologi-
cal forces or human cruelty, one should not seek consolation in the ultimate 
meaningfulness of a harmonious divine order (Komlós 312–313, 317–318). His-
torically speaking, Mikes’s immediate and resolute insistence on the reassur-
ing divine meaningfulness of the Lisbon earthquake and his unwillingness to 
problematize the issue separates him not only from Voltaire but also from the 
whole epoch Voltaire is thought to epitomize: the Enlightenment. 
This is all the more surprising because Mikes has always been studied under 
the aegis of some general terms, making his work a representative of trends, 
movements or epochs in intellectual history, and one of the most routinely 
applied labels has claimed that his oeuvre can be best understood in terms of 
the Enlightenment. Characteristically, a recent (2010) survey of Mikes scholar-
ship started with declaring Mikes “one of the first and artistically the most 
impressive representative of the literature of the early Enlightenment” in Hun-
gary (Tüskés 2010, 291; cf. Tüskés 2011, 299). This method of making Mikes a 
representative, whether of the Rococo, of Jansenism, or indeed of the Enlighten-
ment, has often been productive, yet its drawbacks are no less conspicuous. It 
was very fruitful to invite papers on Mikes “in the context of European Enlight-
enment” (Tüskés 2012), but to define him as a representative of the Enlighten-
ment is an opening gambit with far-reaching consequences for research. Start-
ing with a foregone conclusion about the character and especially the affiliation 
or provenance of Mikes’s work, we are prone to adjust his texts to the criteria 
of the generic term they are supposed to represent. Viewed from the perspective 
of a movement, be it intellectual, artistic or religious, the overall character of 
Mikes’s works would often seem to dovetail with it if only because one tends to 
look for elements that justify one’s hypothesis and may easily disregard the rest. 
When Mikes’s Letters from Turkey is called (with a praise slightly condescend-
ing) “the best work of Hungarian rococo literature”, representing “the rococo 
of the Hungarian nobility”, a rococo that is primarily “hedonistic”, then of 
course we are told that Mikes’s work is geared towards entertainment, it 
abounds in the anecdotal, uses its Biblical elements as sheer curiosities, and 
even the author’s narrative talent cannot prevent it from being a little superficial 
(Hopp 1964, 516, 522–523, 526). The blind spot of this method will be obvious 
as soon as we read those Biblical allusions and Mikes’s own religious statements 
in their context: in most cases, whatever their tone, they are indications of a 
deep religious desire to maintain faith by justifying the ways of God. A pioneer-
ing study convincingly argued that the fountain of Mikes’s religiosity was the 
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Bible, compared to which any spiritual movement or any influence of his envi-
ronment could be of secondary importance only (Zsoldos 81); yet this approach 
can just as easily harden into yet another deductive method that would preclude 
any in-depth analysis and tempt the researcher to look for nothing but Biblical 
correspondences and hence the Biblical aspect of Mikes’s texts. As it is more 
productive (taking Paul de Man’s advice) to look first at the way meaning is 
generated by the actual language of a work, and only afterwards historicize and 
classify the meaning thus generated (1987, 21–26), in our case it is more reveal-
ing to have started with Mikes’s actual wording of the Lisbon disaster and his 
special use of the Jobian archetype before trying to infer what his work as a 
whole may represent.
This is especially true when it is the Enlightenment he is supposed to represent. 
As seen in his responses to almost any news in Letters from Turkey, Mikes was 
so unwaveringly devoted to religion above everything else that he can be sooner 
considered a seventeenth-century figure than a character shaped by the Enlight-
enment. Occasionally he may look simple-minded to a modern reader (Cs. Szabó 
270), and those who praise his character usually do it with some condescension, 
but he was far from naive or shallow. He could face any disaster without despair 
because his faith was resolutely trying to unproblematize it, not because his own 
vision was narrowmindedly unproblematic. The workings of his deep religiosity 
may remind us of Alfred North Whitehead’s insightful, if sweeping, generaliza-
tion about the decisive differences between the 17th and 18th centuries in Eng-
land, and may at least partly corroborate his daring thesis that seventeenth-
century Englishmen had more depth. “Their dominant interest was religion, as 
against the ‘debunking’ of the eighteenth-century rationalists. ‘Debunking’ is a 
good thing to have done, but is comparatively shoal water. Johnson, a sturdier 
figure, was still in essence of the seventeenth century. If he and Voltaire had met, 
they wouldn’t have had much to say to each other.” (102–103) This last statement 
about the imagined (counterfactual) meeting of Samuel Johnson and Voltaire 
may not be entirely truthful, because we can discover intriguing similarities 
between Voltaire’s indignant treatment of theodicy in his Lisbon poem and John-
son’s scathing review on Soame Jenyns’ Free Enquiry into the Nature and Origin 
of Evil (1757), a book-review once rightly considered a clue to the interpretation 
of Johnson’s entire oeuvre (Hinnant vii–viii, 1–10, 126–131). Yet if not about 
Johnson and Voltaire, the hypothesis would turn out to be true when applied to 
Mikes and Voltaire: their respective answers to the Lisbon disaster (and human 
suffering in general) were poles apart, and had they met, they would not have 
understood each other. When one thinks of Mikes’s expressed views on history, 
his tacit assumptions, the long decades he spent in translating seventeenth-cen-
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tury and early-eighteenth-century religious works, the language and the whole 
atmosphere of his letters fictive or real, one understands why he was called the 
last swallow of seventeenth-century Transylvanian literature, and why it was 
thought that the best pages of his Letters from Turkey constituted an epilogue to 
seventeenth-century Transylvanian historiography, although without its combat-
ant nationalism and religiosity (Beöthy 68–69). 
Endorsing this view, and thinking that Mikes belongs to the rear-guard of the 
seventeenth century rather than to the avant-garde of the Enlightenment, I am 
not replacing the usual condescending praise with another type of tongue-in-
cheek adulation or thinly veiled criticism. Saying that his staunch seventeenth-
century religiosity has nothing to do with the early Enlightenment is not the 
same as making him a reactionary. Progress in history is not linear, later epochs 
are not necessarily better than their predecessors, neither is any backward move-
ment an obvious symptom of degeneration. True, Mikes would lose the distinc-
tion of being the most impressive Hungarian representative of early Enlighten-
ment literature, “who, together with Ferenc Rákóczi II, was ahead of the 
development of Hungarian intellectual life by at least half a century” (Tüskés 
2010, 291). But he can be seen as much more ahead of his time, as a predecessor 
of our own age, as an early advocate of facing any disaster without the compla-
cent self-deception that would assume that we could run the universe any better. 
It is no mere coincidence that this pretentious claim, which Leibniz had casti-
gated, in 1686, as the rash pronouncement of our own ignorance (1957, 39), was 
no less critically glossed by Northrop Frye regarding both the ordeal of Job and 
the Lisbon earthquake. In a lecture on Job, he commented on this empathically 
but dismissively: “We have there, as we have so often in the Jewish and Christian 
and Islamic religious traditions, the sense of God as being in charge of the order 
of nature, but without interfering in it. There is always something of a very 
human feeling that if we were God, we would work harder to earn our keep; that 
if we were in charge of what happened, we wouldn’t make such appalling bungles 
as God appears to be making.” (2003a 575) In a note referring explicitly to the 
Lisbon earthquake, he pilloried the same attitude more sarcastically because 
here he wanted to expose its latent European hypocrisy as well. “But human 
paranoia is so great: an earthquake in China, if we’re in Europe, doesn’t raise 
any questions, but in the Lisbon 1755 earthquake everybody ran around in circles 
screaming: How can God let this happen? Man always thinks that if he were 
Providence he’d do more to earn his keep, interfere more & push people around, 
in short, create romances.” (2003, 324–325) It is precisely this unpopular insight, 
whether voiced in the seventeent century or in the twentieth, that Mikes was 
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THE KERYGMATIC MODE IN FICTION:  
THREE EXAMPLES FROM THE UNITED STATES
What makes a work of fiction “great”? In Northrop Frye’s definition, great works 
of literature are “powers to be absorbed”:
Great literature doesn’t simply present beautiful forms or constructs, but releases 
articulate power. Using literature to tune in to that power and to shape one’s own 
articulateness is the end of a literary education. (2008 461-2)
In this light, theorizing such “articulate power” might be the end of a critical 
education. In any case, such a challenge definitely calls for a spiritual kind of 
literary criticism, both encompassing and transcending traditional religious 
criticism with its comparative focus on theological doctrine and literature. In a 
significant remark regarding the difference between a religious type of literary 
criticism and what might tentatively be labelled “spiritual criticism”, Frye notes: 
Word and Spirit have nothing to do with doctrine and everything to do with experi-
ence. (LN 704)
Besides, as Ian Sloan remarks, the interaction in man of Word and Spirit is “what 
Frye means by kerygma” (Sloan 111).  
As critics have pointed out, kerygma is an elusive concept, particularly when 
applied to literature. Northrop Frye himself seems to have been hesitant about 
applying it to secular works, though he did come to recognise that “every work 
of art is a possible medium for kerygma”.1 Remembering that, for Frye, myth 
1 LN 643. Also quoting this passage, O’Grady notes: “In his notebooks jottings while composing 
Words with Power, Frye remarked that he had been ducking the point that the poetic has an 
oracular aspect that merges into kerygma […]” (238). Though not unaware of the theological 
debate surrounding Frye’s use of the word “kerygma”, which is based on a definition of myth 
contradicting Bultman’s, I am turning to this concept in a strictly literary perspective.
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was both “mythos, plot, narrative” (GC 31) as well as the vehicle of kerygma or 
Revelation, the concern of the present study is to examine how the kerygmatic 
experience might be mediated in secular plots or narratives. 
Regarding this possible link between literature and transcendence, US fiction 
is a particularly interesting field of study, which is probably due to the consider-
able influence Puritan thought has had on it. Following Frye’s cyclical vision of 
culture, as analyzed by Glen R. Gill in Northrop Frye on Twentieth Century 
Literature, I will be focusing on three canonical novels, written in the romantic, 
modernist and postmodernist periods respectively. Indeed, for Frye, twentieth-
century literature implied a descent into modernist irony but also a subsequent 
ascent towards spiritual vision:
Frye […] deduced that what ultimately distinguished Romanticism from modernism 
was the latter’s scepticism toward the possibility of the subject-object union that 
made imaginative creation or spiritual revelation, what Frye would later call kerygma, 
possible […]. The second half of Frye’s career, which saw him increasingly theorizing 
the spiritual significance of literature, was an effort to hasten another turn of the 
Spenglerian wheel, ideally creating such a consciousness of its cyclicality that it would 
on its next turn acquire a third dimension and become the spiral ascent that was his 
later apprehension of real cultural process. (Gill xxxvii)
Our analysis purports to examine this suggested succession of a romantic 
emphasis on kerygma superseded by a modernist descent into alienation and 
despair before an ascent back from the demonic pit in The Scarlet Letter (1850), 
The Grapes of Wrath (1939) and Beloved (1987). In a way, this means following 
the route of kerygma, or rather the “kerygmatic mode”, in US fiction. 
Frye defines verbal modes as the “variants” into which the relation of signi-
fiers to signifieds develop (WP 3). “Verbal modes” appear to answer his wish to 
capture “the positive linguistic force […] cutting across the variety of langues 
employed” (GC 5).2 In Words with Power, they are presented as a progression 
from “the less inclusive to the most inclusive verbal mode” (4) in terms of the 
2 Frye describes this conception of language in The Great Code as follows: “To use a convenient 
French distinction: there is in addition to the langue that separates English and French and 
German, also a langage that makes it possible to express similar things in all three languages. 
[…] Human creative expression all over the world has some degree of mutual intelligibility and 
communicating power. […] What we call langage, then, is a very positive linguistic force. One 
wonders whether it is substantial enough for there to be such a thing as a history of langage, a 
sequence of modes of more or less translatable structures in words, cutting across the variety 
of langues employed, affected and conditioned but not wholly determined by them. (5, italics 
in the original) 
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relationship of these modes to human consciousness. Culminating in the keryg-
matic, Frye’s sequence of modes ends on the distinction between this mode and 
all those he has detailed before. In his view, all modes but one affect the psyche, 
whether through mainly the senses, reason and emotion (referred to as the 
descriptive, conceptual/dialectic and rhetoric/ideological modes respectively) or 
the subconscious (the focus of the imaginative—or literary—mode). Encompass-
ing all of these, however, is one mode that addresses what Frye refers to, in 
Pauline terms, as “the soma pneumatikon, the spiritual body (I Corinthians 
15:44)” (124). In other words, the kerygmatic mode refers to the way words may 
affect us spiritually.
This issue of the spiritual power of words might seem to contradict prevailing 
contemporary views presuming the total arbitrariness of words as signs. This 
analysis is thus a rebellious endeavour to turn to literature as not only meaning-
ful but as a possible secular means of encountering transcendence. 
 
The Scarlet Letter, first, presents itself as the very dramatization of kerygmatic 
power. When the narrator chances upon the object that will spark the narrative, 
a red piece of cloth shaped like an A among forgotten documents in his office, 
he describes his experience in the following terms:
My eyes fastened themselves upon the old scarlet letter, and would not be turned 
aside. Certainly there was some deep meaning in it most worthy of interpretation, 
and which, as it were, streamed forth from the mystic symbol, subtly communicating 
itself to my sensibilities, but evading the analysis of my mind.
When thus perplexed […] I happened to place it on my breast. It seemed to me […] 
then, that I experienced a sensation not altogether physical, yet almost so, as of burn-
ing heat, and as if the letter were not of red cloth, but red-hot iron. (42)
The subsequent narrative will then unfold from this original experience, as the 
narrator will try to evoke the story linked to the piece of cloth, basing himself on 
the accompanying written document summing up the life of its late wearer. The 
genesis of the narrative is thus particularly significant as regards the kerygmatic 
dimension of the story: as the first letter of the alphabet, the alpha of the novel, 
this letter, with its implicit connotation of primeval literary creation, appears in 
the text as simultaneously full of meaning and yet “evading the analysis of [the 
narrator’s] mind”. What “deep meaning” it holds “streams forth” from it, “subtly 
communicating itself to the narrator’s sensibilities” in “a sensation not altogether 
physical, yet almost so” This reads as the very definition of the kerygmatic power 
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of language, one that is both verbal (uses letters) and beyond words (escapes 
mental analysis). Mainly, it affects the narrator’s spiritual body (“a sensation 
not altogether physical”), implying a relationship to symbolic meaning that is a 
matter of direct experience. This cannot but recall Frye’s definition of the symbol 
in Words with Power:
Originally, a symbol was a token or counter, like the stub of a theater ticket which 
is not the performance, but will take us to where the performance is. It still retains 
the sense of something that may be of limited interest or value in itself, but points 
in the direction of something that can be approached directly only with its help. A 
symbol may be purely arbitrary (“extrinsic”, as Carlyle calls it), but as a rule it has or 
develops some analogous or other connection with what it points to, so that it can 
expand in that direction, taking us with it. Practically all techniques of meditation, 
for example, work with symbols, verbal or pictorial, that expand toward an identity, 
however defined, with what they symbolize. (109) 
As Frye suggests, the identity between subject and object mediated by the symbol 
is the hallmark of the kerygmatic experience. In other words, in the case of Haw-
thorne’s novel, the kerygmatic experience is what prompts the narrative. It is the 
source of the mythos, the verbal sequence that the narrative then opens out and 
the object of the long prologue detailing the circumstances of the discovery of 
the letter. What the narration appears to be after, in the end, is what no Puritan 
mind could have suffered: the recovery of the kerygmatic power of the letter. 
Besides, the prologue also happens to be the moment when Hawthorne’s nar-
rator gives his famous definition of romance: “somewhere between the real world 
and fairy-land, where the Actual and the Imaginary may meet and each imbue 
itself with the nature of the other” (47). This bears a striking similarity with 
Frye’s meditation on kerygma in Words with Power as a “principle of reality” that 
is “neither objective nor subjective” (128). This “principle of reality”, which he 
also translates as “the reality of hope and illusion”, is a “spiritual presence” that, 
as Professor Denham observes, “goes beyond the conventional formulations of 
dialectic and doctrine” (66). The meeting point between Hawthorne’s romance 
and Frye’s kerygma thus has to do with what Frye calls “the positive illusion 
which is a potential, a something hoped for that can be actualized by a creative 
effort” (WP 131), its vehicle being the symbol:
The more significant the symbol, the more quickly it is transformed into the next 
stage of symbolism, the stage of epiphany or manifestation of a divine presence, a real 
presence appearing as a symbol of itself. (109-10)
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This precisely seems to be what the scarlet letter stands for: “a real presence appearing 
as the symbol of itself”. However, what the letter symbolizes exactly is an issue that 
the novel works hard to make ambiguous. One would initially be tempted to read the 
letter as the symbol of evil: when the narrator puts the scarlet letter on his breast, 
his experience is that “of burning heat, and as if the letter were not of red cloth, but 
red-hot iron” (Hawthorne 42). Yet, as the narrative seeks to show, the meaning of 
the symbol is unstable, as its wearer evolves from being considered a sinner to being 
looked at as an angel of mercy. This suggests that the scarlet letter may transcend 
moral meaning and should rather be looked at as a kind of sacred vessel containing its 
former holder’s heart experience, an experience of suffering so intense as to scald the 
narrator’s own breast two centuries later. In turn, the narrator will strive to resurrect 
the characters linked to that kerygmatic letter: 
On Hester Prynne’s story, therefore, I bestowed much thought. It was the subject of 
my meditations for many an hour, while pacing to and fro across my room […]. My 
imagination was a tarnished mirror. It would not reflect, or only with miserable dim-
ness, the figures with which I did my best to people it. The characters of the narrative 
would not be warmed and rendered malleable by any heat that I could kindle at my 
intellectual forge. (45-6)
The reality of creative illusion or the kerygmatic power of literature thus seems 
to be what Hawthorne’s romantic narrator is after. In the end, it might be the 
secret that lends the letter its scarlet hue, especially when considering the nar-
rator’s Puritan forebears, who would not countenance art, precisely on account 
of its hubristic claim to rival the Word of God: 
 A writer of story-books! What kind of a business in life—what mode of glorifying 
God, or being serviceable to mankind in his day and generation—may that be? Why, 
the degenerate fellow might as well have been a fiddler! (16)
This being said, throughout the story, one both feels the desperate narrative 
attempt to claim kerygmatic power and the relative failure to do so owing to the 
theatricality surrounding the revelation of the scarlet letter. In the first instance, 
after the discovery of the letter, the story starts with the staging of it as “fantas-
tically embroidered and illuminated upon Hester’s bosom” (68), as she is about 
to be exposed to public infamy on a scaffold also described in rather elaborate 
terms as “the very ideal of ignominy” (70). Likewise, at the end of the story, 
when her partner in crime decides to reveal his own letter, which the power 
of his guilt and repentance has mysteriously imprinted on his very breast, the 
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scene is couched in heavy theatrical rhetoric. While the theatrical writing of the 
scene undoubtedly aims at creating cathartic terror, its spectacular character 
also results in a distance that takes away some of the kerygmatic power that the 
scene could have had. 
In other words, The Scarlet Letter’s hyperbolic romanticism might seem to 
work against its potentially kerygmatic power. On the other hand, the perceived 
tension between the genre of the novel and its dramatic frame reflects the ten-
sion between two representations of transcendence: the Puritan one, a religious 
vision dominated by fear of divine law, requires the ritualistic form of drama, 
while the romantic approach, for its part, is a secular one, defined in ontological 
rather than doctrinal terms as the law of the heart, the law of love, best expressed 
through the form of the novel, which allows intimacy with the characters’ inner 
worlds. In terms of verbal modes, Hawthorne’s piece of fiction thus appears to 
rely on a confrontation between religious rhetoric and a spiritual (kerygmatic) 
type of revelation, relocated within man’s heart. This heralds what will be a 
definite tendency of subsequent fiction: looking for kerygma as an immanent 
experience.
Published in 1939, during what is generally considered as the age of modern-
ism, The Grapes of Wrath would seem to share the trademark of its period, angst, 
particularly in view of its topic: the miserable plight of the hundreds of Okla-
homa farmers forced to migrate to California in the 1930s. Still, far from giving 
vent to feelings of despair and alienation, as it could have been expected to, its 
story is cast as a secular version of the crossing of the desert, illustrating the 
indomitable march of mankind’s Spirit. Interestingly, the novel calls this capac-
ity of mankind to transcend itself, whereby “man, unlike any other thing organ-
ic or inorganic in the universe, grows beyond his work, walks up the stairs of his 
concepts, emerges ahead of his accomplishments” (151): Manself, suggesting the 
utterly secular way it conceives of spirit :
The last clear definite function of man—muscles aching to work, minds aching to 
create beyond the single need—this is man. […] For man, unlike any other thing or-
ganic or inorganic in the universe, grows beyond his work, walks up the stairs of his 
concepts, emerges ahead of his accomplishments. […] And this you can know—fear 
the time when Manself will not suffer and die for a concept, for this one quality is 
man, distinctive in the universe. (151)
However, despite the insistently secular frame of the story, as illustrated by this 
concept of Manself—rather than Spirit—to refer to mankind’s spiritual strength, 
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the biblical hypotext3 remains omnipresent, though adapted to suit the secular 
requirements of the novel. Indeed, the omnipresence of the Bible is visible in 
the very narrative project, delineated by Steinbeck himself when he spoke of his 
novel. As he famously wrote in a letter to his editor Pascal Covici, out of the 
five layers of meaning in The Grapes of Wrath: “‘A reader will find as many as 
he can’, and ‘what he takes from it will be scaled entirely on his own depth or 
hollowness’ (quoted by French 82).
This obviously suggests the traditional four levels of the lectio divina, adding 
an enigmatic fifth level that critics generally fail to address. The relatively few 
who have addressed this enigma turn to Dante’s exposition of the “levels of 
meaning” in literature. Interestingly, Frye drew an explicit parallel between his 
theory of verbal modes and Dante’s theory of polysemous meaning:
In the medieval theory of polysemous meaning, or at least in Dante’s exposition of it, 
there is nothing that directly corresponds to our conceptual mode, but there are two 
levels of what I am calling the rhetorical one. The first is “allegorical” (better called an-
alogical or typological); answering the question quid credas, what you should believe; 
the other moral or tropological, answering the question quid agas, what you should do. 
We can call these the theory and practice respectively of Christian ideology. (WP 16)
Frye’s explanation suggests an intriguing line of inquiry into his own fifth layer 
of meaning. For, if his descriptive mode corresponds to the literal level of medi-
eval theory, the preceding quote appears to settle the matter of the equivalence 
between his first three verbal modes—descriptive, conceptual and rhetoric—
and those of medieval theory. The question then remains as to the relationship 
between the medieval fourth—anagogical—level of meaning and Frye’s fourth 
and fifth modes: respectively the “literary” and “kerygmatic” modes.
In The Grapes of Wrath, the anagogical level would correspond, critics gener-
ally agree, to the Emersonian concept of the Oversoul. Clara Mallier points out 
however that, though this key transcendentalist concept might seem to tie in 
with the spiritual level of meaning in the novel, it cannot “be apprehended 
through intellect alone”, but is rather “conveyed to the reader through devices 
closer to representation than abstract ideas”. However, as she perceptively 
observes, if this spiritual meaning is encoded in the book’s style,4 “an important 
3 In Palimpsests (1984), Gérard Genette examines the various types of relationships a text may have 
with prior texts: “By hypertextuality I mean any relationship uniting a text B (which I shall call 
the hypertext) to an earlier text A (I shall, of course, call it hypotext), upon which it is grafted in 
a manner that is not that of commentary” (5, italics mine).
4 Mallier lists a number of devices that serve to encode spiritual meaning in the text, notably 
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difference still separates the anagogical dimension of sacred texts from that of 
Steinbeck’s novel, for the former is esoteric”:
According to the lectio divina, the spiritual meaning of sacred texts is ciphered, en-
coded through symbols that only the exegete can decipher. Now, the spiritual meaning 
of The Grapes of Wrath, on the contrary, is exoteric: Casy gives the keys to it through 
his words, which make up a pedagogical palimpsest of Emerson’s writings. 
Concluding that such an exoteric strategy is in keeping with the novel’s political 
egalitarian ideal, which means to give equal access to its hermeneutic wealth, 
Mallier still leaves unresolved the issue of Steinbeck’s fifth layer of meaning. 
This is where Frye’s kerygmatic mode might be offered as a convincing answer.
Actually, one constant narrative device in the novel is to associate a literal 
level of meaning with a figurative one—as can be seen in the title, The Grapes 
of Wrath, which designates both God’s apocalyptic anger and the literal grapes 
that the farmers would like to harvest to make a living in California. By dint of 
this constant association throughout the novel, the reader is gradually taught to 
see through ordinary reality, as depicted by the literal level of the story, to its 
symbolic significance. The personal, historical situation is thus made symbolic 
of humankind’s and the narrative gradually operates a true conversion in the 
reader, reflecting the main characters’ own progressive awareness of the collec-
tive dimension of their individual plight. Such an opening up of consciousness 
is achieved through a number of narrative devices. The most visible one is the 
modernist structure of the novel, which alternates a realistic and empathetic 
focus on the Joads’ specific odyssey with a rhetoric-cum-philosophical and poet-
ic depiction of the historical and collective situation in the so-called interchap-
ters. The narrative telos, then, is to have the reader pass from a sequential read-
ing of the link between the individual and the collective to a metonymic 
(Emersonian) experience of their oneness (the anagogic level). But this is only 
one step in his progress towards the full symbolic—Christian—spiritual experi-
ence of their interrelatedness—or interpenetration, to take up a Frygian notion. 
This climactic experience of communion is particularly striking in the contem-
plative mood that permeates the final scene, where Rose of Sharon acquires the 
full symbolic power of saintly maternity in the barn where she suckles a dying 
man, in an implicit rewriting of the Nativity. This in turn points to one level of 
signification in the novel that may not be reduced to an exoteric encoding of 
Steinbeck’s biblical style, the way he resorts to a metonymic characterization so as to convey the 
sense of an organic unity between people or the way he links cosmic and human time.
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Emersonian philosophy but rather ultimately seeks to address the reader’s soma 
pneumatikon as the locus of a subtle, transformative exchange through a rewrit-
ing of biblical symbolism. The arguably fine-art allusions of the final tableau in 
the barn—which, Ditsky notes, “is a Louvre of mixed subjects: a Nativity, a Mona 
Lisa, an immense and heroic Delacroix” (122)—produce less aesthetic distance 
than a mood of contemplation referring the reader back to his/her own inner 
world.5 The meditative state thus portrayed and achieved, however, is no ecstat-
ic rapture towards immortal realms but such an immanent, bodily experience 
as to have initially shocked some readers. Its conjunction of the traditionally 
opposed realms of spirit and flesh in a still explicitly Christian frame suggests 
the incarnated and realistic character of kerygma in the novel. In The Grapes of 
Wrath, the deliberately polysemous narration—with its historical and natural-
istic basis, but also rhetorical, poetic and spiritual dimensions—lends the novel 
its prophetic and visionary effect, the result of its kerygmatic realism.
As compared with the narrative strategy of the first two novels discussed, 
Beloved would nearly read as straight realism but for the use of a supernatural 
character: Beloved herself, who turns up as the young adult she would have been 
had her mother not murdered her eighteen years before. Besides, Beloved is a 
historical novel, the story being a fictive version of the life of a fugitive slave, 
Margaret Garner, who tried to kill her children rather than witness their return 
to slavery. In this novel, the way the narration treats the supernatural, putting 
Beloved on an equal footing with perfectly ordinary characters, shows an even 
greater degree of integration of what transcends daily reality than in The Grapes 
of Wrath. To be sure, there is an allegorical quality to the novel, as Morrison 
herself said that she wanted to create a situation where the past (of slavery) would 
sit at the table with the present and demand to be heard. Still, the recognized 
narrative power of the novel far exceeds its allegorical dimension, which has to 
do with the realistic treatment of the non-secular aspect of experience that 
Beloved represents. One clue as to the reason for that treatment of the super-
natural as commonplace may be the belief, expressed by Sethe—the character 
standing for Margaret Garner—that “nothing ever dies”:
5 In this sense, our analysis is at odds with Kocela’s reading of the final scene as “emphasizing 
the constructedness of meaning in self-conscious role-play” (262). If this final scene “explodes 
the allegorical frameworks of [the] novel” (ibid.), we would rather see it as the effect of blurring 
the difference between the literal/realistic quality of the scene and its symbolic dimension than 
the result of an increased awareness on the part of the character (and reader) regarding the 
presumed heterogeneity of those two levels. Just as Rose of Sharon becomes a Madonna, so we are 
made to experience her silent and intimate revelation by watching it. Such, in any case, seems to 
be the aim of Steinbeck’s kerygmatic realism.  
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Some things go. Pass on. Some things just stay. I used to think it was my remem-
ory. […] But it’s not. Places, places are still there. If a house burns down, it’s gone, 
but the place—the picture of it—stays, and not just in my rememory, but out there, 
in the world. […] Where I was before I came here, that place is real. It’s never going 
away. Even if the whole farm—every tree and grass blade of it dies. The picture is still 
there and what’s more, if you go there—you who never was there—if you go there and 
stand in the place where it was, it will happen again; it will be there for you, waiting 
for you. (36)
As is apparent from this conversation between Sethe and her youngest daughter 
eighteen years after her escape from slavery, the “reality” that she speaks of, the 
reality of the past, is neither physical (the actual place may have burnt down) 
nor only psychological (“I used to think it was my rememory. […] But it’s not”). 
Its actuality is spiritual, a matter of presence that is both subjective and objec-
tive, beyond what the senses and memory may grasp. This spiritual presence 
is, at heart, what the “ghost” of Beloved represents, as can be seen in the short 
epilogue concluding the story, after the ritualistic scene that definitively frees 
Sethe from Beloved’s clutch. 
Viewed from a metaliterary perspective, these last two pages epitomize the 
story of the genesis, birth and death of Beloved as the existential metaphor or 
literary embodiment of the collective trauma of slavery, leaving in its place the 
shared feeling of a spiritual presence expressed through the last seven letters of 
her name, printed, alone, at the end of the text. In very poetic prose, Beloved’s 
birth is described as the incarnation of an initial feeling of “loneliness”. It is then 
given “arms and knees”, but fails to acquire an individual identity: for “everybody 
knew what she was called, but nobody anywhere knew her name” (274). Swal-
lowed by the “chewing laughter” and forgotten “like a bad dream”, her anony-
mous physical presence gradually dissolves as collective memory absorbs it. 
Remaining as mere “weather”, “not the breath of the disremembered and unac-
counted for, but wind in the eaves, or spring ice thawing too quickly” (275) and 
the bare suggestion of a “clamor for a kiss”, her haunting presence is converted 
into a peaceful epitaph (“Beloved”). In the end, the letters of her name are like 
her mother’s house, which she used to haunt: “unloaded” and “quiet” (264). 
In a way, the epilogue would thus seem to consecrate the death of meta-
phorical language as the language of possessive identification. In an earlier pas-
sage, Beloved had brought this type of language to a pitch in her famed mono-
logue celebrating the only type of love she could know as a pre-Œdipal child: 
fusional love. In her words, addressed to an unnamed, motherly presence: “You 
are my face; you are me” (216). Indeed, the whole story is about Beloved’s initial 
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haunting of her mother as a ghost, only to turn up as a young adult who is going 
to threaten Sethe with annihilation on account of a boundless demand for love, 
recognition and impossible reparation. In the epilogue, with this demonic bond 
severed, the narrative becomes free to coin a new kind of language, evoking a 
paradoxical sense of presence through absence, collectively shared:
So they forgot her. Like an unpleasant dream […]. Occasionally, however, the rustle 
of a skirt hushes when they wake, and the knuckles brushing a cheek in sleep seem 
to belong to the sleeper. […]
Down by the stream in back of 124 her footprints come and go […]. They are so fa-
miliar. Should a child, an adult place his feet in them, they will fit. Take them out and 
they disappear again as though nobody ever walked there.
By and by all trace is gone, and what is forgotten is not only the footprints but the 
water too and what it is down there. (275)
This sense of a collective communion with Beloved’s spiritual presence, where 
self and other merge in a paradoxical experience of absent presence, is curiously 
reminiscent of Frye’s description of interpenetration in Words with Power:
The spiritual body [of the risen Christ] is everywhere and in everyone […]. The soma 
pneumatikon then suggests a certain fluidity of personality. […] In The Great Code I 
used the word interpenetration to describe this fluidity of personality. […] It seems 
impossible to dissociate the conceptions of spiritual personality and love. The capacity 
to merge with another person’s being without violating it seems to be at the center of 
love, just as the will to dominate one conscious soul-will externally by another is the 
center of all tyranny and hatred. (126) 
Beloved could then arguably be considered as the redemptive effort to convert 
love as psychological possession (the model of which is Beloved’s haunting of her 
mother) into spiritual love or interpenetration, the model of which is Paul D’s 
final offer of love to Sethe. In keeping with his name, recalling the biblical apostle 
of Charity, Paul D’s is a romantic and liberating offer to turn to the future, as 
opposed to the haunting presence of the past that Beloved represented:
“Sethe,” he say, “me and you, we got more yesterday than anybody. We need some 
kind of tomorrow.”
He leans over and takes her hand. With the other he touches her face. “You your best 
thing, Sethe. You are.” His holding fingers are holding hers.
“Me? Me?” (273)
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As this quick perusal of three canonical U.S. novels has shown, the kerygmatic 
mode in fiction may rely on a variety of narrative devices: romantic dramati-
zation, polysemy, metaphorical immediacy, each bringing out the awing, pro-
phetic and compassionate aspects of kerygma. This potentially opens up new 
avenues for thought pertaining to the multifaceted aspects that the spiritual 
power of literature may take. Nonetheless, should such a critical path ever be 
seen to develop, kerygma itself would prove in dire need of theory. Jean O’Grady 
quotes Frye saying: “‘I’d need a distinction between specific (Biblical) and general 
kerygma’” and goes on to comment: “a distinction one wishes he had pursued 
(LN 415)” (O’Grady 240). We hope this paper will have suggested some of the 
forms “general kerygma” may take in literature as well as brought us a few steps 
further towards what Frye seems to have envisioned as a “criticism of Charity”.
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FRYE VS. FREUD ON NATIONALISM: OEDIPUS, HAMLET, 
BÁNK BÁN AND THE “MOTHER-CENTRED MYTH”
I. Freud and the Oedipal Structure of Nineteenth-century Hun-
garian Patriotic Poetry
In the year of the breakout of the Hungarian war of independence, 1848, a major 
writer of the forthcoming era, János Vajda, wrote a poem entitled “Gonosz 
házasság” (Evil marriage). The poem is an open allegory describing Hungary as 
a beautiful widow of the much loved Hungarian king Mathias, seduced, married 
and abused by the villain Austria who had been promising marriage to several 
countries simultaneously. The marriage is so unfortunate that the sons of Hun-
gary—the nation—eventually decide to take arms against the wicked stepfather. 
Pamphlet-like, the poem is interesting for two reasons. 
First, it is an unusually clear articulation of a usual trope of contemporary 
national poetry that spurred Hungarians to rise against foreign rule. By repre-
senting the “usurpation” of Hungary by Austria as an “evil marriage”, Vajda’s 
poem highlights the otherwise oblique fact that the master narrative of patri-
otic poetry is the “family romance”. In the contemporary politico-literary dis-
course, the Austrian ruler, the Habsburg dynasty, is mostly staged as the repre-
sentative of an alien, aggressive and disingenuous force responsible for (literally) 
murdering the Hungarians’ “ancient fathers”—their former “native” political 
leaders—in order to seize Hungary, which is usually personified and presented 
as the mother of the people making up the Hungarian “nation”. The sons are 
usually upbraided for their idleness and incompetence as opposed to the ancient 
fathers who were famous for wielding their swords and arms mightily, as Dániel 
Berzsenyi’s great poem:
How diff’rent rang the thunder of Hungary
Amidst the blood-soaked battles of Attila,
Who boldly faced half of the world in
Punitive anger against the foul West! 
(translated by Adam Makkai, 176)
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As Michael Herzfeld notes, “perhaps people everywhere use the familiar building 
blocks of body, family and kinship to make sense of larger entities” (5). However, 
the articulation of the hatred of foreign rule and the ensuing need to defend the 
country, a specific “family problem”, may be worthy of a deeper examination. 
Second, through forming an allegory from the usual metaphors and allusions, 
the plot of Vajda’s poem transforms this familiar-familial narrative into a strange 
hypertext of Hamlet. The appearance of Shakespeare’s play in this context may 
be surprising at first sight, but Hamlet in Hungary was often alluded to on 
account of its having a particular political relevance for contemporary Hungar-
ian audiences. Far from being a conscious rewriting of the play, the master nar-
rative of Hungarian patriotic poetry may have been influenced by a “social rep-
resentation” of Hamlet, of which József Takáts contends:
In some texts the allusions to Hamlet imply that the tragedy or at least its version 
created in the act of interpretation was understood as a political work of art. In a 
1790 letter, Ferenc Kazinczy writes: “It is well known that the horror the character of 
Hamlet and the ghost awaken in the viewers is akin to the not so rosy feelings of our 
nation…” Even more interesting is the Hamlet interpretation—or rather, a comment 
on the closing scene—by Ágost Greguss, who also foregrounded the political aspects 
of the tragedy. His comment informs us that contemporary Hungarian performances 
of the play usually omitted the last scene, which—according to Greguss—made the 
final reconciliation ineffectual. (…) Greguss’s opinion relies on the assumption that 
the exclusion of the closing scene obscures the fact that the play is about a polity and 
not a person. (166–167) 
The framing of the assumed social-political situation of the Hungarian nation 
as a family tragedy and its implied comparison with Hamlet raises several ques-
tions. Why is the political situation imagined in this fashion? Is the allusion to 
Hamlet completely arbitrary? Is there anything in Hamlet that encourages such 
a “political” reading? Does the interpretation of the play provide any explana-
tion for the family tropology used in national poetry? Can the family romance 
of the national myth of nineteenth-century Hungarian poetry unfold potential 
political meanings in Hamlet? 
In what follows I would like to demonstrate that the connection between 
Hamlet and nineteenth-century Hungarian patriotic poetry is based on a tacit 
understanding of the political implications of Shakespeare’s play. First, I would 
like to show that the literature in question manifests several elements which 
invite the psychoanalytical interpretations of the situation of the Prince of Den-
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mark.1 But this is only the beginning: my central aim is to show that Frye’s 
notion of the “mythic grounding of literature” can offer an alternative explana-
tion for the familial master narrative of Hungarian patriotic poetry. I am trying 
to prove that the “archetypal criticism” that Frye introduces to explore the most 
basic levels of art (and perhaps any kind of discourse) may question the validity 
of the Freudian notion of the Oedipal conflict in this national context. Instead 
of being seen as a psychological phenomenon, the family tropology of the conflict 
should be interpreted as the consequence of the rise of romantic “mother-cen-
tred” myths, which contributed to the increasing popularity and prevalence of 
the metaphor of the motherland in the nineteenth century. 
In the last part of this paper, I would like to show that the widespread allusions 
to a political Hamlet in the national discourse of the era do not only spring from 
the romantic context and its ensuing reinterpretation of the play. The family 
romance of Hamlet is already political in Shakespeare’s play, and although it is 
more than 200 years older than the Hungarian literature in question, it is among 
the first manifestations of the reappearance of the mother-centred myth that 
Frye calls Romantic.
The Oedipal problematic in Shakespeare’s Hamlet has been a commonplace 
in literary theory for over half a century. Based on an idea of Freud, Ernest Jones 
was the first to present this dramatic problem as a psychological one. Accord-
ingly, both Laurence Olivier and Franco Zefirelli would take it for granted that 
1 With the rise and rule of new historicism, cultural materialism, and the cultural analysis of Fou-
cault, Freud has been heavily historicized, which may also support my arguments. In Foucault’s 
The History of Sexuality, for example, psychoanalysis is seen as the representative of the ideology 
of the new bourgeoisie to control its own existence and production by enforcing a discourse 
on sexuality that pathologizes and thus isolates certain forms of this sexuality. In this context, 
the Oedipal conflict, instead of being an eternal truth of human nature, is seen as a kind of 
fiction that is disseminated to influence and control the self-image of people and make them 
conform to bourgeois ideology (Foucault 108.) The exact connection between this ideology and 
the complex itself is most famously expressed by Deleuze and Guattari in their Anti-Oedipus ( 
298-302), that meticulously shows how the heuristic notion of the Oedipal complex stimulates 
the production of capital and the compliance with related state institutions that in turn deeply 
influence the ruling family structure and relations. In this context, both an Oedipal interpreta-
tion of the Hungarian national poetry and the Freudian interpretation of the French revolution 
seem to be correct, as far as they are treated as symptoms of the new “capitalist” spirit. These 
revolutionary movements are known to be the manifestations of the urge to change into a new 
bourgeois political order that was necessitated by economical changes. If bourgeois ideology 
and the Oedipal structure of the family are as complicit as cultural studies today insists, the 
underlying Oedipal motives are themselves the “invention” of the era. Even the Oedipal inter-
pretation of Hamlet may be historicized as a manifestation of the new family relations in the 




Hamlet is in love with his mother, and hates his uncle not only because he mur-
dered his father, but rather because he wedded his mother:
Hamlet had, “as a child, bitterly resented having had to share his mother’s affection 
even with his own father, had regarded him as a rival, and had secretly wished him 
out of the way” (Jones 1954, 78). Such thoughts have been driven into Hamlet’s un-
conscious by his filial loyalty and the social taboo against incest. But the actualization 
of his infantile wish in the murder of his father by a jealous rival produces an obscure 
and depressive memory of his childhood conflict. (Harris 86)
The reason for Hamlet’s famous hesitation follows from the ensuing ambiva-
lence: Claudius commits the crime Hamlet “unconsciously” desires to com-
mit, so, on the one hand, killing Claudius would stand in for killing “himself”; 
punishing him therefore would be punishing himself. A further problem is that 
the revenge would be just another repetition of the original “crime”, given that 
Claudius, being the husband of his mother, now also becomes a father figure: 
The two contrasting elements of the normal ambivalent attitude towards the father 
were expressed towards two sets of people: the pious respect and love towards the 
memory of his father, and the hatred, contempt and rebellion towards the father-
substitute (…) In other words, the original father had been transformed into two 
fathers, one good, the other bad, corresponding with the division in the son’s feelings. 
(Harris 86.)
Similarly, in the patriotic poetry of the nineteenth century, the nation seems 
to suffer from a communal Oedipal complex. The country is taken over by a 
wicked false ruler or “father”. The ancient fathers are dead just like old Hamlet, 
while the “idle” sons are expected to save and regain the country and punish the 
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usurpers. The avenging spirit of old Hamlet in Shakespeare’s play is present in 
Hungary in part in the spirit of the ancient fathers and in part is represented by 
the very spirit of the poetry of the age. Last but not least, the Oedipal motives 
of the prince that are so manifest in modern interpretations of Hamlet, can be 
seen not only in the excessive love of the sons for the country, but also in their 
willingness to die on the battlefield. This is understood not only as a sacrifice to 
save the country and to avenge the ancient fathers, but also as an act of spilling 
blood onto the field and so as to be buried in the earth that is emphatically the 
mother-land of Hungary.
All this is illustrated with many excerpts from Hungarian poetry in a study I 
wrote twenty years ago in 1993. A year earlier, Lynn Hunt had published a book 
that examined the Freudian ‘family romance’ and related phenomena—primarily 
the Freudian notion of the (Oedipally motivated) revolt of the sons in Totem and 
Taboo—as manifested in the beheading of the king, the “father” of his people, 
and the subsequent “freedom” of the democratic “brotherhood” of the nation in 
the discourse on the French Revolution. 
The Oedipal hypothesis may be tested on József Katona’s famous 1819 trag-
edy, Bánk bán, translated as The Viceroy (2003). This emblem of patriotic feeling, 
a play based on historical facts, has been canonized as an outstanding literary 
achievement of the Hungarian pre-romantic movement, and remains well-
known by all Hungarians, being compulsory reading in the school curriculum.2 
2 The main storyline is based on the assassination of Queen Gertrudis, wife of Andrew II in 
1213 by Viceroy (‘bán’ = ‘duke’) Bánk. The King is fighting abroad while his queen, who is of 
foreign birth, feasts with his foreign friends and relatives. Bánk, the king’s deputy, is touring 
the poverty-ridden country while Otto, the Queen’s younger brother, is trying to seduce Bánk’s 
beautiful wife, Melinda. A group of angry Hungarian nobles are plotting a conspiracy against the 
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As an opening move, I wish to compare the play with Shakespeare’s Hamlet. 
Some thematic parallels stand out: the queen of this political drama is called 
Gertrudis, and, in the opera version, the heroine, Melinda, commits suicide by 
drowning herself like Ophelia. But correspondences run deeper than that. To 
understand the analogies, it is important to consider that although the play is 
situated in the past, the tragedy has always been read as an allegory of the situ-
ation of Hungary in the writer’s time and a manifestation of the urge to rise up 
against foreign rule, the root cause of all problems in the country.
The Oedipal problematics are easy to assess. We find many similarities 
between the structure of the conflict in Bánk bán and in Hamlet. Besides the 
political trouble, the central personal conflict of the play is the one between 
Bánk, a Hungarian magnate, and the wicked Otto, the brother of the queen who 
successfully seduces Melinda, the wife of Bánk bán. In Hamlet, the protagonist 
is opposed to a usurper who in the Freudian interpretation is a replacement of 
the dead father figure. In Katona’s play the usurper is the foreign Otto who might 
also be treated as the replacement of the legal father figure, the king, who is again 
missing (although he is not dead, but waging a war in a far-away province). 
Along the same lines we find that the mother figure of this interpretation is 
just as doubled as the father figure. It is either the good and innocent Melinda, 
wife of the king’s deputy, seduced by the usurper, or the wicked Gertrudis, the 
wife of the king himself, who is identified in the beginning as the mother of the 
Hungarian nation; Mikhál, a Hungarian noble describes the revolt as follows: 
Shall children then their mother trample down 
Because their father in a foreign field
Is seeking fortune? That is wickedness!” (71). 
In psychoanalytic interpretations of narratives, the duplication of the object of 
desire is just as frequent as the duplication of the threatening rival in order to 
displace aggressive sentiments. As Bruno Bettelheim argues, the wicked step-
mother replaces the good dead queen in tales like Snow White (282), while in 
Little Red Riding Hood both the rival mother figure and the father figure are 
queen and they send for Bánk, hoping to recruit him for their cause. The duke arrives and is first 
outraged at the idea of the revolt. However, when he is informed of Otto’s advances to Melinda, 
his stance begins to waver. Meanwhile, Otto, encouraged by the Queen’s open approval, drugs 
and rapes Melinda. Bánk then calls to the Queen, and after a bitter quarrel, he stabs her. When 
King Andrew returns, Bánk admits his deeds, convinced of her guilt and his moral innocence. 
He is sentenced to death, when suddenly it turns out that Melinda was killed by the servants of 
Otto, who fled from the country. The king allows Bánk to leave freely believing that life would 
be his greatest punishment.
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doubled (239.) In Bánk bán, Oedipal motives for the murder of the queen can 
also be found. While the seduction of Melinda creates unsatisfied desire, the 
killing of Gertrudis satisfies it in a sublimated way, by the very act of stabbing.
Because of the obvious parallel between the private family problem and the 
political one presented in the play, psychoanalytical motifs should be sought in 
the thematic public sphere too. The private problem consists in a love triangle, 
in which Otto wants to seize Melinda from Bánk, while the political problem is 
presented as the occupation of the homeland of Hungarian nobles by foreigners. 
Bánk is a native, while Otto is a representative member of the foreigners, so the 
parallel may even become allegory if we contend that Melinda may represent 
Hungary itself. 
First, in the play both are raped and destroyed by the foreign usurpers. Second, 
in the national discourse I mentioned above, the homeland is usually treated not 
only as a woman, but as the mother of sons and a wife of ancient Hungarian 
lords, two roles Melinda fills. “Much is at risk – our land / And Melinda” – a 
Hungarian Lord presents the problem (29). Not much later, Bánk conjoins his 
greater griefs, the tragic fates of his country and his wife: “My love for Hungary 
inspires revolt, / My love for Melinda restrains again” (57). He seems unable to 
decide which tragedy strikes him more; he muses and hesitates about what he 
should do. Later on, he actually mixes up the two problems when he describes 
Otto and Gertrude as those who “murdered my good name” (140) in a line where 
his lost manly reputation (due to the rape of his wife) becomes identified with 
the reputation of “all my kin”, which is associated with the ‘nation’ as ‘nemzet’ 




As a consequence of the family problem, Hamlet seems to have the political 
problem present in the background. In contrast, the Hungarian national poetry 
of the nineteenth century uses the family romance as a metaphor of the politi-
cal problematic. In Bánk bán, however, both problems are literally manifest and 
exist side by side: they mutually represent each other. Should we think of a “col-
lective” desire in Jungian fashion? Indeed, the archetypal theory of Frye may offer 
an alternative explanation, questioning even the Oedipal nature of the problem.
II. Frye and the “Mother-centred” Rhetoric of nineteenth-cen-
tury Hungarian National Discourse
In A Study of English Romanticism, Frye attributes the well-known Romantic 
interest in nature to the re-emergence of what he calls the mother-centred myth 
that replaces the father-centred myth dominating the preceding centuries. As 
he says: 
It is probable that the earliest creation myths were sexual and cyclical in shape, as-
suming that man and the world simply came into existence in the same way that 
babies are born and seeds grow in spring. The etymology of the Latin natura and 
the Greek physis connects them. Such myths tend to become mother-centred myths, 
where nature is an earth-goddess renewing her vitality (in more sophisticated versions 
her virginity) every spring. If the role of the male in conception is understood, the 
earth-goddess may be thought of as impregnated by sun or wind or rain, or she may 
be attended by a subordinate male figure who is successively her son, her lover, and 
eventually her sacrificial victim. (5–6)
As implied, graveyard poetry and odes on Nature are just two sides of the same 
coin and both are directly connected to the ancient mother-centred type of 
myths. Death in this romantic worldview is not a new life in a higher dimension 
(as in the father-centred myths of the previous ages), but rather a return to the 
beginning, metaphorized as the womb of the mother “who” on the cosmic level 
is mother Nature or mother Earth. 
As I have mentioned, romanticized and sexualized heroic death is also the 
recurring theme of Hungarian national poetry. In a famous and often-cited 
poem, the most prominent Romantic poet of Hungary, Sándor Petőfi, writes “I’m 
troubled by one thought – to die / in bed, among pillows stacked high” and prays 
God to “let me drop my shield/on the battle field / let youth’s river flow from my 
heart as it’s bleeding” (translated by Adam Makkai, 312)(a desire that eventu-
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ally came true). In Ferenc Kölcsey’s 1823 “Hymn”, which would become the 
Hungarian national anthem in 1844, the civil wars of the past are seen as a feud 
of brothers hurting their mother associated with the earth:
Often ‘gainst you, Hungary,
Did your very sons rave:
Thus the fairest Mother Earth
Did become her sons’ grave!
(translated by Watson Kirconnel; Makkai 194)
All this suggests that the collective “oedipal” desire of the nation might be a 
psychological misinterpretation of a sentiment manifest in culturally specific 
rhetoric. It is not only the feminized personification of the land, but also the 
“oedipal” narrative which can be explained by the mother-centred myth of the 
emerging Romantic ideology of the age. In the Anatomy of Criticism, Frye detects 
the presence of myths in almost every literary creation, like a kind of skeleton. 
This theory enables the critic to explain the basis of the narrative structure in 
terms of the order and ritual manipulation of nature. As he explains:
Narrative is studied by the archetypal critic as ritual or imitation of human action as 
a whole (…) In its archetypal phase, the poem imitates nature, not (as in the formal 
phase) nature as a structure or system, but nature as a cyclical process. The principle 
of recurrence in the rhythm of art seems to be derived from the repetitions in nature 
that make time intelligible to us. Rituals cluster around the cyclical movements of the 
sun, the moon, the seasons, and human life. (…) Ritual is not only a recurrent act, but 
an act expressive of a dialectic of desire and repugnance: desire for fertility or victory, 
repugnance to drought or to enemies.” (105–106)
The hero, Frye suggests, may be the descendant of the agent in the ritual who 
must fertilize the barren earth, dispelling winter and bringing spring and sum-
mer. His death likewise is associated with autumn and general decay, which is 
seen as a failure of man’s efforts to manipulate the greater powers of nature. If 
we return to the drama, such a mythic structure is not impossible to find. The 
country ruled by the usurpers represents the threatening winter personified by 
cold Otto, while the associated barren earth is embodied by the “bad” mother of 
the people, the wicked and unwomanly—“unnatural”—Gertrudis. 
These roles are opposed to the function of those who want to revive the earth 
and bring forth spring, represented by the young and beautiful Melinda, who 
should be fertilized by the powers of life represented by Bánk, the (messianic) 
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Son of this play, the human representative of the (godlike) king. Bánk and his 
entourage of Hungarian nobility represent the positive male principle by being 
associated with the (life-giving) Sun both by their position and by their sudden 
returning from disappearance, not to mention the symbolism of the hope attrib-
uted to Bánk as the head of the rising nobles. The causes of the revolt mentioned 
in the play are strongly associated with natural dysfunction: the people suffer 
from famine; Gertrudis behaves unnaturally, like a man (miming her husband); 
and Melinda’s castle is burnt down. In the end Bánk justifies his deed by the 
necessity to literally sacrifice the queen in order to save the country from dev-
astation.3
The application of Frye’s archetypal theory to this kind of literature is rather 
unproblematic, since this is the very age of Romanticism in Hungarian literature. 
In The Anatomy of Criticism however, Frye treats these associations as basic 
elements in any literary work. What specifically does this mean for the nine-
teenth-century Hungarian poetic discourse in question? If, as the Romantic 
Myth implies, it is the earlier cyclical myth that tends to return in the Age of 
Romanticism, is there a political equivalent of the “father-centred” myth that is 
overthrown in this era? 
The word “nation” comes from the Latin word ‘nasci’, ‘to be born’, which is 
very close to the archetypal associations in question, being an expression empha-
sizing the “genetic” bond between the feminized land and the people living on 
it. The Hungarian version, however, emphasizes the paternal ancestry: the word 
‘nemzet’, which is a translation of the Latin ‘gens’, ‘gentis’, is a shortened form 
of ‘nemzetség’, meaning ‘clan’, connecting people not only genetically but 
through their patrilineal descent. The root of the word ‘nemzet’ is ‘beget’, ‘pro-
create’, ‘inseminate’. The word ‘haza’ has a roughly similar semantics to the word 
‘homeland’ and ‘motherland’ from the early nineteenth century up to now 
(Bańcerowski and Bárdosi 7), and seems to provide a matrilineal complemen-
tary to the patriarchal bonds implied by the word ‘nemzet’, and has nothing to 
do linguistically with ‘birth’, ‘mother’ or ‘mothering’. Rather, ‘haza’ comes from 
the sexually neutral root ‘ház’, meaning ‘house’ and ‘home’. 
On closer look, it becomes clear that the word ‘ház’, ‘house’, is not neutral 
either. Beside one’s physical place of living, it also meant ‘household’, the people 
living in one’s house, including servants, vassals, clients, relatives, etc. (2), but—
3 As Bánk says: Rebellion / Was seething everywhere, and she alone / The hated object; no Hun-
garian / That loved his [mother]land would have refused / To make this sacrifice on its behalf” 
(173). In this case I corrected the translation, which used the term “fatherland” in the German 
fashion. In my view, the Hungarian nationalist sentiments were against not only the Austrian 
rule but also the Habsburg idea of the realm as “fatherland” as well. 
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obviously in line with the concept of clan—first of all, one’s blood relatives and 
descendants in a patrilineal network (as in the expression ‘királyi ház’, meaning 
‘royal dynasty’ or ‘house’). The associations of the root of the word ‘haza’ were 
almost the same as those of the ‘nemzet’. The ‘fatherland’ of Germanic lan-
guages, seems to remain closest to the traditional concept of the body politic, 
the state, which was imagined as a male body with its head being the (male) 
monarch and as a family with the father as the head, the central and most impor-
tant “organ” governing his realm.
It may be clear now that the process of the feminization of the “country” in 
the nineteenth century as a maternal entity separated from the male cultural 
network of the state not only squares with Frye’s mother-centred myth but per-
fectly represents the mytho-political process of the mother-centred myth gain-
ing precedence over the father-centred version. In this process, the members of 
the nation called ‘nemzet’, that is, the descendants of an ancient male monarch 
were expected to become ‘hazafi’, that is, sons of the maternal ‘haza’, which is 
both a linguistic and poetic manifestation of the change. It is definitely this 
figurative ‘mother’ around whom the new revolutionary universe was structured. 
The process is in accord with the phenomenon of the growing merit of the (fem-
inine) affection within the family surpassing and even replacing the (masculine) 
parental authority over children from the eighteenth century. The newly discov-
ered importance of this maternal love creates the bonds within the—newborn—
“nations”. The invention of these, as Sarah Maza put it:
was an attempt to promote new forms of spiritual fulfillment in one’s sense of connect-
edness to a community of fellow human beings. The family occupied a towering place 
in this ideological system. As a natural unit and the embodiment of a feeling rooted 
in nature, it was both the origin of one’s moral sensibility and a model for all other 
social connections. A passage in the historian and social critic Gabriel de Mably’s 
much read Entretiens de Phocion (1763) is typical: “(…) It is only through the practice 
of domestic virtues that a people prepares itself for the practice of public virtues (…) 
Domestic morality determines, in the end, public morality.” (59)
As the family model turns to be more and more affectionate, so the love for the 
country seems to surpass and even overcome the loyalty to the father, the “head” 
of the state, the place of the rational wisdom needed to govern a country. The 
nineteenth-century Hungarian image of the nation with its excessive love for 
its “motherland” is a revolutionary political version of both the contemporary 





The Romantic myth of Frye seems to offer an explanation for the nineteenth-
century Hungarian political imagery. Does this mean that the allusion to Ham-
let, if it exists at all, is completely superficial? Should we assume that while the 
characters and the plot may serve as models for the roles in the master narrative 
of Hungarian patriotic literature, those do not signify a deeper understanding of 
the play itself? May we contend that there is nothing in Hamlet that encourages 
such a “political” reading of it? If Hamlet’s problem is Oedipal, it cannot be true 
to the national sentiment of the nineteenth century, and, vice versa, Hamlet’s 
family problem surely cannot be a political allegory. Can it not?
The kingdom of Denmark in the play is usually treated as a characteristic 
representative of the body politic. The well-known phrase “something is rotten 
in Denmark” seems to be a perfect manifestation of the concept that the perver-
sion and vices of the ruler and his family are mirrored in the state which they 
are the microcosmic representative of. Indeed, this idea is prevalent in Hamlet, 
invoking the correspondence of not only the state and the ruler but also the 
parallel of these and the body. First, it is Laertes who muses about the duties of 
Hamlet and the improbability of his marrying a humble girl, which can be under-
stood in the context of the duality of the “sacred” and the human body of the 
royal person. Later on, Horatio vividly describes the wheel of fortune the rolling 
of which destroys not only the king but the whole socius, as well. In both cases, 
it is the identification of the royal body and his realm that frames his philoso-
phizing.
Although these suggestions would make the nature of the connection between 
the public and the private, i.e. the political actions in the “background” and the 
private problems in the “foreground” of the play, be worth investigating, it usu-
ally remains untouched. There is no correlation noted between the private and 
public events beyond immediate cause and effect. Naturally, there are many 
approaches to Hamlet that place the tragedy in a referential or quasi-referential 
relationship with the actual politics of Shakespeare’s days,4 but these readings 
4 “The international dimension is crucial for an appreciation of the politics of Hamlet, particularly 
when considered in the context of the uneasiness surrounding the late Elizabethan succes-
sion question. This is not to say that there are specific correspondences, that the militaristic 
Fortinbras is meant to represent James IV on stage. (Nor is Denmark Scotland, as Winstanley 
maintained, or Hamlet Essex—and James.)” (Kurland 291) With a loose parallelism, Andrew 
Hadfield similarly contends that the play “demands to be read in terms of the political anxieties 
of (very) late Elizabethan England, ruled by the decrepit, dying Queen who could no longer com-
mand the respect of many of her subjects, with the uncertainty of being ruled by a new dynasty 
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do not imply a correspondence between the private and public problems within 
the play. Rather, they emphasize the correspondence of these problems with 
historical events. Apart from these references, politics seems to remain in the 
background in Hamlet. The influential E. M. W. Tylliard comments that “the 
first scene of the preparation for war” is “unnecessarily particularized for the 
requirements of the plot”, its only function being “to bear in our minds the 
notion of ordinary physical life going on behind the heightened passions of the 
main actors” (Tillyard 35).
Should this be blamed on the interpretations of Hamlet ruling the public mind 
of the twentieth century? Although it is far from being the only way of reading 
the play, the Oedipal-complex theory brings to its extreme the tendency of see-
ing the play as dealing with personality problems. Even if the main character is 
not treated as the subject of Freudian pathology, he is usually taken for the 
representative of early modern “personality” traits, for example, as an individ-
ual whose “melancholic” disposition makes him unable to carry out the task 
demanded by his father. But the play, instead of concentrating on the private and 
the personal only, does create a constant metaphorical relationship between the 
private and the public. After all, this is a basic feature not only of Romantic, but 
of Renaissance political imagery as well.
The play starts by introducing a threatening political situation. It might be 
important that “both Horatio and Marcellus interpret the ghost’s appearance in 
political terms, as a sign that the state is troubled” (Kurland 288). Since Old 
Hamlet is in the armour he wore in the war against Norway, Horatio decides 
that the ghost signals trouble in Denmark’s foreign political situation, which is 
highly supported by the actual danger of the enemy approaching. What Old 
Hamlet says to his son seems to confute this hypothesis taken as evident by 
almost all readings. “Between the ghost’s appearances, the scene shifts to the 
court, the source of trouble” (288), Kurland declares, believing that the first 
impression is not right. It is not so obvious though.
It is also Horatio who lets us know that the reason for the invasion is that a 
part of Norway had become the territory of Denmark through a combat between 
Old Hamlet and Old Fortinbras, in which the latter had lost. Now that the win-
ner has died, young Fortinbras comes “to recover of us, by strong hand / And 
terms compulsatory, those foresaid lands / So by his father lost claims back his 
inheritance.” (1.1.105–107) In a much later scene Hamlet—who wears the name 
of his father just like Fortinbras—articulates an opposition between himself and 
in prospect, surrounded by enemies (France, Spain, Ireland), divided in religious affiliation, and 
driven by factions at court.” (97)
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the foreign enemy, which serves rather to emphasize a similarity between them, 
creating a parallel between his private tasks and Fortinbras’ public goals. In the 
following scene, Hamlet talks about Fortinbras and the “men” in his army as 
admirable people, who, unlike himself, are able to act: 
How stand I then,
That have a father kill’d, a mother stain’d,
Excitements of my reason and my blood,
And let all sleep? while, to my shame, I see
The imminent death of twenty thousand men,
That, for a fantasy and trick of fame,
Go to their graves like beds, fight for a plot
Whereon the numbers cannot try the cause,
Which is not tomb enough and continent
To hide the slain? (4.4.56-65)
In what exactly do the Norwegians excel? Even Hamlet considers their fight to 
be symbolic: they fight for a small piece of barren land hardly worth the trouble. 
The goal of Fortinbras is not the cultivation of the land, but the endorsement 
of his father’s rights of its possession. The grievances and desires of Fortinbras 
constitute the public counterparts of the “personal” problems of Hamlet who 
must “take back” the queen, who is also “unworthy”’ and probably just as “bar-
ren” as the land desired by the Norwegian men. 
The “correspondence” between the public goal of the enemy and the private 
one of Hamlet becomes manifest as soon as the concept of land, queen and 
mother are regarded as the interchangeable terms they were actually becoming 
in the political discourse of the day (cf. Vanhouette 234). The (lawful) king and 
his wife, Gertrude, may plausibly refer to a king and his country, in the way James 
I used the marital image in a speech to his first Parliament: “I am the Husband, 
and all the whole Isle is my lawfull Wife; I am the Head, and it is my Body; I am 
the Shepherd, and it is my flocke” (Harvey 24). In this view, the Gertrude of the 
play is also a rhetorical figure, who also refers to something beyond herself, 
symbolizing the country, in this case Denmark, as well. Politics thus seems to 
be an integral part of the play, instead of providing vague references to certain 
actual events or expectations. 
If so, it also becomes clear why it is important to describe the political situa-
tion of Denmark before turning to the family drama. Considering the meta-
phorical relationship of mother and country as axiomatic, the anger of Hamlet 
for his uncle, who killed his father and married his mother, appears as a familial 
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version of the anger of Fortinbras for the Danish king who “did slay this Fortin-
bras; who […] Did forfeit, with his life, all those his lands / Which he stood seized 
of, to the conqueror” (1.1 89–93). The political aspirations of Fortinbras thus can 
be understood as the public counterpart to the private family problem of Ham-
let. In this sense, the two royal heirs are alter egos, and so it is no wonder that 
Fortinbras is welcome as the one who takes on Hamlet’s political duty.
If the royal pair is interpreted in this Jacobean way, Hamlet with his special 
problems may indeed represent “us”, that is (modern) people with national feel-
ings. Whose political conviction is that their country should not be ruled by 
despots, rulers with “illegal” claims to leadership, abusing the land as well as its 
inhabitants—aptly symbolized by Claudius. In this context the “Oedipal com-
plex” of Hamlet is only metaphorical, an allegorical representation of the anger 
against a probable political conqueror and the desire to defend the motherland. 
What is more, it is not the traditional “body politic” that seems to be stressed 
in this allegory, but a new “participatory relationship” (Frye) between one and 
one’s place of birth. 
Imagining England as a wife of the monarch is a good example of the rise of 
the new concept of the political family and also a gratifying endeavour to rec-
oncile the old paternal rhetoric with the new one. Although the people were 
traditionally imagined as the “children” of the king—and his queen, the country 
was not associated with the queen, and vice versa, the queen was not associated 
with the land. In Hamlet, however, the mother is given a symbolic role that goes 
beyond the framework of the body politic and represents a new kind of social 
ideology, which places the family in the centre instead of the royal body, and 
initiates the notion of the ‘political family’ with the mother in its centre,—this 
indeed being the master trope of the modern nation state.
The image of the ‘motherland’ appears in Henry IV, which, as Moseley main-
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tains, is derived “from the idea of the body politic” (102). This, however, seems 
to be a misunderstanding based on the underestimation of the significance of 
the gendered nature of the concept. “The image of the state as a body remains 
with us throughout the next three plays”, Moseley contends (ibid.), forgetting 
that while the traditional “body politic” is male, the lands of England are emphat-
ically female in the play: 
No more shall trenching war channel her field,
Nor bruise her flowerets with the armed hoofs
Of hostile paces. (Henry IV 1.1.7–9)
The gender trouble of Moseley’s interpretation becomes most striking when he 
talks about the images of bloody war as “the literal dismemberment of Mother 
England” (110), instead of the (sexual) violation of the country. The latter, how-
ever, is unimaginable in the framework of the body politic. The somewhat earlier, 
1561 play Gorboduc presented similar female images of Britain seen as “the 
common mother of us all” who must be saved and controlled by her sons, as 
“the vulnerability of the nation’s body incites equally the transgressions of the 
traitor and the unsavory desires of foreigners” (Vanhouette 234). It is undeniable 
that the ‘body politic’ of the state is split in two. While its land (re)appropriates 
feminine features, the people remain male as the newborn body of the ‘nation’. 
Hamletism, Nationalism, Desire
All these may validate both the political significance given to the play in nine-
teenth century Hungary and the “Hamletism” of Hungarian patriotic literature. 
But while the “Romantic Myth” is undoubtedly suitable for informing the politi-
cal ideology and literature of the Romantic era, the same may seem anachronistic 
in an early modern play. However, the Mediaeval and Renaissance concepts of 
authority were breaking down, and along with them the father-centred myth, the 
“body politic” conceived of as a male body, was waning, too. As Frye writes: “The 
universe of this myth was a projection of Man’s own body: the rational design 
was visible on top, just as the reason is on top of the human body” (1983, 9). The 
transformation of the concept of this masculine “body politic” seems to corre-
spond with the emergence of a feminine principle shaping the political thinking 
of the age. The transformation begins with the displacement of the maternal role 
of the queen to the country and ends with the displacement of the paternal role 
of the king to the government. Why did this happen? The new “political family” 
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rhetoric suggests new possibilities for the subjects of the state, guarantees greater 
mobility in the power-structures it represents and promises new sources of the 
social cohesion in the “love” of the nation for their motherland. As the role of 
the people as “children” remained similar to their previous role, the change was 
not overtly traumatic. However, the radically new opportunities given to these 
„children” are clearly obvious and conform with the emerging capitalist system 
of production. 
The feminization of the “motherland” was surely inspired by the translations 
of Bible and the reformation movement that disseminated the term ‘nation’ 
(Hastings 16-17), as well as the metaphor of the marriage as “a symbolic wedding 
of the king with the land over which he rules” (Frye 2004, 51-52) and its applica-
tion to the view of the “chosen nation” (now England) as the “bride” of Christ. 
But the motivation for the adoption of this symbolism in such a way that tended 
to differentiate the feminized land from the nation as her “sons” lay in the new 
(secular) social potential hidden in this image. In the feudal model, the father-
child “relationship between ruler and subject allows little room for political 
intervention by the subject, who can never grow to meet the monarch on any-
thing like equal terms and will always be a minor” (Hadfield 100.) As opposed 
to this, the individuals in the modern nation built upon the model of the new, 
love-centred nuclear family have no such fixed and subordinate places. Mean-
while (in theory) order is kept not by the authority of the fatherly ruler but by 
the familial love of the members of the nation towards each other and their 
mother-country. 
“Family imagery thus served as a transitional metaphor, initially involving 
traditional obeisance to the king as good father, while allowing for revolutionary 
brotherhood to take shape and later break free of paternal authority” (Maza 73.) 
In the account of Benedict Anderson, the concept of the modern ‘nation’ emerg-
es in the process:
[N]ationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held po-
litical ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which—as 
well as against which—it came into being. For the present purposes, the two relevant 
cultural systems are the religious community and the dynastic realm. For both of 
these, in their heyday, were taken-for-granted frames of reference, very much as na-
tionality is today. (12)
Anderson’s theory of the symptoms and causes of emerging nationalisms5 is 
5 Among many other factors the relativity of universals and the spread of written vernacular 
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approved by Adrian Hastings6, who (opposing other theorists of nationalism) 
argues that English nationalism could and did develop quite early, and “the 
greatest intensity of its nationalist experience together with its overseas impact 
must undoubtedly be located in and after the late sixteenth century” ( 5). Green-
feld also posits the beginnings of English nationalism in this era: “In the seven-
teenth century the sense of English nationality was a novel phenomenon. This 
novelty, more than anything else, distinguished the England of this age from 
other contemporary and past societies” (44). English patriotism, which 
in the sixteenth century centred mostly around the figure of a monarch, also had a 
tendency to praise the nation as such. There were few as outspoken as the Bishop of 
Winchester John Poynet (1516–56) who wrote: “Men ought to have more respect to 
their country than to their prince, to the commonwealth than to any one person. For 
the country and the commonwealth is a degree above the king.“ “Kings and princes,” 
he added, “be they never so great are but members, and commonwealths may stand 
well enough and flourish albeit there be no kings.’ The idea of national loyalty and of 
the nation itself had a firmer basis than it seemed to have had on the Continent. In 
England the nation was becoming the focus of loyalty. (46)
The first symptoms of the change in this “focus of loyalty” from the king the 
father, to the country the mother, can be discovered exactly in the era of Shake-
speare, the time he wrote Hamlet. What is more, it is not impossible that, within 
the immense historical diversity of early and later nationalisms (as Anderson 
sees them) and in the face of the impossibility of a definition that would apply 
to all (as Hobsbawm sees them), it is this mother-centred family imagery that 
creates the common ground.
As for the motivations for “imagining” the nation and nation-ness, Anderson 
contends that
(print literacy) serving capitalist ends. 
6 As Hastings expounds: “What is a nation? Anderson makes another valuable point when he 
suggests that what is most characteristic of a nation is a felt horizontality in its membership 
‘the nation is always conceived of as a deep horizontal comradeship’. Horizontal images are 
something we will come back to from time to time as one yardstick of the presence of this sort 
of society. What we have to look for in nation-spotting is a historico-cultural community with 
a territory it regards as its own and over which it claims some sort of sovereignty so that the 
cultural community sees itself with a measure of self-awareness as also a territorial and political 
community, held together horizontally by its shared character rather than vertically by reason 
of the authority of the state. Even when it is the state which has created the nation, it is not a 
nation until it senses its primacy over and against the state.” (27)
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The great merit of traditional religious world-views (…) has been their concern with 
man-in-cosmos, man as species being, and the contingency of life. (…) With the ebb-
ing of religious belief, the suffering which belief in part composed did not disappear. 
(…) What then was required was a secular transformation of fatality into continuity, 
contingency into meaning. (…) Few things were (are) better suited to this end than an 
idea of nation. If nation-states are widely conceded to be “new” and “historical”, the 
nations to which they give political expression always loom out of an immortal past, 
and, still more important glide into a limitless future. (10–11)
Moseley opines that the “radical religious ideas” of the Elizabethan era left “men, 
however devout, with a world to be explained”, with the consequence that “they 
had to put something in the place of the intellectual systems they had destroyed” 
(21). That something, in part, was apparently the concept of the nation itself. 
Last but not least, the “mother-centred” theory of the ‘nation’ outlined above 
may modestly intervene in the debate that hopelessly tries to decide whether 
nationhood depends on the fact that ‘nation’ has or has not got a state of its own 
or has or has not got a territory of its own. If we examine the “Oedipal” situation 
of the metaphorical nation, we should say it exists by its desire to be a nation 
state. A desire to have a territory of its own, its nostalgic grief for a state that 
used to be its own and its antagonism to the actual state which is denied to be 
its own and should be replaced with its own. Desire is the (ever) unsatisfied 
surplus of needs, as Lacan defined it. But it can also be “the force”, as Frye elo-
quently expressed it, that impels “the process of making a total human form out 
of nature” (105). Which seems to be the very force of making a nation out of a 
people.
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CHAPTER SIX OF WORDS WITH POWER AS INTERVEN-
TION INTO THE DEBATE ABOUT THE METAPHORICAL 
IDENTIFICATION OF WOMEN WITH NATURE
Baudelaire’s “La Géante” deals with the speaker’s fascination with a female giant, 
and in the poem the natural environment and her body are brought into meta-
phorical identification with one another. She is spoken of as though she were 
separate from “Nature”, but she is of course easily identifiable with the whole of 
the natural world:
At the time when Nature with a lusty spirit 
Was conceiving monstrous children each day, 
I should have liked to live near a young giantess, 
Like a voluptuous cat at the feet of a queen.
I should have liked to see her soul and body thrive 
And grow without restraint in her terrible games; 
To divine by the mist swimming within her eyes 
If her heart harbored a smoldering flame;
To explore leisurely her magnificent form;
To crawl upon the slopes of her enormous knees,
And sometimes in summer, when the unhealthy sun
Makes her stretch out, weary, across the countryside, 
To sleep nonchalantly in the shade of her breasts, 
Like a peaceful hamlet below a mountainside. 
    (Baudelaire 45)
In this article, I flesh out Frye’s perception of the nature-as-woman metaphor, 
reading the sixth chapter of Words with Power as a contribution to the debate. 
From this point of view, what is interesting is Frye’s perception of what the 
metaphor brings to society. Sherry Ortner argues that the nature-as-woman 
metaphor is the main causal factor in the historical subjugation of women. As I 
shall point out, in contrast to Ortner, Frye argues that the metaphor is part of an 
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image of a particular relationship between mankind and nature. Interestingly, 
the same metaphor is, in Frye’s view, also part of an image of possible relations 
between men and women. As I shall explain, Frye courts controversy when mak-
ing this last point, though, as I shall demonstrate, it is possible for a sympathetic 
reader to mount a defence of his viewpoint.
In Words with Power, Frye distinguishes between the authentic myth and the 
demonic parody of myth. He speaks of the metaphor identifying a symbolically 
female figure and “nature” (nature as non-human world) within the context of 
demonic parody. Here nature is represented by a woman who, as Frye says, tyr-
annizes over a man. He fastens upon the figure of the femme fatale as the ulti-
mate image of this “cycle of nature”:
Romantic and later poets are also preoccupied with femme fatale figures: Medusa in 
Shelley and Salome in Oscar Wilde and elsewhere, the latter holding the severed head 
of John the Baptist, dramatize their castrating proclivities. Keats’s La Belle Dame sans 
Merci, which takes its title, though not its theme, from a fairly harmless medieval 
poem, presents us with an inferno of damned lovers in the setting of a bleak landscape 
of exhausted fertility. The dark and gigantic females in Baudelaire assimilate the figure 
to the vast unconsciousness of the natural environment. Gérard de Nerval’s poem 
Horus takes us back to Graves’s mythological context: the goddess Isis, finding herself 
in bed with an old king, flings away from him and goes to look for a younger partner. 
As we should expect, the femme fatale is sometimes associated with Eve after the fall: 
such an association turns up in Valéry’s long poem Ébauche d’un serpent (it is also one 
of the strands in the complex weave of La jeune Parque). (WP 219-20)
In his discussion, Frye contrasts this metaphor with what he calls the “bride-
garden” metaphor. The “bride-garden” metaphor, he suggests, is a sacred mar-
riage “in which the Bridegroom represents humanity and the Bride nature” 
(WP 224-5). Here, the bride represents unfallen nature. The identification of 
Eve with Eden belongs to this context, but Frye has an even greater interest 
in the presence of this metaphor in the Songs of Songs. In the Song of Songs, 
“sexual union suggests fertility, and the bride’s body is metaphorically identi-
fied with vineyards, gardens, flowers, and the awakening of nature in spring” 
(WP 196). The “bride-garden” metaphor belongs to the larger context of the 
chapter. In the context of “the garden”, authentic myth and parody are struc-
tured around the image of the hierogamy or sacred marriage, and the “bride-




 • the sacred marriage of Adam and Eve;
 • “the real New Testament hierogamy”, in which “the risen Christ is the 
Bridegroom and his redeemed people the Bride” (WP 224);
 • the Book of Revelation hierogamy, in which Christ as Bridegroom represents 
“the principle of unity or individuality” and the Bride is “the principle of 
community” (ibid.);
 • “the bride-garden metaphor, in which the Bridegroom represents humanity 
and the bride nature” (WP 224-5);
 • the sacred marriage, in which “the Bridegroom is love and the Bride beauty” 
(WP 227).
The demonic parody presents us with a related image and a therefore sixth ele-
ment:
 • “the sadomasochistic cycle, in which the female may tyrannize over the 
male or vice versa” (WP 218).
Of course, we now customarily conclude that the woman-as-metaphor implies 
the subjugation of women. In “Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture?”, Ort-
ner, following on from De Beauvoir, argues that the metaphorical link between a 
symbolically female figure and such a nature is a causal factor in the subjugation 
of women. Of course Ortner’s article, along with Edwin Ardener’s “Belief and the 
problem of women”, was critically engaged with in the volume Nature, Culture 
and Gender, in which a number of social anthropologists challenged her belief 
in the universality of the association of nature with women, and even the univer-
sality of the culture-nature opposition, amongst other relevant issues. However, 
Ortner’s argument is still considered the central statement of the male-female 
culture-nature analogy.1 In her article, she argues that “cultural language and 
imagery continue” (Ortner 74, 87) to serve to establish an association between 
nature and women; that, in turn, automatically leads to a situation in which 
women are assumed “to be closer to nature than men, men being seen as more 
unequivocally occupying the high ground of culture” (Ortner 74, 83-4); and this 
1 In “Heroines of Nature”, Vera L. Norwood speaks uncritically of Ortner’s thesis: “As Sherry 
Ortner posits in her essay on the subject, the issue is not a belief that women are nature but 
that they are closer to nature than men. Using Simone de Beauvoir, Ortner argues that woman’s 
physiology, social roles and psychic structure combine to place her to be nearer nature than 
man. Although Ortner has been criticized legitimately for her attempt to defend her thesis as 
universally true, her conclusions as to its results remain unchallenged if one limits them to 
Western traditions.” (Norwood 1996, 324)
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factor leads ineluctably to the “the universal devaluation of women” (Ortner 74, 
83). 
Frye sees the matter differently. The imagery relates to mankind and nature. 
The exploitation of the natural world represents an attempt to dominate that 
world, but it is never successful: nature only enslaves humanity as a consequence 
of such endeavours, pulling mankind down to a lower level of existence. Frye 
clarifies his point in relation to the second half of Blake’s The Mental Traveller.
The mysterious second half of this poem may be partly understood from the more 
detailed treatment in the prophetic books. Blake saw not only that the exploitation of 
human labour was morally wrong, he also saw that the unlimited exploitation of na-
ture was wrong, and that the same master-slave paradoxes operated there as well. The 
more man achieves “mastery” over nature, the more he becomes a slave to an enclosing 
natural order which eventually will, in Blake’s phrase, “him to infancy beguile”, and 
start the whole elusive and frustrating cycle over again. (WP 221)
The narrative dealing with the femme fatale and her victim points to the exploi-
tation of nature and nature’s capacity for tyranny when exploited. The myth, 
then, is innocent of the kinds of charges levelled against it by Ortner and critics 
who buy into her argument: it doesn’t refer to women in society.
At this stage, the reader might expect the argument of the remainder of this 
article to run as follows: “Myth does not effect the devaluation of women. If myth 
is connected to that devaluation, the responsibility lies with the societal power 
which ‘adapts’ the myth, associating women with nature but men with culture. 
Myth is innocent.” It would, however, be disingenuous if we were to conclude 
that in Frye’s view this area of imagery has no relation whatsoever to women in 
society. Ultimately what separates Frye from a critic such as Ortner is not simply 
a matter of the innocence or culpability of myth, but also of different perceptions 
of the representative power of the myth.
Frye does have an interest in the myth’s applicability to women, a factor which 
will, for some readers, point to a residual sexism in his thinking. Rather remark-
ably, Frye speaks of the situation in which one should indeed associate fallen 
nature with women in society, if not ideologically adapting the myth, then 
exploring its representative power in relation to society. Blake’s “female will” is 
a version of the femme fatale archetype, and Frye often speaks of the repre-
sentative power of the figure “female will” in his Blake criticism. Referring to 
Ulro and Generation (“the first two worlds”) and Beulah and Eden (“the second 




In the first two worlds, nature is a remote and tantalizing “female will”; in the second 
two she is an “emanation”. Human women are associated with this nature only when 
they dramatize its characteristics. (Frye 2005, 351-2)
If, within the context of Blake, Frye speaks of nature as “viciously wilful” (FS 
75), the apparently uncomfortable inference is that women in society at times 
exhibit such wilfulness in their actions.
Such language is confrontational and some readers will undoubtedly turn 
away from Frye at such a moment. But two important points must be made. 
Firstly, if Frye uses or even “adapts” the metaphor here, his interest is not in 
associating amoral and natural behaviour with women, on the one hand, and 
cultured and moral behaviour with men, on the other. Far from it. Crucially, the 
implicit image of men in society is equally ironic. After all, the male figure cor-
responding to the “female will” is the “spectre,” a Blakean figure which gets 
appropriated by Frye in his own work. If the femme fatale is a female figure 
representing fallen nature, the spectre is a male figure representing fallen 
humanity. The inference is clear: if women may dramatize the characteristics of 
fallen nature in their behaviour, men may dramatize the characteristics of such 
a humanity, which Blake presents as “a Male Form howling in Jealousy” in Mil-
ton (3:36, Blake 97). Rather than cultured and moral behaviour, it is this kind of 
psychology which may be associated with men in society through the imagery 
in question.
Of course, while this observation represents something of a defence of Frye, 
it must be followed up by additional important points. After all, as it stands, it 
is as though men and women exhibit utterly different types of human weakness. 
Frye, however, ultimately deconstructs the opposition. In Words with Power, he 
states that literature is concerned not just with femmes fatales who lord it over 
their male counterparts, but with male figures who tyrannize over female figures 
with all the callousness of the femmes fatales:
the sadomasochistic cycle is readily reversible, and if we have Delila and Deianeira, 
we also have Iphigeneia and Jephthah’s daughter, women sacrificed to what it seems 
fair to call male whims. The conclusion of the episode of Jephthah’s daughter (Judges 
11:40) tells us that her grave became a cult site for women lamenting her yearly – 
a significant social expansion from a stock rash-vow story. Male-dominated as the 
Western literary tradition has been, it is still strewn with heroines whose lives have 
been betrayed and blighted by callous lovers. Their reactions range from the ferocity 
of Medea to the quiet self-obliteration of Ophelia. (WP 222)
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If female figures in literature often symbolize non-human nature, it seems as 
though parallel male figures, guilty of destructive whims, may also symbolize 
that nature. And men in society may no doubt be associated with such a nature 
when in their acts they dramatize its characteristics.
If one knew nothing about Frye beyond this level, one could feasibly move on 
from the notion that Frye’s thinking is sexist or essentialist to the extent that it 
is misanthropic; but again the conclusion is erroneous. Following on from Blake, 
Frye is a fourfold thinker, and he thinks in terms of four levels of sexual symbol-
ism. If this area of imagery relates to the lowest level of human experience in 
terms of desire, literature provides us with imagery of ever-more desirable rela-
tionships between mankind and nature, as well as relationships between lovers. 
As Frye clarifies in his Blake criticism, in the imaginative world (the upper levels 
of the world as it is seen by the imagination) the symbolically male figure is a 
lover and the symbolically female the beloved. This is the level of the “bride-
garden metaphor”. Here the primary reference is to mankind and nature again, 
but just as the human figures on the lower level have representative power, so do 
these figures, and we might say that in so much as the lovers dramatize the 
characteristics of a risen humanity and a renewed nature they may be associ-
ated with them.2
Frye does dwell on the ideological adaptation of myth, and he speaks author-
itatively of the adaptation of the hierogamy, pointing out that it traditionally 
takes:
the form of a social institution dominated by incest-taboo imagery and metaphors 
of paternal and maternal authority, where as much spiritual activity as possible is 
withdrawn from physical sex. What sexual life is permitted is regularized by strict 
monogamy and is regarded as existing primarily for the begetting of children (al-
though sometimes the remarkably repulsive phrase “for the relief of concupiscence” 
is included). (WP 223)
Though the nature-as-woman metaphor is an integral part of the hierogamy, 
it is not the ideological adaptation of that metaphor in particular that Frye is 
interested in. Rather, his emphasis is upon the literary value of the metaphor: 
2 Though it is excluded from the sixth chapter of Words with Power, in his Blake criticism and 
elsewhere, Frye speaks of the sexual symbolism of the upper part of the imaginative world: “The 
highest possible state […] is not the union of lover and beloved, but of creator and creature, of 
energy and form” (FS 49).
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the way in which it projects one level of possible relations between mankind and 
nature and one level of relations between lovers. The projection for “relations 
between lovers” may stick in the craw of some readers. But, as I have tried to 
show, when viewed in its proper context, the femme fatale image is less offensive 
than it might at first have seemed.
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A KÖLTÉSZET SZÜLETÉSE: SÁMUEL I. KÖNYVE
A zenélést már a Teremtés könyve a legősibb foglalkozások közt említi: „[Ada] 
Testvérét Jubálnak hívták, ő lett az ősatyja azoknak, akik gitáron és fuvolán 
játszanak” (Ter 4,21). És bár a legelső költemény Lámeché (Ter 4,23–24) a zenei-
költői önkifejezés női kifejezésformának is számított. Miután az egyiptomiak a 
tengerbe vesznek, Mirjam prófétanő Mózes hálaadó költeménye után így énekel: 
Magasztaljátok az Urat, 
mert dicsőség övezi, 
a lovat és a lovast a tengerbe vetette. 
(Kiv 15,21) 
Debora pedig így dicsőíti Bárákkal Kánaán királyának vereségét és persze saját 
győzelmét: 
Jáel napjaiban
néptelenné váltak az utak.
Akik útra keltek, rejtett ösvényekre tértek.
A falvak kihaltak Izraelben.
S kihaltak is maradtak,
míg te, Debora, nem jöttél,
föl nem keltél, Izraelnek anyja. 
(Bír 5, 6–7)
Ezek a próféta- és katonanők igazi nőköltők, de mi mégsem beszélhetünk a mi 
fogalmaink szerinti nőköltészetről. Nem feltétlenül azért, mert ezeket a harci 
dalokat is (esetleg) férfiak szerezték, hanem mert ezt a nőknek tulajdonított lírai 
beszédmódot a Biblia nem is próbálja a férfidalokétól megkülönbözetni. (Pedig 
van ilyen hagyományra is példa: a középkori portugál líra például a férfi- és a női 
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beszédmód világos megkülönböztetésén alapul: cantiga de amor – cantiga de 
amigo, lásd Bánki 105-120). Mózes és Debora hálaadó éneke viszont se formai 
tekintetben, se harcias tematikájában nem nagyon különbözik – mind a kettő 
katonai-vallásos győzelmi ének.  
Ámde azért az Ószövetségben sem minden női dal ilyen harcias apropóból 
született.
Az utolsó nagy, önálló női énekszerző – talán a Biblia legjelentősebb költőnője 
– nem világraszóló katonai győzelmet ünnepel, hanem egy kisgyermek világra 
jöttét. Sámuel édesanyja, Hanna nem diadalmas katonanő vagy prófétanő, 
hanem egy meddőnek kikiáltott, sokáig háttérbe szorított feleség. Ámde bárm-
ilyen nőies és konvencionális is a költeményének apropója, ez a hálaének (1Sám 
2,1–10) talán még különösebb, mint a prófétanők versei. Hanna a gyermek meg-
születése kapcsán Isten – Northrop Frye kifejezésével – „forradalmi tevékeny-
ségét” (KT 306) dicsőíti: az Úr felforgatja a társadalom megszokott rendjét, 
átírja a történelmet, a jelenben és nem a távoli jövőben szolgáltat igazságot. 
Az Úr adja a halált és az életet,
letaszít az alvilágba, és felhoz onnan.
Az Úr tesz szegénnyé és gazdaggá,
megaláz és fölemel.
Fölsegíti a porból a gyöngét
és kivezeti a szennyből a szegényt.
A fejedelmek mellett ad nekik helyet,
díszhelyet jelöl ki nekik.
Az Úr tulajdona a föld minden pillére,
ő helyezte rájuk a világot. 
(1Sám 2, 6–8)  
A kis Sámuel még csak meg sem említtetik: Hanna mindvégig Istent, a Törté-
nelem Urát ünnepli. Isten mindvégig a „szokás” ellenfele, maga a dünamosz, 
az örökös, a kérlelhetetlen változás. Bármennyire egzaltáltan is áradó ez a (a 
lukácsi Magnificatra is ható) költemény, bármilyen gyakran ismétli is Hanna 
Mirjam és Debora harcias frázisait, a mi fogalmaink szerinti „legversszerűbb 
vers” a zsoltárok előtt a Bibliában. A korábbi énekek katonai frazeológiája itt 
mintha már metaforikussá lényegülne, hiszen Hanna nem egy eseményről vagy 
győzelemről beszél, hanem az egész emberi történelem dinamikájáról. Maga a 
költemény előadása beleilleszkedik valamilyen szertartásba (a kis Sámuelt bemu-
tatják Silóban), de az alkalmi jelleg már egyáltalán nem érződik.
Hanna költeménye a felkent király említésével zárul. A költemény tehát a 
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jövőbe íródik. Hiszen Izraelnek ekkor még nincsen királya – az Ószövetség 
következő nagy költője, sőt a költője az a Dávid király lesz, akit majd Hanna fia, 
Sámuel ken fel. Az ének egy megtörtént és egy eljövendő születés között helyez-
kedik el. Nemcsak látomás a történelemről, Istennek a történelemben betöltött 
szerepéről általában, hanem aktuális utalásokban is bővelkedő prófécia, ame-
lynek apropóját egy múltbéli esemény, Sámuel megszületése biztosítja. (A 
költemény mágikus szerepéről csak akkor beszélhetnénk, ha Hanna a dalt a fia 
fogantatása előtt énekelné, nem pedig utána.)
Sámuel könyve nem művészéletrajz, de azért a költészet születése (a zsoltár-
forma műfajjá kristályosodása) és a királyság megalapítása mégiscsak egybeesik 
a zsidó hagyományban. Az archaikus kultúrák gyakran a törvény és a tudás 
hordozóiként tekintettek a költőkre, ámde Dávid nemcsak a kultúra révén örökölt 
tudás, hanem egyben a politikai hatalom letéteményese is. Míg Hanna, Mirjam 
és Debora (nyilvános, közös vagy éppen magányos) éneke egyszeri alkalom, a 
„szokás” megszakítása (azt se tudjuk, bárki elismételte-e Hanna hálaénekét, azaz 
hogy a dal az egyszeri eseménytől elszakítva „költeményként” funkcionált-e), 
addig a zsoltárokat a közösség tagjai meghatározott alkalmanként énekelték, 
tehát „megidézték”. A dávidi ének megszenteli Isten idejét. Szokássá válik.
Bár az Ószövetség nem rajzolja meg Dávid költői portréját, de rávilágít az 
általa képviselt művészet gyógyító, kiegyensúlyozott, már-már „apollói” jelle-
gére. Saul búskomorságát, „rossz szellemét” elűzi Dávid lantjátéka, ahogy Saul 
tanácsadói ígérik: „Aztán, ha rád tör Istennek a gonosz lelke, megpendíti a 
húrokat, és jobban leszel” (1Sám 16,16). E szerint a dávidi költészet nagyon távol 
áll attól az önfeledt, extatikus, beavató jellegű zenétől, ami ebben az időben (mint 
Pávich Zsuzsanna kitűnő, az Ószövetség korának „zenei életét” bemutató 
írásából és disszertációjából is tudjuk) a prófétálást kísérte. És mégis: a zenét 
hallgató Saul menthetetlen és nemcsak menthetetlen, hanem megválthatatlan 
is. A vágy és a gyűlölet egyetlen mozdulatával a vele szemben ülő, lanton játszó, 
tehát védekezésképtelen Dávid felé hajítja a lándzsáját (1Sám 19,10).
Mert a harmóniát teremtő zenének is megvan a maga erotikus, csábító aspek-
tusa – ahogy magának Dávidnak. Épp Dávid személyes vonzereje az, amely oly 
féltékennyé teszi Sault, miközben ennek a tüneményes vonzerőnek ő maga sem 
tud ellenállni. Ez a típusú (Dávid esetében már-már ellenállhatatlan, az ellenségeit 
is halálosan megalázó) vonzerő a költőnők esetében egyáltalán nem hangsúly-
ozódik. Jellemző módon a Biblia csak Dávid, nem pedig a „költőnők” „csinosságát” 
és ellenállhatatlan vonzerejét emeli ki. Dávid zenéje és költészete – bármilyen 
őszinte és páratlanul méltóságteljes – elválaszthatatlan a hatalomtól, a rendtől és 
a csábítástól.
A három női dalszerző közül csak Sámuel anyjának, Hannának a társadalmi 
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kapcsolatait ismerjük. Hanna (Dáviddal ellentétben) nem bűvöl el senkit és sem-
mit – a legkevésbé Izrael szakrális vezetőjét, Éli papot, aki a silói szentélyben 
imádkozás közben durván megleckézteti: „Meddig akarsz még itt maradni ilyen 
részegen? Igyekezz kijózanodni!” (1Sám 1,14). A némán elmondott ima, a szív és 
Isten párbeszéde gyanús, hiszen a közösség spirituális vezetője számára is 
ellenőrizhetetlen. De még ez a maga korában szokatlan imádkozási forma sem 
indokolja, miért ilyen szálka az Úrhoz fohászkodó Hanna a főpap szemében.
Vagy ebben a megalázó rendreutasításban talán a papság által képviselt kul-
tusz és a prófétaság közti konfliktus nyomát kell látnunk? A prófétaság nem 
kötődött Silóhoz, míg a papság által gyakorolt kultusz igen. Éli talán úgy gon-
dolja, hogy az extázisnak nincs helye a kultusz helyén, másrészt pedig – ingerül-
tsége erre enged következtetni – talán azt sem tartja helyénvalónak, hogy az 
extázist épp egy nő élje át. Hiszen Hanna imádkozik a gyermekéért ahelyett, 
hogy áldozatot mutatna be, tehát a szóra bízza, amit állatok vére árán kellene 
megkapnia. Hanna mégis megpróbálja az eksztázist a hivatalos kultusz helyén 
gyakorolni. De mint Éli reakciójából is látható, csak Dávid, a „felkent” működése 
révén válhatnak ezek az eksztatikus gyökerű szent énekek a kultusz részeivé.
A kiegyensúlyozott, apollói jellegű, mértékadó dávidi költészetnek tehát van-
nak extatikus gyökerei. És más tanulsággal is jár, ha Sámuel könyvét a költészet 
„megalapításaként” vagy keletkezéstörténeteként olvassuk. Eszerint az imád-
kozás, a szavakba vetett hit és maga a líra is  kompenzáció: a földi igazságtalan-
ságok kiküszöbölésére szolgál. A társadalmi rendet újra és újra felforgató Isten 
igazolásul is szolgálhat az ilyen extatikus költészet szociális töltetére. A költő(nő) 
hangot ad azoknak, akiknek nincsenek saját szavaik, így közvetít Isten, az 
igazságosztó és a nép között.
Amúgy a karizmatikus, még az ellenségei vonzalmát is elnyerő Dáviddal sze-
mben Hanna szinte megtestesíti a kitaszítottságot és az alávetettséget. Nemcsak 
asszony, hanem terméketlen asszony – és nem elég, hogy terméketlen, a vallási 
hatalom szemében furcsán, már-már extravagánsan is viselkedik.1 De a szavak 
fölötti, az imában és a költészetben is kifejeződő hatalom a Bibliában elválasz-
thatatlan nemcsak a gyermeknemzéstől, hanem a politikától. A Sámuel könyvé-
ben azok győzedelmeskednek, akiknek vannak szavaik – saját szavaik. Mert 
hiszen nem érdekmentes sem a Hanna-féle extatikus, sem a dávidi mértéktartóbb 
1 Hanna változatos módon érzékeltett, más bibliai hősnőkhöz, pl. Sárához, Ruth-hoz, Máriához 
hasonló, kiszolgáltatott helyzete rendkívül nagy nyomatékot kap a szövegben. Talán mert „a 
nők bibliai történelemben elfoglalt helyével kapcsolatos motívumoknak, mint a levirátusnak és 
a csodás kései gyerekáldásnak, van egy olyan dimenziója, amely szerint a nő képe kiszélesedik 
egyfajta proletáriátussá, állandó, folytonos kiszolgáltatottságban tartott, az ellenséges világban 
a szabadulást váró emberiséggé…” (IH 268).
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költészet sem. A megalázott Hanna fiában, Sámuelben és Sámuelen keresztül 
sújt le Élire és házára az Úr.  (A Sámuel könyve amúgy is mindvégig párviadalra 
épül: Saul és Dávid „játszmáját” megelőlegezi az Éli fiai és a kis Sámuel szem-
beállítása, de a termékeny és a terméketlen feleség, Peninna és Hanna rivalizá-
lása is.)
Hanna pályafutásának csúcsa persze nem egy világra szóló csata vagy éppen 
az Izrael fölötti politikai hatalom megnyerése, hanem Sámuel, a próféta világra 
hozása és egy különös, az Úr mindent felforgató, de egyben igazságosztó szerepét 
dicsőítő költemény megalkotása. A legnagyobb elfogultság és szubjektivitás itt 
egyfajta lírai univerzalizmus forrása lesz. Az ének konklúziója szinte megidézi 
a Sámuel könyvének sorsdöntő párharcait, miközben hömpölygő párhuzamok-
ban állítja elénk a minden megszokást felforgató Történelem Urát. És talán ez a 
kozmikus látásmód magyarázza, hogy a zsidó királyság intézményesülésének 
története, a Sámuel könyve miért kezdődik egy szokatlanul viselkedő édesanya 
történetével (nem Dávid édesanyjáéval, hanem Sámueléval), és miért jelenik meg 
itt – egy költőkirály uralomra jutásáról szóló bibliai könyvben – teljes 
terjedelmében a Saul és Dávid prófétájának megszületését ünneplő hálaének.
Hanna nem meghal – hiszen ahogy születéséről, úgy a haláláról sem számol 
be a szöveg –, hanem szertefoszlik, szinte „felitatódik” a szövegben. Hiszen az ő 
öléből próféták származnak, és nemcsak egy nagy próféta, hanem az Úr és a 
közösség viszonyát átformáló költészet is.
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NORTHROP FRYE AND BÉLA HAMVAS
1. Why Compare Béla Hamvas and Northrop Frye? 
This paper aims to focus on comparing a motif that is common to the writings 
of Northrop Frye (1912-1991) and the Hungarian writer, thinker and philosopher 
of religion Béla Hamvas (1897-1968). Studying their works I was struck by the 
similarity in the structure of their thinking. There is no sign of any “anxiety of 
influence”, as Hamvas’s works were, of course, not translated into English, and, 
to my knowledge, there is no allusion to Frye in any of Hamvas’s books. They are 
equally unusual, idiosyncratic thinkers whose works are not easy to catalogue or 
classify. The prolific intellectual output of the two has had a rather controversial 
reception. Readers of both Frye and Hamvas become either friends or foes, neu-
trality is not an option. Not only is the content or the structure of their thinking 
similar, but one can notice similar features in their styles, as well. For example, 
both of them were fond of scribbling in notebooks before shaping the final ver-
sions of their books and both of them were attracted to the genre of “anatomy” 
as practised and promoted by the seventeenth-century English scholar Robert 
Burton (see Hamvas 1993, 24–28; GC xxi).
Northrop Frye’s literary career needs no introduction: his books on Blake, 
Shakespeare, the romantic tradition, modern poetry as well as his literary criti-
cal opus, Anatomy of Criticism, and, last but not least, the great Bible books, The 
Great Code and Words with Power, have received much critical attention.
This, however, is not the case with Béla Hamvas. Indeed, intellectual achieve-
ments of small countries tend to be unrecognized by the cultural currents of 
politically stronger nations, and the likelihood of remaining unknown and invis-
ible to the wide world is even stronger when somebody has spent most of his 
creative life behind a certain “curtain”. During his life in the Communist era, an 
official hush surrounded him proscribed as he was from publishing, but copies 
of (very frequently mistyped) manuscripts changed hands at high prices on the 
Hungarian intellectuals’ black market in the seventies and eighties. Some of his 
works were not printed until just before the political changes in 1989, and now 
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his complete works are being published in a series (so far twenty-five volumes 
have come out). Rigorously attacked and passionately defended, Hamvas was 
indeed “hushed up to become a legend” as a contemporary critic said. Hamvas, 
the first Hungarian interpreter of writers and poets like Joyce, Eliot, Powys, 
Huxley, Dos Passos; of philosophers like Jaspers and Heidegger and of theologi-
ans like Barth and Bultmann, responded with great insights to the “sense of 
crisis” these outstanding artists and thinkers shared in the wake of World War 
I. Moreover, similarly to Eliot, he also found remedy for the crisis of modern 
civilisation in “tradition” or, more precisely, the traditionalism of archaic cul-
tures. At the beginning of his intellectual journey is the recognition of the total 
crisis of the world and at the terminus of the journey is the unconditional yes 
to, the approval of, the sacred texts of humankind. But he was much more than 
a sensitive reader or reviewer of contemporary Western European artists, phi-
losophers and theologians. In fact, he was a universally oriented mind steeped 
in the cultures of the archaic, classical and modern ages. This encyclopaedic 
concern explains why he frequently became (and still becomes) a stumbling 
block for pure specialists. By being an artist himself, he was able to open up new 
intellectual horizons for his readers. He was a prolific writer, turning out almost 
three hundred publications between 1930 and 1948 and a huge quantity of man-
uscripts in the last twenty years of his life. Now, forty-four years after his death, 
most of his works have become available.
To briefly summarize his life’s journey, Béla Hamvas was born in 1897 as the 
son of a Lutheran minister and later a secondary-school teacher in a provincial 
town of Upper Hungary, now Slovakia. After finishing his school, he found him-
self fighting in World War I. Wounded on the battlefront, he went through the 
total physical and psychological shock caused by the collapse of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire. After the war, he studied Hungarian and German literature 
at Budapest University. During these years he voraciously read the great mas-
terpieces of world literature and philosophy, especially those by his favourites: 
Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Dostoyevsky just as the medieval 
mystics or the authors of classical antiquity. He began his career as a journalist 
but soon became disillusioned with what he called the “superficial nature” and 
“pseudo-culture” of journalism. In 1927 he became a chief librarian and he 
remained so for more than twenty years not only in a literal but also in a meta-
phorical sense of the word: a “gardener”, “preserver”, and “cultivator” of accu-
mulated human wisdom similarly to his great predecessors and inspiring mas-
ters, Lao-tzu, the author of Tao-te-Ching, and Robert Burton, the writer of The 
Anatomy of Melancholy. In the early thirties he devoted his energy to the study 
of classical Greek culture, mythology, philosophy and tragedy. He founded the 
Tibor Fabiny 
• 186 •
so-called “Island Circle” with his friend, the famous historian of religion, Káro-
ly Kerényi (1897-1973).
The second half of the thirties was a most stimulating period for him, writing 
essays on the great but yet uncanonized works of modern literature and on the 
great texts of the tradition he located in ancient Chinese, Japanese, Hebrew, 
Iranian, Hindu, and Greek cultures. His great but not yet fully published ency-
clopaedic work about the spiritual heritage of archaic humankind, Scientia Sacra 
(its first volume was published in 1988) goes back to this period.
The first collection of his essays entitled A láthatatlan történet (Invisible 
History) was published in 1943. During World War II, he was drafted three 
times. He even served on the Russian front. When his company was ordered to 
go to Germany in 1944, he managed to escape. He arrived in Budapest only to 
find his home totally destroyed by a bomb. His library, all his manuscripts, all 
his notes, all his work he had identified himself with, perished.
In the three years following the end of the war, his intellectual activity was 
rejuvenated: he became the editor of a series on contemporary thinkers, pub-
lished a unique anthology about the wisdom of five thousand years entitled 
Anthologia Humana, and wrote a book on modern art with his wife, Katalin 
Kemény (Northrop Frye’s wife was also an art historian). The pluralistic political 
climate of those coalition years formed a highly stimulating background for his 
creative activity. In 1948, however, the Communists took over, and Stalinist 
totalitarian dictatorship set in. On the eve of this political outcome, his book on 
modern art was severely denounced as “modern snobbism” by the well-known 
Marxist critic and philosopher, György Lukács (1885–1971). He was also attacked 
by minor figures of the now official ideology. As a result, not only was he com-
pletely banned from publishing, but he was sacked from his job as a librarian 
and was forced into early retirement at the age of fifty one. For the remaining 
twenty years of his life, he had to struggle to earn a living. He became a blue-
collar worker, finally a storeman at an industrial plant more than a hundred 
miles away from his home. During the day he worked and during the night he 
polished his knowledge of Hebrew and Sanskrit. These two decades of “exile” 
did not pass in a spiritual vacuum. On the contrary, they proved to be his most 
fertile writing period. He composed collections of essays, he even wrote novels, 
the most famous one being a so-called “catastrophe novel”, Karnevál (Carnival), 
which would eventually be published in 1985. He wrote without the slightest 
hope that his books would ever be published. However, when at home, he was 
surrounded by poets, painters and artists of all sorts who went to listen to the 
“master” and ask him for new and inspiring manuscripts.
It was a world turned upside down. One of Hungary’s most erudite minds and 
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authors was employed as a blue-collar labourer while he was creating his out-
standing literary and intellectual oeuvre. Life and work remained inseparable 
for Hamvas. For him crisis, apocalypse, and salvation were not well-constructed 
intellectual doctrines far from experienced reality. Whatever he created was 
sealed and authenticated by his moral refusal to adapt his ideas to the world 
around him, to compromise with spiritually alien powers or to participate in 
what he called “the modern corruption of existence” just for the comfort or the 
pleasures of this life. Having retired for the second time in 1964, he died in 
November 1968 at the age of seventy one.
2. Crisis, Apocalypse and “Transparency” in Hamvas
As the central motifs of Hamvas’s thought, a critic has recently identified “cri-
sis”, “tradition”, Christianity, and art. Yet these are all united by his stress on 
“universal orientation” and “transparent existence”. In the mid-thirties, he pub-
lished three essays entitled A modern apokalipszis (Modern Apocalypse), Krizis 
és katarzis (Crisis and Catharsis) and A világválság (World Crisis). As a librarian 
he even compiled an inventory and an annotated bibliography of the literature 
of crisis. He described his project as “criseology”, the study of the literature of 
crisis. The vast and still useful bibliography covers the literature of spiritual, 
cultural, scientific, artistic, literary, political, and economic crisis. Hamvas was 
astonished that none of these documents of human erudition could touch the 
real root of crisis. He became all the more keen to find the cause, the origins 
of crisis. It seemed to him that each crisis was apparently a consequence of an 
earlier crisis that had remained essentially unsolved. Where is the beginning 
of crisis, the first lie, the dark point, the proton pseudos? he asked. He then set 
out to explore chains of crises through history: from the twentieth century he 
went back to the nineteenth century, from there to the French Revolution, then 
to the Enlightenment, to rationalism, to Humanism, to the Middle Ages, to the 
Greeks, to the Hebrews, to the Egyptians, and to Primitivism. Reading history 
backwards, he found that crisis had always been present throughout history, 
moreover, its location proved to be deeper and deeper. Unable to grasp “the 
beginning” of crisis in history, he became aware of the fact that he had com-
mitted the typical European mistake of trying to locate this dark point in the 
outside world and not within one’s own self. Having realized this, he came to 
believe that corruption was an ontological event, i.e., affliction  has always been 
at the very heart of human existence.
From here onward he defined crisis as the disturbed and corrupt existence 
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that is not primarily of horizontal (historical) but rather of vertical (metaphysi-
cal) nature.
Crisis-consciousness in history, i.e. subjective anxiety about the total collapse 
of the world, appears however, in its most concentrated form in the twentieth 
century, which Paul Tillich later called the age of anxiety. All the antidotes 
offered by previous ages and cultures to forget about crisis appear all of a sudden 
ineffective. In fact, they turn out to have been tricks: refined and cunning tech-
niques of escaping reality.
Hamvas found that Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Spengler were the great mas-
ters of “prophetic criseology” as they all explicitly shared the “crisis-conscious-
ness” resulting from perceiving all the threatening possibilities. Kierkegaard 
observed that the discrepancy between the Gospels and historical (European) 
Christianity was so huge that Christianity as such simply did not exist any more. 
And Nietzsche, also justifiably, burst out against historical Christianity: it was 
not the human heart that corrupted Christianity but Christianity (in its per-
verted historical version) that corrupted the human heart. Hamvas came to note 
(following Rozanov) that Nietzsche’s cry was but an echo of the howling of the 
Apocalypse.
The solution of the problem, according to Hamvas, lies partly in the idea of 
“transparency”. “Transparent”, according to the dictionary, means “allowing 
light to pass through so that objects (or at least their outlines) behind can be 
distinctly seen” (Hornby 919), it is the opposite of “opaque”, which does not allow 
light to pass through or allow unilluminated objects to be distinctly seen. Trans-
parency has to do with apocalypse, revelation, being uncovered, removing the 
curtains of forgetfulness or any disguise: it anticipates the ultimate seeing “face 
to face”. In his most famous work, Scientia Sacra, Hamvas writes that “transpar-
ency” pertains to aletheia (truth): 
[W]hoever opens himself to the whole he himself becomes transparent. Whoever 
is willing to step out from his hiding place is giving up his self-security… He stands 
uncovered without trying to conceal anything. Being ready and open for anybody all 
the time. Aletheia means being uncovered. Participating in truth which is itself open 
all the time. Only whoever has opened himself can reveal. (Hamvas 1996, 123) 
Tradition, aletheia, apocalypse, and transparency are almost synonyms for Ham-
vas. As Antal Dúl, the editor of his works, puts it: “Béla Hamvas considers tradi-
tion (i.e. revelation) the authentic information of human existence. Its language 
does not prove anything, it does not argue, but, addressing their most burning 
issues, it touches human beings, and compels them to respond.” (Dúl 877)
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In the course of history, this open existence has become corrupted, and this 
has resulted in the split of theory and practice. The tragedy of modernity and its 
philosophy that “it that it tries to realize transparent existence without univer-
sal orientation and science tries to realize universal orientation without tranpar-
ent existence.” (Hamvas 1996, 146). 
According to Hamvas, historical Christianity is only a corrupted, depraved 
form of evangelical Christianity (1996, 149). Historical existence has perverted 
Christianity and turned it into Pharisaism, clericalism and the Antichrist.
For Hamvas, the Antichrist is the total opposite of transparency or the spirit 
of truth; it is the embodiment of disguise, fraudulence and deception:
The Antichrist can be conceived as the opposite of the Holy Spirit because the Spirit 
wants to reveal what is concealed and the Antichrist wants to conceal what has been 
revealed. Hiding and disguise is an endless process of the Antichrist which can only 
be balanced by the endless illumination of the Holy Spirit. (1996, 173)
3. “Transparency,” “Kerygma” and “Apocalypse” in Frye
For Northrop Frye, “transparency” was a category he frequently used but never 
explicitly discussed. He adopted the term in two, not totally unrelated contexts: 
(a) as a principle of pedagogy, and (b) as a principle of language.
a) As a Principle of Pedagogy
Frye emphasised many times, especially in his pieces on education, that a proper 
teacher ideally extinguishes his personal ego, and it is only his subject that is 
present in the classroom:
If I’m lecturing on Milton, for example, the only presence that has any business being 
in that room is Milton. If I become an opaque presence and people listen to me instead 
of listening to Milton through me, then I’m becoming some sort of fake priest…When 
I teach, I try to transmute myself into a kind of transparent medium so that the room 
is full of the presence of what I am teaching. It’s a long process for the students to 
realize that they are in effect within the personality of Milton and not being talked 
to by me… The only authority in the classroom is the authority of the subject taught, 
not the teacher. (Cayley 147 –149) 
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It is very easy for the teacher to turn himself into an opaque substitute for liter-
ary experience, presenting himself and his personal influence as the substitute. 
This is a subtle and insidious temptation he must fight against every moment 
in the classroom. His ultimate goal is the abolition of himself, or the turning of 
himself into a transparent medium for the subject, so that the authority of his 
subject may be supreme over both teachers and students. (Frye 1988, 20)
b) As a Principle of Language
In the first chapter of The Great Code, Frye developed his Vico-based idea con-
cerning the three phases of language: the first, metaphorical phase is imagi-
native, characterized by a plurality of “gods”; the second, metonymic phase is 
abstract and metaphysical, the language of reasoning and logic; and the third, 
demotic phase, closely related to the age of science, is descriptive or denotative 
language. Which phase of language would the language of the Bible belong to? 
To the first or to the second, to both or to none? Frye maintains: “The origins 
of the Bible are in the first metaphorical phase of language, but much of the 
Bible is contemporary with the second-phase separation of the dialectical from 
the poetic, as its metonymic ‘God’ in particular indicates” (GC 27). But on the 
whole there is not much abstraction nor many “true rational” arguments in the 
Bible. Biblical Hebrew is an “almost obsessively concrete language”. Neverthe-
less, Frye’s final conclusion is that “the Bible fits rather awkwardly into our cycle 
of three phases” (ibid.).
In his quest to identify the specific nature of biblical language, Frye recog-
nizes its oratorical or rhetorical character. Indeed, sometimes it has been 
“assumed to be the rhetoric of God, accommodated to human intelligence” (GC 
29). But it is different from human rhetoric, which tries to win over an audience 
by means of manipulation. The specific linguistic idiom of the Bible is indeed 
beyond the three phases of language, it is, in fact, a fourth phase: kerygma or 
proclamation. Frye defines it as follows:
Kerygma is a mode of rhetoric, though it is rhetoric of a special kind. It is, like all 
rhetoric, a mixture of the metaphorical and the “existential” or concerned but, un-
like practically all other forms of rhetoric, it is not an argument disguised by figura-
tion. It is the vehicle of what is traditionally called revelation, a word I use because 
it is traditional and I can think of no better one. But if we take this word to mean 
the conveying of information from an objective divine source to a subjective human 
receptor, we are making it a form of descriptive writing… The Bible is far too deeply 
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rooted in all the resources of language for any simplistic approach to its language to 
be adequate. (GC 29–30)
So biblical language, i.e. kerygma, is “not an argument disguised by figuration”. 
Let us dwell on this unique and significant insight for a while! Rhetoric, the art of 
persuasion usually tries to “sell” a rational argument with the help of tropes and 
figures. According to Frye, biblical rhetoric is just the opposite. Here we must 
mention that Frye’s literary criticism has frequently been attacked because it 
dismisses value judgement, so important for other literary critics. Frye, however, 
consigned value judgement to the history of taste because of its transiencefick-
leness. But this rejection of value judgement was also rooted in his notion of 
reason and argumentation being aggressive. “The language of reason is implicitly 
aggressive”, he said in his sermon on symbols in 1967 (RW 253). This is how he 
contrasts argument with literary or poetic language in an interview:
I detest argument. The actual technique of argumentative writing is something I 
avoid as far as possible… an argument is always a half truth… It is a militant way of 
writing, and I’m not interested in militancy. Literature, you see, doesn’t argue within 
itself. That’s the principle of Shelley’s Defence of Poetry, that literature cannot argue. 
As Yeats says, you can refute Hegel but not the “Song of Sixpence”. (Cayley 94)
This is exactly the nature of biblical kerygma. In “The Double Mirror”, an essay 
written in 1981 when he was about to finish The Great Code, he writes: “The 
rhetoric of proclamation is a welcoming and approaching rhetoric, in contrast 
to rhetoric where the aim is argument or drawing the audience into a more 
exclusive unit”(MM 236). 
Biblical language is characterized by a kind of “transparency” as it can be 
“seen through”, it has nothing to hide, no hidden agenda. In his still unpublished 
Notebooks, Frye contrasts the language of the gospel—to our astonishment—
with that of the church and her creeds: 
The language of the gospel is mythico-metaphorical, transparent, with the kerygma 
sounding through it. What about the language of the Church? The language of the 
anathema-creeds is of the devil, but there must be something in it to rescue. (LN 630)
Kerygma is not only something “transparent” but also linked up with another 
term Frye frequently used: “interpenetration” (Denham 154). For Frye “spiritual 
language is interpenetrative… discursive language, being militant, aims at agree-
ment and reconciliation” (LN 660). In his posthumous work on the Bible, The 
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Double Vision, Frye, based on Paul’s distinction of spiritual and carnal under-
standing, makes a crucial distinction between “imaginative” and “demonic” lit-
eralism:
I am not trying to deny or belittle the validity of a credal, even a dogmatic, approach to 
Christianity: I am saying that the literal basis of faith in Christianity is a mythical and 
metaphorical basis, not one founded on historical facts or logical propositions. Once 
we accept an imaginative literalism, everything else falls into place: without that, 
creeds and dogmas quickly turn malignant… Demonic literalism seeks conquest by 
paralysing argument; imaginative literalism seeks what might be called interpenetra-
tion, the free flowing of spiritual life into and out of one another that communicates 
but never violates. As Coleridge said… “The medium by which spirits understand each 
other is not the surrounding air, but the freedom which they possess in common”. 
(DV 17 –18)
Thus kerygma as “divine rhetoric” is characterized by the lack of argument, 
aggression and its attributes are transparency, interpenetration and freedom. 
Perhaps the characterization of this language is most powerful and overwhelm-
ing in an oral lecture which is the last in a thirty-part series recorded for the 
video and transcribed by the Toronto Media Center, later on on published also 
in Biblical and Classical Myths:
The Bible is not interested in arguing, because if you state a thesis of belief you have 
already stated its opposite; if you say ‘I believe in God’, you have already suggested 
the possibility of not believing in him… the language of the Bible has to be a language 
which somehow bypasses argument and refutation… So the Bible uses the language 
of symbolism and imagery which bypasses argument and aggressiveness and at the 
same time clearly defines the difference between life and death, between freedom 
and slavery, between happiness and misery, and is in short the language of love, and 
according to Saint Paul, that is likely to last longer than most other forms of human 
communication. (Frye-Macpherson, 2004,250)
4. Conclusion
It is outside the scope of this paper to illuminate all the aspects that are strik-
ingly in common in the thinking and writings of the well-known Canadian critic 
and the so-far little-known Hungarian writer Béla Hamvas. Further comparison 
would indeed deserve a dissertation. 
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Apart from introducing the figure and phenomenon of Hamvas, a thinker 
largely unknown beyond the borders of Hungary, I have chosen to concentrate 
upon the motif of “transparency” and its satellite ideas of apocalypse, aletheia 
or kerygma.
Despite the contrast between the fame and reputation Frye managed to earn 
during his lifetime and Hamvas’s total lack of a visible worldly career, there is 
also much in common in their attitudes to established academic institutions. 
Northrop Frye is said to have declined invitations to prestigious academic insti-
tutions to the United States and remained loyal to his Victoria University in 
Toronto saying that “one has to remain provincial in order to become universal”. 
Béla Hamvas was also a provincial Hungarian living in total isolation throughout 
the first seven decades of a troublesome twentieth century but, as we have seen, 
he was entirely committed to universalism. Both Hamvas and Frye advocated 
and adopted a language that is unusual in the context of discursive argument and 
logical discourse. Both of them, therefore, chose to be extravagant outsiders, even 
stumbling blocks, for their contemporaries. Such lonely men of genius are usu-
ally first rejected, then forgotten, but eventually, one day, they come back again. 
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ÉRINTKEZŐ ÉLETMŰVEK:  
NORTHROP FRYE ÉS RUDOLF KASSNER1
Kezdettől fogva a holizmusra való igény jellemezte működését, amely tágabb 
és szűkebb szakmáján belül meglehetősen ritka jelenség. Gondolatvilágában 
irodalom és biblikum komplementer módon váltak egységessé. Vallástudós-
nak túlságosan irodalmár, irodalomtudósnak túlságosan vallásos. Vallásfel-
fogásában sokkal inkább aufklérista, mint dogmatikus, a vallás formája inkább 
foglalkoztatja tartalmánál – akár egy katekumen, kezdő hitgyakorló. Modern 
mítoszkutatóként nem állná meg a helyét: az irodalmat mítoszként olvassa, a 
mítoszt irodalomként. Ezért lát Platónban vízválasztót, olyasvalakit, aki ki- és 
átvezette a nyugati gondolkodást mai állapotába: ennélfogva nagy tisztelője, de 
a szívéhez a preszókratikusok közelebb állnak. A filozófián, valláson, irodalmon 
túl a művészet is izgatja: bár az érzéki tetszésben felfedezi a tapasztalati tudást, 
esztétának túlságosan etikus. Antidogmatikus, mégsem egészen liberális, ahhoz 
túlságosan konzervatív. Az ökuméné csillaga vezeti kezét, uralja szándékait: a 
kettéhasítottság ellen ír, a világnézet dualizmusa és szétszakítottsága ellen. 
Krisztológiája éppoly radikális és metaforikus, mint kevés elődjéé, pl. Doszto-
jevszkijé. Történelemszemléletében nem sok modern elem van, mivel mitikus. 
Mégsem fordul el korától, éppen ellenkezőleg: hangja nem ritkán didaktikus, 
szelíden kinyilatkoztató. Változatos műfajú szerző: amit ír, inkább esszéjellegű 
beszámoló, semmint karteziánus értekezés. Szavaiból és fogalmaiból nem rend-
szert épít, hanem organikusan szerveződő jelentésrétegeket simít egymásra. 
Szövege nem attól válik építménnyé, hogy, akár egy rendszerben, elemei aládú-
colják egymást, hanem attól eleven, hogy a teremtő képzelet megjelenítő-ereje 
működteti. Fiatalon William Blake ihleti meg: hosszú élete egészére a látomásos 
költő-festő tanítványául szegődik.
1 Köszönettel tartozom Tóth Sárának, A képzelet másik oldala – Irodalom és vallás Northrop Frye életművében c. 




Azok előtt, akik Northrop Frye és Rudolf Kassner életművét és -útját egyaránt 
ismerik, nem titok: az iménti felsorolás az azonosságok sora volt – ez indokolta 
az egyes számot. Tömören ezzel a bevezetővel adható meg a válasz a kérdésre, 
mi (minden) fűzi egybe és rokonítja Frye-t és Kassnert.
A morvaországi születésű osztrák író és filozófus, Rudolf Kassner közvetlen 
megidézése előtt először is arra tegyünk kísérletet, hogy Frye világnézetére, 
irodalomértésére germanista szemmel pillantsunk rá, így befogva látómezőnkbe 
a két interkontinentális rokont. E rápillantásunknak még akkor is van jelentősége, 
ha a nagy tudású és az angolszász művelődésben is otthonos Kassnerről van szó. 
Ő ugyanis, amennyire széles látókörű gondolkodó, legalább annyira és kife-
jezetten német, illetve osztrák: elsősorban rendkívüli nyelvi univerzuma okán, 
amelynek gyökérzete egészen Eckhart mester misztikus nyelvhasználatáig nyú-
lik vissza. Kérdésünk ezért így szól: vajon a német nyelvű kultúra mely elemei 
fedezhetők fel annál a kanadai irodalomtudósnál, akit az angolszász kritika egyik 
legjelentősebb alakjaként tartanak számon? Ha e kérdést komolyan fontolóra 
vesszük, akkor válik igazán izgalmassá a két gondolkodó összevetése.
Kézenfekvő az irodalommal kezdeni, még közelebbről az olvasással. Az Ige 
hatalmában több helyütt, de a Kettős tükörben is találunk fejtegetéseket az 
olvasás mibenlétéről (lásd például KT 116, 119). Az előbbiben Frye ugyan egy 
franciára, Roland Barthes-ra hivatkozik, amikor az újraolvasás elodázhatatlan 
feladatáról beszél, de mindkét helyen Friedrich Schleiermacher hermeneutikai 
megfontolásai juthatnak eszünkbe. A teológus és Platón-fordító ugyanakkor a 
divinációt részletesebben és pontosabban elemezte, illetve a hangsúlyt nem kife-
jezetten a korábbi olvasmányélményekre helyezte (vö. IH 108, 186; ABI 95), így 
hatása legfeljebb közvetett lehet. Továbbá Frye azon megfogalmazása, miszerint 
„igazában a nyelv használ bennünket, nem pedig mi a nyelvet” (KT 109), több 
rendelkezési jogkört ítél oda a nyelvnek a mindenkori beszélő, azaz a szót kérő 
ember kárára, míg Schleiermacher kiegyensúlyozottabban mérte ki az illetékes-
ségeket: A fordítás különféle módozatairól c. nevezetes előadásában a nyelv és a 
nyelvvel élő ember kapcsolatát oldás és kötés kettősségében látta megvalósulni.2
A hermeneutikai kör frye-i megfogalmazását inkább Hans-Georg Gadamernél 
tanácsos keresnünk, aki Az igazság és módszer vonatkozó fejezetében többször 
is bizonyos méltánytalansággal kezeli Schleiermachert. Gadamer a műalkotás 
létmódjának módszertani segédfogalmául a játékot választotta, 
művészetontológiai elemzése pedig (hol részleteiben, hol egészében) visszhangra 
2 „Minden embert egyfelől a nyelv ural, amelyet beszél; ő maga és egész gondolkodása annak 
terméke. Teljes bizonyossággal nem tud semmi olyat elgondolni, ami azon kívül helyezkedik el. 
[…] Másfelől azonban minden szabadon gondolkodó, szellemileg tevékeny ember maga is alkotja 
a nyelvet.” (Schleiermacher 124)
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talált Frye-nál: a játék kapcsán mindketten az önmagáért való energiáról 
értekeznek, a lélek kötetlen mozgásáról, a külső céloktól való mentességről és az 
éber elme szabad játékáról (vö. IH 69, 72; ABI 36, 26–27). Hasonló áthallásról 
tanúskodik az ünnep frye-i fogalma is (vö. ABI 36). A műalkotás ontológiáját 
megíró Gadamer Az igazság és módszerben nagy, revizionista érvrendszert 
működtet, amellyel jelentősen korrigálja a Kant óta tartó filozófiai és esztétikai 
hagyományt. Ugyanakkor a német idealizmus egyik alapgondolatát is átmenti, 
amikor a költészet primátusát hangsúlyozza a többi művészettel szemben: „… a 
költészet az egyetlen olyan művészet, amelyik úgyszólván kezdettől fogva az 
újfajta »szabadság« felé vezető úton halad” (42).
Miként a protestáns teológus Schleiermacher, úgy egy másik protestáns indít-
tatású német, a fiatal klasszika-filológus Friedrich Nietzsche sincs jelen köz-
vetlenül Frye írásaiban. Ezzel szemben az érett gondolkodó, az Így szólott 
Zarathustra, A morál genealógiájához vagy Az Antikrisztus kései Nietzschéje 
annál inkább, értelemszerűen. A tragédia születésének titáni szerzője Frye szel-
lemi horizontjának, világnézetének előkészítőjeként is felfogható. Idézzük fel egy 
pillanatra, mit is mond Frye Az Ige hatalmában! Megállapítja, hogy a mitologikus-
költői gondolkodásmód Platón Állama óta alá van vetve a dialektikus nyelvnek. 
A Platón-féle „forradalom lényege az volt, hogy a müthoszt felváltja a logosz” (IH 
60; lásd még KT 228). Nietzsche, a szakadár tudós, pontosan ezt, a leíró nyelv 
elúrhodását és a mítosz elsorvasztását nevezi esztétikai szókratizmusnak – 
Szókratész és Platón mellett Euripidészt állítva pellengérre. Ahogyan a müthosz 
Platón ítélőszéke előtt rajtavesztett a logosz előnyhöz juttatásával, úgy húzza az 
eredeti, apollóni-dionüszoszi művészet is a rövidebbet a telhetetlenül optimista 
megismerésvággyal és a végtelen tudálékossággal szemben (Nietzsche 127). Így 
kerekedik felül a tudomány a művészeten.
Amikor Nietzsche a hűvösen számító Euripidészt ócsárolja, amiért a görög 
tragédiában művészietlen naturalizmust honosított meg, és üres, kiszámított, 
jól célzott hatásra törekedett, nem nehéz nem gondolnunk Frye roppant von-
zalmára választott lélekvezetőjének, Blake-nek anti-euripidészi művészete iránt. 
És megfordítva: amikor a modernitás kritikusai Blake felé fordultak, valójában 
éppen azzal az értetlenséggel szemlélték a látomásos művészt, ahogyan annak 
idején Euripidész az őt megelőző, a hagyományból táplálkozó mitikus görög 
tragédiát. A három főkolompos ténykedésének köszönhető, toldja meg kritikáját 
Nietzsche, hogy a vallások „alapjaikban maguk is tudós vallásokká fajultak”, és 
hogy „minden vallás szükségszerű előfeltétele, a mítosz már mindenütt megbé-
nult, hiszen a mítosz területén is” (149) ugyanaz a szellem uralkodott el. A leíró 
nyelv felülkerekedése azonban nem volt végzetes hatású, mert az irodalom 
megállította (kevésbé optimistán: késlelteti) a metaforikus nyelv elapadását, 
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amiként a Biblia és bizonyos fokig az irodalom átmentették a mítoszt a Platón 
utáni nyugati gondolkodásba. 
Frye gondolatvilágának további német forrásvidékei: az érvelési stratégiában 
nem ritkán a hegeli logika és dialektika alkalmazása; szellemtörténeti áthallások 
poco pianóban; gondolati és irodalomelméleti mélyrétegeiben Jung archetí-
pustana, nem kevésbé jelentősen Ernst Cassirer3; a költőség, költőiség kitünte-
tett fontossága okán leheletnyi Heidegger4; végezetül A lélek és a formák Lukác-
sa a maga ambiciózus kritikafelfogásával.
*
Rudolf Kassner hat évtizedet és tízszer ezer oldalt felölelő életműve5 
változatos műfajú szövegeket kínál: szépirodalmi ihletésű nagyesszét, platóni 
hagyományon nyugvó dialógust, angol előképekre hagyatkozó imaginációt, 
koanjellegű mondásokat és így tovább. A századforduló szecessziójának cizellált 
formakultúráján nevelkedett Kassner klasszikusan vagyonos író, aki bőkezűen 
bánik poétikus szövegeivel. Mindebből már elég világosan kitűnik, hogy az 
osztrák mennyire egyívású a kanadaival – sőt, hogy kettejük alapfogalmai, mint 
arra a bevezetőben már utaltam, egyaránt Blake-től eredeztethetők. Most tehát, 
amennyire ez lehetséges, szálazzuk ki a tízezer oldalból a Blake-fonalat!
Kassner Blake-kel, illetve Blake autográf nyomataival először a British 
Museumban találkozott 1897 körül, első londoni tartózkodása idején – és a felf-
edezés valósággal szíven ütötte (VI: 517–8). Fiatalkori barátjának szóló leveleiből 
kiderül, hogy intenzíven kezdett el Blake-kel foglalkozni. Így ír: „Blake, miszti-
kus, festő és költő, az emberiség egyik legsajátosabb szelleme” (1979, 45). Alig 
másfél évvel később, Houston Chamberlain és Maurice Maeterlinck ösztönzé-
sére kezdett bele első könyvének megírásába, amelynek eredeti címe Die Mystik, 
die Künstler und das Leben (A misztika, a művészek és az élet) és 1900-ban, 
Lipcsében látott napvilágot.6 1920-ra jelentősen átdolgozta, és a címét is megvál-
toztatta Englische Dichterre (Angol költők). Kassner később jól látta, mennyire 
3 A releváns utalást ezúton is köszönöm a Frye-konferencia egyik szekcióelnökének, Kovács 
Árpádnak.
4 Egyik kiemelt argumentációs helyén Heideggert említi (IH 120).
5 A referenciamű: Kassner 1969–1990. A továbbiakban ennek egyes köteteire hivatkozom, saját 
fordításomban közölve az idézetteket.
6 W. B. Yeats Blake-interpretációja alapvető segítségére volt Kassnernek a Misztika-könyv megírá-
sakor. Yeats értelmezését „egyenesen zseniális kritikának” tartotta (IX: 897). 1908 nyarán közös 
barátaiknál személyesen is találkozik Yeatsszel, akinek szellemes Blake-értelmezései inkább 
felkeltették a kíváncsiságát, mint a költő saját művei. Ahogyan Kassner megfogalmazta: szép 
ember volt, szép arccal, aki elfekről és elfkirálynőről beszélt, amelyekben valóban hitt is; „olyan 
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ösztönzően és sorsdöntően hatott szellemi fejlődésének egészére a portrékat 
tartalmazó sorozat: „A könyv értéke nem is annyira a 25 éves ifjútól származó 
kritikában van, hanem az eljövendő műveket előzetesen meghatározó, előre meg-
látó össz-szemléletben. Teljes egészében egy látó ember műve, nem pedig egy 
ítélőé.” (III: 466) Később úgy vélte, esszégyűjteményének egyes portréi, így pl. 
Shelleyé vagy Swinburné, veszítettek jelentékenységükből, ám Keats- és Blake-
portréjának igazságait megerősítve látta (IX: 354).
Könyvében Blake-ről többek között megállapítja, hogy számára a Biblia az 
emberiség és az egyén életének nagy szimbóluma, hozzátéve: bizonyos tekintet-
ben mindannyian a Bibliát éljük (I: 30–31); különös figyelmet szentel Blake nemi 
vagy nemekkel kapcsolatos misztikájának, és úgy fogalmaz, hogy nála a szellem 
a természetbe, az örökkévalóság pedig az időbe emanált. Már ennyiből is nyil-
vánvaló, hogy Kassner 1900-as Blake-esszéje számos ponton megelőlegezte az 
1947-es Fearful Symmetryt (Rettentő szimmetria). Barátja, Hugo von Hof-
mannsthal a könyv megjelenésekor úgy vélekedett, hogy abban a képzelőerő új 
filozófiája szunnyad (lásd IX: 355). Valóban: Kassner világképének, világszem-
léletének egyik alapfogalmává válik a képzelőerő, amelyet ténylegesen a Blake-kel 
való találkozásnak köszönhetett. Itt azt is érdemes megjegyeznünk, hogy Kass-
ner volt az első, aki német nyelven írt Blake verseiről (IX: 911).7 Egy emberöltővel 
később Kassner a Das neunzehnte Jahrhundert (A tizenkilencedik század) c. 
könyvében, annak is az Egyensúlyzavar címet viselő fejezetében ismét hangsúlyos 
helyen és összefüggésben említi Blake nevét: a minden impulzusával a 18. 
századhoz tartozó költőt az „utolsó látnoknak” és „misztikus Ádámnak” nevezi 
(VII: 273).
Kassner, Blake nyomán, szintén azt vallotta, hogy a költői „nem okfejtő 
szerkezet”, hanem a „képzelet világába tartozik” (IH 63). A Kettős tükörben sem 
kisebb feladat hárul a költészetre, mint az, hogy a nyelv metaforikus szakaszát 
folyamatosan újrateremtse (KT 63). Amikor Frye éles különbséget tesz a leíró 
nyelv és a metonimikus írásmód között, utóbbiról azt mondja, hogy egyetlen 
kifejezés sokoldalúsága „egy teljes gondolati rendszernek lehet a nyitja” (KT 112). 
A metonimikus írásmód jellemzői persze nem vagy csak részben állnak, példának 
okáért, a francia szimbolizmusra, Rilke költészetére vagy Ady kifejezésmódjára, 
és Frye nyilván azt sem gondolja, hogy általában az irodalmi beszéd, csak azért, 
volt és olyan [ma is], mint egy hangszer, egy hárfa, amelyen visszhangzik az egész kelta-ír mon-
davilág” (X: 896; vö. IX: 326).
7 Korábban csak Henry Crabb Robinson tanulmánya (William Blake, Künstler, Dichter und 
religiöse Schwärmer) látott napvilágot németül, igaz, még jócskán a költő életében, 1811-ben 




mert előszeretettel használ szóképeket, metonimikus. De e nyelvezet értő 
működtetése, ez a nyelvfelfogás éppen Kassner szövegeiben figyelhető meg kris-
tálytisztán, mivel ő maga is közel ugyanazokra a végkövetkeztetésekre jutott az 
irodalmi nyelv, sőt a Biblia nyelvezete kapcsán: ezért lehetséges, hogy egy-egy 
par excellence kassneri kifejezés nem csupán megfeleltethető valamely műve 
egy-egy gondolati rétegének, de szavainak helyi értéke azok valamennyi jelen-
tésvetületét. Álljon itt néhány sarokfogalom Kassner irodalomkritikai, vallásel-
méleti és filozófiai műveiből: „szám”, „mérték”, „határ”, „ábrázat, arc, látvány” 
(tehát a Gesicht fogalmának egyes jelentésváltozatai), „fiziognómia”, a „közép”, 
„képzelőerő”, az „istenember” és így tovább.
A „költői látomás integritását” (IH 67) Kassner mindvégig és következetesen 
fenntartotta magának, legyen szó mások művészetéről írt esszéiről, tanul-
mányairól, avagy saját írásművészetéről, amelyet gyakran „álomprózaként” 
emlegetett. A látomásosság, az álom vagy a képzelőerő hamar döntő szerephez 
jutott nála, és maradt is vezérlő csillaga egész munkássága során. A fiatalkori 
gyűjtemény után most vegyük szemügyre időskori, zenei tárgyú esszéit!
Kassner zene iránti vonzalmának sokszor és sokféleképpen adott hangot: az 
1905-ös, csodálatos nyelvi megformáltságú nagyesszé, a Die Moral der Musik 
(A zene morálja) még a zenét tartotta omnipotens művészetnek, ám ezt idővel, 
a fiziognómia alapjainak letételekor meghaladta: „Az ember birodalma nem a 
szimmetriáé vagy a ritmusé, hanem a mértéké. […] A szó ennek a mértéknek a 
kifejezése. A szó: mérték. Ezért a költészet az ember voltaképpeni művészete, a 
művészet a mérték birodalmában” (IV: 71–72). Ennek ellenére az ötvenes évekre 
öt olyan esszét is írt Kassner, amelyek közvetlenül a zenét, illetve a hallást állítot-
ták a középpontba – és kivétel nélkül és tökéletesen ismeretlenek. Kettőt emelek 
ki, a Mozartról és a Beethovenről szólót. E két zeneköltő illusztrálja ugyanis 
Kassnernél azt a két világrendet, amelyet a lélek és a szellem határoz meg.
Frye Az Ige hatalmában tisztázza, mit is jelent az irodalom története, azt, 
hogy annak csak az egyik részét képezi a tényleges történelmi idő (IH 78). Kass-
ner is gyakran folyamodott ahhoz az módszerhez, hogy elemző műveiben az 
irodalom, a zene vagy általában a művészet jelenségeit az e módon felfogott 
(meta)történelem szerint elemezze – esetünkben Mozartot Caesarral, Beethovent 
pedig Mozarttal állítva párhuzamba. Mozarttal, mint írja, a „nagy művészet” 
ért véget, melyben lélek, hang és dallam együtt található meg, de Mozart azért 
csúcspontja és vége is a nagy művészetnek, mert az ő zenéje volt képes feloldani 
a rációval megzabolázott művészet merevségét, és ő rázta le magáról a már 
Platón Államát is meghatározó dogmatikus igazság- és értelemfogalmat. 
Összefoglalóan mondja: „Mindennek a szellem vetett véget, amely ott fúj, ahol 
csak akar.” Bibliai utalása, a János 3,8 („A szél fú, ahová akar és annak zúgását 
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hallod, de nem tudod honnan jő”) Frye számára is központi jelentőségű A kettős 
tükörben (KT 33).
Míg a Mozart-esszé: lélekrajz, lélekportré, addig a Beethoven arca című esszé 
hamisítatlan fiziognómiai leírás. Kassner képsorozatokkal és „ábrázatokkal” 
dolgozik, a maga kifejlesztette módszer jegyében. A meditatív szemlélés8 során, 
mint több helyen megírta, a dolgokat nem megérinteni kell, hanem hagyni, hogy 
lesüllyedjenek bennünk, hogy azután hasonlatokként, látványként, ábrázatként 
(Gesicht) merüljenek fel ismét. A kassneri esszé rendkívüli stíluskultúrája és nagy 
értéssel egybefűzött szóképei révén állandóan mozgásra bírja az olvasó 
képzelőerejét: fedezze fel magában azt a bizonyos goethei „belső színpadot”, ahol 
a szöveg magától kezd el működni, mozgalmassá válni, „játszani” – éppen ezért 
Kassner szövegei mindig az olvasás összetett mechanizmusára, belső, imaginatív 
erejére, mindenekelőtt pedig dinamizmusára emlékeztetnek. Kassner műveinek 
megfelelő olvasásáról különféle instrukciókkal is ellát bennünket: a szöveget 
olvassuk el többször, és hagyjuk hatni, ne rontsunk neki észérveinkkel, ne alkos-
sunk azonnal ítéletet, meditáljunk fölötte, olvassuk fel maguknak hangosan, 
mintegy előadva. Ekkor feltárulhat a szöveg imaginárius tartalma, kivilágosod-
hatnak boltozatai. Kassner azt várta el az olvasótól, amit Pál a hit gyakorlójától: 
a mondanivalót „lelkiképen” (KT 112–13; IH 160) kell megragadni.
Csakhogy a vizuális gondolkodás e két szerzője, Frye és Kassner egyaránt a 
hallásra helyezi a hangsúlyt (ABI 41, 72). Kassner egészen közvetlenül is, amikor 
Beethoven fiziognómiáját elemzi.
Beethoven arcára Ferdinand Georg Waldmüller híres festménye közvetíté-
sével pillant rá, akinek a zeneköltő süketen és egyetlen alkalommal ült modellt. 
A portréra tekintve Kassner hasonlatok egész sorát említi – Marszüaszt, Tolsz-
tojt, az Otricoli Zeuszt, Bachot és Wagnert hozva fel példaként. Sajátos fel-
fogásának megfelelően elemzi előbb a Beethoven-portré orrát, ahogy ő nevezi: 
„a dac fénytelen tövét” (IX: 692), aztán az állát, amelyről megállapítja, hogy „az 
többé nem a merő önfejűség helye, hanem valami igen magasnak, kimagaslónak 
az alapja vagy puszta talapzata” (IX: 693). A leírás utolsó állomásaként a 
Beethoven szemei és fülei közötti kapcsolatot mutatja be. A süket zseni a sze-
mével pótolja azt, amit hallásával együtt elveszített: a pillantás révén világosod-
hat meg. Beethoven a szenvedő ember képét tárja elénk, süketsége és élénk szeme 
közvetlenül a kettéhasadt világot jeleníti meg. A külső és a belső, a kint és a bent 
hadakozik Beethoven arcán. Míg Mozart a „nagy művészet” korának végső meg-
nyilvánulása volt, addig Beethoven a „posztmozarti” világrend alakja.
8 Nem minden jogalap nélkül való az a megállapítás, hogy Kassner a zen alapállását érvényesíti 
minden művében (Spoerri 55).
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Kassner kései szövegeiben fenntartatja a művésznek odaítélt prófétaszerepet, 
Beethoven fiziognómiai leírásából ez egyértelműen kiderül: „A szem és a fül 
bizonyos értelemben úgy viszonyulnak egymáshoz, mint a művész és a próféta. 
A művész egy örökké jelenvaló világ prófétája.” Ezután a Sixtus-kápolna men-
nyezetfreskójának egyik legismertebb részletét idézi fel, hogy a prófétaarcot a 
művészarc mellé helyezhesse. Ézsaiás arcában a hallás legtökéletesebb ábrázo-
lását véli felfedezni. E látomásra hívó rámutatásban egymás enharmónikusává 
válik a Hammerklavier-szonáta Beethovenjének művészarca és Michelangelo 
Ézsaiásának prófétaarca:
Miként a művész esetében a feszültség a fültől a szemig vezet, úgy a prófétánál meg-
fordítva, a szemtől a fülig. Miután kellőképpen megvizsgáltuk Beethoven, a művész 
arcát, forduljunk Michelangelo Ézsaiásához, ha a prófétaarcot akarjuk megkapni: a 
próféta arca a fülhöz vezet – felemelt ujjával vezérlőn –, az idők zengő teljességéhez. 
(IX: 696–97.)
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A FRYGEAN PERSPECTIVE ON EUROPEAN IRONY:  
THE GREEN BUTCHERS
In this paper I will attempt to apply what I believe is Northrop Frye’s perspective 
on a significant feature of European élite culture. I am using the term European 
not in a geographical but in a sociological sense, having in mind the culture 
of the secularized élite all over the Western world, which, according to Peter 
Berger, constitutes, as it were, a European island even in America (11). This fea-
ture happens to be an attitude of extreme irony, more precisely, the tendency of 
interpreters to overlook textual data that may counterpoint or call into question 
the predominance of the ironic vision of alienation. The concept of irony is thus 
brought into play not simply in the traditional sense of a rhetorical trope, but in 
a philosophical or existential sense, first theorized by Romantic philosophers, 
and afterwards by thinkers such as Kierkegaard, Paul de Man or Frye himself. 
1.
It is well known for readers of Anatomy of Criticism that irony, coupled with sat-
ire, is a very important point of orientation in Frye’s literary universe. In his cir-
cle of the four pregeneric plots or mythoi (comedy, romance, tragedy, and irony/
satire) or in his U shaped quest, irony is the lowest point. Whereas tragedy, asso-
ciated with autumn, implies the downward movement of a hero of great power of 
action, irony implies the lack of action. Characters are not travelling downward 
because they are already down, totally paralyzed as it were. This scheme corre-
sponds to Frye’s historical modes which proceed from myth through romance, 
through the high and low mimetic to the ironic mode. Whereas in the mythic 
mode the “hero” is superior to us, normal beings in degree and kind, at its 
opposite, in the ironic mode he or she is worse than us and has the least power 
of action. Whereas in Frye’s polarized world of imagery the apocalyptic group 
of images belong to the mythic mode and present a world of fulfilled desire, its 
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opposite, demonic imagery belongs to the ironic mode, a repudiated world of 
unfulfilled desire, of unrelieved suffering and alienation. 
In short, Frye, in the Anatomy of Criticism, suggests that irony has a demon-
ic quality to it, and later, in Words with Power, he calls the pole of irony quite 
consistently “hell world” and its opposite—referred to in Anatomy as the myth-
ic and apocalyptic—the paradisal pole. Quite logically, Frye’s world of irony and 
satire, being the mythos of winter, is a cold hell, a frozen and motionless sphere. 
(Not all together accidentally, the film I am about to discuss has some important 
scenes in the deep-freezer room of a butchery.) The positive energy in Frye’s 
universe is human desire, which transforms nature into a home, helping us 
achieve oneness with other people, with the exterior world and with God, and 
thus finding true identity. At the other pole, action and motion are absent, no 
transformation takes place, which leaves us in the hell world of alienation: from 
nature, from other people, from God, and from ourselves. As opposed to iden-
tification with who and whatever is other, in the hellish state of irony we experi-
ence extreme detachment and objectivity to the point of being overpowered by 
the objective world we cannot change, even being turned into objects ourselves.1
This account is very similar to Paul de Man’s ironic vision of language and of 
the human condition, with the substantial difference that for de Man irony is 
not one pole but it is the only authentic interpretation of existence. For de Man 
words do not have the power to unite subject and object, self and world, language 
being a network of signs referring endlessly to other signs and never achieving 
oneness with something other and real. Neither can the self achieve oneness 
with the non-self or with itself for that matter. In an endless series of acts of 
consciousness attempting to grasp its own reality, the self is doubled, multiplied 
and is finally dissolved in the “narrowing spiral of a linguistic sign… more and 
more remote from its meaning” (De Man 222). De Man picks up Baudelaire’s 
example of a stumbling and falling man laughing at himself falling, and invests 
this scene with philosophical significance, turning it into a symbolical Fall, in 
the course of which the divided or split self comes to view himself as an object, 
treated by Nature “as if he were a thing … whereas he is quite powerless to turn 
the smallest particle of nature into something human.” (214)
1 “The descent of the visionary ladder would take us into a world where subject and object grow 
steadily further apart, and end by the subject’s becoming an object too” (WP 87). Analyzing 
Waiting for Godot in a Frygian perspective, Diane Dubois claims that the extreme ironic mode of 
the play is a result of the characters being trapped by the objectively real and unable to use the 
transformative power of their imagination to give sense and meaning to the chaos of external 
reality (116, 119, 121).
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Decisive thinkers of the last century, such as Paul de Man, tend to absolutize 
or essentialize the hell-like world of irony and satire, the state of alienation and 
split. To mention another towering figure, Jacques Lacan’s vision of the self and 
its relation to the world is dominated, as Frye would say, by the archetype of 
satire, which is sparagmos: fragmentation or tearing to pieces. The self or ego as 
seen by Lacan is always already fragmented, in bits and pieces, the integrated 
imago being the deceptive result of an imposition of a rigid and artificial unity 
on this chaotic turbulence (97). According to one of his critics, Joel Whitebook, 
in Lacan’s work synthesis and integration are suspected as inauthentic, and con-
trary evidence tends to be overlooked. Lacan, Whitebook argues, tendentiously 
misrepresents Freud by placing almost sole emphasis on the death drive as 
opposed to the integrating Eros (see Whitebook 122–128).
Of course, the onset of an age of extreme irony in the post-war era is under-
standable. Europe had been through one of the most horrible times humankind 
had ever experienced, with our societies coming as close as possible to experi-
encing the “hell world” Frye describes in such a chillingly precise manner as “a 
world of power without words, where the predominant impulse is to tyrannize 
over others” (WP 88). The tendency to interpret existence in terms of irony and 
irony only and to suspect discourses of integration and synthesis is also under-
standable. What is less understandable is when interpretive practices begin to 
turn into a futile enjoyment of irony for its own sake. The most precise account 
of this attitude I have found comes from Hungarian writer Mihály Kornis, who 
uses images of cold and frost to describe the extreme ironic mode: 
In its final stage, irony turns into a sort of Satanism. It rejoices in being free, free to 
do anything, but its joy lacks serenity. Rather, it is frozen and shrunken; it has become 
lucid, but it is only capable of wit. The warm serenity of humour shines with the ability 
to suffer, the “serenity” of irony shines only with the inability to suffer. (137)
Northrop Frye, on the other hand, is known to be a critic with a preference for 
comedy and romance over tragedy and irony. The reason for this, I believe, is 
not the lack of understanding of the latter, but his sharp vision of its ultimately 
hellish nature. And to see hell for what it is, it is necessary to see it in context. 
Without something else to compare it with, without an opposite to measure 
it up to, absurdity would cease to be absurd because it would be all there is. 
In his vision of the whole of literature Frye relativizes the mythos of irony and 
satire by turning it into one of the four pregeneric narratives and by contrast-
ing its demonic imagery with the apocalyptic or paradisal group of images. His 
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strongest statement about the relativity of irony comes, however, from Words 
with Power:
[I]n proportion as we try to approach literature with a sense of personal involvement 
or commitment, one pole of it begins to look like the revelation of a paradisal state, 
a lunatic, loving, poetic world where all primary concerns are fulfilled. It is a world 
of individuals but not of egos, and a world where nature is no longer alien but seems 
to be, in the medieval phrase, our “natural place.” It is one pole only: the other pole 
is the imaginative hell explored in tragedy, irony, and satire. The hell world may be 
described as the world of power without words, where the predominant impulse is to 
tyrannize over others so far as one’s ability to do so extends. But it is the paradisal 
pole that gives us a perspective on the hell world, or, in our previous figure, provides 
the norm that makes irony ironic. (88, emphasis mine.)
However, Frye does not only relativize irony structurally, but also historically. 
In his essay on the successive historical modes of literature, he describes how in 
our own age the ironic mode, as the last in the series of modes, follows the low 
mimetic mode (the age of realism), showing also signs of a return to the mythic. 
He says that “during the last hundred years, most serious fiction has tended 
increasingly to be ironic in mode” (AC 34–35). Although he does not spell this 
out explicitly, one aspect of the irony in modernity seems to be the split between 
high and low culture, between educated, ironical readers and mass consum-
ers. Thus the interpreting habits of cultivated readers or receivers (the élite), 
even when applied to popular culture, may sharply differ from the approach 
of its regular audience. In contrast, the description of irony in the earlier, low 
mimetic phase actually sounds like what Wayne C. Booth calls “stable irony” 
(see 1–32). As Frye explains, “the reader is invited to share in the irony, because 
certain standards of normality common to author and reader are assumed. Such 
assumptions are a mark of a relatively popular mode: as the example of Dick-
ens indicates, the gap between serious and popular fiction is narrower in low 
mimetic than in ironic writing.” (AC 49)2 
By implication, in the ironic mode proper irony becomes “unstable”, and in 
its extreme infinite, or, as we have seen in de Man’s more philosophical account, 
2 Advertisement and propaganda, the major arts of our ironic age, says Frye in the 1950s, build 
on an exaggeration of this gap, pretending “to address themselves seriously to a subliminal 
audience of cretins, an audience that may not even exist, but which is assumed to be simple-
minded enough to accept at their face value the statements made about the purity of a soap or 
a government’s motives. The rest of us, realizing that irony never says precisely what it means, 
take these arts ironically, or, at least, regard them as a kind of ironic game.” (AC 47)
A Frygean Perspective on European Irony: The Green Butchers 
• 207 •
“the dialectic of the self-destruction and self-invention which characterizes the 
ironic mind is an endless process that leads to no synthesis” (220). In infinite 
ironies, Booth says, “the clear implication is that since the universe (or at least 
the universe of discourse) is inherently absurd, all statements are subject to 
ironic undermining. No statement can really ‘mean what it says’.” (240–241) 
Unlike de Man however, Booth and Frye make a distinction between stable and 
unstable ironies, and Frye does this by pointing out the difference between “the 
ironic tone that we may find in low mimetic or earlier modes and the ironic 
structure of the ironic mode itself” (AC 49). The ironic structure does produce 
endless, hellish irony for Frye, yet, as we have seen, not only is it confined to one 
phase of history, ultimately it is also only one pole of a polarized vision. Not even 
the most unrelenting poststructuralist ever experiences existence as perma-
nently and absolutely alienated, and, except for geniuses as intent as William 
Blake, not many of us can claim to be “in God’s presence night and day”. The 
polarized vision of an ideal world of fulfilled desire and its opposite, a hell world 
repudiated and rejected by people, is not reality in the ordinary sense, but in an 
intense sense: the kind of reality T. S. Eliot believes humankind cannot bear 
much of. It is a vision of the world in imaginatively sharpened contours. None 
of us lives in either world, but we need both as points of orientation. 
The implication seems to be that, in Frye’s vision, the bleakest and darkest 
ironical work contains in itself the totality of the literary universe. A narrative 
of the most extreme tragical or ironical descent can conjure up its opposite, the 
comic ascent, and thus echo the entire U shaped story of loss and recovery, of 
alienation and redemption. In the ironical mode, in the world of experience the 
vision of innocence has been lost. Yet this vision, called by Frye “a permanent 
integration or unity of being” in an essay on Paul de Man, is something “we can 
neither attain nor leave alone” (2005, 224). This is exactly what Frye goes on to 
say to conclude the previously quoted passage in Words with Power about the 
ironical and the paradisal pole:
[W]hile there is no human society where we do not find all the horrors of psychotic 
humanity, we seldom fail to find something in the culture of a society that is congen-
ial. The sense of the congenial, of a genuine human communication through words, 
pictures, textiles, ceramics or whatever, comes from the innocent vision at the heart 
of all human creation and the response to it. Such a vision is a presence created by an 




In the following brief discussion of the Danish film Green Butchers, I will be 
looking for hints of what Frye calls the innocent or paradisal vision, an aspect 
of the film almost entirely overlooked by reviewers.
In Anders Thomas Jensen’s macabre satire two frustrated, freakish young men 
set up their own butchery in a small Danish village. Haunted by a past history 
of emotional injury and loss, insecure in several ways, they both hunger after 
social recognition and psychological fulfilment. Bjarne lost his wife and parents 
in a car accident caused by his mentally handicapped twin brother who tried to 
avoid a deer while driving. Bjarne is now obsessed with killing animals and col-
lecting skeletons, and he is trying to pull his comatose brother off the life support 
system in order to raise money for the butchery business. Initially, no one seems 
interested in the new shop, which only confirms a pattern of rejection in the life 
of the uptight and weird-looking Svend, abused by his parents as a child and 
predictably not very successful with the other sex as an adult. One night he 
accidentally locks up an electrician in the deep-freezer room only to find him 
frozen to death the following morning. Panicking, he slices up the man’s thigh 
and sells it in a special marinade as “Svend’s chicky-wickies”. News of the exqui-
site meat product spreads, and locals line up in front of the shop. For the first 
time in his life, he feels loved and respected by the community. To supply the 
growing demand, Svend gets entangled, with Bjarne’s reluctant help, in a series 
of grisly murders, trapping and butchering people in the deep freezer. Bjarne, 
however, is not only a helper, the life-support machine he turns off to lay hold 
of his brother’s money appears as a visual parallel to Svend’s freezer.
Having looked through more than thirty online reviews3 in English, Spanish, 
Hungarian, and French, my impression is that besides complaining about the 
fairly high gore quotient and warning sensitive vegetarians, the majority of 
reviewers do not see much more in the film than one more exploitation of the 
hackneyed theme of cannibalism. Interestingly, few try to interpret the Danish 
director’s work in terms of its genre, satire, although the motif of cannibalism 
is strongly related to what I have already mentioned as the core archetype of 
satire and irony in Frye’s vision: sparagmos (tearing to pieces). In Frye’s arche-
3 Out of the 30 reviews surveyed, 25 do not mention the old priest and the garden at all (15 reviews 
in English, 1 in Spanish, 7 in Hungarian and 2 in French); the old priest is mentioned, but not his 
garden, or not as a positive contrast, in altogether 4 of the reviews surveyed (3 in English; 1 in 
Hungarian); and, finally, the priest’s story is mentioned and related to both sacrifice and satire 
in 1 Hungarian review written by Gábor Toldi, an aesthetics academic at the Roman Catholic 
University in Hungary (see Toldi).
A Frygean Perspective on European Irony: The Green Butchers 
• 209 •
typal perspective satire shocks us into seeing “the world as it is before the imag-
ination begins to work on it” (AC 147). It is the world of one diseased ego feeding 
upon the other to repair the loss that cannot be repaired, to fill up the gaping 
hole in one’s existence. To put it in a Lacanian manner, it is a world where the 
metonymic sliding of desire is endless, the killing cannot stop. There is also a 
strong sense of arbitrariness Frye generally associates with tragic irony (AC 41): 
the deeply injured Svend is totally deprived of the power of action, the first mur-
der, as it were, happens to him accidentally, both murderer and victim being 
playthings of circumstance, reduced to the status of helpless, driven objects.
My contention, however, is that while the majority of online reviews essential-
ize the murderously dark satire of the two cannibal butchers who sacrifice oth-
ers to feed themselves, they overlook certain visual and narrative hints of the 
opposite, paradisal pole: a Eucharistic vision of love nurtured by sacrifice. 
Several reviews mention the so-called Romantic subplot, Bjarne’s slowly blos-
soming love affair with the lovely orphaned Astrid, but the good-hearted local 
priest who raised her and gives her a job, is only mentioned in passing, and only 
once or twice in a positive sense. No importance is attributed to the strong 
counterpointing relation between the priest and his surroundings and the world 
of the butcher shop. In sharp contrast with the cold, grey colours of the butchery 
and the frozen atmosphere of the freezer full of chopped-up lifeless corpses, the 
old priest has a hothouse in which he cultivates a garden teeming with green 
life. It turns out that the old man was sole survivor of an airplane-crash in which 
he only stayed alive by eating the flesh of his dead wife, a wife whose memory he 
has not ceased to cherish. The morbidity of the priest’s story establishes a link 
with the narrative of the butchers. The common motif is sacrifice: the cannibal 
butchers sacrifice others to feed themselves, but a truly loving relationship also 
involves sacrifice in that the partners give away part of themselves to nurture 
the other. The priest in the film, quite simply, stands for love. Whereas the butch-
ers spread death, the priest has been nurtured and enlivened by the love he and 
his wife had for each other, so now he himself can spread life by taking care of 
Astrid and growing a garden. In this perspective the story of the priest has 
unmistakably Eucharistic overtones.
I know of no better interpretive tool in order to make sense of this weird con-
nection between cannibalism and the Eucharist than Northrop Frye’s notion of 
demonic parody. To quote Frye, “the Eucharist symbolism of the apocalyptic 
world, the metaphorical identification of vegetable, animal, human, and divine 
bodies, should have the imagery of cannibalism for its demonic parody” (AC 
148). No-one would take the Lord’s Supper to be cannibalism. No-one would call 
it cannibalistic when we nurture and support one another by giving from our-
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selves. Cannibalism, however, with its images of torture and mutilation, is a 
demonic parody of the Lord’s Supper. And in the Bible, the Lord’s Supper appears 
as the type of the apocalyptic feast at the end of times. 
The apocalyptic world is a world of union, and union brings life and fertility. 
“Fertility,” Frye says, “means food and drink, bread and wine, body and blood, 
the union of male and female” (AC 193). Eucharist symbolism is apocalyptic 
because alongside sexuality, eating is the most ancient and the most intensive 
expression of union both literally and symbolically. In the priest’s story both of 
these aspects of union are present, and in Bjarne’s approach to Astrid the hope 
of a redemptive love relationship appears. Furthermore, a strong desire for a 
harmonious relationship with animals also surfaces. Most of these positive 
motifs revolve around the church which stands on a hill above the village, thus 
providing a perspective, a vantage point both visually and in terms of interpre-
tation. Approached this way, I find it significant that it is the priest who expos-
es the crime of the butchers because he recognizes the special flavour of the 
meat. The term “demonic parody” does suggest a connection between the apoc-
alyptic image and its demonic counterpart, but it also implies that it is the 
apocalyptic which provides the norm. The linking motif, as we have seen, is 
sacrifice. Love always has a cost. Even in the Garden of Eden, as the Benedictine 
theologian Ghislain Lafont suggests (458), love meant giving up something of 
oneself for the sake of the other. In a fallen world of demonic parody this giving, 
this sacrifice, turns into butchery. Yet we know it is only a parody and not the 
real thing: this is why satire provokes such a nervous laughter.
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KETTŐS TÜKRÖK – TÜKÖRSZERKEZETEK  
ÉS BIBLIKUS OLVASATOK A KORTÁRS MAGYAR 
IRODALOMBAN  
(Esterházy Péter: Harmonia caelestis, Javított kiadás; 
Bodor Ádám: Sinistra körzet, Verhovina madarai)
„Nincsenek tisztán meghúzható határok”, írja Frye „A metafora táguló világa” 
című tanulmányában, „csak érdekeltségi központok. Sok író van Platóntól Sar-
tre-ig, akiket nehéz, vagy hogy még pontosabban fogalmazzunk, szükségtelen 
besorolni vagy az irodalomhoz, vagy a filozófiához”(1997a 57).Sőt, mintha a 
szépirodalom és a bölcselet nyelve között éppen „a metafora táguló világának” 
szellemében átjárható volna a határ. Frye munkásságának egyik legfontosabb 
hozadéka, hogy ezt az átjárhatóságot a Biblia esetében és hatásában felmutatta. 
A Könyvnek – illetve könyveknek – a tükörhöz hasonlítása önmagában meta-
fora, a kettős tükör pedig magasabb szintű nyelvhasználatot mutat: már nem 
csupán a hétköznapi, informatív nyelvnek a szintjén, hanem a reflexív és eszté-
tikailag értelmezhető létértelmezés szintjén vagyunk. A Biblia kettős tükör, mely 
önmagát mutatja.1
Frye szerint a nyelv metaforikus, ám ezt a metaforikusságot az emberi tudat 
lehetőségei teremtik meg, miként írja: 
A metafora tehát olyan társadalmi állapotban tűnik fel, amelyben az észlelő szubjek-
tum és az észlelt tárgy közötti szétválás még nem megszokott, és ebben a kontextus-
ban nem tesz egyebet, mint hogy egy csatornát vagy egy energiaforrást nyit meg az 
emberi és a természeti világ között. Az istenek nem egyszerűen az emberi értelem 
kivetülései a természeti világra: egyben a természeti erők előidézői is. A metafora 
kiindulópontja így hát, úgy tűnik, az, amit úgy hívhatnánk, Heidegger terminusát 
átvéve, hogy eksztatikus metafora (ecstatic metaphor), az azonosság érzékelése az 
egyén öntudata és a természeti világ között.” (1997a 59)
1 Ahogy maga Frye írja: „A két testamentum afféle kettős tükröt formál, egyik a másikat tükrözi 
vissza, de a külvilágot egyik sem” (KT 146).
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Az Ige hatalma bevezetésében Frye a Kettős tükör célját abban jelöli meg, hogy 
megmutassa, a „Biblia elbeszéléseiből és képeiből kitűnő szerkezet miként 
rokonítható a Nyugat irodalmi műfajaival és konvencióival” (7).
Tanulmányom e Frye-i gondolatok metszéspontján elhelyezkedve két kortárs 
magyar író több könyvből álló, tükörszerkezetű alkotásaival foglalkozik, ame-
lyek igénylik az egymást tükröző biblikus és profán olvasatot, s amelyekben az 
önmagában is tükörtermészetű nyelv metaforarendszerré épül fel. Esterházy 
Harmonia caelestis és Javított kiadás, illetve Bodor Ádám Sinistra körzet és 
Verhovina madarai című művei egy-egy alapvető metaforán alapulnak.
Amikor Esterházy Péter a Harmonia caelestis című regényét -2000ben 
megjelentette, a recepció szinte azonnal az egyik főművének tartotta. Pályafutása 
során az író átalakította a történetmondás, a világot leíró nyelv és az irodalom 
referencialitásáról gondoltakat. Ez a könyve, miközben „minden ott van benne, 
amit a Bevezetés tudott (idézetek helyzetbe hozása, a tradíció újragondolása, 
többnyelvűség, nyitott mű stb.), de ott van benne a történet, a történelem, a 
huszadik század nagy, kijózanító meséje is” (Selyem). Bár Frye szerint „nincs a 
világon még egy könyv, melynek szerkezete akár csak távolról is hasonlítana a 
keresztény Bibliáéhoz” (KT 148), a Harmonia caelestis éppen struktúrájában 
idézi meg a Bibliát. A két nagy részre osztott könyv első fele a távoli múlt, mely 
a tizenhetedik századi táj érzékeny leírásától, a család teremtésétől tart az apa 
történetének kezdetéig. Az első rész szerkezete után mind térben, mind időben 
szűkebb területet ölel fel, stilárisan pedig erősödik a realista leírásra való haj-
landóság. S a második részben az ősök hosszú leírásai után az apa alakja immár 
fiúként jelenik meg. Ez az apává váló fiú könyve, ahol a fiúkból apák lesznek, az 
apák pedig belerajzoltatnak az apa-képbe. Ezt találjuk meg az utolsó mondatban, 
amikor a Hermes Baby írógépet verő apafigura már íróvá, az íróvá lényegül át. 
S ezért lesz az apa a Harmonia caelestis legalapvetőbb metaforája.
Az első rész, az „Édesapámok könyve”, az Ószövetség szerkezetét idézve mind 
térben, mind időben meglehetősen sokrétű. A 371 rész, amelyet az olvasási kon-
venciók miatt „hagyományosan egységként olvasunk”, a könyv második felében 
sokszor tematikusan ismétlődik vagy parafrazeálódik. A futballozó „édesapám” 
motivikusan ismétlődő leírása (241, 486) a következőképpen éri el a csúcspontját: 
Klasszikus apa–fiú ikon, jártam meccsre apámmal.[…] A szünetben megszerzett virslit 
meg sült kolbászt a nagy plecsni mustárral vittük vissza a helyünkre. Szívesen néztük 
az üres pályát is. Szép. […]
Lent meg az a gyönyörűséges zöld négyszög, benne a fehér vonalak, körök. A men-
nyország lehet ilyen, apa, finom ennivaló, szépség, gondoltam. (546–547)
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A második rész Újszövetség-jellegű: a fiúból apává váló figura Krisztus-allúziója 
egyértelmű. Freud azt írja, hogy „a zsidóság apavallás volt, a kereszténység fiúval-
lás lett. A régi istenapa a háttérbe vonult Krisztus elől, helyébe Krisztus, a fiú 
lépett.” (138) Esterházy pedig így jellemzi az apát: „[…]nincsen semmije, csupán 
mi. Tényleg semmi. A semmi grófja.” (348) Ez persze összecseng a krisztusi 
mondással: „Az én országom nem e világból való” (Jn 18,36), ahogyan a következő 
apajellemző mondat is: „évszázadok óta édesapám volt az első Esterházy, ki rang 
és mód nélkül született” (368).
Esterházy írásmódját kezdetben barokkosnak kezdik tartani, de a barokk nála 
nem puszta stílusimitáció, hanem a legmagasabb szintű genette-i parafrázis. A 
barokk építészek gyakran éltek a térnövelő illúziókeltéssel; ekkor terjednek el a 
kastélyok tükörtermei, melyek bizonytalanná teszik az embert. A könyv még a 
barokkra is utalást tesz: 
Egyáltalán semmije nem maradt, se háza, országa (hazája), se családja, se Sohn, se 
Vaterland, egyszer csak semmi, és még az sem maradt, aki emlékeznék mindenre. Ez 
is olyan barokk benne, ez az oszcillálás a semmi és a minden közt, az ég és a föld közt 
(a föld a minden, az ég a semmi). A barokk a legteljesebben üres: az édesapám. (36)
A tükör, miközben visszaigazolja a tükörbe néző létét, egyben el is bizonyta-
lanítja a benne magát szemlélő embert: láthatóvá teszi önmaga számára, egysze-
rre megtestesíti és felszámolja az Isten képmására teremtett egyediségét és a 
heideggeri egyetlenségét (Einheit).
Az apa alakja a Harmonia caelestisben a már nem gondoskodó, de még 
jelenlévő Istent idézi. Ezt a megszenvedett, de elérhető nyugalmat, összhangot 
mutatja a cím: a harmónia ugyan idea, s nem a földön található meg, létezéséhez 
azonban nem fér kétség. 
Esterházy könyvének metaforarendszere az „édesapám” szóra épül. Az apaság 
képzete a világ kronologikus folyamatosságának, a család és a világ kontinuitását 
tükrözi egymásra. Az egyéni élet, a közösségi élet és az időbeliség összekapc-
solódik a világ rendjéről alkotott képzettel: hiszen „a metafora nem más, mint 
híd a tudat és a természet között, és így lényegében a nyelvi mikrokozmosz maga” 
(Frye 1997a).
2001-ben még úgy nézett ki, hogy Esterházy a Harmonia caelestisszel létre-
hozta a nagy szintézist. S aztán belenéztünk egy újabb tükörbe. A Javított 
Kiadásban mindent tükörből látunk. A Harmonia caelestisben felépített és 
elsiratott apafigurát nem lehetett sem elfelejteni, sem eltemetni. A könyv ellen-
tétben látszik állni mindazzal, amit Esterházy pályája során a szöveg és alkotó-
ja, a nyelv és a valóság, referencialitás és irodalom kapcsolatáról gondolt. A Javí-
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tott kiadás módosít Esterházy megszokott nyelvhasználatán. Pirossal szedve 
jelöli a vendégszövegeket, legyen szó a dossziék tartalmáról, Kemény István 
verséről vagy akár a Harmonia caelestis mondatairól. Esterházy maga hatalmaz-
za fel az olvasót, hogy átgondolja a könyv és a valóság kapcsolatát.
Ha a Javított kiadás regény, akkor annak érvényessége Kunderával szólva a 
könyv lapjaira korlátozódik: „Egy regény egyetlen létjogosultsága az, hogy olyat 
mond, amit egyedül a regény tud elmondani” (52–53). S ez a kunderai definíció 
esetünkben párhuzamba állítható Frye már idézett mondatával: a Biblia kettős 
tükör, mely önmagát mutatja.
A bibliai párhuzamokat folytatva a Harmonia caelestis Ószövetségre – és 
Újszövetségre – való felosztása után a Javított kiadás az Apokalipszis lehetne. 
A Javított kiadás elejének a vendégszövegekhez vagy a szójátékokhoz való 
viszonya a mű végére megváltozik, s visszatér a könyvnek mint konstrukciónak 
a lehetősége. János jelenéseinek az egyik utolsó mondata is egymásra csúsztatja 
a világot és a könyvet: „És ha valaki elvesz e prófétálás könyvének beszédeiből, 
az Isten annak részét eltörli az élet könyvéből, és a szent városból, és azokból, a 
mik e könyvben megírattak” (22, 19). A Javított kiadás a dossziék, a könyvek 
leírásával ér véget: 
Az első rózsaszínes, erősebb papír, a második fényes barna, a harmadik világosabb, a 
negyedik matt. Fekete szalaggal lehet összekötni őket, illetve a harmadiké fehér. […] 
Apám élete közvetlen (és viszolyogtató) bizonyítéka az ember szabad voltának.(281)
Az árulás könyvei az életről, a létezésről alkotott keserű tudásnak, az ártat-
lanság elvesztésének metaforájává lesznek. Az ember szabad voltának említése 
szintén összefügg a metaforával: ahogyan a szabadság egyszerre az Isten által 
az embernek adományozott állapot és a választás lehetősége, a metafora erejét 
is az intellektuális halandóságnak való fölötte állás és az értelmezés réseiben 
megnyilvánuló szabadság kettőse adja: hiszen ahol a nyelv funkcionális eleme a 
metafora, ott „föl kell adnunk a pontosságot a rugalmasság kedvéért” (KT 112)
Bodor Ádám majdnem húsz évvel a Sinistra körzet után írta meg a Verhovina 
madarai című regényét. A Verhovina madarai ugyanúgy egy telep köré 
rendeződik, ahogyan a Sinistra körzet is. Húsz év alatt nem változott a táj. S az 
olvasó pedig, kit a narrátor Vergiliusként kalauzol végig az egyszerre hiperreal-
ista és álombéli Poklon és Purgatóriumon, hogy a könyv végén talán a Feltámadás 
reményében búcsúzzon el tőle, azt látja, húsz év után minden másképpen van, 
mégis ugyanúgy: idővé alakult tükörbe néz. Ugyanakkor a Verhovina a Sinistra 
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körzettel szemben valóságos földrajzi helyet is jelöl. A „felföld, hegyes vidék”, 
amit a ruszin szó jelent, nem is lehetne máshol, csak itt, valahol Kelet-Közép-
Európában. A földet az éggel összekötő szakrális hegy metaforájának Az Ige 
hatalma egy egész fejezet szentel: a Bodor-művek egymást visszatükröző min-
densége ebbe a nem evilági térbe hatol át. 
Bodor könyveinek alapmetaforája a táj, a Verhovina madarai esetében azon-
ban a madarak. Az emberek úgy élnek egymás mellett, ahogyan az egy élettérbe 
került állatok az erdőben: számon tartják egymást, valójában mégis egyedül 
vannak. 
Verhovina természeti-biológiai környezetében az ember nem elsősorban tár-
sadalmi lény. Az évszakok körforgása, a hideg, az éhség, a tárgyi szűkösség 
biologikuma a társadalmi, sőt az ontológiai szintnél erősebb létet idéz meg. 
Bodor ezzel a civilizációtól elzárt teleppel túlhalad a kulturált–barbár ellentét-
páron. Verhovina egyszerre természeti és ipari táj:„távol a város kísértésétől, 
imbolygó ködök, kénszagú melegforrások, elhagyott tárnák és meddőhányók 
közelében” (6).
Verhovina lakói közel kerülnek egymáshoz, eltávolodnak egymástól, de 
nyelvtelenségük állapotában nem reflektálhatnak a világra, csak elszenvedhetik 
azt. Egyszerre vannak az ártatlanságon túl és a reflexión még innen.
A címben megelőlegezett, a folyamatosan hiányzó s a végén mégis megjelenő 
madaraival együtt Verhovina a létezés metaforája, amellyel szemben lehetnek 
esztétikai, etikai, sőt akár vallási érveink is, de egyrészt hatástalanok marad-
nának, másrészt a létezés súlyos félreértéséről tennének tanúbizonyságot. Nem 
várható el, hogy a világ a mi törvényeink szerint működjön. Istennel és így a 
létezéssel szemben soha nincs igazunk.
Bodor szövegei közelebb állnak a metaforikus, mint a metonimikus 
nyelvhasználathoz.2Könyveiben a nyelvi szegénység nem negatívum. Azt tuda-
tosítja, hogy a szavak nem leplezhetik el, legfeljebb leleplezhetik, mennyit ér a 
nyelv metonimikus vagy leíró szintje. Verhovina lakóinak szava hazátlanabb a 
szónál: Bodor nyelve nincsen messze Pilinszky stilizált némaságától, a metafora 
erejére épülő költői nyelvtől.
Verhovina madarai a telepen élők metaforájának tekinthetők. A brigadéros a 
telepre hívott intézetiseket hívja madaraknak: „madaraknak hívta őket, tudván, 
hogy a vége mindig az, hogy egy szép napon elrepülnek” (6). S a Verhovina 
madarai legfontosabb bibliai utalásai a madarakkal kapcsolhatóak össze. A 
2 „A metaforikus szakasz szómágiája, mint említettük, abból származik, hogy a dolgoknak és sza-
vaknak közös energiájuk van, melyet azonban a szavak testesítenek meg és uralnak. A metonimi-
kus szakaszban a szómágia szublimálódik, amolyan látszatmágia lesz belőle, mely hozzátartozik 
a szekvenciális vagy lineáris elrendezéshez.” (KT 44)
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halottakat feltámasztó Nika Karanika3 ruháját madarak díszítik4. De az elhagya-
tottság reménytelenségének állapota és a remény visszatérésének ígérete egyaránt 
a madarakhoz kapcsolódik: 
Először a kakasokat lehetett hallani, kattogásuk mint egy üres templomban, vis-
szhangzott a Néma erdő fatörzsei között, aztán a korai rigófütty is át- meg átszőtte a 
távoli tisztásokat. De a hang, ki tudja, honnan, talán egy másik országból érkezhetett. 
Az is lehet, Hanku csak képzelődött. (49)
S a regény végén feltűnő madarak a Noéhoz visszatérő galambként hozzák 
magukkal a reményt: „Csőrükben ágacskákkal […] Megjöttek a rozsdafarkúak” 
(255).5
Az utolsó oldalon a gyilkossá váló Adam nevű főhős tiszta ruhát vesz, magára 
ölti új énjét, mint mindenki, aki Verhovinán halni készül. S a megérkező 
madarakról nem tudhatjuk biztosan, hogy a halál nyugalmát vagy a feltámadás 
fényességét hozzák-e magukkal.
Verhovina reménysége a reménytelenségben gyökeredzik. Ez a reményég irra-
cionális, ésszel megérthetetlen, az ember számára irányíthatatlan. „A hit min-
den értelmet meghalad, s megmarad azután is hogy az értelem csődöt mondott. 
[…] A kereszténység hagyományos és központi tantételeit csak metaforákkal 
lehet kifejezni” (111). Ám nem csupán a kereszténység, de az európai filozófia 
koncepcióit is.
Bodor nem pusztán tájat és nyelvet talált ahhoz a világhoz, melyben az ontoló-
giai és a történelmi viszonyok befolyásolta nyomorúság nem válik külön, hanem 
metaforává is tette azt a világot, melyben éppen az ontológiai nyomorúság 
elsődlegessége miatt nem működik a történelem illúziója. A negatív Welt-
geschichte a nem észlelhető Heilsgesichtét tükrözi vissza.
A Harmonia caelestis regény, a Verhovina madarai pedig közelebb van a 
regényhez, mint a novellafüzérhez. S ez a műfajkijelölés azért fontos, mert min-
tha Frye éppen a modern irodalom talán legfontosabb műfajáról, a regényről 
beszélne a legkevesebbet. A kritika anatómiájában az arisztotelészi hármas 
műnemi felosztást követve az epikával számottevően foglalkozik, illetve többször 
is szóvá teszi, hogy az irodalomkritika nem tudja teljesen feltérképezni az irodal-
3 „Kettőt feltámasztott, azt mondják. Hogy a fenébe csinálta?” (59)
4 „Kék selyemköpeny volt rajta, melyre fénylő fonallal szálldosó madarak, pintyek, süvöltők, ken-




mi műfajokat. Sőt az epikus művek hőseinek osztályozásánál sem említi a regé-
nyt. 
Valószínűleg nem véletlen, hogy a Kettős tükör bevezetésében azt olvashatjuk, 
hogy a teremtő képzeletnek a Biblián alapuló kerete a tizennyolcadik századig 
határozta meg a Nyugat irodalmát. A regény műfajának a megszületéséig. Ha 
René Girard és Derrida nyomán azt mondanánk, hogy a regény apokaliptikus 
műfaj, ezzel a műfaj bibliai gyökereit hangsúlyoznánk. De Kundera szerint is a 
regény az egydimenziós, tehát az Istentől elhagyatott világ műfaja, mely akkor 
született meg, „amikor Isten lassan elvonult arról a helyről, ahonnan a világegy-
etemet és annak értékrendjét irányította, ahol elválasztotta egymástól a jót meg 
a rosszat, és értelmet adott mindennek” (16).
Esterházy és Bodor apokaliptikus világokat teremt. Esterházy egyszer a Har-
monia caelestisen belül, majd a Harmonia caelestis és a Javított kiadás között 
hozott létre tükörrendszert. Bodornál a két könyv tükrözi egymást; egy másik 
szinten pedig mind a Sinistra körzetben, mind a Verhovina madaraiban a telepek 
összes egyéni vagy kollektív története visszatükrözi azt az eget, amelynek üres 
a trónja. 
Slavoj Žižek egy írásában azért tartja a posztmodern hiányt a modern hiánynál 
sokkal felkavaróbbnak, mert a posztmodern a központi ürességet nem a „hiányzó 
Isten” távollétében, hanem a „hiányzó isten” nézőpontjából képzeli el. A mod-
ernség szerint „a struktúra, az interszubjektív gépezet akkor is jól működik, ha 
a Dolog hiányzik, ha a gépezet egy üresség körül forog; míg a posztmodern 
kifordítás megmutatja a Dolgot magát mint megtestesült, materializált üres-
séget” (8). Belenézünk a tükörbe, s nem látunk ott semmit. Illetve a semmit látjuk 
ott.
Kettős tükör, metafora, biblikus olvasat. Valószínűleg a mi kultúrkörünkben 
nem létezik ezek nélkül irodalmi mű, sőt, ezek lehetősége adja, jelöli ki a kultúrkör 
amúgy elasztikus és képlékeny, de mégis létező határait. S a kettős tükörben ott 
áll az ember, aki reflexív képességével mint tárgyat szemléli a világot s benne 
önmagát; a szükségszerűen metaforikus nyelvet használó olvasó, aki legyőzni 
igyekszik „azt, amit Blake a tárgyat szemlélő szubjektum »kettéhasadt 
fikciójának« (»cloven fiction«) nevez” (Frye 1997a 62). Azt az egységet keresi, 
amit már csak a nyelv hármasában találhat meg: az immanencia metaforikus 
nyelvének nosztalgiájában, az értéket hiányként felmutató metonimikus nyelv-
ben és a valóság tapasztalatát leíró nyelv kizárólagosságában. S ez a három nem 
zárja ki, hanem felerősíti és megsokszorozza egymást, mint két tükör a közéjük 
helyezett gyertya fényét.
Aki tükörbe néz, saját képét látja benne, aki két tükör közé áll, megsokszo-
rozva látja ezt a képet. 
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S „Létezni valójában annyit tesz, mint látva lenni.” (Lacan 83) Sartre-ot idézve: 
„[…] látom magamat, mert valaki lát.” (Sartre 322) Kerényi Károly definíciója 
szerint a mítosz „akár így, akár úgy formálták meg, alapjában véve mindig egy 
magamagát formáló, kibontakozó és összes változataiban félreismerhetetlen 
alapszöveg. Ennek az alapszövegnek a szavait nem lehet rekonstruálni, csupán 
a variációk szavait lehet elismételni. De különbségeik mögött mégis föl lehet 
ismerni valami közöset: egy történetet, amit sokféleképpen lehet elmondani, 
mégis ugyanaz marad.” (12) A Bibliát újraíró szövegek úgy írják meg a jól ismert 
történeteket, hogy közben azzal is szembesítenek, az újraírás csakis metafora 
lehet.
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THE CRITIC AS WRITER, THE WRITER AS CRITIC:  
THE CREATIVE IMAGINATION 
IN NORTHROP FRYE’S WORK
There are several areas in which the concept of the creative imagination is rel-
evant to Northrop Frye’s work, extending to his theory of literature, his views of 
religion and the Bible, and his social thought. Thus the concept of an imaginative 
space is an overarching principle in Frye, offering a ground on which his wide-
ranging ideas are linked. In the following pages I wish to survey the role of the 
creative imagination in Frye’s method and thought, point out some features of 
his critical language, which often verges on the language of literature, and then 
move on to some of his “creative writings” to reveal some important connections 
between his fiction and later theories.
Frye’s literary theory evolved from his view of literature as forming a unity, 
an “order of words” within a mythical framework, made up of metaphors and 
typological connections. As he stated, “It is evident that criticism cannot be a 
systematic subject unless there is a quality in literature which enables it to do 
so. We have to adopt the hypothesis, then, that just as there is an order of nature 
behind the natural sciences, so literature is not a piled aggregate of ‘works’, but 
an order of words” (1957, 17). The unitary theory of the imagination is one of the 
most essential elements in Frye’s concept of literature and his exegesis. He 
extended Blake’s proposition: “Every Poem must necessarily be a perfect Unity” 
to the whole of literature in the heuristic principle that literature forms a coher-
ent whole, an idea expounded in Anatomy of Criticism. This unity of literature 
is a reality the critic must achieve consciously, by using his imagination in mak-
ing connections between different works. Frye’s whole critical output incorpo-
rated in his complex theories can be seen as an attempt at demonstrating the 
cohesion of all literature and, as a result, the possibility of establishing a unified 
theory of literature as well. Throughout Frye’s books, this unity and coherence 
of literature is verified through a compelling combination of literary examples 
and theoretical investigations, and, in this way, the hypothesis is shown to be 
true. 
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Analysing Frye’s Blakean epistemology, Joe Velaidum notes the following:
For Frye, perception has the possibility of creating three types of reality: a reality 
based on the passive perception of objects, which Frye equates with nature; a reality 
based on the active perception of nature as material shaped into human form, which 
is equated with civilization; and finally, a reality based on the imaginative perception 
of unity, which aligns with the greatest visionaries and is ultimately the perception 
of God. (26) 
Frye believed in the possibility of constructing a “spiritual” world, the world of 
art, made by the creative imagination on the basis of the perception of the every-
day world around us. The “spiritual” world, for Frye, is a “physical” world, which 
is not detached from the world in which man lives and ordinarily perceives, 
but it is constructed by a conscious effort using the creative imagination. This 
spiritual world, in turn, is highly organized and reveals the hidden significance 
of our ordinary world. Frye’s works, however complex or complicated some of 
them may seem, rest on this concept of the creative imagination reaching the 
level of a unified vision of the object of investigation, in which, eventually, the 
subject-object distinction ceases to exist. In order to reach the spiritual world by 
vision, one needs to creatively perceive the surrounding world, with some effort 
on one’s part. As he claims: “[t]his is the world as it really is, not the world as our 
lazy minds and senses perceive it” (Cayley 55). Therefore, art does not represent 
a fake, illusory world, but one which is absolutely real. As Velaidum points out, 
for Blake, drawing on Berkeley, “nothing can exist that is not perceived”, and 
“the perceiver possesses the innate ability to perceive and create reality” (27-28). 
In Frye, too, the world of vision is “a world of creators and creatures” (1947, 26), 
in which man is capable of seeing what he wants to see (a point to be discussed 
in another context below). The creative imagination used by the artist and the 
creative imagination employed by the critic stem from the same ground and are 
therefore linked.
Frye criticism has been for long preoccupied with the question of whether his 
religious views had a decisive impact on his critical thinking or it was the other 
way round, his notions of literature and culture influencing his thoughts con-
cerning religion. This question cannot be answered objectively; all that can be 
asserted with certainty is that he strongly believed in the human power to create 
a better world—whether in art, scholarship, or in our everyday lives—whose 
ideal form is traditionally represented as the Garden of Eden, Heaven and simi-
lar mythological places. His “assumption of total coherence” (1957, 16), may have 
derived from a religious belief but what can be known for a fact is that it was a 
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working hypothesis, something imagined, an idea Frye had to believe in before 
he could start his enquiries into literature.
Regarding Frye’s interpretation of the Bible and its connection with the crea-
tive imagination, it is important to observe that the underlying pattern of his 
analysis consists of a series of de-creations of the Bible and of its imaginative 
re-creation, aiming to form another, heightened sense of unity, a newly con-
structed spiritual vision. The de-construction of the Bible involves the rejection 
of the relevance of its literal meaning and historical truth, both being highly 
restrictive, bound to a single vision of the world, manifested in ideologies, fun-
damentalism and the limitation of human freedom. Instead, Frye maintains that 
the main building blocks of the Bible are its inherent metaphors, and it is their 
combination that must be taken into consideration when analysing, and indeed 
establishing, its unity. Consequently, he replaces literal meaning with meta-
phorical meaning and the concept of historical truth with the idea of the Bible 
representing sacred history. In Frye’s imaginative recreation of the Bible, meta-
phor and sacred history are both seen as being incorporated in the language of 
myth, which in the Bible turns into what is traditionally called kerygma. Accord-
ing to Frye, kerygma unites the metaphorical and concerned aspects of all rhet-
oric; however, the nucleus underlying it is not an allegorical argument but “what 
is traditionally called revelation” (1982, 29). 
Taking one step further, it is obvious that Frye’s social thought and his ideas 
of the role of education in society are also based on the creative imagination, the 
model of the artist who, using his imagination, recreates the world to make it 
more real, as well as a better place. If Western culture and literature are intri-
cately connected to myth in general and the Bible in particular, then they must 
retain something of the concerned or “caring” aspect of the kerygma. Frye dis-
cusses this idea in relation to Shakespeare, saying that he becomes an “aspect of 
our own imaginative lives” because of the “quality of care” in his poetry (1982, 
220). Frye’s social thought is, in this way, tied in with the “concerned” or 
“engaged” aspect of myth and literature, a term that he uses in various contexts 
in his works.
Therefore, in Frye’s conception, the creative imagination is a function which 
is shared by both the artist and the critic. There is, however, another aspect of 
Frye’s work which draws it close to the realm of art: his critical language. Even 
though Frye endeavoured to write in a clear and unambiguous language so as to 
be understood even by the general public, not just a handful of theorists, his 
literary theory has given rise to various interpretations. He provoked contrasting 
responses from various scholars and critical groups throughout his life and his 
works have continued to elicit diverse analyses since his death. These divergent 
The Critic as Writer, the Writer as Critic
• 223 •
interpretations concerning Frye are, no doubt, related to his language. This is 
indicated by W.K. Wimsatt’s remark, who, in 1966, complained about Frye’s 
“frequently shuffling associational logic and syntax, which at the worst I would 
describe as a kind of verbal shell game” (84) and that in Anatomy of Criticism, 
Frye “achieves some sort of maximum of hyper-Aristotelian, minutely subdi-
vided conceptualization, rampant pigeonholing, an earnest proliferation, a 
superfoetation of archetypal phantoms, of heroes, myths, modes, cycles (qtd. in 
Hamilton 231). Frank Kermode went as far as to claim that “Frye offers you a 
choice of thinking him entirely right or entirely wrong” (qtd. in Hamilton 7). 
Frye himself often complained that he was completely misunderstood. How-
ever, he rarely responded specifically to any criticism of his work, and when doing 
so, he reacted only in general terms. He usually defended himself by claiming 
that he had more refined ideas than his critics had assumed. In Spiritus Mundi, 
for example, he remarked that “the most serious adverse criticism of me still 
seems to me to be based on assumptions too remote from mine for revision to 
meet them” (100).
The question as to what prevented Frye from setting out his theory clearly 
and without confusion is related to his language. The point at issue involves the 
dichotomy of form and content, expression and thought. Understanding litera-
ture, for Frye, is connected to the eye, as much as to the ear. Anagogy, as the 
most complex level of meaning in Frye’s theory, virtually transcending meaning, 
takes the form of a vision, which Frye attempted to describe with language. 
Hence Frye’s distrust of argument, for a vision does not argue but supersedes 
argument by revelation. In a sense, therefore, his criticism was an attempt to 
communicate that which is beyond language, which is very difficult to commu-
nicate precisely—to describe what is primarily visual. Consequently, Frye was 
more concerned with presenting a vision than putting forth an argument. In this 
way, Frye’s constant visualization (his predilection for metaphors like “insight”, 
“vision” and “shape”), and his suggestion that anagogy takes the form of some-
thing to be seen, points in a direction which shifts Frye’s thought beyond ordi-
nary scholarly language.
This explains why Frye’s critical language is sometimes poetic (primarily 
metaphoric), for it is the language of poetry that is capable of transmitting imag-
es for the eye. And since Frye’s language is, at least partly, poetic, it evades defi-
nite meaning, unless the metaphoric ideas are consistently put together to form 
a large synthesis. Metaphor brings about a synthesis different from the disparate 
individual complexity of the two things brought together. The “more” in the 
meaning of a metaphor includes the likeness constructed between the two 
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things, and because there is no definite meaning expressed by metaphors, Frye’s 
aphoristic-metaphoric ideas may be interpreted in different ways. 
Frye’s poetic language can also be linked to his concept that literature does 
not denote a reality or a system of thought outside itself, and that the principles 
of literary criticism should derive from the principles of literature itself. Thus, 
Frye placed creative imagination, as the most basic element of all art, at the 
centre of his criticism and his work is “creative” in the sense that it imagina-
tively builds up a system which reflects the arts from the inside, which explains 
why the linguistic forms that he used are close to the ones found in literature. 
So much so that Frye’s language occasionally assimilates into its subject matter 
to the extent that it actually expresses itself as poetry. Some of his sentences are 
open to scansion. As A.C. Hamilton has demonstrated the statement: “A plati-
tude may be true, even universally true; but it would not occur to us to call it 
profoundly true”, consists of two hexameter lines (cf. 207-208). And, as Robert 
Denham has pointed out, some of Frye’s sentences can be read as poems (cf. 
1984, 8-9).
Whereas the role of the creative imagination in Frye’s theories is generally 
acknowledged in literary studies, it is much less known that Frye was not only a 
literary critic, social theorist and cultural thinker but a writer as well. To be 
more precise, as a young man in his twenties, he tried his pen as a writer, an 
ambition which he never entirely abandoned in his later career. The following 
pages are intended to map out this hitherto rather neglected part of his writings 
and to show, more specifically, that some of the basic ideas of his literary theory 
first appear in a rudimentary form—albeit quite explicitly—in the creative writ-
ings produced in his early years. 
Six of Frye’s eight pieces of short fiction were published between 1936 and 
1941 in Acta Victoriana and The Canadian Forum; two remained manuscripts 
for decades before their publication in the Winter 1992/1993 edition of the 
Northrop Frye Newsletter. Frye also wrote short poems, a limerick and a four-line 
poem, both published in Acta Victoriana in 1931 when he was nineteen, as well 
as a sonnet on his twenty-third birthday (cf. Hart 293). In addition, Frye is also 
the author of an unfinished novel, entitled The Locust-Eaters; the plan of a novel 
was conceived in 1935 but actual work on it started only in the 1940s. Today 
Frye’s fiction is available in volume 25 of the Collected Works of Northrop Frye, 
published in 2007.
As Robert Denham and Michael Dolzani, editors of the volume, predict in the 
“Introduction” with a pinch of irony, Frye’s stories “will turn out for most read-
ers to be not altogether successful” (xxviii). True as this nicely put euphemism 
might be, Frye’s fiction has a firm place in his oeuvre; it reveals the interests, 
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concerns and frame of mind of the scholar and sheds light on his critical works 
from the “other” pole, the pole of literature, which was the permanent subject 
of his theoretical investigations. 
The plotline of the eight stories is quite simple; these short fictions predomi-
nantly focus on the intellectual questions arising out of the mythological uni-
verse in which their author was so much engaged in his scholarly writings. At 
the time of the creation of these stories, Frye was very far from the established 
literary scholar which he became later in life; most of these stories were written 
well before his first major essay, “The Anatomy of Prose Fiction”, appeared in the 
Manitoba Arts Review in 1942. Fearful Symmetry was already under way, but 
years away from publication. 
Below I will briefly discuss the story-lines of Frye’s short fiction and then move 
on to some connections between the stories and his later theories.
The short story entitled “The Ghost” describes the visitations of the title char-
acter; his first visit takes him to his “enemy”, a rival who defeated him by winning 
the heart of Margaret, the beloved one; his second visit is made to Margaret, and 
the third to a priest. The emphasis is put on the ideas and arguments repre-
sented in the dialogues. The punchline of the story suggests that the ghost does 
not merely exist but has come back as a living human being: “‘Excuse me,’ said 
the ghost. ‘Could you get me a drink? I am very thirsty’” (2007, 62). The next 
story, entitled “Fable… in the Nineteenth-Century Idiom”, is a dialogue between 
“a man who wished to be a great writer” and “his daimon”, who promises to bring 
him “the seven spirits who hold the seven great secrets of writing” (62). The point 
of this one-and-a-half page story is that the spirits holding the key to great artis-
tic achievements are the seven deadly sins. The story “Face to Face” is a first-
person narrative somewhat in the manner of Joseph Conrad with a short intro-
duction followed by a dialogue between the narrator and a supposedly unreliable 
traveller who recounts his experiences on a strange island. The plot of “Affable 
Angel” takes place in London, where the dialogue between the two locals about 
the similarity between a gyroscope and the human brain becomes a colloquy 
with the unexpected descent of an angel. The angel’s appearance hardly sur-
prises the Brits, who, in this shabby part of London, are “expecting something 
more out of the way… Something really disturbing. Devils, yes; angels, not quite” 
(67). A policeman appears and vanishes, there is some talk of heaven and hell, 
and the three go for a beer. At the crux of the story the angel returns to the sky, 
but on his way sends what turns out to be a Nazi bomber crashing into the 
Thames. The language of this story is very British (“Blimey”, “not bad chaps”) 
and also very colloquial as demonstrated in the last lines: “‘NICE WORK, 
ANGEL!’ yelled Augustus at the top of his voice. ‘Break it up, boys; break it up,’ 
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said the policeman, reappearing.” (69) Frye’s next piece of fiction, “The Resur-
gent”, is a six-page story about the painful and maddening struggle of a young 
painter torn between artistic freedom, manifesting itself in the desire of creating 
paintings in the avant-garde style, and what he believes to be his patriotic duty 
to conform to the demands of his country, to depict nationalistic themes in the 
genre similar to both socialist realism and the Romantic realism favoured by the 
Nazis. “The Resurgent” was published in 1940, and the political implications of 
this dystopia are not difficult to see. The story is narrated by the painter’s sister 
on the basis of her late brother’s diaries. The sister is a staunch believer of the 
false ideals of this totalitarian state, emerging as a result of the Resurgence, and 
is unable to understand her brother’s struggle for artistic freedom, exhibiting 
itself in violent trances during which he reverts to his old style of abstract art, 
while actually working on a realist painting. She is also unable to grasp the real 
causes of her brother’s final suicide. The story “Prelude” is a retelling of the Judg-
ment of Paris, while “Incident from the Golden Bough” takes its theme from 
Frazer’s account of “The Myth and Ritual of Attis”, Chapter 34 of the Golden 
Bough. “Interpreter’s Parlour” contains the interpretation of a poet’s seemingly 
nonsense poem by the poet himself; the story as a whole is a witty parody of 
exaggerated literary interpretations. In a sense, it is a complicated, intellectual-
ized version of Humpty Dumpty’s explication of “Jabberwocky” in Through the 
Looking Glass; although Frye’s poem is more difficult and more abstract than 
that of Lewis Carroll. According to the poet’s somewhat ambitious remark, “it’s 





Vine, -in (e) 
Prunes and prisms. (84)
Frye’s irony is evident in the last line of the story. When the poet is done with 
his long and laborious interpretation, illuminating the important message of the 
poem, his interlocutor expresses his appreciation with these words: “Thank you 
very much. It must be very interesting” (86). 
The plot of Frye’s unfinished novel, The Locust-Eaters, is set in Canada and 
revolves around the life of a family in an imaginary province; it contains char-
acterizations, as well as biographical references to Frye’s own life; however, in 
its current form it is too short and too fragmentary to be dealt with as a novel. 
The Critic as Writer, the Writer as Critic
• 227 •
The earliest title for this projected novel was Quiet Consummation, the phrase 
coming from Cymbeline (cf. “Introduction”, ibid., xxxv), and originally planned 
to be “laid out to be in sonata form”.1 On the evidence of his Notebooks, in 
addition to the unfinished novel, there were other forms of fiction which Frye 
intended to experiment with: the fantasy, the detective story, an academic novel 
in a university setting, and the bardo novel, among others (cf. ibid., xxxiii). 
Another plan was to write “a sequence of eight definitive novels”, and as Denham 
and Dolzani observe, while “he abandoned his brief anatomy experiment, he 
never really abandoned his fiction-writing dream” (xxxiii).
Regarding his short fiction, as is obvious from the above plot summaries, the 
action presented in Frye’s stories is limited; they are mostly dialogues or collo-
quies between the characters. In this respect, most of them can be interpreted 
as scenes that offer themselves to be performed on stage, the narratives serving 
as stage directions. Also, as some of the stories present supernatural beings and 
have a thrilling, eerie aspect, these can be brought into connection with the 
Gothic, especially with what later came to be known as the Southern Ontario 
Gothic in Canadian literature. Using Frye’s own system, however, as Denham 
and Dolzani point out, these “stories are fundamentally brief anatomies” in the 
sense that they are “brief Menippean satires” (xxv). As Denham and Dolzani 
observe, “In Frye’s system, the tale is a short form of romance, the short story, a 
terse form of the novel, the essay, a short version of the confession; and the dia-
logue or colloquy, a brief Menippean satire or anatomy” (xxv ).
As is obvious from the above story-lines, in his twenties Frye was already 
greatly preoccupied with the mythological and religious themes which later 
formed the basis of his literary theory. In the following pages I will point out 
some specific ideas in Frye’s fiction which resurface in his later scholarship in a 
refined, modified and extended form. This, in a sense, is a typological reading 
of Frye, where the story elements serve as the types and the subsequent theories 
as the antitypes. The ideas raised in the stories are mostly rudimentary, men-
tioned in passing; yet, what should be noted is that some theoretical conceptions 
appear in one form or another as early as these works; in fact, they are probably 
their earliest written occurrences in Frye’s work.
In Frye’s first story, “The Ghost”, published in 1936, Margaret’s lover tells the 
following inhospitable words to the title character (who, as we remember, has 
come to haunt him): “I am not at all impressed by the fact that I see you. Enlight-
1 Frye’s letter to Roy Daniels dated 14 July 1935, quoted in Hart 267-268. In the same letter, Frye 




ened people see what they want to see. Superstitious people see what they have 
to see” (60, italics mine). Upon closer analysis, this statement amounts not only 
to what is an unfriendly welcome of the ghost; it also entails a good deal of self-
criticism, implying that the lover is not an enlightened person; if he was, he 
would not see the ghost. 
The core of this idea, in a different context and a more elaborate form, reap-
pears in Fearful Symmetry, eleven years later. In analysing the major differ-
ences between Lockean and Blakean epistemology, Frye concludes: 
there are not only two worlds, but three: the world of vision, the world of sight and 
the world of memory: the world we create, the world we live in and the world we run 
away to. The world of memory is an unreal world of reflection and abstract ideas; the 
world of sight is a potentially real world of subjects and objects; the world of vision is 
a world of creators and creatures. In the world of memory we see nothing; in the world 
of sight we see what we have to see; in the world of vision we see what we want to see. 
These are not three different worlds, as in the religions which speak of a heaven and 
hell in addition to ordinary life; they are the egocentric, the ordinary and the visionary 
ways of looking at the same world.
The fact that in the world of vision or art we see what we want to see implies that it is 
a world of fulfilled desire and unbounded freedom. (1947, 26, italics mine) 
It is interesting to note that in Fearful Symmetry Frye further refines his theory 
and finally distinguishes between four levels of vision. The first is represented 
by generalizations and abstraction based on memory (the Lockean universe), 
or by Blake’s Ulro. The second is the world we live in, the physical world, which 
Blake called Generation. Above it lies the world of imagination, represented by 
a vision of love and wonder, lifting man from the “world of subject and object” 
but still unable to produce art. Blake calls this level Beulah. The fourth level is 
an intensification of the third, “the highest possible state”, the “union of creator 
and creature, of energy and form”, which Blake names Eden (48-50). The idea 
first appearing in “The Ghost” once again emerges in Frye’s posthumous book, 
The Double Vision, where the distinction lies primarily between the second level, 
representing our “normal vision” of the world, and the third and fourth visions, 
contained in one.
Another interconnection between ideas discussed in Frye’s short fiction and 
his subsequent literary theory can be found in his story entitled “Prelude” and 
his book The Great Code. In “Prelude”, an account of the “Judgement of Paris” 
myth, Minerva condescendingly explains to Paris, “But deities don’t think quite 
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on your plane, lofty as that may be for a mortal. It’s very difficult to approximate 
divine conceptions with human terms, but I’ll try” (2007, 77, italics mine). 
The above idea recurs in the “Introduction” to The Great Code, where Frye 
asserts: “To answer a question (a point we shall return to later in the book) is to 
consolidate the mental level on which the question is asked” (1982, xv). This 
“later point in the book” is the interpretation of the Book of Job, more precisely, 
God’s answer to Job’s questions about the cause of his calamity: 
The fact that God’s speech is thrown into a series of rhetorical questions to which 
“no” is the only answer seems to give it a bullying and hectoring quality, and certainly 
there is no “answer” to Job’s “problem.” But did we ever seriously think that so great a 
poem would turn out to be a problem with an answer? To answer a question, we sug-
gested at the beginning, is to accept the assumptions in it, and thereby to neutralize 
the question by consolidating the mental level on which the question was asked. Real 
questions are stages in formulating better questions; answers cheat us out of the right 
to do this. So even if we remain dissatisfied with God’s performance, a God who was 
glibly ready to explain it all would be more contemptible than the most reactionary 
of divine bullies. (196, italics mine)
It should be mentioned that while in “Prelude” Minerva finally explains the 
concept of beauty on the human level by reference to aspects of the world which 
can be experienced and desired by Paris, in the interpretation of the Book of Job 
Frye clarifies why this is necessary. He states that God’s reply cannot be com-
prehended exactly on account of the fact that the things he projects before Job 
from the time of the creation are beyond Job’s experience; Job (and the reader) 
did not participate in the creation. Why the creation? Because “any causal expla-
nation takes us back to a First Cause, that is, the creation” (1982, 196). Another, 
extended aspect of this train of thought is the principle of verum factum, namely, 
that man knows only what he has made, which is a central tenet of Frye’s thought, 
exemplified in such works as The Great Code, Words with Power, The Double 
Vision, and his essays “Cycle and Apocalypse in Finnegan’s Wake” and “Expand-
ing Eyes”.2 
In “Affable Angel”, originally published in 1940, the Angel describes the place 
of devils in the following way: “where do they fit in? They’re above you in power, 
below you in morals, I hope; below you perhaps in intelligence” (2007, 68).3




The above concept re-emerges in Frye’s classification of the types of fiction by 
the relative position of the reader in comparison to the protagonist, as explained 
in the First Essay of Anatomy of Criticism. “Power”, “morals” and “intelligence” 
are all factors to be taken into account when defining one’s place in relation to 
devils according to the short fiction. However, only the “hero’s power of action” 
remains as a category to be considered in the classification of literature in Anat-
omy of Criticism, since morality is expressly rejected and intelligence is not 
mentioned. As Frye claims seventeen years after the publication of “Affable 
Angel”: 
Fictions may be classified, not morally, but by the hero’s power of action, which 
may be greater than ours, less, or roughly the same. Thus:
 ͮ If superior in kind both to other men and to the environment of other men, 
the hero is a divine being, and the story about him will be a myth in the 
common sense of a story about a god. …
 ͮ If superior in degree to other men and to his environment, the hero is the 
typical hero of romance, whose actions are marvellous but who is himself 
identified as a human being. …
 ͮ If superior in degree to other men but not to his natural environment, the 
hero is a leader. … This is the hero of the high mimetic mode, of most epic 
and tragedy, and is primarily the kind of hero that Aristotle had in mind.
 ͮ If superior neither to other men nor to his environment, the hero is one of 
us … This gives us the hero of the low mimetic mode, of most comedy and 
of realistic fiction. …
 ͮ If inferior in power or intelligence to ourselves, so that we have the sense 
of looking down on a scene of bondage, frustration, or absurdity, the hero 
belongs to the ironic mode. 
Looking over this table, we can see that European fiction, during the last fifteen 
centuries, has steadily moved its center of gravity down the list.4 (1957, 33-34, 
italics mine)
The above excerpts demonstrate how a seemingly unimportant remark in Frye’s 
early short fiction assumes relevance by its reconsideration for a theory of litera-
ture, revealing Frye’s memory and imagination at work over the span of almost 
two decades.
It is also worth invoking an excerpt from another early story of Frye which 
can be interpreted as reflecting his own lifelong effort of finding unity in art and 
4 With the exception of “myth”, “romance”, “high mimetic”, “low mimetic”, and “ironic”.
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literature. The hero of “The Resurgent” writes the following lines in his farewell 
letter before his death: 
(Oct.11.) Working normally all day until I settled down for the evening after dinner. 
I had the old dizzy feeling back again stronger than ever and finally everything went 
black and I was in a stupor for some time. When I became conscious again I saw that 
I had covered the canvas with a network of lines, drawn in such a way that wherever 
one looked one’s eye seemed to be on the point of getting some sort of unifying pat-
tern, only to see it dissolve again in chaos. But no: that doesn’t give the least idea of 
the picture’s effect. It sent your eye frantically scurrying all over the canvas in search 
of that missing clue that would bring the whole scheme together: you got into a panic 
when you couldn’t find it and would start over with the same result. (2007, 74-75)
Instead of juxtaposing the above with a passage from a theoretical work demon-
strating a pattern of unity in literature (for which Anatomy of Criticism would 
offer multiple examples), I wish to invoke a biographical reference from Frye’s 
diary, showing the difficulties he went through while writing Fearful Symmetry. 
In 1940, when the story “The Resurgence” was published, Frye’s first book, Fear-
ful Symmetry, was well underway. Therefore, the above lines of the imaginary 
painter could have been modelled on Frye’s own strife, especially in view of 
his heavy emphasis on the unified vision of Blake’s art. In his 1942 diary, Frye 
described the struggle of writing the book with lots of irony. On July 21, he 
remarked:
Chapter Five. The Blake takes all my time & energy: I shall never write a book under 
such conditions again. I’ve stopped playing the piano & stopped reading. And every 
once in a while I suspect I’m writing shit. If the public doesn’t like it I shall write a 
novel which shall earn me a million tax-free dollars, exclusive of movie rights, & lose 
me my job. (1996, 6–7)
On July 23, he wrote: 
Oh God, when I finish this book I shall learn to compose music. I shall get my teeth 
fixed. I shall go to a horse race and bet on the horse that looks most like Aunt Dolly. 
I shall go to the Riverdale Zoo and sneer at the Great Crested Macaw (Accius Pacu-
vius). (7) 
As is well known, Fearful Symmetry was a success and established Frye’s name 
in criticism. A significant career was on the rise and Frye continued to produce 
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major ideas and theories for over four decades. In the meantime, his short fiction 
remained almost completely unknown, overshadowed by the scholar’s output. 
However, it is well worth recalling these small pieces to see where he came 
from and to be reminded of the fact that there was a period in his career when 
it was not clear whether he wished to express his ideas in creative or theoretical 
writing, that is, whether he would become a writer or a scholar. As he himself 
noted, “I came to college, barely seventeen, convinced of the superiority of cre-
ative to scholarly work, never dreaming I was cut out to be a scholar, critic & 
professor, though other schoolboys called me professor as a nickname at the age 
of twelve at the latest” (2007, 27).
The above discussion of Frye’s short fiction, demonstrating his creative imag-
ination at work in his early years, started with “The Ghost” and its strange title 
character, and then moved on to some other creepy, funny and ironic stories, 
some of them containing ideas which resurface in Frye’s profound theories in 
an extended form. Now we have arrived at the Riverdale Zoo and the Great 
Crested Macaw, which, like the Ghost, is another strange creature; strange, 
because in reality it does not exist, and its Latin name, Accius Pacuvius, refers 
not to a bird but two tragic dramatists of Ancient Rome.5 
From the Ghost to the Great Crested Macaw, therefore, we have come full 
circle.
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MOUNT ‘ARAFAT AS A SITE OF RECOGNITION: ANAG-
NORISIS IN NORTHROP FRYE AND THE QUR’AN1
When thy Lord drew forth from the children of Adam—
from their loins—their descendant, and made them testify 
concerning themselves, (saying): “Am I not your Lord (who 
cherishes and sustains you)?”—They said: “Yea! We do tes-
tify!” (This), lest ye should say on the Day of Judgment: “Of 
this we were never mindful.”
Qur’an 7:1722
[A] recognition scene transforms a story into a kind of 
game. That is, the story becomes a puzzle, of which the 
recognition scene is the solution. 
(Northrop Frye, SeS, 130)
In the Introduction to Words with Power, Northrop Frye states that a large por-
tion of his critical thinking revolved around the double meaning of the Aristote-
lian term anagnorisis. The play between the double meaning of ‘recognition’ and 
‘discovery’ can be found throughout his work, and is perhaps most apparent in 
his articulation of the interplay between identity and metaphor starting in The 
Great Code and carrying through to The Double Vision. Frye’s concept of the 
existential metaphor hinges on the reader’s discovery and subsequent recogni-
tion of a “that’s for me” element in the text. My paper explores this framework 
in Frye’s reading of the Qur’an by analyzing some of the annotations he made 
in a copy of the Qur’an in his personal collection. In the course of this analy-
sis my paper will explore the Arabic root ‘arafa (to recognize, to know) as the 
framework for understanding a larger Qur’anic narrative of recognition and the 
Qur’anic image of Mt. ‘Arafat as both etymologically connected to the root ‘arafa 
and as a site of numerous Qur’anic and extra-Qur’anic recognition scenes. The 
narrative in the Qur’an begins on the Day of the Covenant (7:172), continues with 
1 I would like to thank Todd Lawson for his guidance and comments while writing this paper, 
and Robert Denham for sharing his knowledge on Northrop Frye and anagnorisis and for his 
comments on an early draft of this paper.
2 All quotations of the Qur’an are from the A. Yusuf Ali translation, except for citations of the 
verses that Frye annotated.
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the imperative to recognize the signs of God (41:53), and culminates on the Day 
of Judgment (10:46; 64:9; 82:5; 99:6-8). Mt. ‘Arafat is mentioned in the Qur’an 
and in Islamic exegetical literature in connection with all three, the beginning, 
middle and end, points in the narrative. The connection between Mt. ‘Arafat and 
anagnorisis/‘arafa arises from Frye’s annotations, and my analysis uses Frye’s 
published works to investigate how the annotations can be understood in the 
context of Frye’s broader inquiry into anagnorisis. In a 17 May 1949 entry of 
his published Diaries, Frye records that he purchased a copy of John Rodwell’s 
1861 English translation of the Qur’an in Toronto, one of the two Qur’ans in his 
collection of books he annotated: 
On an impulse I bought two Everymans, the Koran & George Macdonald’s Phantastes, 
& a rather dubious Jungian book. The Koran still baffles me: I can’t figure out why 
the hell anybody went for that book. It probably makes a lot more sense in Arabic 
as a prose-poetry synthesis of the Word in which rhetorical & dialectic aspects are 
indistinguishable. (2001, 207) 
The entry indicates that this was not his first encounter with the Qur’an. The 
purchase of the Qur’an occurs two years after the publication of his first book, 
Fearful Symmetry, in 1947. While it has not been possible to pinpoint when he 
first encountered the Qur’an, this “second” encounter with the Qur’an occurred 
around the time he was first envisioning “a big book on the Bible”, a vision which 
was at least partially realized many years later in The Great Code and Words 
with Power. The diary entry, in conjunction with other entries from the published 
diaries and notebooks, indicates that Frye’s concern with the Qur’an began early 
and was a concern that continued throughout his career. His claim in 1949 that 
he is still puzzled by the Qur’an suggests that the annotations in his copy of 
Rodwell’s translation can and perhaps should be read as a continued effort to 
“figure out why anyone went for this book”. One of the ways the annotations can 
be approached is through the literary convention and hermeneutic framework 
of anagnorisis. In the Introduction to Words With Power, Frye claims that much 
of his “critical thinking has turned on the double meaning of Aristotle’s term 
anagnorisis, which can mean ‘discovery’ or ‘recognition’, depending on whether 
the emphasis falls on the newness of the appearance or on its reappearance” 
(14). For the purposes of this paper I am using the Arabic verb ‘arafa (to know, 
to recognize, to discern) as an Arabic equivalent of Aristotle’s term. My use 
of ‘arafa is based on Frye’s annotations and the analysis they generated rather 
than on the Arabic translations and commentaries on Aristotle. The verb comes 
from the root ‘ayn-ra-fa, which occurs over 70 times in the Qur’an. Some of the 
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other meanings it conveys in the Qur’an in various other grammatical forms are: 
knowledge (47:6), confession (9:102), rampart/barrier (7:46), and honourableness 
(2:231-36). Although Frye had no knowledge of Arabic, we know that he was at 
least aware of this verb due to a highlighted footnote on the word al-‘araf (bar-
rier or wall) in his copy of the Qur’an. The footnote is given in reference to the 
mention of al-‘araf at 7:46: “And on the wall AL ARAF shall be men who will 
know all.” The footnote explains that the wall’s “name… is derived from ‘Arafa, 
‘to know’”. The wall/barrier al-‘araf is popularly understood to be an intermedi-
ary location between the garden/Paradise (al-jannah) and the fire/Hell (al-nār). 
In this passage from Sura 7, the people on al-‘araf look first at the companions 
of the Garden, then at the companions of the Fire, and speak to them from 
their intermediary location. In such a position al-‘araf functions as a barzakh, 
an isthmus between two things, e.g.: “It is He Who has let free the two bodies 
of flowing water: one palatable and sweet, and the other salt and bitter: yet has 
He made a barrier (barzakhān) between them, a partition that is forbidden to 
be passed” (25:53). This site might also be considered symbolic of the reader’s 
position of “knowing all”, that is, of being able to “see” the entire Qur’anic nar-
rative, the nature of both Paradise and Hell, and the actions that lead to the one 
or the other. At this point we need to distinguish between two different uses 
of recognition. The first sense, as a “recognition scene”, falls under Aristotle’s 
definition of anagnorisis as “a change from not-knowing to knowing” (87). This is 
something that happens to literary characters and, in many cases, reverses their 
course of action. Examples of this type in the Qur’an would be the scene between 
Joseph and his brothers in Sura 12 and the final conversation between Moses and 
Khidr in Sura 18. The second sense is something that happens to readers, and is 
an event that is connected to Frye’s concept of the existential metaphor, when 
the reader begins to identify with what is being read. This type of recognition 
will be discussed in more detail below. For the moment what is important is to 
highlight the difference between these two uses of the concept of recognition. 
Before discussing the formal structure of recognition (anagnorisis) in the Qur’an 
and the images associated with it, we need to outline the creative play that occurs 
in recognition associated with readers. We must also grasp how recognition 
affects readers before we look at how recognition affects characters in what 
is being read. In The Secular Scripture, Frye writes, in connection with comic 
works, that the recognition scene: “transforms a story into a kind of game” (130). 
The recognition in this context is connected to a riddle or the explanation of a 
mystery, something that was hidden or obscured, and then, with the right key, 
is finally revealed. Such a key in the Qur’an can be found at 41:53: “Soon We will 
show them Our Signs in the (furthest) regions (of the earth), and in their souls, 
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until it becomes manifest to them that this is the truth. Is it not enough that 
thy Lord doth witness all things?” This verse or aya (Arabic aya pl. ayāt), a term 
that can refer to a verse of the Qur’an as well as a ‘sign’, indicates that the world, 
rather than being simply a place in which to live or exist, holds an inner mean-
ing. Understood in this way, the world itself becomes a text to read. The inner 
meaning and symbolism of the world as text become more significant once the 
reader arrives at the recognition scene. The events leading up to the recognition 
scene must be discovered anew or recognized in light of the new information 
given. In the context of re-discovery or re-cognition events and object are read 
with new meaning. The revelatory nature of the recognition scene means that 
all previous events must be re-traced or traced back from the recognition scene. 
In Arabic this hermeneutic task is encapsulated by the term ta’wīl, commonly 
translated as interpretation, but literally meaning ‘tracing back to the source’. 
The thing recognized must be traced back to the original moment of knowing, 
thus the reader must embark on a metaphorical journey in the act of interpreta-
tion. This journey involves a figurative seeing that pulls the story/narrative into 
the consciousness of the reader. The reader can go back and discover the clues or 
path that lead to the recognition scene. This game continues indefinitely, and a 
new game is put into play at every reading. There are new pieces of the puzzle to 
be discovered with each new reading. The reader is constantly drawn back into 
the story in search of new and better understandings or recognitions (see MM 6). 
The reader is repeatedly drawn up from the lower world (world of nature) into the 
higher verbal (spiritual) world. Two Qur’anic terms that are associated with this 
type of movement are zāhir and bātin, “exoteric”/“esoteric” or outer/inner. This 
movement is also the movement associated with Frye’s existential metaphor—
the moment readers recognize or discover themselves in what is being read and 
the subject/object distinction is blurred. In Words with Power, Frye explains 
that “the type of identification we have been calling existential metaphor…[is] 
standing outside oneself: a state in which the real self, whatever reality is and 
whatever the self is in this context, enters a different order of things from that 
of the now dispossessed ego” (85-6). The reader is drawn out of the world of ego-
centrism, where all thought and concern revolves around what directly affects 
the desires and wants of the individual, and into a higher social world where the 
wants of the individual are subsumed into the wants of a larger community. It 
is important to emphasize that the creative play or game associated with this 
type of recognition produces a lens through which the reader views the world. 
Before going on to discuss in more detail how the recognition scene sets this 
game of reader recognition into motion, the literary structure of the Qur’an 
needs to be outlined. When dealing with the idea of a Qur’anic “narrative of 
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recognition”, it should be borne in mind that the Qur’an as a whole is not a 
proper narrative. The Qur’an is comprised of 114 Suras (chapters) of varying 
length—each one comprised of revelations orally given to the Prophet Muham-
mad by the angel Gabriel over a period of approximately 23 years (610–632 C.E.). 
The Suras were gathered together after the death of Muhammad, and the current 
form of organization, roughly by length rather than chronological order, was 
produced by the community of his followers. This organization began around 
633 C.E., when Abu Bakr instructed that the revelations orally memorized and 
written down by Muhammad’s companions be brought together to form one 
text, and continued with ‘Uthman who had multiple copies made of the col-
lected revelation.3 Sura 12 (Yusuf ) is the only proper narrative; the other Suras 
contain exhortations, warnings, proscriptions, references and allusions to other 
prophets, and stories from the Jewish and Christian sacred texts, as well as other 
Near Eastern sources. Norman O. Brown writes about the style of the Qur’an: 
“Historical material is fragmented into its archetypal constituents, and then 
subjected to displacement and condensation, as in dreams. It is a rebirth of 
images, as in the Book of Revelations, or Finnegans Wake.” (167) Brown is point-
ing out that people, places, and events are not discussed in terms of linear/his-
torical cause and effect, instead, all of time and history is condensed into the 
moment. In this typological and apocalyptic style, each image or word points 
towards a meta-historical plane that gives them meaning. Frye discusses this in 
connection with Sura 3: “the third Sura of the Koran appears to be identifying 
Miriam and Mary; Christian commentators on the Koran naturally say that this 
is ridiculous, but from the purely typological point of view from which the Koran 
is speaking, the identification makes good sense” (GC 172). The identification 
makes sense when considered from a non-linear perspective. On the meta-his-
torical level Miriam and Mary are both types that link Moses and Jesus into one 
prophetic sequence. This meta-historical plane is connected to the higher verbal/
spiritual world discussed above. Historical events and people are used as signs 
that simultaneously point outwards towards the recognition of this meta-his-
torical plane and inwards to the discovery of them in the life/consciousness of 
the reader. Meaning is generated through this creative play associated with trac-
ing each word and image back to the meta-historical plane, a play connected to 
the Arabic concept of tā’wil. This play then leads us back to the existential 
metaphor. The tracing that occurs might also be considered a mental process 
whereby the reader organizes the fragmented material into a cohesive narrative 
form. This process of organization is situated within Frye’s distinction between 
3 For a detailed introduction to the historical and exegetical study of the Qur’an, see von Denffer.
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the panoramic and participating apocalypse. The panoramic apocalypse is the 
revelatory narrative from creation through to the judgment at the end of time. 
The participating apocalypse takes place in the reader’s mind after reading. The 
narrative presented by the panoramic apocalypse invites the reader to join in 
this vision, to make it the lens through which they view the world. Joining in 
this vision leads the reader into a new life, a new way of seeing the world, and 
the world as text is read with added meaning, new re-cognition. Frye writes at 
the end of the section on the two types of apocalypse, “the [participating] apoc-
alypse is the way the world looks after the ego has disappeared.” (GC 138) The 
disappearance of the ego is similar to the dispossessed ego mentioned above, 
thus the recognition associated with the reader and reading transforms indi-
viduals and creates a new verbal/spiritual world for them. Such a tracing of words 
and images gives us a framework with which to outline a Qur’anic narrative of 
recognition that takes place in meta-history. Frye identifies two recognition 
scenes in the Qur’an in his annotations: first, as “recognition scene”, “On that 
day shall men come forward in throngs to behold their works, and whosoever 
shall have wrought an atom’s weight of good shall behold it, and whosoever shall 
have wrought an atom’s weight of evil shall behold it” (99:6-8); and second, as a 
“negative recognition scene”: “The day when He shall gather you together for the 
day of mutual gathering, will be the day of MUTUAL DECEIT.” (64:9) He also 
highlights two other references to these scenes of judgment and recognition. 
First, “They shall recognise one another! Now perish they who denied the meet-
ing with God, and were not guided aright!” (10:46), where Frye underlines the 
word “recognise”. And the second one he underlines and marks in the margin 
is: “Each soul shall recognize its earliest and its latest actions.” (82:5) These are 
connected to a larger narrative in the Qur’an that begins on the Day of Covenant, 
when God gathered all creation together before time and history began:
When thy Lord drew forth from the children of Adam—from their loins—their de-
scendants, and made them testify concerning themselves, (saying): “Am I not your 
Lord (who cherishes and sustains you)?”—They said: “Yea! We do testify!” (This), lest 
ye should say on the Day of Judgment: “Of this we were never mindful.” (7:172)
Frye does not annotate this verse, but he does highlight an allusion to it: “Ver-
ily, we proposed to the Heavens, and to the Earth, and to the Mountains to 
receive the Faith, but they refused the burden, and they feared to receive it. 
Man undertook to bear it, but hath proven unjust, senseless!” It is because of 
this Covenant that the signs (ayāt) are placed in the world—so that humanity 
may remember (dhikr) or recognize (‘arafa) the covenant they made with God. 
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The Qur’an itself provides hints or clues within its Suras to aid the process of 
remembrance/recognition. (33:72)Each Sura, aya, and word/image (sign of God) 
is totum simul—contains this entire narrative from the Day of Covenant to the 
Day of Judgment within itself. The levels of reading or the journey of reading as 
ta’wīl, tracing back to the source, involves discovering each sign’s place in the 
outer meta-historical narrative as well as in an inner personal narrative. Frye 
explores this journey through the images of ascent and descent associated with 
mountains, ladders, and caves, gardens and furnaces— all images that he high-
lighted and/or commented on in his Qur’an. They symbolize the movement from 
the natural world to the higher verbal world. In connection to the Arabic terms 
zāhir and bātin, each image is a sign with an outer (zāhir) appearance and an 
inner (bātin) meaning ascertained through ta’wīl, tracing each back to the spir-
itual or meta-historical realm. It is through this movement that the existential 
metaphor is played out, that the reader starts to identify with what is being read. 
Mount ‘Arafat is symbolic of this journey, not only as a point of contact between 
the lower and the upper worlds4, but also because its very name comes from the 
same root as ‘arafa (recognition). However, the link between the Mount and the 
structure of recognition is not philological, but literary and inter-textual rather. 
Mount ‘Arafat is an important site on the Hajj, and, in what follows, I will show 
how it is one of the most important images/symbols of this narrative, not only 
because it comes from the same root as ‘arafa, but also because it represents the 
movement or journey associated with this narrative of recognition. Mt. ‘Arafat is 
only mentioned once in the Qur’an: “When ye pour down from (Mount) ‘Arafat, 
celebrate the praises of God at the Sacred Monument, and celebrate His praises 
as He has directed you, even though, before this, ye went astray.” (2:198) The 
longest Sura, Surat al-Baqara, mentions the root 20 times, the largest number 
of occurrences in any sura, and uses it in forms pertaining to honour and good-
ness as well as recognition,5 and it sums up the entire Qur’anic vision of history, 
from the Creation of humanity and the Covenant, to the expulsion of Adam 
and Eve from Paradise and the history of the People of the Book, to the call to 
remember the Covenant, the description of the right path leading to the final 
recognition on the Day of Judgment, and nature of Paradise and Hell. It mentions 
Mt. It mentions ‘Arafat in the section that outlines the Hajj, the pilgrimage to 
Mecca. In a sense, the Hajj can be seen as a type of the larger historical narra-
4 For more on the importance of the image of the mountain in connection with ascent and 
descent, see WP chapter 5. 
5 The Day of Covenant is also connected to this etymological structure of recognition. Sura 7, 
al-A‘rāf, derives its name from this root and also contains the second most frequent mention of 
the root, 6 times, along with Sura 4, al-Nisā’.
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tive of recognition outlined above; it is symbolic of the movement from the Day 
of Covenant to the Day of Judgment and the cultivation of remembrance that 
leads to a final (positive) recognition scene rather than a negative recognition 
scene. If we trace the place Mt. ‘Arafat has in each part of this narrative, we see 
it constantly appearing as the site of a recognition scene. According to al-Tabari, 
Mt. ‘Arafat was the site where the Day of Covenant took place: Then God rubbed 
Adam’s back at Na’mān of ‘Arafah and brought forth his progeny (dhurriyyah). 
He scattered them in front of him like tiny ants (dharr). He made covenants with 
them and “had them testify against themselves: Am I not your Lord?” And they 
said: “Yes,” as God says. [Q 7:172] (al-Tabari 304) 
Because of this it can be considered the prototype of all other recognition 
scenes. It is also the site where Gabriel taught Abraham the rites and ceremonies 
surrounding the hajj, and on the hajj it is where the pilgrims gather in “a sym-
bolic act meant to bring to mind the ultimate gathering on the Resurrection 
Day”. (Asad) Edward Lane, in his Arabic-English Lexicon, adds to this when he 
mentions the possible reasons for the naming of Mt. ‘Arafat: “Because it is a place 
sanctified and magnified, as though it were rendered fragrant: or because the 
people know one another there.” Each scene either implicitly or explicitly refers 
back to the Day of Covenant and the narrative that develops from it. Each of 
these scenes on Mt. ‘Arafat can be labelled a recognition scene in themselves, or 
a sign alluding to the final recognition scene on the Day of Judgment. It is also 
relevant at this point to note that the fragrance mentioned by Lane in the passage 
from his Lexicon is ‘arf, also a cognate of the ‘ayn-ra-fa root. The association of 
scent/perfume and knowledge further forges a link with Frye’s concept of the 
higher verbal/spiritual world. Fragrance is an ephemeral sign or clue that at first 
reading or experience may not stand out, but becomes an important symbol 
upon re-reading and engaging with the game set in motion by the recognition 
scene. In conclusion, the journey that is associated with this narrative of recog-
nition is the journey to “see” the significance of the entire narrative both out-
wardly in the rhythm of religious life and inwardly in consciousness. It is a 
continual repetition and creation of meaning, and the outer and inner puzzles 
both have an existential pull at the core of their movement. The reader places 
this higher verbal world onto the natural world and it becomes the lens through 
which they navigate and live in the world. Inwardly this narrative is an inner 
cycle or hikāya—an Arabic term meaning simultaneously performance, narra-
tive, mimesis, history, and re-creation—that occurs at every reading of the 
Qur’an. The French philosopher Henry Corbin tells us that all the communities 
of the Abrahamic religious traditions face a fundamentally hermeneutic task—
the task to understand the true meaning of their revealed scripture. This task is 
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shaped by the consciousness of the individual, by, in Frygian terms, how much 
of the “that’s for me” element they recognize in what is being read. Corbin 
explains: 
Everything depends therefore on the initial act of consciousness which establishes 
a perspective, together with the laws that will henceforth govern it. The act whereby 
consciousness reveals to itself this hermeneutical perspective, at the same time reveals 
to it the world that it will have to organize and structure on a hierarchic basis. From 
this point of view, the phenomenon of the sacred Book has given rise to corresponding 
structures in the Christian and Islamic worlds. (2)
For Corbin, the world that is created for a community out of a revealed scripture 
arises from the individuals within the community reading and seeking to under-
stand the text. This understanding is formed through the readers’ recognition 
of themselves in the text, similar to the process outlined above in connection 
to the panoramic and participatory apocalypses, and through this recognition 
them begin to form a teleology and verbal/spiritual world in which to live. Frye 
expresses a moment similar to that described by Corbin in the last two sentences 
of The Double Vision: “In the double vision of a spiritual and a physical world 
simultaneously present, every moment we have lived through we have also died 
out of into another order. Our life in the resurrection, then, is already here, and 
waiting to be recognized.” (85) In essence this structure of recognition that is 
associated with the reader is also a type of world building. Both Corbin and Frye 
are describing the process whereby a sacred text becomes the lens through which 
the individual sees the world, the process whereby the text becomes the basis 
for the verbal/spiritual world in which the community lives. The task now is to 
look further at this structure of recognition and Mt. ‘Arafat, and other moun-
tains typologically associated with it, such as Mt. Sinai and Mt. Qāf and how the 
cognates of the root ‘arafa are used in connection with them. Thus, this paper 
is just one step towards uncovering how the Qur’an might be considered the 
“great code” of Islam, and why, in the words of Frye, “anyone went for this book.”
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MYTHICAL JOURNEYS IN AGATHA CHRISTIE’S 
CROOKED HOUSE AND ORDEAL BY INNOCENCE
It is almost a truism that detective fiction functions as the showcase for various 
literary theories. Critics can exemplify their relatively complex theories with the 
help of this “simple” genre, since detective fiction is based on clear-cut rules, 
formulaic structure, and a straightforward language and transparent style. Cer-
tain thinkers use the investigation process in the traditional whodunit to explain 
narratological theories and the differences between fabula and syuzhet (Todorov 
44-45; Brooks 23-36). Others focus on the genre to demonstrate psychoanalysis, 
poststructuralism or deconstruction – it is enough to mention here Jacques 
Lacan’s and Jacques Derrida’s interpretations of Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Purloined 
Letter” and the far-reaching theoretical discussion that they provoked (Muller 
and Richardson). 
In this essay, I interpret Agatha Christie’s detective fiction in the mirror of 
anthropological and mythical theories. Based on Northrop Frye’s Anatomy of 
Criticism and his essay “The Journey as Metaphor”, I argue that Christie’s 
Crooked House (1949) and Ordeal by Innocence (1958) demonstrate various 
aspects of the rites of passage and liminality, phenomena that are closely related 
to Frye’s views on the mythical hero’s circular or spiral journey. I also intend to 
demonstrate that the investigation process in the two novels closely follows 
mythic rituals, such as the ancient ritual of the scapegoat or pharmakos.1 
Defining liminality, Victor Turner draws on Arnold van Gennep’s description 
of “rites of passage”, in which three separate phases are distinguished: separa-
tion, liminality, and re-incorporation. The notion of liminality is a period of 
social transition, either that of the tribal subject or that of the community itself, 
1 Although it would be difficult to argue that these two stories are the most famous or most 
significant works of the author, Christie claimed in her autobiography that her own favourites 
were exactly these two novels (Knight 90-91). Thus, the texts can be considered as paradigmatic 




when “the ritual subjects pass through a period of ambiguity, a sort of social 
limbo” (24). This process is often reflected in “spatial symbolism”, as the transi-
tion in status is accompanied by spatial transference or “a geographical move-
ment from one place to another. This may take the form of a mere opening of 
doors or the literal crossing of a threshold which separates two distinct areas” 
(25). Thus, the rite of passage is not only symbolic, but it also literally involves a 
passage, a movement, and a journey. 
It is important to note, however, that liminality and the rite of passage should 
not be imagined simply as a horizontal journey, a mere shift from point A to 
point B. Instead, anthropological and mythical theories describe a system of 
composite movements and diverse paths that the initiand or mythical hero fol-
lows.  
First, Frye and Turner underline that such horizontal journeys almost always 
indicate a vertical movement or hierarchical repositioning. The spiritual journey 
of the rite of passage involves a movement from a primary to a more mature 
status: from the dwelling of the uninitiated novice to that of the initiate, the 
fully-fledged member of the tribe. Thus, point B indicates a more elevated, priv-
ileged and superior position than point A. An initiated adult has typically more 
rights than an uninitiated child; the end of the journey should find the traveller 
more experienced, wiser and more widely recognized, which results in a more 
pivotal status. 
The overall presence of such paradigmatic vertical movements is based as 
much on sociological principles as on mythical beliefs and religious views. As 
Frye says in his “The Journey as Metaphor”: 
So far we have been speaking of journeys over the surface of the earth. But in my-
thology our world has always been a middle earth, with different forms of above and 
below it… The symbol of ascent may be a tree, or a mountain, or a ladder… The Greek 
word for ladder, klimax, and the Latin word, scala, will give us some notion of the 
immense proliferation of this image… and it was a common view not many centuries 
ago that scale and degree were essential to the form of human society as well. (216-17; 
emphasis in original)  
Somewhat analogously, contemporary theories, especially poststructuralism, 
also question the possibility of solely horizontal linear movements. They argue 
that linear processes indicate the presence of a dualism in the form of point A 
as a starting point and point B as the goal, and such a dualism almost always 
correlates with a hierarchical binary opposition. As Jacques Derrida argues, “in 
a classical philosophical opposition we are not dealing with the peaceful coex-
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istence of a vis-à-vis, but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms 
controls the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), holds the superior position” (41; 
emphasis in original). Point B usually holds the superior position in spiritual and 
religious journeys, since the final destination is placed on a more elevated level 
than the starting point (Klapcsik 7-9).
Second, Mircea Eliade, Frye, and Turner frequently emphasize the omnipres-
ent tradition of the image of cyclical or circular movements in rituals, myths, 
literature and arts. The mythical or fantastic journey involves a full cycle when, 
for example, the hero undertakes a quest, which is followed by the act of return-
ing home. As Frye puts it, 
the containing way or direction is cyclical. When the cyclical movement enters the 
individual life, we have the form of journey we call the quest, where a hero goes out 
to accomplish something, kill a dragon, deliver a heroine from a giant, help destroy 
a hostile city, or what not. The hero of a quest first goes “away”: that is, there must 
be some direction for his movement… If the quest is successful, he normally returns 
home, like a baseball player, the great model for this returning journey being of course 
the Odyssey. (1990, 213) 
It is important to note that after the journey is completed, the home where the 
hero arrives will not be exactly the same as it was before: “the starting point [is] 
renewed and transformed by the quest itself” (214). As mentioned before, the 
journey transforms the hero and elevates his position in society, and so his home 
will also become more valued, elevated and decorative than before. Thus, as Frye 
indicates, possibly the most archetypical form of journey is helical, forming a 
“spiral climb” or a “spiral path going around a mountain or tower” (217, 218).
Such journeys are openly reflected in various literary genres; most notably, 
perhaps, in fairy tales and children’s fantasy stories. According to Vladimir 
Propp’s formalist theory of fairy tales, the first function (β) describes the event 
when the protagonist or his relative absents himself from home. His ninth func-
tion (B) describes the moment when the hero is allowed to go or he is dispatched. 
Later, during function XI (↑), the hero leaves home. Functions XX (↓) and XXIII 
(o) describe the episode when the hero returns home, followed by the events 
when the hero rises in the social hierarchy: he is given a new appearance under 
function XXIX (T), which may involve him building a marvelous palace (T2). 
Thus, in these fairy tales the starting point or home of the hero is literally trans-
formed at this point, demonstrating the more elevated status of the character. 
Eventually, the hero becomes married and ascends the throne, forming function 
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XXXI (W), where the word “ascend” clearly indicates the progress from a lower 
to a higher social position (see Propp 25-65). 
Maria Nikolajeva also emphasizes the role of the journey in fantasies and fairy 
tales, especially in children’s stories, where the “purpose of the journey is the 
maturation of the child (protagonist as well as the reader)” (46). Nikolajeva uses 
the differentiation between linear and circular journeys for her categorization 
and historical survey of children’s literature. She argues that more recent and 
subversive fantasies may form linear or open-ending journeys, but the majority 
of traditional children’s fantasies involve circular journeys, since these are more 
reassuring for a child: “the return home is a matter of security: whatever hard-
ships and trials are endured, safe home is the final goal” (46). 
So how are such circular journeys and spiral climbs related to classical detec-
tive fiction? How are these motifs manifested in Christie’s stories? 
Interestingly enough, Christie’s fictional murders frequently indicate the 
metaphor of the journey. Certain stories evoke the journey literally: murder cases 
often involve commuters or tourists who travel to exotic places by plane, ship or 
trains. Enough to mention here The A. B. C. Murders (1936), which is set in 
various parts of England and where a railroad guide and a traveling salesmen 
play crucial roles; Death in the Clouds (1935), which is set on an airplane; Death 
on the Nile (1937), set on a ship on the river Nile; the train journeys in her 4.50 
from Paddington (1957); and Murder on the Orient Express (1934). 
 It is even more significant, however, that many times the murder per se can 
be interpreted as a journey. Christie’s works foreground the period between the 
murder and dénouement and describe it as a journey or liminal phase in the life 
of a family. The primary social situation before the murder takes place becomes 
point A, the initial situation. The investigation forms the liminal process or 
chaotic interlude in the life of the family. Finding the culprit at the end of the 
novel coincides with point B. Revealing the murderer is the final goal of the 
detective’s and reader’s journey, the return home and security when the charac-
ters reincorporate into an orderly, peaceful and well-established society. 
 Accordingly, Christie’s murder mysteries often meticulously portray the spir-
itual journeys and hierarchical relations of the family and the isolated rural 
community. Especially in her early fiction, for example, The Murder at the Vic-
arage (1930), Christie’s characters “inhabit comparable enclosed domestic spac-
es, consisting of a tight-knit, class bound, and hierarchical community of a 
village or parish” (Mezei 105).2 In these cases, detective fiction can be charac-
2 Even in Christie’s stories of the 1930s, middle-class and working-class characters appear and 
sometimes transgress social levels, especially in the form of liaisons. For example, in the short 
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terized with the help of Frye’s low-mimetic and ironic mode. Low-mimetic 
works, which include many comedies and nineteenth-century realistic fiction, 
focus on everyday characters, especially their hierarchical positions and usu-
ally futile attempts to reach a higher social level (AC 34). As Frye puts it, the 
main idea in low-mimetic texts is “the exclusion of an individual on our own 
level from a social group to which he is trying to belong… [and the character’s] 
mania or obsession about rising in the world” (39). 
In Christie’s works, such attempts are clearly recognizable when the head of 
a wealthy and powerful family becomes the victim, “a tyrannical figure and 
husband whose death is eagerly desired by the family” (Mezei 105). In this case, 
the crime is followed by the relatives’ “jostling for positions of power” (106), since 
many characters try to take the former position of the victim. For example, the 
narrator in Crooked House stresses that due to the murder of the head of the 
Leonides family “[t]he old order changeth” (109). The new order, however, cannot 
commence before the guilty party is found: the place at the top of the social and 
financial pyramid needs to be filled, and it has to be filled by an “innocent” 
character. The culprit needs to be found; or rather a culprit, since the indicted 
criminal does not even have to be the actual murderer, just somebody who is a 
suitable scapegoat for the family. 
Thus, the liminal period of the investigation evokes another ritual, namely, 
the “sacrificial rite” (Moretti 137), the rite of the scapegoat when the individual 
is sacrificed for the sake of the community, which is a typical characteristic of 
Frye’s low-mimetic and ironic mode (AC 41-42). Detective fiction becomes, as 
Frye says, “a ritual drama around a corpse in which a wavering finger of social 
condemnation passes over a group of ‘suspects’ and finally settles on one. The 
sense of a victim chosen by lot is very strong, for the case against him is only 
plausibly manipulated” (46). In other words, the genre evokes “the formula of 
how a man-hunter locates a pharmakos and gets rid of him” (46; emphasis in 
original).3 
story “The Tuesday Night Club” published in The Thirteen Problems (1932), the young maid Gladys 
Lynch is the culprit, who has a secret liaison with the master of the house, “who had got Gladys 
Lynch into trouble, as the saying goes” (18). In Christie’s Poirot novels the setting of the English 
country house is often transferred to London where the class-bound society and hierarchical 
structure of old England—especially in late novels such as Third Girl (1966)—is more openly 
reformed and significantly loosened. In the late Miss Marple stories—for example, The Mirror 
Crack’d from Side to Side (1962) and Nemesis (1971)—even the countryside has changed and become 
less socially conservative. A new housing estate has been built in St. Mary Mead and, as Gillian 
Gill observes, the countryside characters seem to “have been left behind by life and watch help-
lessly as the fabric of their house and their lives falls in pieces about them” (199).
3 Analogously, Christine A. Jackson argues that the “confrontation between the sleuth and vil-
Sándor Klapcsik
• 250 •
In Christie’s Crooked House, everybody would prefer the young second wife, 
the stepmother Brenda, to become the pharmakos or the murderer. A member 
of the family openly reveals that the incident “won’t matter—as long as the right 
person killed him” (18). The narrator/detective/Watson-figure also experiences 
the effects of sacrificial rite when he admits that “the Crooked House was having 
its effects upon me also. I, too, wanted to find, not the true solution, but the 
solution that suited me best” (190). A servant, a foreigner, an insane stepmother 
or stepchild would be the ideal culprit who would suit the family the most, mak-
ing it possible for them to start a new order of spotless innocence. 
In Crooked House, the family’s wish does not come true, and the dénouement 
is hardly reassuring when a juvenile family member turns out to be the mur-
derer. In other novels—Ordeal by Innocence, Appointment with Death (1938), 
4.50 from Paddington—the family can start the new era without losing their 
innocence, since the culprit turns out to be an outsider. But no matter what it 
takes, finding any kind of murderer is still better than lacking the solution. 
Therefore, the murder in Christie’s stories usually does not entail a gruesome 
act; in fact, the murder becomes, quoting Frye, “an ironic game”, as the reader 
is hardly shocked even by the sometimes gory details of the case: “we read mur-
der stories with a strong sense of the unreality of the villainy involved” (AC 47). 
The reader is distanced from the physical effects of the homicide because the 
case becomes a formula and metaphor for a mythical journey or social ritual. 
Another Christie novel, Ordeal by Innocence, also emphasizes that the old 
order and hierarchical relations of the family come to an end with the murder. 
The new order commences only after the characters go through a mourning 
period, that is, the temporary era of the investigation. The characters live in 
tranquility after the arrest, indictment and death of the son “Jacko”, who was 
found guilty of the murder of the tyrannical stepmother. However, two years 
later an unexpected outsider named Arthur Calgary turns up, reveals the alibi 
for Jack Argyle and proves his innocence, which is accepted with little delight 
in the family. Calgary subverts the stable relationships of the family that were 
formed after the alleged murderer—the perfect scapegoat, the mentally unstable 
stepson—had been found guilty, and so he creates the situation of “anti-struc-
ture” (Turner 28). 
Until the new murderer is found, the family needs to go through a second 
lain… takes on the scapegoat ritual significance… [when t]he investigation, a search for the 
aberrant personality, can be seen as a ritual hunt to override the original murder. The detective 
goes after the criminal, the one who committed the murder and lied to cover it up. In doing so, 
the sleuth may commit a similar kind of murder, but we condone this taboo, because the killing 
is an act of nature, a cleansing of the culture” (16).
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unpleasant liminal period—their first liminal period having taken place between 
the murder and the indictment of “Jacko”. During this time, the faces are masked 
and the social positions are flexible, since the family members try to define their 
own and other’s roles, positions and duties. As Christie’s characters often wear 
masks to hide their real nature, the stories evoke Mikhail Bakhtin’s carnival, a 
festivity that “marked the suspension of all hierarchical rank, privileges, norms 
and prohibitions” (10). 
In Bakhtin’s description, the medieval carnival functioned as an intermediary 
phase of ambivalence, a playful period of reversed hierarchies and “temporary 
liberation” from the social order: “Carnival was the true feast of time, the feast 
of becoming, change, and renewal” (10). Turner characterizes liminality analo-
gously: liminality forms a playful “weird domain” in space and time, in which 
“ordinary regularities of kinship… are set aside, where the bizarre becomes nor-
mal, and where… [the participants] are induced to think, and think hard, about 
cultural experiences they had hitherto taken for granted” (27, 42; see also Klapc-
sik 44-46). 
Ordeal by Innocence candidly describes this carnivalesque liminal situation 
when a character says: 
I just don’t know. … I’m frightened of everybody. It’s as though behind each face there 
was another face. A – sinister sort of face that I don’t know. I don’t feel sure that 
Father’s Father, and Kirsten keeps saying that I shouldn’t trust anybody – not even 
her. And I look at Mary and I feel I don’t know anything about her. And Gwenda – 
I’ve always liked Gwenda. But now I’m not sure about Gwenda anymore. I see her as 
somebody different, ruthless and – and revengeful. I don’t know what anybody’s like. 
(148; emphasis added)
One can, of course, realize here without difficulty that the Bakhtinian joyful 
laughter of the carnivalesque crowd is entirely missing in Christie’s fictional 
family. Instead, the characters undergo a painful and enforced situation and 
they rather experience the mask in its relatively modern “Romantic” form, which 
“is stripped of its original richness and acquires other meanings alien to its 
primitive nature: now the mask hides something, keeps a secret, deceives. Such 
a meaning would not be possible as long as the mask functioned within folk cul-
ture’s organic whole. The Romantic mask loses almost entirely its generating and 
renewing element and acquires a somber hue. A terrible vacuum, a nothingness 
lurks behind it” (Bakhtin 40). 
The stressful and obligatory nature of the family’s temporary period corre-
sponds with Turner’s liminal stage, which differs from the carnival in the sense 
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that “the carnival is unlike a tribal ritual in that it can be attended or avoided, 
performed or merely watched, at will… To the contrary, in tribal ritual even the 
normally orderly, meek and ‘law-abiding’ people would be obliged to be disor-
derly in key rituals” (Turner 43; emphasis in original). Frye also states that in 
the majority of ritual journeys “the journey is seldom regarded as a good thing 
in itself. It is undertaken because it must be: if the journey is a metaphor for life, 
life has to be followed to the end” (1990, 221). 
The chaotic interlude, the transitory period without patriarchal rule and hier-
archy, repels and frightens the family members in Ordeal by Innocence, who 
would otherwise gladly follow community rules and maintain the established 
social structure and family hierarchy. The behavior of such characters fore-
grounds a major contradiction in detective fiction: the genre presumes and por-
trays desire for a stable social structure and hierarchical order, but the murder 
and the following investigation necessitates and embodies a liminal stage, a 
disturbing intermission in the rule of rationality and that of financial or feudal 
hierarchy. Thus, for a short period the shocking or supernatural becomes believ-
able and even a butler or a ghost can be suspected of the murder of a wealthy 
and noble victim. 
Eventually, of course, social stability returns and the reader realizes that it 
was neither a ghost nor the butler who had murdered the master of the house. 
Analyzing The Murder at the Vicarage, Mezei also underlines the recurrence of 
order in Christie’s fiction: “[a]lthough positions of power have been temporarily 
altered or undermined… the veils of tradition and authority once more descend 
over the households” (116). 
Such works by Christie closely resemble Frye’s comedies, which are centered 
around the rebirth or “the integration of the society… idealizing a simplified life 
in the country” (AC 43).4 The purpose of the detective in these novels is to 
reinstate a situation that “the audience has recognized all along to be the prop-
er and desirable state of affairs” (164). After the characters endure the ordeal of 
the murder case, the ritual of liminality and that of the pharmakos, they regain 
a stable identity and power structure, and they can return to a structured and 
hierarchical society. As Shaw and Vanacker observe, “a more secure world than 
ever before is created because the truth about everyone has been ascertained 
4 Both novels are set in an English country house where the peace, simplicity, lucidity, and order 
of innocent rural life forms a sharp contrast with the brutality and opacity of murder. As Julian 
Symons argues, “the most satisfying detective stories are those set in idyllic and preferably rural 
conditions”, because in this environment the corpse appears shockingly out of place (15; see 
also Klapcsik 39).
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and any unease and doubt has been located and expelled in the figure of the 
murderer” (21). 
When the new order is instated, a stabilized social life commences, in a way 
similar to traditional comedies. What Frye says about comedies may equally well 
apply to Christie’s stories: the events cause “a new society to crystallize around 
the hero… The appearance of this new society is frequently signalized by some 
kind of party or festive ritual,” and so “[w]eddings are most common, and some-
times… many of them occur” at the end of the play or story (AC 163). Crooked 
House ends with the realizations of the marriage plans between Charles Hay-
ward and Sophia Leonides; in Ordeal by Innocence, two couples split up during 
the investigation process (Leo Argyle and Gwenda Vaughan separate temporar-
ily, whilst the relationship of Hester Argyle and Dr Craig dissolves permanent-
ly) but a new relationship between Michael and Tina Argyle is formed. Further-
more, almost all Christie novels end with sudden engagements, new romantic 
relationships or definite marriage plans. 
To sum up, the investigation process in Christie’s Crooked House and Ordeal 
by Innocence manifests Turner’s rite of passage and Frye’s circular or spiral 
journeys in that the initial status quo in the family and British society is tempo-
rarily questioned and disrupted, but, eventually regained, the hierarchy becomes 
even stronger and presumably uncontested for good. Christie’s other works differ 
from these novels in several aspects—she is, of course, famous for her genre 
innovations and subversive narrative techniques—but, at least in those cases 
where the head of the family is the murder victim, they tend to follow the pattern 
described here to a greater or lesser degree. For example, in Five Little Pigs 
(1942), Poirot needs to solve a mystery sixteen years after the murder of Amyas 
Crale and so the investigation process differs from the liminal stage in the sense 
that seemingly everyone has forgotten about and overcome the consequences of 
the murder. And yet, Poirot investigates because the daughter of the alleged 
murderer and the victim, Carla Lemarchant, is engaged to be married but she is 
afraid that her fiancé might suspect her of murderous tendencies. Poirot needs 
to metaphorically travel back in time to find the culprit before the new family 
and social structure can commence, in a way similar to the novel Elephants Can 
Remember (1972), where Celia Ravenscroft’s forthcoming marriage is in danger 
because of an unsolved mystery from the past. Needless to say, Poirot reveals 
the actual murderer in both cases and the wedding can eventually take place in 
both novels. 
Thus, Christie’s works often manifest the temporary and re-constitutive 
nature of liminality and the mythical journey: such events “invert but do not 
usually subvert the status quo, the structural form, of society; reversal underlines 
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to the members of the community that chaos is the alternative to cosmos, so 
they’d better stick to the cosmos, i.e., the traditional order of culture” (Turner 
41).5 In other words, the evoked and then eliminated doubts reinforce the tra-
ditional world order: the provisional uncertainties liberate the reader from the 
monotony that derives from the rigidity and predictability in the fictional uni-
verse of detective fiction. 
Works Cited
Bakhtin, Mikhail. Rabelais and His World. Trans. Helene Iswolsky. Blooming-
ton: Indiana UP, 1984.
Bourdieu, Pierre. “Rites of Institution.” Language and Symbolic Power. Cam-
bridge: Harvard UP, 1991. 117-126. 
Brooks, Peter. Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative. Cam-
bridge: Harvard UP, 1992. 
Christie, Agatha. Crooked House. London: HarperCollins, 2008. 
–––. Elephants Can Remember. London: HarperCollins, 2002.
–––. Five Little Pigs. London: HarperCollins, 2001. 
–––. The Mirror Crack’d from Side to Side. London: HarperCollins, 2011.
–––. The Murder at the Vicarage. London: HarperCollins, 2011.
–––. Ordeal by Innocence. Glasgow: Fontana Books, 1963. 
–––. Third Girl. London. HarperCollins, 2009.
–––. “The Tuesday Night Club.” The Thirteen Problems. London: Collins, 1981. 
7-18.
Derrida, Jacques. Positions. Trans. Alan Bass. London: Athlone, 1987. 
Frye, Northrop. Anatomy of Criticism. Four Essays. Princeton: Princeton UP, 
1973. 
–––. “The Journey as Metaphor.” Myth and Metaphor: Selected Essays. Char-
lottesville: UP of Virginia, 1990. 212-26.
Gill, Gillian. Agatha Christie. The Woman and Her Mysteries. New York: The 
Free Press, 1990. 
5 Pierre Bourdieu’s complex criticism of Turner’s theory further emphasizes the re-constitutive 
and discriminatory nature of the rite-of-passage and liminality. Bourdieu claims that Turner’s 
ideas rather conceal “one of the essential effects of rites, namely that of separating those who 
have undergone it, not from those who have not yet undergone it, but from those who will not 
undergo it in any sense, and thereby instituting a lasting difference between those to whom the 
rite pertain and those to whom it does not pertain” (117). 
Mythical Journeys in Agatha Christie’s Crooked House and Ordeal by Innocence
• 255 •
Jackson, Christine A. Myth and Ritual in Women’s Detective Fiction. Jefferson: 
McFarland, 2002. 
Klapcsik, Sandor. Liminality in Fantastic Fiction. A Poststructuralist Approach. 
Jefferson: McFarland, 2012. 
Knight, Stephen. Crime Fiction, 1800–1900. Detection, Death, Diversity. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
Mezei, Kathy. “Spinsters, Surveillance and Speech: The Case of Miss Marple, 
Miss Mole, and Miss Jekyll.” Journal of Modern Literature 30.2 (2007): 103-20. 
Moretti, Franco. “Clues.” Signs Taken for Wonders: Essays in the Sociology of 
Literary Forms. London: Verso, 1983. 130-56. 
Muller, John P. and William J. Richardson, eds. The Purloined Poe: Lacan, Der-
rida, and Psychoanalytic Reading. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1988.
Nikolajeva, Maria. “Children’s Literature as a Cultural Code: A Semiotic 
Approach to History.” Aspects and Issues in the History of Children’s Litera-
ture. Ed. Maria Nikolajeva. Westport: Greenwood, 1995. 39-49. 
Propp, Vladimir. Morphology of the Folktale: Second Edition. Austin: U of Texas 
P, 1968.
Shaw, Marion, and Sabine Vanacker. Reflecting on Miss Marple. New York: Rout-
ledge, 1991.
Symons, Julian. Bloody Murder. From the Detective Story to the Crime Novel: a 
History. London: Faber, 1972.
Todorov, Tzvetan. “The Typology of Detective Fiction”. The Poetics of Prose. 
Trans. Richard Howard. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1977. 42-52. 
Turner, Victor. “Liminal to Liminoid, in Play, Flow, Ritual. An Essay in Com-
parative Symbology.” From Ritual to Theatre. The Human Seriousness of Play. 




FRYE AND THE MUSICAL POET
It is a well-known fact that Frye was a lover of music to the point that he consid-
ered it an “alternative career”. Yet, the role of music has been left largely unex-
plored in the conceptual framework of his literary theory (Bogdan 57). Perhaps 
for the same reason, his preoccupation with Milton had never enjoyed such emi-
nence as his writings on Blake, because it is in terms of music and musical poetry 
that the importance of Milton to Frye stands out (Fletcher 750–1). Hence, my 
aim is to explore how Frye’s knowledge of music, and his theoretical use of musi-
cal form—particularly in his exposition of epos—sheds new light on Milton’s 
Paradise Lost and can, therefore, contribute to the recently rekindled debate 
among Milton scholars about the oral/aural significance of Milton’s poems.
Revisiting Frye’s notions on music in poetry in connection with Milton stud-
ies seems particularly relevant in light of the obsession the majority of Milton’s 
scholars bestow upon the poet’s thought and thought only.  Beverley Sherry—
who has recently been expounding benevolent possibilities lying dormant in T. 
S. Eliot’s legacy to Milton studies (see 2010 and 2010a) encapsulates this obses-
sion in an introduction to John K. Hale’s Milton as Multilingual as follows:
In the past sixty years, since the work of, say, C. S. Lewis, Rosemond Tuve, Arnold 
Stein, F. T. Prince, Frank Kermode, Joseph Summers, Christopher Ricks, there has 
been a general move away from formalist study, which includes verbal criticism, to-
wards an emphasis on Milton’s thought—moral, religious, philosophical, and political. 
This development has overtaken the close study of Milton’s handling of words, result-
ing in a neglect of his minutely sensitive and endlessly creative genius with decorum, 
which remained for him “the grand master peece to observe”. (17)
Stanely Fish too, in his article “Why Milton Matters; or, Against Historicism” 
(2005) criticizes the current trend in Milton studies, echoing Ellen Rooney’s 
concern that “once the category of form has been attenuated every text is reduced 
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‘to its ideological and historical context’ and ‘reading has been displaced by a 
project of sorting by theme’”. Milton scholars, says Fish, “pick up the stick from 
the wrong end”, and proceeds to use the stick to rap them for their practice of 
historical criticism and for forgetting that criticism focusing on aesthetic form 
“is no less historical than any other” because, he adds, “literary forms are, more 
often than not, their vehicles [i.e. of social and political concerns]”. (8)
It is quite interesting that despite the similarity of their assessment, Sherry 
singles out Fish’s How Milton Works—albeit in a footnote—as “typical in its 
minimal concern for the way Milton works with formal elements of writing” 
(Hale 17n11). But instead of delving into this curiosity further, I will presently 
heed Sherry’s advice, although with a twist: instead of reassessing “a poet-critic 
[Eliot] who heard Milton” (Sherry 2010a, 35), I will revisit a critic with a keen 
ear for Milton who considered Eliot a “must read”(Frye 2010, 183), and thus 
echoed many of Eliot’s observations on Milton’s aural prowess, yet did so with-
out Eliot’s anti-Miltonic sentiments.1 
According to Warkentin, Frye’s notions on music in literature grew out of a 
student essay focusing on Robert Browning, which he wrote as an undergradu-
ate in 1932–3 (Frye 2006, 9). Published in the University of Toronto Quarterly 
1 Eliot’s earliest remarks on Milton are from his 1919 essay on Marlowe and his two 1921 studies 
on the Metaphysical poets, Marvell and Donne (Eliot 1934, 118–125, 281–304). However, his 
most substantial treatment of Milton is the essay “A Note on Milton’s Verse” published in Essays 
and Studies (1936) and his lecture on Milton to the British Academy (1947). The essay and the 
lecture were entitled “Milton I” and “Milton II” respectively and published in Eliot’s collec-
tion, On Poetry and Poets(1957). [I had recourse to these texts in Kermode’s edition of Eliot’s 
essays (Eliot 1980) and in an online edition of Eliot’s Milton: Two Studies (1968), and choose to 
cite the latter as it provides a more complete text.] The gist of Eliot’s complaint against Milton 
is that “the sensuous effect of [his] verses is entirely on the ear” (11). Milton’s syntax, which 
Eliot considered to be primarily of musical significance and not beneficial to the development 
of thoughts, confirmed his theory of the “dissociation of sensibility”, namely, that in England 
there occurred in the seventeenth century a dislocation of thought and feeling for which Eliot 
blamed Milton and Dryden (33). In Eliot’s view, Milton, though a great poet, “could only be an 
influence for the worse, upon any poet whatsoever” (31; Frye 2010, 193). The attack initiated by 
Eliot, was abetted by Ezra Pound in a 1934 diatribe against “the gross and utter stupidity and 
obtuseness of Milton” ( 103), which had been influenced by Middleton Murry, and lent aca-
demic force by A. J. A. Waldock and F. R. Leavis, to whom Milton exhibited “certain sensuous 
poverty” (Leavis 47) and “a feeling for words rather than capacity for feeling through words” 
(51). The ensuing “Milton controversy “was termed by James Thorpe “a unique phenomenon in 
the history of literary criticism” (19). For an overview of Eliot’s criticism covering 1919–1947 
see Bollier (165–192). For a larger-scope study of the twentieth century’s “Milton Controversy”, 
tracing it back even to Milton’s earliest critics, see Bergonzi (162–180). See also Ricks, especially 
pages 1–21. Frye, reflecting on the persistence of anti-Miltonic and anti-Romantic sentiments 
in his contemporaries, claimed that Pound’s [and presumably Eliot’s] depreciation of Milton’s 
achievement “should not be taken today as a serious dictum […] but as a quite funny parody of 
the sort of pedantic nonsense that historicism unchecked by taste will fall into” (2010, 101–2).
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in 1942 (11:2, 167–79) under the title “Music in Poetry”, it was Frye’s first major 
piece of critical writing, and a significant one too, for its major tenets were 
incorporated in a systematic discourse on genres in his seminal Anatomy of 
Criticism in 1957. For this reason, I will mostly have recourse to the latter work 
when referencing his interpretation of melos and (to a lesser degree) opsis in 
literature and how these affect our reading and understanding of Milton.
According to Frye, literature predominantly “appeals to the ear, and so par-
takes of the nature of music”, however, it also appeals to the (inner) eye, thus 
partaking of the nature of the visual/spatial arts too (2000, 244). Depending on 
the inclination and technical skill of the individual poet, one will either empha-
size the melos, the musicality of the work, or the opsis, the spectacle of the same, 
although in Frye’s reading this too will turn out to be predominantly an aural 
quality. In both instances, Frye is adamant to distinguish the technical, Aristo-
telian meaning of the two terms from their sentimental applications. Musical 
poetry, claims Frye, is “poetry which resembles in its structure the music con-
temporary with it”; this technical use of the word musical is at odds with the 
sentimental use that calls “any poetry musical if it sounds nice” (255). He blames 
this sentimental use on a misconception of the word “harmony”, that is, applying 
its common sense meaning to the one pertaining to music, and in the initial 
essay even blames Milton (though indirectly) for it:
The ancient doctrine that the music of the spheres was a harmony is perhaps the old-
est source of this confusion. In At a Solemn Musick, Milton makes the discordant 
music of earth the symbol of the life of fallen man: in heaven there will be “perfect 
Diapason”, which in terms of music we know means spending all eternity on one note. 
(Frye 2006, 13)
As he elaborates further in the Anatomy of Criticism, “[i]n this figurative sense of 
the word harmony, music is not a sequence of harmonies at all, but a sequence of 
discords ending in harmony, the only stable and permanent ‘harmony’ in music 
being the final resolving tonic chord” (256). He goes into a more technical elabo-
ration in “Music in Poetry”, wherein his blaming reference to Milton seems quite 
quixotic and paradoxical because just a couple of lines later he quotes two lines 
from Milton’s L’Allegro (143–4) as a proper definition of music as such.2 It is also 
somewhat disappointing from a Miltonist point of view that Frye does not refer-
2 “Music is not a sequence of harmonies: the word ‘harmony’ in music ought always to be in 
inverted commas. Music is a sequence of discords ending in harmony… In other words music 
is a process of ‘Untwisting all the chains that tie / the hidden soul of harmony’” (2006, 11).
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ence the “regular / [..] when most irregular” dance of the angels,3 when clarifying 
that the music most closely analogous to extended poetry in continuous metre is 
“music in its more extended instrumental forms, in which the organizing rhythm 
has descended more directly from dance than from song” (255).
Disappointing as this omission might be, it is nevertheless understandable 
since Frye’s study on musical poetry is not a case study—as one might term 
Eliot’s study on Milton—but a general attempt at a theory/rhetoric of genres. 
However, whenever Frye references Milton, he does so in terms reminiscent of 
Eliot. Thus, he claims that “Milton must be read with a myopic eye and a keen 
ear” (2006, 20). In Eliot’s words, Paradise Lost exerts a “peculiar demand for a 
readjustment of the reader’s mode of apprehension” in which emphasis is “on 
the sound, not the vision, upon the word, not the idea” (1968, 41). One should, 
however, quickly add that it is not emphasis on a single word that Eliot is refer-
ring to, but a string of words. As he notes, “Milton’s verse is especially refrac-
tory to yielding up its secrets to examination of the single line” or the single 
word for that matter (42). The unit of Milton’s verse is “the period, the sentence 
and still more the paragraph” for “[i]t is only in the period that the wavelength 
of Milton’s verse is to be found” (42). Frye concurs when he states that musical 
diction “employs a long cumulative rhythm sweeping the lines up into larger 
rhythmical units such as the paragraph”,4 listing two additional features: the 
irregularity of its metre and the heavy reliance on enjambment (2000, 257). It is 
here that he references Milton as employing the word musical in its proper sense: 
“When Milton says that rhymed heroic verse is ‘of no true musical delight’, 
because musical poetry must have ‘the sense variously drawn out from one verse 
into another’, he is using the word musical in its technical sense” (257).
Let us, therefore, take a look at one of those “wavelength”, paragraph-long 
passages of Milton’s Paradise Lost that particularly exemplifies the features Frye 
associates with musical poetry: “sharp barking accents, crabbed and obscure 
language, mouthfuls of consonants and the bite and grip of many monosyllables” 
(2006, 12). The passage in question describes bands of fallen angels bent on 
discovering their new dismal world in Hell:
3 “Mystical dance, which yonder starrie Spheare / Of Planets and of fixt in all her Wheeles / 
Resembles nearest, mazes intricate, / Eccentric, intervolv’d, yet regular / Then most when most 
irregular they seem, / And in thir motions harmonie Divine / So smooths her charming tones, 
that Gods own ear / Listens delighted” (PL 5.620–7).
4 Similarly, C. S. Lewis writes in A Preface to Paradise Lost: “We must not be allowed to settle 
down at the end of each sentence. Even the fuller pause at the end of a paragraph must be felt as 
we feel a pause in a piece of music, where the silence is part of the music, and not as we feel the 
pause between one item of a concert and the next” (45). Note that Lewis too puts an emphasis 
on sensing Milton’s larger, epic units, implying hearing in his reference to musical pause.
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… Thus roving on
In confus’d march forlorn, th’ adventurous Bands
With shuddring horror pale, and eyes agast
View’d first thir lamentable lot, and found
No rest: through many a dark and drearie Vaile
They pass’d, and many a Region dolorous,
O’er many a Frozen, many a fierie Alpe,
Rocks, Caves, Lakes, Fens, Bogs, Dens, and shades of death,
A Universe of death, which God by curse
Created evil, for evil only good,
Where all life dies, death lives, and Nature breeds,
Perverse, all monstrous, all prodigious things,
Abominable, inutterable, and worse
Than Fables yet have feign’d, or fear conceiv’d,
Gorgons and Hydras, and Chimeras dire.  (2.614–628)
The predicament of the devils, their inability to find rest in this “Region dolor-
ous”, is highlighted by the “bite and grip” and rapid succession of many monosyl-
lables (“Rocks, Caves, Lakes, Fens, Bogs, Dens…”) emphasizing both the debased 
nature of the variety offered in Hell and the musical experience of reading the 
passage. In addition, as a monosyllable “always demands a separate accent, how-
ever slight” (Frye 2000, 261), the accumulated stress of the monosyllabic line 
makes “the reading of Hell analogous to exploring it” (Forsyth 204), as the pas-
sage describing Satan’s flight across Chaos recreates in reading the turbulent 
bumpiness of his course: “Ore bog or steep, through strait, rough, dense, or 
rare, / With head, hands, wings, or feet pursues his way, / And swims or sinks, 
or wades, or creeps, or flyes” (2.948–950).
The previous passage also reveals some slight discrepancy between Eliot’s and 
Frye’s assessment of Milton’s verse, and the eventually impossible task of distin-
guishing between the working of melos and opsis in the technical use of the 
terms Frye prefers.
Eliot, who persistently emphasizes the limitation of Milton’s visual powers, is 
somewhat relenting when it comes to “imagery suggestive of vast size, limitless 
space, abysmal depth, and light and darkness” for this he considers “the kind of 
imagery in which he [Milton] excelled, or made less demand upon the powers of 
visual imagination which were in him defective” (1968, 40). An observation that 
might be justified in theological terms, as Milton applied the imagery described 
by Eliot predominantly to scenes of Hell and its horrors, thus, emphasizing the 
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visual nature of the Fall, while contrasting it with the aural nature of faith and 
Eden.5 And while for Eliot Milton excelled in depicting Hell, Frye claims that 
“[t]he musical, or cacophonous, diction is better fitted for the grotesque and 
horrible, or for invective and abuse” (2006, 12; 2000, 256–7), yet again evoking 
Milton’s Hell, the epitome of grotesque and horrible but not in a pictorial sense. 
For indeed, despite the multitude of words displayed in the passage we get no 
sense of what the devils see in particular; it is rather the sense of what they feel 
while seeing it that we gather. Not only cannot the devils find rest, the reader 
too is denied a rest and is particularly out of breath by the time s/he reaches the 
period of Milton’s paragraph. In the passage Milton makes the most out of the 
structure and texture of English, particularly with the cluster of monosyllables 
that accentuate, as Milton’s schoolmaster would say, “heaviness and 
slowness”(Jones 238). Another contemporary of Milton, Richard Flecknoe in his 
Miscellania (1653), claims that the unpopularity of English in Europe is due to 
“its monosyllables, and short snapping words […] which render the sound harsh 
and unpleasant unto Strangers ears… render[ing] it ragged and disjointed” (Jones 
238n6), a description perfectly corresponding to the ragged bands of Milton’s 
fallen angels “in confus’d march forlorn”. And yet, does the impossibility to 
visualize Milton’s sonorous description of the devil’s exploration render this 
passage devoid of opsis? 
As it turns out, what Frye consider analogous to opsis in its technical, true sense 
is the rhetorical device of onomatopoeia, i.e. of imitative harmony, and quotes from 
Pope’s Essay on Criticism to describe and exemplify the phenomenon:
‘Tis not enough no harshness gives offence,
The sound must seem an echo to the sense…
When Ajax strives some rock’s vast weight to throw,
The line too labours, and the words move slow;
Not so, when swift Camilla scours the plain,
Flies o’er th’ unbending corn, and skims along the main.
(Frye 2000, 258)
So, for Frye opsis basically boils down to sound-effects that correspond with the 
sense of the words in the poem, much like in the passages from Paradise Lost 
5 E.g. Milton stresses the role visual perception has in the Fall when describing Eve’s reaction 
to Satan’s reasoning in the temptation scene of Book 9: “Fixt on the Fruit she gaz’d, which to 
behold / Might tempt alone [..] / […] which with desire […] Sollicited her longing eye” (9.735–736, 
741, 743). Also in Eve’s musing to herself, paraphrasing Gen 3:6 (cf. 1Jn 2:16): “Here grows the 




I have quoted.6 English, according to Frye, excels in imitative harmonies and, 
although, some of them inevitably get lost with the passage of time, new ones are 
perpetually being “recreated in colloquial speech” which is itself, if good, termed 
“picturesque” or “colourful” (259). Consequently, the difference between melos 
and opsis is not based on the sensory effect they create, since both are elements 
of poetry (literature) and as such primarily appeal to the ear (243–244). Nor do 
they seem to work by mutual exclusion but in a complementary way: the passage 
in mention employs both melos and opsis, thus, both contributed to the most 
valued and often cited strength of Milton’s Paradise Lost, namely, its kinetic 
effect on the reader. A further telling example of this effect is, still within Book 
2, when Sin opens the Gate of Hell and before her, Satan and Death “in sudden 
view appear / The secrets of the hoarie deep” (2.890–891). Yet again, the reader 
has no access to their “view” in terms of visual description, for everything Milton 
lists defies visual imagination and references sound instead:
[…] a dark
Illimitable Ocean without bound,
Without dimension, where length, breath, & highth,
And time and place are lost; where eldest Night
And Chaos, Ancestors of Nature, hold
Eternal Anarchie, amidst the noise
Of endless Warrs, and by confusion stand.
For hot, cold, moist, and dry, four Champions fierce
Strive here for Maistrie, and to Battel bring
Thir embryon Atoms; they around the flag
Of each his Faction, in thir several Clanns,
Light-arm’d or heavy, sharp, smooth, swift or slow,
Swarm populous, unnumber’d as the Sands
Of Barca or Cyrene’s torrid soil,
Levied to side with warring Winds, and poise
Thir lighter wings. To whom these most adhere,
6 The opsis in this sense is even more pronounced if we consider that the adjectives in the passage 
under consideration (PL 2.614–628) are dominated by the sound of R: dark, drearie, dolorous, 
frozen, fierie, perverse, monstrous, prodigious, inutterable, worse; even the prodigies imported 
from classical antiquity resound with R’s: Gorgons, Hydras, Chimeras. According to John 
Aubrey (1626–1697), Milton “pronounced the letter R very hard” (Hughes 1023). In a parenthe-
sis Aubrey refers to R as the litera canina (i.e. the canine letter), so the hard pronunciation of 
R might sound something like a growl, or a snarl. Read in such an onomatopoeic manner, the 
passage almost creates the sense of “wailing and gnashing of teeth”—a recurring figure in the 
gospel of Matthew to describe the anguish of the damned (see also PL 6.339–343 of Satan).
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Hee rules a moment; Chaos Umpire sits,
And by decision more imbroiles the fray
By which he Reigns…   (2.891–909)
The invocation of a battle scene with the notion of armies grouped around flags, 
in clans according to their light or heavy armoury only serves to highlight the 
futility of our attempt to imagine such a scene (for picturing it would entail a 
sort of ordering, especially in a martial scene like this). What we get instead is 
anarchy, in which we cannot make head or tail of an army of such insubstantial 
champions as hot, cold, moist, and dry (monosyllables again). Like the victory 
of the elements and their “embryon Atoms” it is but for a moment that we get 
an image, only to discard it in the following moment. As on torrid soil, we get 
no solid footing and we stand in confusion if we stand at all.
It is at the brink of this abyss that Satan pauses, lingering and postponing his 
flight:
… Into this wilde Abyss,
The Womb of nature and perhaps her Grave
Of neither Sea, nor Shore, nor Air, nor Fire,
But all these in thir pregnant causes mixt
Confus’dly, and which thus must ever fight,
Unless th’ Almighty Maker them ordain
His dark materials to create more Worlds,
Into this wild Abyss the warie fiend
Stood on the brink of Hell and look’d a while,
Pondering his Voyage…   (2.910–919)
The eighteenth-century commentator, Jonathan Richardson lauds this passage as 
“very Artfull!” for in it “the Poet Himself seems to be Doing what he Describes, 
for the Period begins at 910. Then he goes not On Directly but Lingers, giving 
an Idea of Chaos before he Enters into it” (81). But Milton is not merely artful 
in postponing our initial anticipation of Satan’s flight or jump “into this wilde 
Abyss” for the reader’s expectation is thwarted yet again at the repetition of 
“into this wilde Abyss” as “the warie fiend” merely “stood on the brink of Hell 
and look’d a while / Pondering his Voyage”. It is ten lines later that he will actu-
ally spread “his Sail-broad Vannes” for flight and spurn the ground (2.927–929). 
Again, the kinetic effect, making the reader experience rather than picture what 
the poet describes is achieved by the long cumulative rhythm of the paragraph 
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long passage, which, to reiterate my point, is characteristic of musical diction 
according to Frye.
In conclusion, I wish to bring up a point in Frye’s argument with which I 
strongly disagree. When identifying the “radical of presentation” as the basis of 
generic distinction—“in the sense that the genre is determined by the conditions 
established between the poet and his public” (2000, 247)—and acknowledging 
that certain works might have more than one radical of presentation connected 
to it, he makes the following remark on Milton 
Milton, for example, seems to have no ideal of reciter and audience in mind for Para-
dise Lost; he seems content to leave it, in practice, a poem to be read in a book. When 
he uses the convention of invocation, thus bringing the poem into the genre of the 
spoken word, the significance of the convention is [merely] to indicate what tradition 
his work primarily belongs to and what its closes affinities are with. (247)
For Frye, Milton’s Paradise Lost is an epic and not an epos, a difference he main-
tains throughout his essay, using the word epos “to describe works in which the 
radical of presentation is oral address” (i.e. “poems intended to be recited”) and 
using the word epic “for its customary use as the name of the form of the Iliad, 
Odyssey, Aeneid and Paradise Lost” or, in other words, “epics of the conventional 
jumbo size” and therefore, one assumes, not convenient for recital (248). And 
yet, as Walter J. Ong claims, “In all the wonderful worlds that writing opens, the 
spoken word still resides and lives. Written texts all have to be related somehow, 
directly or indirectly, to the world of sound, the natural habitat of language, 
to yield their meaning” (8)7. This is especially true when considering Renais-
sance texts, Milton’s included. We need to remember, Neil Rhodes urges, that 
Renaissance culture “was still highly oral in character, where reading aloud was 
common, and where sound effects were as important in the reception of poetry 
as they would have been in the more obviously spoken forms of drama, sermon 
and oratory” (32). As Milton scholars, we need to remember this not merely to 
retrieve “a vital element […] of cultural history” marginalized with the rejec-
tion of formalism in favour of historicism in the 1980s (ibid.), but because of 
the growing popularity of Milton marathons, that is, the public reading aloud 
of Milton’s works (mostly Paradise Lost). These marathons are gaining world-
7 As a matter of fact, in an attempt to come up with an alternative to the anachronistic and self-
contradictory term, “oral literature”, Ong himself, in his seminal study, adapts Frye’s terminol-
ogy and opts to refer to all purely oral art as epos.
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wide momentum, performed within many academic communities and nowadays 
regularly reported on the Internet. 
Therefore, while disagreeing with Frye’s reductionist view of Paradise Lost’s 
radical of presentation, I do believe Frye’s theory of genre, and particularly his 
reintroduction of melos and opsis, can have an important part in readjusting our 
mode of apprehension of Milton, allowing the aural and oral features of his work 
to reenter the arenas of conflict of his thought. In Hale’s words, Paradise Lost is 
“oral in conception, execution and first reception; so why not also in present-day 
reception?” (17).
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NORTHROP FRYE, WILLIAM BLAKE  
AND THE ART OF TRANSLATION
I must create a System, or be enslav’d by another Man’s. 
William Blake. 
As far as we know, Northrop Frye did no study the theory of translation, nor 
did he practice it. It even seems he believed that “translation” of ideas and 
concepts is quite impossible—that “an intellectual and cultural synthesis that 
gets everything in and reconciles everyone with everyone else is an attempt 
to build a Tower of Babel, and will lead to confusion of utterance” (CW 11, 
200) Yet the interest in the history of literature and oriental culture inspired 
Northrop Frye and helped him understand and cultivate the art of interpre-
tation and recreation of ideas, particularly in his study Fearful Symmetry. 
Originally, I wanted to discuss the importance of Frye’s work for the translation 
profession and how it influenced my translation of his Anatomy of Criticism and 
William Blake’s Marriage of Heaven and Hell. But my concept changed on the 
day I arrived in Budapest when I decided to visit the Orthodox Synagogue in 
Kazinczy utca. The man who was selling the tickets at the front door suddenly 
decided to give me and five American tourists a guided tour. He started point-
ing to the items in the interior with excitement and explaining the history and 
importance of the place. But the language he spoke was an ultimate example of 
chaos: an English word here, a German phrase there, Hungarian padding every-
where. I liked it though: I did not understand the whole sentences, but somehow 
I knew what he was trying to say and what he meant. He was an interpreter from 
the hell of Babel, and yet he represented the heaven of deeper understanding.
In my mind, I started comparing this experience of chaos to the idea of order 
celebrated and promoted by Northrop Frye, comparing chaotic interpretation 
of the spoken now to systematic translation of the written then. I pondered on 
various views of translation. In his annotation to the English translation of 
Dante’s Inferno, William Blake wrote, “It appears to me that men are hired to 
run down the men of genius under the masks of translators” (1957, 413). Northrop 
Frye said: “Everyone concerned with language is aware of the extent to which 
reading a translation is a settling for the second best” (GC 4) So, what is the role 
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of the translator? Is she supposed to be a traitor? The master of confusion? An 
architect of another Tower of Babel? Or is she a competitor who will never win? 
An ambassador? A mediator? A re-creator of the original message?
When János Kenyeres in his inspiring lecture “Northrop Frye as Creative 
Writer” reminded me (again) of Northrop Frye’s Fearful Symmetry, all the piec-
es suddenly fell into place and my blurry ideas started to make sense. I realized 
that if Northrop Frye studied translation more deeply, he could see the realm of 
translation as a kind of 3D universe. The first dimension (“the world of memory 
[where] we see nothing”) would be vocabulary: the words and phrases the trans-
lator has to learn or look up in dictionaries. The second dimension (“the world 
of sight [where] we see what we have to see”) would be formed by grammar, 
syntax, and the rules we have to follow to make ourselves understood. The third 
dimension (“the world of vision [where] we see what we want to see”) would be 
the translator’s inspiration, enlightenment, insight, connection and relationship 
with the author, the art of translation (FS 33). An ideal world would also have 
the fourth dimension, time, not the time, which along with space, has “no abso-
lute existence” as perceived by our limited senses in this world of matter (Damon 
404), but eternity, when “we see things for what they really are” as if we had 
already “cleansed the doors of [our] perception” (Blake 1994, 36). Such an ideal 
world is an ambition and aspiration of most translators. Unfortunately, it’s only 
a dream—in reality, the translator’s time is only the Buddhist now. She drowns 
in the sea of meanings, forgets the associations and cannot reach the future. Now 
is the time when the translator sees what she can. That is probably why old 
translations always become obsolete and why the classic works of literature, 
including the Bible, are and have to be translated again and again. 
William Blake’s vision of translation seems to be bipolar, more of a 2D world. 
On the one hand, there is Heaven, Passivity, Reason represented by the Angels, 
interpreters, teachers, universities, and abbeys—the dimension of interpretation, 
explanation, and support. On the other hand, there is Hell, Activity, Energy, 
Creativity and passion represented by the Devils, prophets, poets—the dimen-
sion of provocation, questions, and emotions. C. S. Lewis, the author of The 
Great Divorce would have probably liked this polarity. But what about transla-
tors? Are they interpreters, aspiring poets or both? Perhaps we need the third 
dimension again, Limbo, “the region supposed to exist on the border of Hell”, 
the realm of ghosts who are not seen but who are present and powerful, ghosts 
with compassion who can reach both Heaven and Hell by entering their universe 
in time.
My own vision of translation seems to be bipolar, too. To me, the original is 
the work of a Poetic Genius, the creation of something out of nothing. Transla-
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tion is the work of an inspired ghost, the recreation of something out of some-
thing. If this reminds you of the Book of Genesis and the “beginning of begin-
nings”, it might not be a coincidence.
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A „BALLADISZTIKUS NOVELLA”  
MINT ARCHAIKUS TAPASZTALATOK MEGJELENÍTŐJE  
A MODERNSÉGBEN1*
A tizenkilencedik század második felének magyar irodalmában a novella sok új 
változata mellett egyben a ballada műfajából ismert témák, jegyek jelentek meg. 
A szakirodalom e forma balladával rokonítható jegyei miatt legtöbbször a „bal-
ladisztikus novella” vagy „balladás novella” terminussal illeti ezt a változatot. 
Ez az elnevezés azonban – ahogyan a századvég többi novellaváltozatának sza-
kirodalomban használt elnevezése is (pl. lírai, drámai novella) – problematikus, 
hiszen legtöbbször csak metaforikus értelemben használható. Sőt magának a 
műfajváltozatnak a megléte is tisztázatlan. Tanulmányomban e poétikai inter-
ferencia leírását, illetve a „balladisztikus novella” fogalmának újbóli értelmezését 
kísérelem meg.
A novella elmozdulása a ballada felé megtalálható több századvégi-század-
fordulós életműben is, pl. Mikszáth Kálmán vagy Tömörkény István elbeszélé-
seiben, de legmarkánsabban Petelei István rövidprózai írásaiban jelentkezik, 
ezért az irodalomkritika legtöbbször az ő írásinak elemzésekor vet fel kérdéseket 
a balladisztikus novellával kapcsolatban.
A ballada novellára gyakorolt hatására, az elbeszélésekben való jelenlétére a 
kritika már a kezdetektől felfigyelt. Ezt a századvég mértékadó kritikusa, Péterfy 
Jenő szellemében a tragikum iránti fogékonyság egy újabb megnyilatkozásának 
tekintették. Kozma Dezső Peteleiről szóló kismonográfiájában a székely népbal-
ladák megtermékenyítő hatását hangsúlyozta, és konkrét népballadák motívu-
mait mutatta ki elbeszéléseiben (32). Németh. G. Béla, akinek olvasata sokáig 
meghatározta az íróról való gondolkodói horizontot, a századvégi társadalmi 
viszonyok realista tükrözőjének, a „válságba jutott kisember” írójának tekintette 
Peteleit, s novelláinak elemzésekor főleg a lélekrajzra, a mélylélektanra helyezte 
1 A kutatás a TÁMOP 4.2.4.A/2-11-1-2012-0001 azonosító számú Nemzeti Kiválóság Pro-
gram – Hazai hallgatói, illetve kutatói személyi támogatást biztosító rendszer kidolgozása és 
működtetése országos program című kiemelt projekt keretében zajlott. A projekt az Európai 
Unió támogatásával, az Európai Szociális Alap társfinanszírozásával valósul meg.
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a hangsúlyt. Arany János hatását is felfedezte, amelyet a későbbiekben többféle 
szempontból értékeltek, főleg konkrétan, Arany műballadáival keresve a kapc-
solatot. De még ha Németh G. Béla esztétikai-értékelő szempontból értelmezte 
is az író életművét, megemlítette azt is, hogy Petelei „szereti az ősi toposzokat a 
maga világába helyezve újraformálni” 136). Többek közt Ophelia, Rómeó és Júlia, 
Don Quijote motívumait hozta fel példának. Györke Ildikó 1992-es tanul-
mányában a „balladaszerű novelláról” már mint létező, elfogadott novellatípus-
ról értekezik, Peteleit tartva e típus egyik megteremtőjének (27–39). Ballada és 
novella találkozási pontját főleg a tematikában látja, s csak a témához kapc-
solódónak az elbeszélés tudatos szerkesztését. A balladai téma jelenléte azonban 
nem elegendő ahhoz, hogy önálló novellatípust különítsünk el – ugyanannak a 
témának a felhasználása vagy ugyanannak a motívumnak a megjelenése 
önmagában nem jelenthet műfaji rokonságot. Dobos István novellatípusokkal 
foglalkozó monográfiájában tárgyalta a balladisztikus novella kategóriáját is 
(89–96). Felhívta a figyelmet arra, hogy a kritikatörténet már számos alkalom-
mal utalt ballada és novella rokonságára, főleg a századvég irodalmával kapcso-
latban. Szerinte azonban a ballada kompozíciója megvalósíthatatlan a novella 
formájában, ugyanakkor elismeri, hogy a századvégi novella különböző bal-
ladatípusok jellegzetességeit hasonította át (93). Petelei ilyen típusú elbeszéléseit 
ezért balladás hangulatú elbeszéléseknek nevezi. Novella és ballada mediális 
különbségét azonban oly mértékben véli különbözőnek, hogy elutasítja a bal-
ladisztikus novella kategóriáját. 
II. 
A balladisztikus novella mint az epika fikcióba váltása
Ahogy a recepciótörténet témához tartozó nagyon rövid felelevenítéséből 
kitűnik, a korábbi elemzések már sokat foglalkoztak ballada és novella sajátos 
ötvöződésével, de eddig még nem született kielégítő magyarázat kapcsolatukra 
a balladisztikus novellának nevezett formában. A klasszikus, Arisztotelész rend-
szerére épülő, azt továbbgondoló műfajtipológiák műnemi hármasságából kiin-
dulva a balladának már az elhelyezése is kétséges, hiszen az általánosan ismert 
megállapítás szerint is a ballada olyan verses formájú mű, amely epikus, drámai és 
lírai elemeket egyesít magában. A ballada azonban nem az arisztotelészi eredetű 
műfaji rendszer része – a magas irodalmiságtól elkülönülő orális költészet egyik 
formája lévén –, a benne található „lírai” és „drámai” jegyek elkülöníthetetlen 
részei, alkotóelemei. A novella műfaja ugyanakkor, bármelyik meghatározását 
vesszük is alapul, jellegzetesen a magas irodalmiság elbeszélő műfaja.
A „balladisztikus novella” mint archaikus tapasztalatok megjelenítője…
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Míg a hagyományos műfajelméleti megközelítés nem vezetett eredményre, 
Northrop Frye és a mítoszkritika eredményeit felhasználva új irányból 
közelíthetjük meg a kérdést. Frye eredményeit eddig még sem a balladisztikus 
novella műfajtipológiai vizsgálataiban, sem Petelei ilyen típusú elbeszéléseinek 
értelmezésében nem alkalmazták. A kritika anatómiája című munkájában Frye 
abból indul ki, hogy a műfajok kritikai elmélete jószerével Arisztotelész után 
megrekedt. Az antik irodalom nem osztályozta a prózai műveket, az elmúlt évs-
zázadok „új” műfajai viszont ezt szükségessé tennék. Frye az „epika” szót 
alkalmazza minden olyan műre, amelynek előadásformája szóbeli, ezáltal „az 
irodalom minden fajtáját jelenti, akár verses, akár prózai, amennyiben őrzi 
magában az élőszóbeli recitálással és a művet hallgató közönséggel kapcsolatos 
konvenció fenntartásának igényét” (209). Ez alapján minden olyan mű, amely 
megszólítja, elképzeli hallgatóközönségét: epika. A régi, archaikus módon 
működik, elmondja¸ nem pedig megírja a történetet. Az „epika” szót én is ilyen 
értelemben használom a továbbiakban.
A könyvnyomtatás megjelenése és elterjedése az irodalom új létmódját hozta 
létre. A közönséggel közvetlen kapcsolatot nem tartó nyomtatott irodalmi 
formákra Frye a fikció terminust használja. Ennek megfelelően a ballada az epika, 
a novella a fikció közegébe tartozik. A modern irodalmiság fő mediális jelleg-
zetessége, hogy esetében már nem beszélhetünk orális irodalmi kultúráról. Frye 
az irodalom létmódjának változását egy történeti példával illusztrálja: „A beszélő 
költő és az őt hallgató közönség közötti kapcsolat még valóságosan fennállhatott 
Homérosz vagy Chaucer esetében, de hamarosan mindinkább elméletivé vált, s 
ezzel párhuzamosan az epika észrevétlenül átment fikcióba” (210). Ez az a folya-
mat, amely által – megítélésem szerint – megfogható a novella balladisztikus 
változatának születése is; ha Frye fenti gondolatait vesszük alapul, akkor a bal-
lada epikus, azaz szóbeli jellegének a novella fikciójába való átváltása hozhatja 
létre ezt a novellaváltozatot. Ennek tükrében nem is a két műfaj keveredésének, 
hanem egy meglévő tapasztalati struktúra (a ballada) átalakulásának lehetünk 
tanúi. A ballada műfaja újjászületik a novella keretein belül, az alapjául szolgáló 
egzisztenciális tapasztalat lényegét megőrizve, de a modern gondolkodáshoz és 
társadalmi meghatározottsághoz alkalmazkodva. Fontos, hogy a ballada nem 
lassan alakul át „balladisztikus novellává”, hanem tudatos, írói szándékról van 
szó, amelynek itt fő törekvése az ősi tapasztalatok, törvények működésének meg-
mutatása a modern kor olvasójának. Az átalakulás poétikai sajátosságait pedig 




Ballada – műballada – balladisztikus novella
Az epika fikcióba váltását megvizsgálhatjuk a ballada, a műballada és a balladisz-
tikus novella mediális szempontú összevetésével. A népballada népköltés, orális 
közegben létezik. Történetet mond el a közösségnek a közösségről. A benne 
található transzcendens (csodás) elemek maguktól értetődően működnek benne, 
nem szorulnak magyarázatra. A műballadák megjelenése értelmezhető annak a 
fordulópontnak, amely az addig csak szóbeli műfajt átmozdította az írásbeliség, 
a fikció területére. Csakhogy már a népballada sem epika (frye-i értelemben), ha 
le van jegyezve, mert médiumváltás történt, már nem eredeti közege a befoga-
dás helye. Ezzel tulajdonképpen az történik, hogy az írásbeliség felszámolja azt 
a szoros és reflektálatlan közösségi konszenzust, amely az orális költészetben 
a „transzcendens” jelenségeket valóságos tapasztalatként rögzíti. (Ez a műfaji 
transzformáció alapvető oka).
Az átmenet epika és fikció közt a transzcendens-mágikus jelleg megjeleníté-
sében a legszembetűnőbb. A népballadában ezt még semmi nem relativizálja, a 
fikcióban a csodás elem viszont a szereplők tudatára korlátozódik. Igazi határ-
helyzetet képeznek az olyan kétértelmű szövegek, mint Goethe „Erlkönig”-je („A 
tündérkirály) vagy Arany János „Bor vitéz”-e. Goethe az egyik szereplői tudatba 
helyezi az archaikus struktúrákat: a természetfeletti jelenségek a kisfiú számára 
láthatóak vagy a tudatában jelennek meg. Goethe tökéletesen játszik a transz-
cendens és az immanens váltogatásával: 
‘Hát nem látod … ott - nem látod, apám:
a tündérlányok már várnak reám. –’
”Fiam, fiam, én jól látom: amott
A nedves fűzfák törzse ragyog.”
(Képes Géza fordítása)
A szöveg az olvasót teljes bizonytalanságban hagyja a természetfeletti kép-
zetek igazságát-hamisságát illetően. Ilyen elven működik Arany „Bor vitéz”-e 
is; a ballada végén Bor vitéz menyasszonya meghal, s szintén eldönthetetlen, 
hogy valóban a vőlegény kísértete vitte magával a halálba kedvesét, vagy a lány 
tudata hasonlott meg. Az olyan balladák viszont, amelyekben a transzcendens 
jelenségek mélylélektani magyarázatot kapnak, például az „Éjféli párbaj” vagy az 
„Ágnes asszony” – ez utóbbiban a lélektani magyarázat, hogy Ágnes megháboro-
dott – már egyértelműen a fikció és a realizmus, a valóság logikája felé haladnak. 
Mivel a modernségben az orális kultúra elveszti életterét, a ballada sajátságai 
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is átalakulnak, módosulnak. Már nincs költő, aki elbeszéljen, s nincs közösség, 
aki meghallgassa. A befogadás gyakorlata megváltozik, az elbeszélő és a közös-
ségviszonya átalakul írásbeliség és egyedi befogadó kapcsolatává. A századvégi 
fikciós irodalom érdeklődése a ballada iránt azonban tagadhatatlan. Archaikus 
struktúrák, mitikus motívumok, így a balladából ismertek is megjelennek a 
fikcióban. Az archaikus, csodás elemek azonban itt már nem működnek, nem 
működhetnek közvetlen módon, a modern irodalom valóságigénye miatt. 
Működhetnek azonban átvitt módon, amelyet Frye a displacement terminussal 
határoz meg: „a mítosz és a metafora adaptálása az erkölcsiség és a hihetőség 
kánonjaihoz”, azaz a modern olvasó elvárásaihoz (301).
IV.  
Egy példa a displacement működésére
Befejezésül egy példával szeretném bemutatni, hogy a balladisztikus novella hog-
yan működtet egy a balladából átvett archaikus elemet, azaz hogyan működik 
a displacement, az átvitel.
A balladisztikus novellában például a rítus, a látomás és az álom már csak 
displacement-elemként jelenhet meg. Petelei talán legtöbbet elemzett novellája, 
az „Őszi éjszaka” egy balladában látott rítus, a tetemre hívás retorikájához nyúl 
vissza, ugyanahhoz, amit Arany János „Tetemre hívás” című balladájából 
ismerünk: a vérébe fagyott halott sebe megint vérezni kezd, így leleplezi a holt-
test előtt megjelenő gyilkost. Ahogy Kund Abigél, az „Őszi éjszaka” szereplője is 
közvetetten okozója a halálesetnek. Arany balladájával ellentétben viszont a 
novella törli a külső transzcendens szempontokat, itt a rítus a lélekben fejti ki 
hatását. A Petelei-novella asszonyszereplője vétkes fiatal szeretője halálában. A 
holttestet itt a gyilkosság helyszínén hagyják, ami történetesen az asszony háza 
közelében van. A nő nem tud szabadulni bűne súlyától, a holtest folyamatos 
jelenlétében felőrlődik. Ez tehát az átvitel vagy displacement, amellyel a „tetem-
rehívás” a racionális nyomozási pszichológia elemévé válik. S mint a balladában, 
a novellában is eléri célját, a bűn bevallását, leleplezését. Nem kell már a termé-
szetfelettinek beavatkoznia, nem is avatkozhat be a modern élet szemlélete, a 
realizmus tapasztalata miatt, de ehhez mégis elengedhetetlen, hogy az asszony 
a transzcendens erőtérben ítélje meg saját tettét, azaz a transzcendens büntetés 
reális az ő számára, így az ő tudatában, a lelkiismeretében mégis működik, s 
lezajlik a folyamat. A rítus eléri tehát célját a balladisztikus novellában is, a nő 
bevallja a bűnt. Ehhez már nincs szükség transzcendens beavatkozásra, de a 
természetfeletti erő mégis jelen van, ugyan már nem a mű által feltételezett 
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tárgyi valóságban, hanem a szereplői tudatban. A rítus tudati szinten játszódik 
le s működik. 
Az archaikus elemek azonban nem csak a századvégi novellában érvényesül-
hetnek tudati szinten. A „Tetemre hívás” és az „Őszi éjszaka” sorába állíthatjuk 
Móricz Zsigmond „Barbárok” című novelláját is, ahol a kilincsre akasztott 
gyilkos eszköz látványa töri meg a bűnöst. Az öv és a megölt ember között 
metonimikus viszony teremtődik, s itt már nem is a tetem látványa késztet a 
vallomásra, hanem a gyilkosság eszköze. A displacement itt viszont már sokkal 
rejtettebb módon érvényesül, a Petelei novellákban még erősebb az átvitel felis-
merésének lehetősége. Frye maga is említi, hogy az olvasón is múlik, meglátja-e 
az átvitelt, vagyis a realista szöveg mögötti mitikus struktúrát.
A századvégi novella egyik változata tehát a balladából ismert elemeket, struk-
túrákat jelenít meg. Ez tekinthető szerintem a „balladisztikus novellának”. 
Feltehető azonban a kérdés: mi lehet a balladisztikus novella célja, létének 
értelme? Valóban csak a századvég irodalmának tragikum iránti fogékonysága 
hozta volna létre a novella e változatát, a balladai tragikus témákat, hangulatot 
kihasználva? A ballada komplex, sűrű jelentéstartalmú jellegét az adja, hogy 
szorosan kapcsolódik az ember legősibb tudásához, évszázadok, sőt valószínűleg 
évezredek átszűrt egzisztenciális tapasztalatát jeleníti meg. A ballada azonban 
már nem életképes műfaj, mert az, ahogyan megjeleníti az általános emberi 
tapasztalatokat, elvesztette hihetőségét. Az ebben az orális formában rejlő 
archaikus tapasztalatok dialogikus elsajátítására, felidézésére, ismerőssé tételére 
a novella tágabb kerete mégis lehetőséget ad. Az archaikus tartalom a novella 
formájában szólíthatja meg a modern kor olvasóját. A balladák olvasása szép, 
de idegen, mert már nem egyezik a modern olvasó közegével. A novella világa 
azonban ismerős.
A balladisztikus novella legfontosabb jellemzője tehát, hogy a ballada archai-
kus tapasztalatait jeleníti meg, azonban a természetfeletti elemek már nem ter-
mészetfelettiként működnek, hiszen a modern gondolkodás ezt már nem enge-
di meg, vagy ha igen, csak a hősök tudatában megjelenő képzetekként. Azt a 
következtetést szűrhetjük tehát le, hogy a balladisztikus novella azért tekinthető 
létező, külön novellaváltozatnak, mert a balladából ismert archaikus struktúrát 
alakítja át, idomítja saját szerkezetéhez, a modern kor olvasójának tudatához. A 
hangsúly nem azon van tehát, hogy a novella átvesz-e elemeket a balladából, 
hanem azon, hogy hogyan teszi ezt. A balladában kötelező struktúrák azonban 
a novellában feltételessé válnak. Az átformálódás mozzanata tehát legalább olyan 
fontos, mint a megőrzés mozzanata. Ez követhető nyomon Petelei István novel-
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láiban is. A balladisztikus novella kérdésköre azért is érdemel külön figyelmet, 
mert jelzi, hogy az írott modern irodalmat a népiesség mozgalmán túl is mélyen 
foglalkoztatta az orális költészettel folytatott dialógus; a modern prózai elbes-
zélés szövegközi kapcsolatai sem korlátozódnak írott előzményekre. Ennek egyik 
szembeötlő változata a balladisztikus novella.
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NORTHROP FRYE IN ROMANIA:  
TRANSLATIONS AND CRITICAL STUDIES
Introduction 
A professor of literature at the English Department of Alexandru Ioan Cuza 
University of Iasi, Romania, once remarked that Northrop Frye was known in 
Romanian literary circles not as a Canadian, but an American. As I was working 
on a doctoral thesis about the Romanian reception of English Canadian authors 
in general and novelists in particular at the time, this rang a bell about the mis-
conceptions affecting Frye’s reception in our country ever since its beginnings: 
Stephen Leacock, hailed as Canada’s Mark Twain, was considered an American 
humorist by periodicals such as Adevărul literar şi artistic (Literary and Artistic 
Truth) in the inter-war years. 
1. Northrop Frye in the Communist Era
This particular historical period is very difficult to account for in any reception 
study, especially one concerning a critic. Romania has several bibliographies on 
the relation of our literature with other literatures of the world (see Ion Lupu 
and Cornelia Ştefănescu’s two-volume Bibliografia relaţiilor literaturii române 
cu literaturile străine în periodice [Bibliography of Romanian Literature and Its 
Relations with Foreign Literatures in Periodicals] published in 1997), but usu-
ally these go only as far as the pre-communist period. There is also a diction-
ary of novels in translation up to 1989 edited by the Romanian professor and 
critic Aurel Sasu, but the lack of a centralised database makes any endeavour to 
research the reception of a literary figure quite difficult. As far as critics are con-
cerned, things are even more complicated. Comprehensive information can only 
be found after the fall of the communist regime even though Romanian national 
libraries have started to develop online databases. Contents of periodicals that 
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came out under the communist regime remain a mystery, and anyone interested 
needs to devote a lot of time to researching sources the old way. 
During my doctoral thesis at Alexandru Ioan Cuza University and York Uni-
versity I came across Toma Pavel’s 1964 review of the Anatomy of Criticism 
among the criticism on Canadian authors in periodicals publishing on foreign 
literature such as România literară (Literary Romania) and Secolul XX (The 
twentieth century). Following this review, Frye would often be mentioned in the 
communist period, and the book itself would also come out in Romanian in 1972. 
In his article, “Northrop Frye şi ambiţiile sistemului” (Northrop Frye and 
System Ambitions), Pavel first speaks about ‘structure’ and ‘structuralism’ as 
fashion of the time, calling the former one of the magic words of American 
cultural life. So no reference to Canada or Frye’s national appurtenance is made 
at this stage of (communist) Romanian culture; the critic is simply assimilated 
to the American space in general with no reference to Canada in particular, as 
it had happened to Leacock in the pre-communist years. 
After discussing structure, structuralism and the fields in which they became 
relevant (structural linguistics, structural sociology, structural pedagogy, struc-
tural study of folklore, structural music, structural painting), referring to France 
and its attempts to define the term structure and its relevance for the humanities 
and going as far as asking whether “Dieu est-il structuraliste?” (98, passim), 
Toma Pavel brings Frye’s work into play. He argues that, in The Anatomy, Frye 
attempts “to build the perfect theory of a field, starting from definitions and 
theorems which he then combines as in logic to enhance transparency in struc-
ture and all its secrets” (ibid.). Further on, the Romanian critic argues that Frye’s 
system tries to encompass the variety of recent developments in literary criticism 
in a fabulous network, an interesting baroque construction under the sign of 
‘structure’. In Pavel’s account, Frye first examines a literary work not by con-
necting to its universe but by modes he classifies according to the moral strength 
of the ‘hero’, and goes on to develop his myth criticism, his Dionysiac myth of 
tragedy reflecting the god’s death, the myth of comedy corresponding to Hercu-
les’ acceptance in the society of gods’, romance where the hero is brave enough, 
and the low and high mimetic modes. 
Toma Pavel criticises Frye’s complicated construction for not being as round 
and as perfectly chronological as Frye had intended, and indeed being irregular. 
To support his claim, he refers to Petronius’s Satyricon, Lope de Vega’s and 
Calderon’s tragedies being synchronous with picaresque novels, and the works 
of Romanian poet Stefan George or Claudel’s tragedies reaching the highest 
highs of mimesis. 
Frye however, Pavel concedes, is not concerned with the structure of the iso-
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lated literary work but all literature, the stress falling on literary convention (99, 
passim). His system based on repeated imagery and archetypes, is easy to apply 
to conventional literature aiming at recurrence and ritual. Pavel’s further criti-
cism is that Frye draws too heavily on comparative mythology (Frazer) and 
psychology (Jung), and is enslaved to neighbouring disciplines’ archetypes that 
are non-literary. Frye’s terminology is also inappropriate and arbitrary including 
far too many different things, and this has a simplifying effect. The Romanian 
reviewer regards Frye’s psychoanalysis-like discussion of Le Malade Imaginaire 
as “far-fetched” (100). 
Pavel holds against Frye that he, unlike Curtius in his European Literature 
and the Latin Middle Ages, “postulates a unity of literature which he illustrates 
by symmetric deductions from data in ethnology and psychoanalysis, opening 
‘fake windows’ to no rooms, not to literature anyway, but to neighbouring fields 
of study” (100-101). At this point, Pavel falls back on Marxist grids declaring 
that Marxist criticism put literature in the right relation with neighbouring 
fields, the ‘real’ and ‘fundamental’ products of superstructure and social life, not 
‘coincidences’ invented by the researcher as in the case of Northrop Frye. Includ-
ing mythology in literature, according to Pavel, has no justification. Resorting 
to Bible criticism is not literary criticism, and compressing everything ‘narrative’ 
(religion included) into literature is to weaken criticism. One might wonder to 
what extent Toma Pavel merely rehashes communist ideology or it is also driv-
en by e communist anti-religious zeal. 
Nevertheless, he concludes by criticising Frye’s construction for its rupture 
between the mythical and mimetic modes, for being a method that cannot be 
applied by and is of no use to the reader, and for making reference almost exclu-
sively to ancient Greek and English literature. Frye’s systematic thought, Pavel 
maintained, is a slave to ‘fanatic structuralism’ (100). 
For all Pavel’s criticism, Romania was the first country behind the Iron Cur-
tain to publish Northrop Frye’s Anatomy of Criticism in 1972. In her preface, 
the notable Romanian critic Vera Călin praises Frye’s book as “an initiation in 
the art of criticism or a didactic account of a system, the proposal of a way to 
read literature… The premise of Frye’s Anatomy is that myth criticism—by way 
of old myths (pagan, Judaic, and Christian), an extreme schematisation of action 
and conventionalisation of character—has provided a genuine grammar of liter-
ary archetypes” (vi). One may agree or disagree with Frye’s perspective on lit-
erature, Călin notes, but the composition of his work is “imposing” and his 
interpretations are “brilliant”, not to mention his outstanding erudition in the 
history of culture. The reader, she recommends, should acknowledge the power 
of a conception that rejects the idea of literature as a baggage of isolated units.
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The Anatomy was brought out by the publishing house Univers in a significant 
and sustained effort to make the achievements of Western criticism (e.g. Roland 
Barthes, Paul Ricoeur, Gerard Genette, Jean Starobinsky, Georges Poulet, and 
George Steiner, etc.) available to Romanian readers in good translation. 
Frye thus not only did not escape the attention of Romanian critics during 
the communist era, but also contributed to unofficial, non-Marxist thought, his 
myth or archetypal criticism concentrating on the literary text “as a junction 
between the temporal and the permanent” and being “aware of the great TEXT”, 
as Rodica Albu pointed out at the First Symposium of English and American 
Studies in 1982 (117). Though some critics, such as Radu Şerban, complained 
that seminal works like Frye’s had little bearing outside small circles of philolo-
gists. This was although some Canadian novelists, including Mazo de La Roche 
and Louis Hémon, who had been translated into Romanian were not quickly 
forgotten (see Virgil Teodorescu and Petronela Negoşanu).
2. The Post-communist Years
After the fall of the communist regime, The Double Vision and The Great Code 
came out in Romanian translation in 1993 and 1999 respectively. The latter con-
tains a chronology based on John Ayre’s biography, and Frye’s works are regularly 
referred to in critical journals such as România literară, Sfera politicii (Political 
Sphere), Contrafort (Abutment), and Cultura, to name but a few. In Cultura, Alex 
Goldiş reviewed the renowned Romanian critic Adrian Marino’s 1968 Intro-
ducere în critica literară (Introduction to Literary Criticism) which mentioned 
Frye as among the world’s important literary critics: Murray Krieger, Tudor 
Vianu, Leo Spitzer, Lucian Blaga, Mihai Ralea, I. A. Richards, Roman Jakobson, 
Roland Barthes, Mihail Dragomirescu, William Empson, E. Lovinescu, C. G. 
Jung, Jean Ricardou, Eugen Simion, G. Calinescu, Mircea Eliade, Sainte-Beuve, 
Benedetto Croce, Charles Mauron, Gaston Bachelard, G. Ibraileanu, Cl. Lévi-
Strauss, Umberto Eco, Lucien Goldmann, Roman Ingarden, Titu Maiorescu, 
Nicolae Manolescu, Mihai Ungheanu, René Wellek, Matei Calinescu, Maurice 
Blanchot, Paul Valéry, Gaëtan Picon, Serban Cioculescu, Francesco de Sanctis, 
Perpessicius, and Jean Rousset. 
In his study of irony and the rise of Romanian postmodernist criticism in the 
1980s, which was frowned upon by the communist regime, Gheorghe Grigurcu 
(2003) refers to Frye as following in Aristotle’s and other major theorists’ foot-
steps. Again in România literară, Grigurcu (2004) reviewed the reputed critic 
Ion Bogdan Lefter’s book on Romanian criticism between 1960 and 1990, who, 
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like some others, saw criticism as sui generis form of literary creation and plead-
ed for the critic’s need for subjectivity. Lefter found that Frye’s approach squared 
with Georges Poulet’s dictum that criticism is not a “zero” but a “superior degree” 
of literature, and that the critic as artist is a transmitter, evoker, and stimulator 
of sensibility for future tasters. At last, Frye is also recognised as a Canadian in 
a discussion of Blake studies and the importance of his Fearful Symmetry (see 
Mihăieş).  
Northrop Frye has by now found his way into Romanian university curricula. 
At the University of Suceava, for instance, professor Mircea Diaconu lists Frye’s 
works in the compulsory reading for his courses “Theories and Doctrines in 
Literature Sciences” (Anatomy of Criticism and The Double Vision) and “Litera-
ture and Philosophy” (The Secular Scripture). At the same university, Frye’s 
Anatomy is also recommended to distance-learning students taking up profes-
sor Ovidiu Morar’s course in literary theory. At the University of Craiova, 
optional distance-learning course material by Cătălin Ghiţă, “Introduction to 
the work of Mircea Eliade”, mentions Frye in a footnote as belonging among the 
most ‘serious critics’, along with Lord Raglan, William A. Lessa and Thomas J. 
Altizer. A number of recent doctoral theses in the humanities have also drawn 
on Frye’s works, especially the Anatomy and The Great Code.1 
Interestingly enough, despite the blossoming of Canadian Studies and Cana-
dian Studies Centres throughout Romania especially after 2000, Northrop Frye 
is given little credit as a Canadian scholar. His most quoted and reputed work 
in Romanian academia remains the Anatomy. I myself referred to The Bush 
Garden and Divisions on a Ground in my thesis on The English Canadian Novel 
in Romania, Translations and Critical Studies when dealing with issues of Cana-
dian identity. 
To assess the influence of Frye on post-communist Romanian criticism, we 
might mention a tribute to his work by the comparative critic Corin Braga in his 
volume on “Archetypology”: “Frye projects an anatomy of criticism, a true image 
of invariants that can be found in all literary words since antiquity” (16). Braga 
likens Frye to Adrian Marino who envisaged “a project in which comparative 
1 See e.g. Gianina Todirică. A Race of Giants on the Westward Trails: A Study of The Great Nar-
rative of the American West. Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi, 2010; Simona Marusceac 
Laurean. Aesthetic and Educational Valences in Children’s Literature. Oradea University, 2010; 
Anca Tomoioagă. Metamorphosis of Psalms in Modern and Postmodern Romanian Poetry. Ora-
dea University, 2011; Ruxandra Marilena Zamfira Coman. Satirical Prose in the 19th Century 
(1830-1870). University of Bucharest, 2012; Cristina Timar. The Novels of Transition. Petru 
Maior University of Targu-Mures, 2010; Emilia Georgeta Ivancu. Games of Identity and Alter-
ity in the Novels of Salman Rushdie and V. S. Naipaul. Babeș-Bolyai University of Cluj Napoca, 
2010.
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literature is ‘recapitulated’ in a theory and poetics of world literature by extract-
ing invariants common to all European, Asian, African literature” (ibid.). Also, 
what was overlooked during the communist era, Frye’s studies of the Bible and 
literature, came to the fore with the publication of the Great Code, which Con-
stantin Jinga soon assimilated in his 2001 book on the Bible and the Sacred in 
Literature. 
Conclusions 
Northrop Frye has moved from margin to centre on a diachronic path from 
communist to post-communist Romania. If he was mistaken for an American 
author during the communist regime, his citizenship was restored after 1989. 
Moreover, the Marxist grids in the paratext of the 1972 translation of Anatomy 
of Criticism are no longer felt. He is now an accepted critic, and The Double 
Vision and The Great Code have also been translated into Romanian. There are 
several periodicals that mention Frye when discussing various topics, university 
professors list him in their course bibliographies and PhD students cite him in 
their theses. Yet he has not had the influence in Romania to call for a systematic 
investigation comparing his and Mircea Eliade’s work. In contrast to his writings 
mentioned above however, his works pertaining to Canada are still untranslated 
and little discussed in Romanian academia.  
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In the third essay of the Anatomy, “Archetypal Criticism” Northrop Frye inter-
prets Byron’s Don Juan as a clear instance of satire, belonging to the “mythos of 
winter” (1957, 223–242). As he points out, satire in Don Juan is to a large extent 
achieved by a strong self-parodying tendency and by constant digressions—both 
leading to the partial marginalization of the hero (1963).
I intend to show that Frye’s analysis can be extended to the genre of the verse 
novel as such. First, Frye’s approach helps capture the chief difference between 
the verse novel and the mock epic, namely that the latter type of satire funda-
mentally lacks the two features mentioned. Second, it shows that, in the verse 
novel, the parody of other genres, which typically belong to Frye’s “mythos of 
summer”, and the self-mocking tone reach a higher level; the verse novel is a 
genre which is by definition a literary response. As such, it is also self-responsive: 
verse novels after Byron tend not only to be self-reflexive as texts but they 
emphatically reflect on the genre itself, either by distancing themselves from 
(certain aspects of) previous verse novels, as did many Hungarian examples in 
the second half of the nineteenth century, or even by parodying previous ones, 
as does Térey’s 2001 work, Paulus, with Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin. Contemporary 
instances of the genre, including the latter and Anthony Burgess’ Byrne (pub-
lished posthumously in 1995), show that Frye’s analysis is very much of a current 
issue.
1. Frye on Byron
First of all, let us consider in more detail what Frye writes about Byron and how 
this fits into his larger framework. As is known, Frye distinguishes four main 
types of mythical movement to define the pregeneric elements of literature, 
mythoi or generic plots. These are the romantic, the tragic, the comic, and the 
Júlia Bácskai-Atkári
• 288 •
ironic or satiric, which he associates with summer, autumn, spring, and winter 
respectively. (1957, 131–242).. As he says, “ironic myth is best approached as a 
parody of romance: the application of romantic mythical forms to a more real-
istic content” (223).
According to Frye, Byron’s Don Juan is a “second-phase satire”, where “second 
phase” means literal, descriptive or realistic in intent, and also an “intellectual 
satire”; this subtype of the satire is characterised by a clear stance against estab-
lished beliefs in society and in literature by a deconstruction of the romantic 
idea of “the beauty of perfect form”. As Frye describes:
Tristram Shandy and Don Juan illustrate very clearly the constant tendency to self-
parody in satiric rhetoric which prevents even the process of writing itself from be-
coming an oversimplified convention or ideal. In Don Juan we simultaneously read 
the poem and watch the poet at work writing it: we eavesdrop on his associations, his 
struggles for rhymes, his tentative and discarded plans, the subjective preferences 
organizing his choice of details […], his decisions whether to be “serious” or mask 
himself with humor. (232–233)
The strong presence of the narrator throughout the text has a further conse-
quence, pointed out by Frye: Don Juan is a secondary character in the text of Don 
Juan (Frye 1963). As Frye describes, Don Juan never actually emerges clearly as 
a character and there is no sense of engagement or participation to be perceived 
from his part—in other words, Don Juan is never an active agent. From all this 
it follows that since “Don Juan is not Don Juan’s poem but Byron’s poem, it could 
hardly have been ended, but only abandoned or cut short by its author’s death” 
(185).
2. The Byronic Verse Novel as Intellectual Satire
Having pointed out all this, I would like to elaborate on how Frye’s analysis can 
be extended to the genre of the Byronic verse novel and how it can be related to 
the narrative structure of Don Juan and other verse novels.
First of all, let us consider the issue of parody and self-parody. Though there 
is large variation in what is parodied in Don Juan, there are typical tendencies 
to be observed. Using Frye’s terms, the parodied genres fall into the category of 
the “mythos of summer”—such as the epic, romantic novels, and romantic poet-
ry (mostly the Lake Poets). The way parody is achieved is that allusions to these 
genres are inserted in the context of experience and hence measured against it. 
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As far as the nature of this experience is concerned, it is markedly literary expe-
rience.
At the end of Canto I (stanza 222), Don Juan exhibits a typical section parody-
ing the Lake Poets and Robert Southey in particular:
‘Go, little book, from this my solitude!
I cast thee on the waters, go thy ways!
And if, as I believe, thy vein be good,
The world will find thee after many days.’
When Southey’s read, and Wordsworth understood,
I can’t help putting in my claim to praise.
The four first rhymes are Southey’s every line;
For God’s sake, reader, take them not for mine.
The way parody works here is quite clear: the narrator quotes the first four lines 
form one of Southey’s works, taking them out of their original context and put-
ting them into his own text. The difference between the two kinds of literature 
is explicitly highlighted by the narrator himself in the second half of the stanza 
where he distances himself from the first four lines and hence from the kind 
of poetry associated with Southey (and Wordsworth). This alienating gesture is 
accompanied by a strong value judgement as the narrator clearly considers his 
kind of poetry superior to that of Southey and Wordsworth.
Apart from romantic poetry, epic conventions are also often subject to paro-
dy in Don Juan (Bácskai-Atkári 95–103). The following example is from Canto 
I (stanza 207):
Besides, in Canto Twelfth, I mean to show
The very place where wicked people go.
This is part of an argumentation in which the narrator tries to convince the read-
ers that his poem is not the least immoral and here refers to the epic tradition 
of the hero’s journey to hell (note that there are other references to this in the 
text as well). However, his ironic tone reveals that although the epic tradition 
will be kept, he does not fully take it seriously and the chief aim is not to comply 
with certain established rules but to satisfy the needs of certain readers, about 
whom he is similarly ironic and considers their need to see “wicked people” sent 
to hell as childish.
Such gestures lead us to the second major narrative feature of Don Juan and 
the verse novel, which is the large number of reflections on writing as such. In 
Júlia Bácskai-Atkári
• 290 •
the quotation above, the narrator partly talks about his work in general and 
partly refers to specific plans concerning the text yet to be written. This is even 
more emphatic at the end of Canto II (stanza 216):
In the meantime, without proceeding more
In this anatomy, I’ve finished now
Two hundred and odd stanzas as before,
That being about the number I’ll allow
Each canto of the twelve or twenty-four;
And laying down my pen, I make my bow,
Leaving Don Juan and Haidée to plead
For them and theirs with all who deign to read.
As can be seen, the narrator here explicitly makes reference to his plans concern-
ing his work, abandoning the actual narration of the story. Note also that his 
plans are relatively vague since he talks about writing twelve or twenty-four can-
tos; again, the numbers are references to the revered epic tradition: the Iliad and 
the Odyssey have 24 and the Aeneid has 12 cantos. This reference is again ironic 
since it is the narrator’s personal decision to establish the number of cantos, 
and it does not follow from the nature of the text being a proper epic otherwise.
It is worth mentioning that the reflections on the extradiegetic level may be 
more emphatic than the ones on the diegetic level. This naturally results in an 
increased tendency of stepping away from the story itself and it is quite typical 
that the narrator leaves his characters while digressing on other topics; when 
and how he does this is fully arbitrary.
The third fundamental feature of the narrative structure of Don Juan regards 
composition, which is characterised by a certain kind of infinity, as was also 
pointed out by Frye. This is not accidental as the form is constantly being revised 
throughout the entire text and there are several plans mentioned concerning the 
length, but any two of these are at least partially in conflict with each other—
moreover, the planned length also increases as the text proceeds. Recall that the 
narrator promised twelve or twenty-four cantos altogether in Canto II (see the 
quotation above); in Canto XII, however, he says the following (stanzas 54–55).
But now I will begin my poem. ‘Tis
Perhaps a little strange, if not quite new,
That from the first of cantos up to this
I’ve not begun what we have to go through.
These first twelve books are merely flourishes,
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Preludios, trying just a string or two
Upon my lyre or making the pegs sure;
And when so, you shall have the overture.
My Muses do not care a pinch of rosin
About what’s called success or not succeeding.
Such thoughts are quite below the strain they have chosen;
‘Tis a ‘great moral lesson’ they are reading.
I thought, at setting off, about two dozen
Cantos would do; but at Apollo’s pleading,
If that my Pegasus should not be foundered,
I think to canter gently through a hundred.
Here the narrator explicitly refers to the fact that he has changed his plans 
regarding the length of the work. This creates the impression that that the text 
is actually not born out of a concept set in advance (cf. Christensen 215) but it is 
rather created when narrating, and in this sense it is possible infinite, inasmuch 
as there is no text-internal reason that would bind it to a given length.
Apart from this, infinity is also reinforced by the fact that the main focus is 
not on the hero but on writing about the hero hence the primary concern of the 
narrator is not to round off the story of Don Juan but rather to prolong it as much 
as possible.
All of these characteristics pertain to the verse novel in general and contrib-
ute to the distinctive narrative structure thereof. Hence these can be considered 
as structural characteristics of the genre and as such they are fundamentally in 
line with Frye’s analysis presented in the previous section. There are a number 
of examples for the Byronic verse novel in Hungarian literature as well, mostly 
dating from the second half of the nineteenth century and the 1870s in particu-
lar. A prototypical example would be László Arany’s A délibábok hőse [The Hero 
of Mirages].
Naturally, when considering general features of the verse novel, it must be 
kept in mind that there are considerable differences as well with respect to the 
actual realisation of the features mentioned above. For instance, while infinity 
is truly prototypical for verse novels, it is generally due to abandonment rather 
than the death of the author, as was the case with Byron. For instance, Pushkin’s 
Eugene Onegin also lacks a rounded-off ending but this is due to Pushkin’s aban-
donment of the text and is paired up in the text with a gesture from the narrator 
that clearly indicates the arbitrary decision to abandon the story at a given point; 
that is, the narrator leaves his hero in a very uncomfortable situation and instead 
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of narrating his story further on, he explicitly says that he prefers to leave the 
situation there as it is.
Apart from offering valuable points of consideration for the characterisation 
of verse novels, Frye’s analysis also helps highlight some crucial differences from 
the mock epic. This is especially important because Don Juan is partly also 
referred to as a mock epic in the relevant literature. However, mock epics lack 
the self-parodying tendency and digressions that are central in verse novels. In 
other words, the verse novel fundamentally deconstructs established literary 
norms, which is not true for the mock epic.
3. Extensions
There is yet one more important extension line of the analysis presented so far, 
also built on Frye’s insights. I have argued that the verse novel is a strongly self-
reflexive genre, in that verse novels tend to have self-reflexive texts that may also 
reflect on questions concerning the essence of the genre itself. In addition, the 
verse novel is also self-reflexive on the genre level: besides the individual text 
being aware of their textual nature, the verse novel as a genre is also markedly 
aware of itself.
This becomes evident when considering contemporary verse novels, which 
contain reflections on nineteenth-century verse novels. Apart from explicit 
reflections and references, there are of course similar characteristics too; for 
instance, János Térey’s Paulus has a dominant narrator, who occasionally inter-
rupts narration in order to reflect on his personal concerns and who also devotes 
considerable time to disclosing his plans concerning the text.
In Paulus there are actually three storylines: that of Pál ‘Paul’, who is a geek 
at the turn of the 21st century, the one of the German officer Friedrich von Pau-
lus, taking place during the Second World War, and finally the story of the 
biblical Paul, which is mostly present in underlying form. Thus the genre of the 
verse novel is further deconstructed, in that any of these storylines is inter-
rupted not only by the narrator’s personal concerns but also by the other two 
storylines—obviously, the three are interconnected in a number of ways and 
apart from interrupting each other, they also reflect on and reinterpret one 
another.
Térey’s Paulus is also a good example for postmodern verse novels reflecting 
on the history of the genre since it rewrites Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin (Margócsy 
37–45). This can be observed in the story of Pál and Ludovika, which is built on 
that of Onegin and Tatiana, that is, the former is similar to but is also mark-
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edly different from the latter. For instance, when she meets Pál, Ludovika is 
already married: nevertheless, they have an affair, albeit a rather short one. These 
features are excluded in Eugene Onegin: neither Onegin or Tatiana is married 
when they meet, which is precisely the reason why there is some chance of them 
getting together—however, when later on Tatiana is married to someone else, it 
is her marriage that acts as a barrier to Onegin’s advances.
Another point of difference is the letter written by Ludovika, which is actu-
ally a virus. Naturally, the text itself differs markedly from the one written by 
Tatiana, e.g. it contains explicit sexual references; still, the underlying gesture 
is similar in the two cases, and Ludovika’s letter strongly evokes Tatiana’s. 
Besides the text being different, the form of the virus indicates that Ludovika’s 
text is in a way fundamentally destructive—this is in line with the entire text of 
Paulus being destructive, indeed a deconstruction, of the genre of the verse 
novel. Similarly to Onegin, Pál also realises later (and in fact too late) that he 
should not have rejected Ludovika, who in turn finally rebuffs him—in doing so, 
however, she is clearly harsher than Tatiana (that is, she basically sends him to 
hell, rather colloquially).
The differences and similarities between Paulus and Eugene Onegin could of 
course be further examined as they constitute an intricate network of intertex-
tual references. The point here is to stress that this is true for postmodern verse 
novels in general, though different texts may exhibit such reflexive characteris-
tics to different degrees.
The fact that postmodern verse novels tend to reflect on previous ones in a 
similar way to how self-reflexivity is attested within the individual texts shows 
that reflections are indeed fundamentally important when considering verse nov-
els and that Frye’s way of reading Byron is thus also productive on the genre level.
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A ROMANIAN COSMOGONIC MYTH  
IN THE LIGHT OF NORTH FRYE
Northrop Frye’s theories can be applied to any Christian-influenced culture. 
Romanian culture is an amalgam of older pagan elements fused with Christian-
ity. On the ancient strata, the Dacian and Thracian cultic worship of Zamolxis-
Gebeleizis, Dionysos-Zibelthiurdos, Mithras and various Greek and Roman dei-
ties, a Byzantine, Eastern Christianity is superimposed. 
This fusion is fascinatingly evident in the world of Romanian folk mythology. 
I’d like to consider just one of these myths here—a cosmogonic one—which, 
despite all its many variants, preserved its broad unity. At the centre of the story 
are two twin-like figures—God and the Devil—which at the creation walk 
together, addressing each other as ‘Fellow’ (God) and ‘Unfellow’ (the Devil). God 
is naïve, unaware of his demiurgic powers, he at first doesn’t know how to initi-
ate creation. He eventually discovers that he can create in the moment when he 
throws his stick (or axe, in other variants) into the primordial waters. When he 
does so, a fir tree rises from the waters, and among this tree’s branches, he finds 
the Devil. In the moment when they first see each other, the Devil feigns friend-
ship, calling God ‘Fellow’, and suggesting that they be friends and brothers. God 
accepts the Devil as a friend but cautiously rejects the offered brotherhood, 
calling the Devil ‘Unfellow’. 
The two of them start to travel above the primordial waters until the Devil 
suggests that God create something else. God accepting, asks the Devil to dive 
into the waters and bring back sand in his name. On being asked, God explains 
he intends to turn the sand into dry land using the power of his name. The Devil 
retrieves the sand, but deciding that he wants to be the one who creates the dry 
land, takes it in his own name. Before the Devil succeeds in getting the sand to 
the surface it becomes burning hot, scorching him and forcing him to release it 
and dive again. After stubbornly persisting through many unsuccessful attempts, 
his skin becomes permanently darkened (Vulcănescu 241). Finally God, seeing 
the Devil’s changed colour and realizing what has been happening urges him to 
A Romanian Cosmogonic Myth in the Light of North Frye 
• 295 •
fulfil the task. The Devil, diving again, takes the sand saying “I take this sand in 
the name of God” but right before surfacing, adds “and in my name, too”. The 
sand immediately seeps between his fingers, and is lost, but God, by taking the 
scrapings from under the Devil’s nails, is able to gather sufficient material to 
create a small island with enough space for the two to lie down on. God explains 
he will leave the sanctification of the new creation till the next day, and the two 
lay down to sleep. After a while, convinced that God has fallen asleep, the Devil 
tries to roll God into the water, but God, suspicious of his intentions, has too 
only feigned sleep: as the Devil rolls God forward, the land extends under him; 
the Devil then tries to roll him in the opposite direction with the same effect, 
and then rolls him crosswise until he has rolled God in all four cardinal direc-
tions, creating the earth. On the next day, the Devil pretending that nothing has 
happened, asks God about sanctifying the land. In answer, God laughs, inform-
ing the Devil that the land was already sanctified in the night, by the cross-form 
in which Unfellow had rolled God over the land. Thus exposed, the Devil plants 
himself under the tree and claims the new-created land, suggesting God find 
somewhere else for himself. God, his patience understandably exhausted, 
denounces Unfellow as an evil friend and summons a huge bull that takes the 
Devil away. From the fir tree, under which the Devil had taken his stand pieces 
of meat start to fall and from its leaves humans appear. 
After Unfellow’s unceremonious departure, God realizes that the land is too 
wide and plain, but that he has no idea how to improve it. He turns to the hedge-
hog for help who grumpily declines. It is only with the help of the bee who 
overhears and reports hedgehog’s mumblings that God understands that by 
stretching the lands he can make mountains, plains, hills and valleys and the 
world is saved from the tedium of the primordial landscape (Olinescu 44).
As we can see, the Romanian view on the genesis of Earth and humankind is 
the product of multiple influences. Of course, we have the primary Christian 
element of the cross. The primordial waters and the role of speech in the act of 
creation are recognizable from Genesis. The fir tree of our story is a recogniz-
able kin to the cosmic trees of various pagan mythologies—from the fir tree that 
appears in Turkish mythologies (Vulcănescu 242), to the better known world ash 
of the Scandinavians, and the giant cedar of the Gilgamesh story—though per-
haps there is more than an echo of Eden’s tree of knowledge of good bought dear 
by knowing ill in Unfellow’s appearance among its branches. We can also iden-
tify motifs from the Greek-Latin legends in the bull that takes the Devil. The 
possibly unique feature of the Romanian story is the naiveté of God—omnipo-
tent but, as evidenced in his clumsiness in initiating the creation, clearly not 
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omniscient. Though God’s knowledge seems to grow with his creation, even after 
he has realized the Devil’s true nature, he finds himself still at a loss.
To illustrate Frye’s theory about mythology as drawing a line around the com-
munity and strengthening it, we can point to the continuing special significance 
of the bee and the hedgehog in Romanian peasant consciousness attested by the 
persistence of taboos against harming them. There are echoes too of the fir tree’s 
once sacred significance in its role in many traditional poems, fairytales or bal-
lads. Traces of the omnipotent but not omniscient god are found in many fairy 
tales with the figure of a young hero who is helped by an old wise man or hag—
in Christian terms God the Son and God the father. 
The Orthodox-Christian basis of Romanian mythology makes it very instruc-
tive to compare with Biblical mythology and thus enrich our understanding of 
each. As Frye says in The Great Code: “If we read the Bible sequentially, the Bible 
becomes a myth, first by tautology, in the sense in which all verbal structures 
are metaphorical by juxtaposition, and second, in a more specific sense of con-
taining a structure of significantly repeated images. […] Traditionally, the Bible’s 
narrative has been regarded as ‘literally‘ historical and its meaning as ‘literally’ 
doctrinal or didactic: the present book takes myth and metaphor to be the true 
literal bases.” (63–64)
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ABSTRACTS AND BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
tut
1. Bácskai-Atkári, Júlia 
Frye Reading Byron
In his influential essay Archetypal Criticism, Northrop Frye interprets Byron’s 
Don Juan as a clear instance of satire, belonging to the “mythos of winter” (Frye 
1957). As he points out, satire in Don Juan is to a large extent achieved by a 
strong self-parodying tendency and by constant digressions—both leading to the 
partial marginalization of the hero (Frye 1963). I will show that Frye’s analysis 
can be extended to the genre of the verse novel as such: first, it captures the chief 
differences from the mock epic, which is satire fundamentally lacking the two 
features in question. Second, the parody of other genres—which typically recall 
Frye’s “mythos of summer”—and self-mocking tone are present on a higher level 
too: the verse novel is a form which is by definition a literary response. As such, it 
is also self-responsive: verse novels after Byron tend not only to be self-reflexive 
as texts but they emphatically reflect on the genre itself, either by distancing 
themselves from (certain aspects of) previous verse novels, as did many Hungar-
ian examples in the second half of the nineteenth century, or even by parodying 
previous ones, as does Térey’s Paulus with Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin. With the 
appearance of contemporary instances of the genre (e.g. Byrne by Burgess), Frye’s 
analysis is very much of a current issue.
Júlia Bácskai-Atkári received her PhD (summa cum laude) in General Linguistics 
from the University of Potsdam, Germany, and has graduated from Eötvös Loránd Uni-
versity, Budapest with an MA (hons) in English Language and Literature and in Hun-
garian Language and Literature. Currently, she is research fellow at the University of 
Potsdam, Linguistics Department. Her main research area in literature is the narration 
of the nineteenth century novel in verse and of the postmodern development of the 
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genre in Hungarian and English literature, with particular interest in Byron’s oeuvre 
and reception.
2. Bánki, Éva
A költészet születése—Sámuel I. könyve 
Az Ószövetség női dalai (Debora, Mirjam, Hanna hálaéneke) nem hagyományos 
szerelmi énekek, nem tipikusnak mondható női szerepversek, hanem az ószövet-
ségi zsoltárköltészetet megelőző profetikus énekhagyományba illeszkedő lírai 
megszólalások. A fenti énekköltők mindegyike az Úr történelemben betöltött 
szerepéről vall, emellett sajátos társadalomképet is közvetítenek. („Isten mint 
forradalmár”—Northrop Frye is kitért a Hanna-ének különös társadalmi szem-
léletére.) Ámde ezek a szokatlan női dalok a zsoltárokkal ellentétben mindig val-
amilyen epikus szituációba helyeztetnek bele, alkalmiak, „történelmiek”—abban 
az értelemben is, hogy elszakíthatatlanul kötődnek valamilyen történelmi vagy 
magánéleti eseményhez, tehát nem is illeszthetők bele a zsoltárok liturgikus kör-
forgásába. Ez azért is különös, mert a Sámuel I. könyve—amelyet Dávid személye 
miatt tekinthetünk akár egy, a lírai megszólalás eredetét, a „költészet születé-
sét” tárgyaló szimbolikus elbeszélésnek is—egyetlen nagy ívű cselekménysorba 
illeszti bele a dávidi és a hannai költészetet. Előadásomban a Hanna-féle hálaé-
nek (1Sám 2,1–10) epikus funkcióját, motivikus kapcsolódásait, történelemkon-
cepcióját, a dávidi zsoltárköltészettől való szignifikáns eltéréseit fogom vizsgálni.
The Birth of Poetry—Samuel I
The female songs of the Old Testament (Deborah’s, Miriam’s and Hannah’s 
hymns of praise) are far from conventional love songs, and cannot be said to be 
typical female role poems either; rather, they are lyrical utterances belonging to 
the prophetic song tradition preceding the poetry of the Psalms. All the hymn 
writers mentioned witness to the role of the Lord in History, and they also convey 
a characteristic view of society (“God as revolutionary”—as Northrop Frye also 
touched upon the unique social attitude of the Song of Hannah.) These unusual 
female songs however fit into some sort of epic situation, they are incidental, 
“historical” pieces—in the sense that they are inseparably related to some sort 
of historical or private event, i.e. they do not fit into the liturgical cycle of the 
Psalms. Why this is extraordinary is because Samuel I, which can be seen as a 
symbolic narrative discussing the origin of lyrical utterance, indeed the “birth 
of poetry” due to the person of David, places the poetry of Hannah and David 
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into a grand sequence of events. The paper examines the epic function, the motif 
links, the concept of history of Hannah’s Song, and its major differences from 
the poetry of David.
Bánki Éva negyvenöt éves regényíró, tanár, irodalomtörténész. PhD-dolgozatát roman-
isztikából, a középkori nőköltészet és trubadúrlíra kialakulásának témájából védte meg. 
Tanítványaival két nagysikerű trubadúr-antológiát állított össze. Kreatív írást és galego-
portugál irodalmat tanít az ELTE-n, világirodalmat, kreatív írást, műfordítástudományt 
a Károli Magyar Irodalom Tanszékén. A Károli Gáspár Református Egyetem bölcsész-
karának docense.
Éva Banki (45), novelist, teacher, literary historian, wrote her PhD thesis in Romance 
philology, on the rise of mediaeval female and troubadour poetry. With her students, she 
published a highly successful anthology troubadour poetry. She teaches creative writing 
and Galician-Portuguese literature at Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, and world 
literature, creative writing, translation a Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed 
Church, Budapest, where she is an associate professor. 
3. Dávidházi, Péter
A Tribute to The Great Code: Voltaire’s Lisbon Poem, Mikes and the Book of Job
Being a tribute to Northrop Frye’s work on the Bible, the paper is meant to dem-
onstrate how a present-day scholar may benefit from applying Frye’s insights 
and methods to a comparative analysis of two literary works with a common, if 
latent, biblical subtext. Both Voltaire’s “Poëme sur le désastre de Lisbonne ou 
examen de cet axiome: tout est bien” and Kelemen Mikes’s letter CXCVIII in 
his Letters from Turkey were prompted by the Lisbon earthquake of 1755, both 
responded to the problems of theodicy, and both alluded to the book of Job. In 
constant dialogue with Frye’s ideas, the paper reveals these similarities, but only 
to highlight (and celebrate) some characteristic differences that are incompatible 
with the usual classification of Mikes’s work as a typical representative of early 
Enlightenment literature.
Péter Dávidházi, Member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, is Head of the 
Department of nineteenth-century Hungarian Literature at the Research Centre for 
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the Humanities, and he is Professor of English Literature at Eötvös Loránd University, 
Budapest. As a visiting professor he taught at the University of California, Irvine, and 
the University of Jyväskylä, Finland. Published in Hungary, England and the US, his 
books include The Romantic Cult of Shakespeare: Literary Reception in Anthropo-
logical Perspective (London: Macmillan, 1998). His latest book is Menj, vándor: Swift 
sírfelirata és a hagyományrétegződés [Go, Traveller: Swift’s Epitaph and the Strata of 
a Tradition], (Pécs: Pro Pannonia, 2009). His recent work focuses on the uses of biblical 
allusions in modern English and Hungarian Poetry.
4. Denham, Robert. D. 
Frye and Longinus
The paper examines the question of whether or not the two essential thrusts 
in Frye’s critical vision are more or less incommensurate with each other and 
therefore not subject to Frye’s usual tendency of bringing together oppositions, 
such as Aristotle versus Longinus, by way of their interpenetration or their being 
subjected to the Hegelian Aufhebung. The question is approached by way of 
Frye’s commitment to both Aristotelian and Longinian perspectives. Denham 
concludes that Frye finally privileges Longinus over Aristotle.
 
Robert D. Denham is the Fishwick Professor of English, Emeritus, Roanoke College, 
Salem, VA. He was formerly Director of English Programs for the Modern Language 
Association and formerly chair of the English department at Emory & Henry College. He 
has written and edited 28 volumes by or about Northrop Frye, including eleven volumes 
of The Collected Works of Northrop Frye.  His most recent book is The Northrop Frye 
Handbook. 
5. Dullo, Andrei
Application of Frye’s Analysis of Christian Symbols to Romanian Mythology
Northrop Frye is known as one of the greatest literary critics in the contempo-
rary period. His approach can be applied to anything related to literature all 
over the world. His contribution to understanding cultural environment can 
be sensed even in the Danubian space. My aim in this paper is to apply North-
rop Frye’s analysis of Christian symbols to Romanian mythology, especially to 
myths referring to the creation of the world. Our tradition is rich in mythologi-
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cal beings and stories that follow a pattern easily found in the Bible. Filtered by 
the ancient Romanian mentality, these myths consist of Christian motifs that 
emerge together with other kinds of influences at work in the Danubian region 
where adaptations of the Bible are widespread. Frye’s study of biblical symbols 
(in The Great Code: The Bible and Literature) can be successfully applied to our 
Christian mythology. Therefore, my paper is aimed at enriching the way in which 
Northrop Frye is perceived, both in Romania and in South-Eastern Europe, and 
providing an alternative interpretation of native mythological motifs.
Andrei Dullo (born in Cluj-Napoca 1991) is a student in the bachelor second year at the 
Faculty of Letters of Babeş-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca. He is vice-president of the 
writing circle held at the Students House of Culture, Cluj-Napoca Municipality (2008—
present). He has published in Steaua cultural magazine of Cluj-Napoca, Bucovina 
Literară cultural magazine of Suceava, Semn cultural magazine of Cluj-Napoca, and in 
Avangarda Literara cultural magazine of Galaţi.
6. Fabiny, Tibor 
Northrop Frye and Béla Hamvas
The paper focuses on the common features, and especially one common motif, 
“transparency”, in the writings of the Canadian literary critic Northrop Frye 
(1912–1991) and the Hungarian writer, thinker and philosopher of religion Béla 
Hamvas (1897–1968). Both of them were unusual, idiosyncratic thinkers whose 
works are not easy to classify; and the intellectual output both has had a rather 
controversial reception.
Hamvas was a chief librarian and a prolific essayist in Budapest between the 
two world wars. On the eve of the Stalinist totalitarian takeover, Hamvas’s book 
on modern art was severely denounced as “modern snobbism” by György Lukács. 
Being employed as a physical worker for several decades, Hamvas’s works were 
prohibited to be published, but his manuscripts were copied and were circulated 
by his followers.
A common motif in the works of Hamvas and Frye is “transparency”, which, 
according to the dictionary, means “allowing light to pass through so that objects 
(or at least their outlines) behind can be distinctly seen”. In his most famous 
work Scientia Sacra Hamvas writes that “transparency” pertains to aletheia 
(truth). For Northrop Frye “transparency” was a category he frequently used but 
never explicitly discussed. He adopted the term in two, not totally unrelated 
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contexts: (a) as a principle of pedagogy, (b) as a principle of language. Biblical 
language, says Frye, is characterized by a kind of “transparency” as it can be 
“seen through”, it has nothing to hide, no hidden agenda.. 
Despite the contrast between the fame and reputation Frye managed to earn 
during his lifetime and Hamvas’s total lack of a visible worldly career, there is 
also much in common in their attitudes to established academic institutions. 
Northrop Frye is said to have declined invitations to prestigious academic insti-
tutions to the United States and remained loyal to his Victoria University in 
Toronto saying that “one has to remain provincial in order to become universal”. 
Béla Hamvas was also a provincial Hungarian living in total isolation through-
out the first seven decades of a troublesome twentieth century but, as we have 
seen, he was entirely committed to universalism. Both Hamvas and Frye advo-
cated and adopted a language that is unusual in the context of discursive argu-
ment and logical discourse. Both of them, therefore, chose to be extravagant 
outsiders, even stumbling blocks, for their contemporaries. Such lonely men of 
genius are usually first rejected, then forgotten, but eventually, one day, they 
come back again. 
Tibor Fabiny is Director of the Institute of English Studies and the Centre for Herme-
neutics at Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church, Budapest. He teaches early 
modern English literature and culture, including the works of William Tyndale, William 
Shakespeare and John Milton, literary theory and the history of biblical interpretation. 
He is the author of several books in Hungarian; his book in English (The Lion and the 
Lamb. Figuralism and Fulfilment in the Bible, Art and Literature, London, Macmil-
lan, 1992) on biblical typology and literature was inspired by Northrop Frye’s insights 
on the subject. 
7. Feltracco, Daniela
Northrop Frye and the Neural Theory of Metaphor
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the concept of metaphor within 
Frye’s theoretical architecture and in connection with the recently emerged neu-
roscientific studies. In particular, I will analyze Frye’s theoretical statements on 
metaphor emerging from the Notebooks. Then, it seems interesting to investigate 
the current streams of innovative tendencies viewing rhetoric—and some of its 
main key concepts, such as the metaphor—as a neural-based complex system. 
To this purpose, I will examine Frye’s unshakeable fundamentals searching for 
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the elements that contemporary scholars—such as George Lakoff—have drawn 
to ground their theories on neurorhetorics. 
Daniela Feltracco (Farra di Soligo, TV Italy 1968) graduated in 1992 at the IULM 
(Feltre), with a dissertation on Australian literature focussing on the novelist Elizabeth 
Jolley. From 1993 to 1999 she taught English language and literature in primary and 
secondary schools. From 2000 to 2004 she was granted a PhD course in Comparative lit-
eratures at the University of Udine. Under the supervision of Stefano Calabrese, professor 
of Semiotics and Literary theory at the Faculty of Foreign languages in the University of 
Udine, she completed her PhD with a dissertation on Northrop Frye’s Criticism (North-
rop Frye: anatomia di un metodo critico, Forum Editrice, 2005). She also translated and 
published some fragments from Frye’s Notebooks (Frammenti critici, a cura di Stefano 
Calabrese e Daniela Feltracco, MUP Editore, 2005). She also contributed to a volume 
on the motifs of fairy tales with particular reference to Little Red Riding Hood oral and 
written versions (Cappuccetto Rosso: una fiaba vera, a cura di Stefano Calabrese e 
Daniela Feltracco, Meltemi, 2008). From 2005 to 2010 she taught Italian language at the 
Faculty of Scienze della Comunicazione e dell’Economia at the University of Modena 
e Reggio Emilia. She is currently teaching English language and literature at secondary 
school and doing some studies on the neural theory of metaphor as she is preparing a 
chapter to be included in a forthcoming volume on Neurorhetorics.
8. Ficová, Sylva
Northrop Frye, William Blake and the Art of Translation
Motto: I must Create a System, or be enslav’d by another Mans. As far as we 
know Northrop Frye did not study the theory of translation, nor did he practice 
it. It even seems he believed that the “translation” of ideas and concepts is quite 
impossible—that “an intellectual and cultural synthesis that gets everything in 
and reconciles everyone with everyone else is an attempt to build a Tower of 
Babel, and will lead to confusion of utterance.” Yet the interest in the history of 
literature and oriental culture inspired Northrop Frye and helped him under-
stand and cultivate the art of interpretation and recreation of ideas, particularly 
in his study Fearful Symmetry. That is why I would like to discuss the importance 
of Frye’s work for the translation profession and how it influenced my translation 
of his Anatomy of Criticism and William Blake’s Marriage of Heaven and Hell. 
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Sylva Ficová is a freelance translator and editor. She studied English and Czech 
at the Faculty of Arts, Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic, and took part in 
exchange studies at the Faculty of Arts, University of Leeds, the UK. She has trans-
lated more than 10 books, including two theoretical books by Northrop Frye, fic-
tion, poetry, and a  comic book. As a  freelance translator she also specializes in 
localization and subtitling. She worked as an English teacher for several years and 
has written a  number of book reviews and articles. She lives with her daughter in 
Brno, Czech Republic. Last autumn she read a paper on “Northrop Frye in Czech 
Lands” at the conference Canada in Eight Tongues organized by the Central Euro-
pean Association for Canadian Studies and Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest. 
9. Fülöp, József
Northrop Frye és Rudolf Kassner
Tanulmányomban Northrop Frye és az osztrák esszéíró, Rudolf Kassner (1873–
1959) szellemi rokonságára mutatok rá: mindketten alkatilag voltak képtelenek 
a szűkkeblű dogmatikusságra és kiskatekizmusra; számtalan kötetet felölelő 
életművükben roppant erudícióról és széles szellemi horizontról tettek tanúbizo-
nyságot; a biografikus és habitusbeli közös jegyeken túl tematikus azonosságok is 
felfedezhetők, annak ellenére, hogy Kassner, néhány (jelentős) irodalomkritikai 
szövegét leszámítva, nem tekinthető irodalomtudósnak.
Az egybevetés közvetlen alapjául Frye-nak a Pált ismétlő, a metaforáról szóló 
gondolatkörét és Kassnernek a látvány, a fiziognómia és a képzelőerőről vallott 
nézeteit választottam. Amiképpen Frye az elméletíró eszköztárával közelít az 
irodalmi (és a bibliai) szöveg poliszemikus természetéhez, Kassner műfajok 
(hasonlatok, példabeszédek, esszék, transzfigurációk, elbeszélések, fiktív levelek 
stb.) változatos során át példázza a költői szövegek többszólamúságát a maga 
kifejlesztette fiziognómiai módszer jegyében, közvetlenül emlékeztetve az 
olvasás összetett mechanizmusára, belső, imaginatív erejére és dinamizmusára.
A filológiai párhuzamokon, tehát az „össze-” vagy „egybeolvasáson” felül Frye 
és Kassner Biblia-értéséről is számot kell adnunk. Röviden, hívószókkal: János 
3,8; az Ige kihirdetése; Ézsaiás prófétasága.
Northrop Frye and Rudolf Kassner
The paper examines intellectual relationship between Northrop Frye and Rudolf 
Kassner (1873–1959): both had an inborn inaptitude for dogmatic small-minded-
ness or catechism thinking; their extensive oeuvre witnessed to their huge erudi-
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tion and wide intellectual horizons; apart from similarities in life and habit, they 
shared several common themes in spite of the fact that Kassner, excluding his few 
(yet significant) literary critical works, cannot be regarded as a literary scholar. 
The basis of comparison is Frye’s discussion of metaphor recalling Paul and 
Kassner’s thinking on spectacle, physiognomy and imagination. As Frye 
approaches the polysemic nature of the literary (and Biblical) text by way of the 
means of a theorist, so does Kassner exemplify the polyphony of poetic texts in 
the name of his physiognomic method through a variety of genres (similes, 
parables, essays, transfigurations, narratives, fictive letters, etc), and thus calls 
attention to the complex mechanism of reading, its internal imaginative force 
and dynamism.
Apart from philological parallels, reading them together must account for 
Frye’s and Kassner’s understanding of the Bible, the Proclamation of the Word 
(John 3,8) and the prophethood of Isaiah in particular.
Fülöp József 1979-ben született Szombathelyen. Az Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyete-
men esztétikát, a Károli Gáspár Református Egyetemen germanisztikát végzett. Dok-
tori címét az ELTE Filozófiatudományi Doktori Iskolájában szerezte. Adjunktus a KRE 
Német Tanszékén (ahol egyben a Hüperión Fordítói Műhely vezetője), ugyanott óraadó 
a Szabadbölcsészet Tanszéken, valamint a Liszt Ferenc Zeneművészeti Egyetemen. 
Szerkesztőként és fordítóként is tevékeny.
József Fülöp was born in Szombathely 1978. He studied aesthetics at Eötvös Loránd 
University, Budapest, and German at Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church, 
Budapest. He earned his PhD at the Doctoral School of Philosophy of ELTE. He is a 
lecturer at the German Department of KGRE, where he leads the Hyperion Transla-
tors’ Workshop, and he also teaches liberal arts KGRE and at the Liszt Ferenc Music 
University. 
10. Gill, Glen Robert 
The Dialectical Vision: Myth and Criticism as Cultural Theory in the Work of 
Northrop Frye 
The twenty-first century has thus far seen an increasing marginalization of myth 
as an existential factor to populist, insular, and radical communities, which 
thrive but largely outside the mainstream of liberal intellectual culture. Over 
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the course of his prolific fifty-year career, Northrop Frye consistently worked 
to recover myth from the rationalist and materialist perspectives that sponsor 
such dismissals, even as he theorized the function of such skeptical habits of 
mind in liberal society. A conventional overemphasis of one of these aspects of 
Frye’s work over the other, however, has led to a misapprehension of his intel-
lectual project and legacy as Janus-faced, as dual if not bifurcated, establishing 
an identity for him as a theorist of myth on the one hand, and as a social and 
cultural critic on the other. A long-overdue coordinating of these two dimen-
sions of Frye’s thought, as this paper shall endeavour, will demonstrate that 
they are interrelated and interdependent as dialectical phases or elements in a 
single, over-arching vision or theory of myth-as-cultural process. In this paper, 
I will argue that the chief contribution and essential legacy of Northrop Frye is 
his mythic theory of culture; his conception of society as proceeding dialecti-
cally from an essential, originary basis of mythic thought, which itself creates 
a necessary, countervailing phase of rational resistance, but ultimately enables, 
through the catalytic element of criticism, a mature consciousness of culture as 
consisting of variations and complexes of myth accommodated to yet fulfilled 
in the existential realities of human life. 
Glen Robert Gill is an Associate Professor in the Department of Classics and Humani-
ties at Montclair State University, New Jersey. He is the author of Northrop Frye and the 
Phenomenology of Myth (University of Toronto Press, 2007), the editor of Northrop Frye 
on Twentieth-Century Literature for The Collected Works of Northrop Frye (University 
of Toronto Press, 2010), and has published essays on Frye, C. G. Jung, T. S. Eliot, Robert 
Lowell, Elizabeth Bishop, and J. R. R. Tolkien.
11. Graham, Brian Russell
Primary Identity in Literature: Frye-Inspired Reflections on Characters in 
Literature
Sherry Ortner famously argued that the nature-as-woman metaphor is the cause 
of the historical subjugation of women, and her critique informs today’s eco-
criticism. In this article, I discuss Frye’s view of the tradition in literature of 
symbolizing nature as a female figure. As I shall explain, we should not view 
Frye’s attitude to this area of imagery as illustrative of his dubious sexual poli-
tics, however tempted we may be. In contrast to Ortner, Frye argues that the 
metaphor is part of an image of a particular relationship between mankind and 
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nature, as well as image of possible relations between men and women. Frye’s 
view is neither, sexist, nor essentialist, nor misanthropic, I argue.
Brian Russell Graham is assistant professor of literature, media and culture at Aal-
borg University in Denmark. His first monograph, The Necessary Unity of Opposites, is 
a study of Northrop Frye, particularly Frye’s dialectical thinking. He continues to work 
with literary and cultural theory, but has also begun original research on English poet 
William Blake. He also writes about popular culture—his latest research in this area 
deals with “Fictions of the Apocalypse.” Graham has also been venturing into fiction, 
2011 seeing the publication of his first work of fiction.
12. Hódosy, Annamária
Frye vs. Freud on Nationalism: Oedipus, Hamlet, Bánk bán and the “Mother-
centred Myth”
There is a strange complicity between nineteenth-century Hungarian patriotic 
poetry and Shakespeare’s Hamlet: the plot of the play reminded contemporary 
Hungarian readers—and sometimes seemed to them to be an allegory—of the 
political situation of their country suffering under Habsburg rule. The paper 
demonstrates that the connection between Hamlet and the Hungarian literature 
of the period is based on a tacit understanding of the political implications of 
Shakespeare’s play. These Hungarian patriotic poems and plays manifest several 
elements which invite the psychoanalytical interpretations of the situation of 
the Prince of Denmark. However, Frye’s notion of the “mythic grounding of 
literature” can offer an alternative explanation for the familial master narrative 
of Hungarian patriotic poetry. The “archetypal criticism” that Frye introduces to 
explore the most basic levels of art (and perhaps any kind of discourse) may ques-
tion the validity of the Freudian notion of the Oedipal conflict in this national 
context. Instead of being seen as a psychological phenomenon, the family tro-
pology of the conflict should be interpreted as the consequence of the rise of 
romantic “mother-centred” myths, which contributed to the increasing popular-
ity and prevalence of the metaphor of the motherland in the nineteenth century. 
Furthermore, the family romance of Hamlet is already political in Shakespeare’s 
play, and although it is more than 200 years older than the Hungarian litera-
ture in question, it is among the first manifestations of the reappearance of the 
mother-centred myth that Frye calls Romantic.
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Annamária Hódosy teaches as senior assistant professor at the Visual Culture and 
Literary Theory Department of the University of Szeged. She wrote her PhD thesis on 
the metafiction in Shakespeare’s Sonnets. Her main fields of interest are feminist and 
queer literary and film theory. 
13. Horváth, Csaba
Kettős tükrök—tükörszerkezetek és biblikus olvasatok a kortárs magyar 
irodalomban (Esterházy: Harmonia Caelestis, Bodor Ádám: Sinistra körzet, 
Verhovina madarai)
Az előadás a kortárs magyar irodalom két reprezentáns művéből, Esterházy Péter 
Harmonia Caelestiséből és Bodor Ádám pár művéből, a Sinistra-körzetből illetve 
a Verhovina madaraiból kiindulva a kettős tükör és a Nagy Kód értelmezési 
lehetőségeit vizsgálja. Mindkét mű a tükörszerkezet és a biblikus hagyomány 
metszéspontján értelmezhető, s rájuk épülve jól bemutatható a Frye gondolatai 
és a posztmodern nagy narráció végére vonatkozó elméletek közötti dinamikus 
feszültség. 
Double Mirrors—Mirror Structures and Biblical Readings in Contemporary 
Hungarian Literature: Péter Esterházy: Harmonia Caelestis; Ádám Bodor: Sinis-
tra körzet (Sinistra Circuit) and Verhovina madarai (The Birds of Verhovina)
The paper examines the interpretative possibilities of the double mirror and the 
Great Code starting out from representative contemporary Hungarian works, 
Péter Esterházy’s Harmonia Caelestis; Ádám Bodor’s Sinistra körzet (Sinistra 
Circuit) and Verhovina madarai (The Birds of Verhovina). All three works can be 
interpreted at the intersection of the mirror structure and the Biblical tradition, 
and, on their basis, the dynamic tension between Frye’s ideas and the theories 
concerning the end of the grand narrative can be clearly demonstrated. 
Horváth Csaba Az ELTE-n folytatott tanulmányai után a párizsi Ecole des Hautes 
Etudes en Sciences Sociales-on posztgraduális képesítést (DEA), majd a az ELTE esz-
tétika doktori iskoláján PhD fokozatot szerzett. Kutatási területe a kortárs irodalom és 
irodalomelmélet, azon belül is a regény műfajának filozófiai aspektusai. 
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Csaba Horváth, after his graduate studies at Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, he 
earned a post-graduate degree (DEA) at Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 
Paris. He wrote his PhD thesis in aesthetics at ELTE. His field of research is contempo-
rary literature and literary theory, the philosophical aspects of the novel as a genre in 
particular.
14. Kelemen, Zoltán
Mítosz és irodalom—Northrop Frye mítoszkonstrukciójának 
kritikai megközelítése
Northrop Frye szerint a történelmi, legalábbis bizonyos történettudományi 
értelemben, a mitikus ellentéte. Habár egy ponton túl Frye szerint minden 
történelmi munka a mitikushoz, sőt a költőihez közelít érthetőségében, meg-
fogalmazásában. Így Frye megkülönbözteti a romantikus mítoszokat, ame-
lyek „Isten országának vagy egy osztály nélküli társadalomnak” a megtalá-
lásáról vagy a hozzá vezető zarándoklatról szólnak; a komikus mítoszokat, 
melyek a haladást tételezik lassú fejlődésként vagy forradalmak mechanikus 
sorozataként; a tragikus mítoszokat, melyek a hanyatlásnak és a bukásnak 
állítanak emléket; végül az ironikus mítoszokat, melyek a visszatérésről és a 
véletlen katasztrófáról szólnak. Northrop Frye A kritika anatómiája című 
munkájában kifejti, hogy a különböző irodalmi történetek, mítoszok, népi mesék, 
motívumok szívesen csoportosulnak enciklopédikus formákba. Másrészt Frye 
az orákulumokból vezeti le számos olyan történettípus kifejlődését, melyek 
előszeretettel tömörülnek enciklopédikus gyűjteménybe. Frye szerint az ironikus 
ábrázolásmód eleve köthető az áldozati rítusokhoz és a haldokló istenséggel 
kapcsolatos tiszteletadás formáihoz, a gyászmunkához. Enciklopédia és mítosz 
összefonódását, pontosabban a mítoszok enciklopédikussá válásának igényét 
Northrop Frye egyetemes érvényűnek tételezi, bár az enciklopédikus hajlamot 
nem minden esetben tartja esztétikailag pozitívan értékelhetőnek.
Jelen dolgozat figyelmének homlokterében mégsem A kritika anatómiája áll, 
hanem The Great Code-nak a mítoszt illető meghatározása. Milyen összefüggés 
van A kritika anatómiájában megfogalmazott esztétikai állásfoglalás és a míto-
szt társadalmi nyilvánosság elé táró olyan típusú retorikák között, melyek például 
a zsidókeresztény, illetve az antik görög-római kultúrát jellemezték? A kutatás 
G. S. Kirk, Jan Assmann, Kerényi Károly és Mircea Eliade mítoszmeghatározá-
sainak segítségével próbálja áttekinteni ezt a problematikát The Great Code 
szövegterében.
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Kelemen Zoltán 1969. december 29-én, Dombóvárott született. 1989-től napjainkig 
folyamatosan publikál. 1995-től dolgozik a Szegedi Tudományegyetem Bölcsészettu-
dományi Karának Összehasonlító Irodalomtudományi Tanszékén. Kutatási területe: 
közép-európai és angolszász irodalmak, határainkon túli és emigráns magyar iroda-
lom, kulturális ikonológia. Legutóbbi könyve a 2012-es könyvhétre jelent meg A köd-
lovagok tegnapjai címmel és a dualizmus-kori magyar ködlovag szerzőkről tartalmaz 
tanulmányokat.
Myth and Literature—A Critical Approach to Northrop Frye’s 
Construction of Myth
According to Northrop Frye, the historical, at least in the sense of historiogra-
phy, is the opposite of the mythical. Though, beyond a certain point, according 
to him, all histories approach the mythical, even the poetic in their wording and 
their understanding. He thus distinguishes romantic myths, which are about 
finding, or the pilgrimage to, the Kingdom of God or a classless society; comic 
myths, which presuppose progress as slow development or a mechanical series 
of revolutions; tragic myths, which commemorate fall and decline, and ironic 
myths, which are about return and accidental catastrophe. In the Anatomy of 
Criticism, he expounds that the various literary stories, myths, folk tales, and 
motifs tend to group into encyclopaedic forms. On the other hand, it is to oracles 
that he traces back the development of stories that have a predilection to forming 
encyclopaedic collections. In his view, ironic representation can in principle be 
linked to sacrificial rites and forms of reverence to dying gods, mourning. The 
interweaving of myth and encyclopaedia, more precisely the need for myths 
to become encyclopaedic, was deemed to be universal by Frye, yet he does not 
always have a positive assessment of this encyclopaedic tendency.
The paper nevertheless focuses not on the Anatomy but The Great Code and 
its definition of myth. What is the relationship between the aesthetic position 
formulated in the Anatomy and the rhetoric that publicizes myth in e.g. the 
Judeo-Christian and the Greco-Roman cultures? The paper seeks to review this 
problem in the textual layers of The Great Code with the help of the myth defini-
tions proposed by G. S. Kirk, Jan Assmann, Károly Kerényi, and Mircea Eliade.
Zoltán Kelemen was born in Dombóvár in 1969. He has been regularly publishing 
since 1989. He teaches at the Department of Comparative Literature of the University 
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of Szeged. His field of research spans Central-European and British-American literature, 
cross-border and emigrant Hungarian literature, and cultural iconology. His last book, 
The Yesterdays of Daydreamers, discussing Hungarian “daydreamer” writers of the late 
nineteenth century, came out for the 2012 Book Week.
15. Kenyeres, János 
Northrop Frye as Creative Writer
The Critic as Writer, the Writer as Critic: The Creative Imagination in Northrop 
Frye’s Work
When examining Northrop Frye’s vast output, one finds that the concept of the 
creative imagination is relevant to him in several areas. This paper wishes to 
map out some of the fields where this holds true, including his views of litera-
ture, the Bible and his cultural and social thought. However, Frye was not only a 
literary critic, social theorist and cultural thinker; he tried his pen as a writer as 
well. Most of his eight pieces of short fiction were published between 1936 and 
1941 in Acta Victoriana and The Canadian Forum. In addition, Frye is also the 
author of an unfinished novel. While suggesting that the creative imagination 
is an overarching principle in Frye’s oeuvre, the paper examines Frye as writer 
and traces some connections between his fiction and scholarship.
János Kenyeres is Director of Research and Associate Professor in the School of Eng-
lish and American Studies at Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, where he teaches 
English and Canadian literature, Canadian cinema, and literary theory. He has several 
publications in these fields, including the book Revolving around the Bible: A Study of 
Northrop Frye (2003). From 2005 to 2008 he was Visiting Professor of Hungarian at the 
University of Toronto. He is currently vice-president of the Central European Associa-
tion for Canadian Studies, head of the Canadian Studies Centre in the School of English 
and American Studies at Eötvös Loránd University, and co-editor of The AnaChronisT.
16. Klapcsik, Sándor
Mythical Journeys in Agatha Christie’s Crooked House and Ordeal by Innocence
The essay interprets Agatha Christie’s detective fiction in the mirror of anthro-
pological and mythical theories. Based on Northrop Frye’s Anatomy of Criticism 
and his essay “The Journey as Metaphor,” I argue that Christie’s Crooked House 
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(1949) and Ordeal by Innocence (1958) demonstrate various aspects of the rites 
of passage and liminality, phenomena that are closely related to Frye’s views on 
the mythical hero’s circular or spiral journey. I also intend to demonstrate that 
the investigation process in the two novels closely follows mythic rituals, such as 
the ancient ritual of the scapegoat or pharmakos. In the classical detective story, 
usually a powerful man, the head of the family, is murdered and so an established 
world order and seemingly rightful power structure is ended. The new order, 
however, cannot commence before the guilty party is found. The culprit does 
not have to be the actual murderer, merely a suitable scapegoat for the family. 
Analogously, Frye emphasizes that the basic formula of detective fiction presents 
“how a man-hunter locates a pharmakos and gets rid of him.” Frye associates 
detective fiction with comedy, which is centered around the (re)birth or “the 
integration of the society,” the characters’ return to a rightful state of affairs. 
The investigation process in Christie’s Crooked House and Ordeal by Innocence 
manifests Turner’s rite of passage and Frye’s circular or spiral journeys in that 
the initial status quo in the family and British society is temporarily questioned 
and disrupted; eventually, however, after the characters endure the ordeal, the 
ritual of liminality and that of the pharmakos, they can regain a stable identity 
and power structure: in a way similar to comedies, a new social order is created 
and a stabilized social life can commence. 
Sándor Klapcsik is an assistant professor at the Technical University of Liberec in 
the Czech Republic, where he conducts research on multiculturalism and adaptations 
in popular culture. He was a part-time senior lecturer at Károli Gáspár University of the 
Reformed Church in Budapest, Hungary between 2011 and 2012. He earned his PhD at 
the Cultural Studies Department of the University of Jyvaskyla, Finland, in 2010. He was 
a Fulbright-Zoltai Fellow at the University of Minnesota and did a long-term research at 
the science fiction archives of the University of Liverpool. His essays were published in 
Extrapolation, Foundation, and Journal of the Fantastic in Arts, and he received the 
Jamie Bishop Memorial Award from IAFA for an essay in Hungarian on Philip K. Dick 
as well as the Mary Kay Bray Award from SFRA for his review on Rewired: The Post-
Cyberpunk Anthology. His book Liminality in Fantastic Fiction: A Poststructuralist 
Approach was published by McFarland in 2012.
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17. Kocić-Zámbó, Larisa
Frye and the Musical Poet
It is a well-known fact that Frye was a lover of music to the point that he con-
sidered it an “alternative career.” Yet, the role of music has been left largely 
unexplored in the conceptual framework of his literary theory (Bogdan). Perhaps 
for the same reason, his preoccupation with Milton had never enjoyed such 
eminence as his writings on Blake, for it is in terms of music and of the musical 
poet that the importance of Milton to Frye stands out (Fletcher). Hence, my aim 
is to explore how Frye’s knowledge of music, and his theoretical use of musical 
form—particularly in his exposition on epos—sheds new light on Milton’s Para-
dise Lost and can, therefore, contribute to the recently rekindled debate among 
Milton scholars about the oral/aural significance of Milton’s poem.
Larisa Kocić-Zámbó, Assistant Professor at the University of Szeged, Institute of English 
& American Studies. Reader in Early Modern Literature and Culture, particular interests 
in Donne, Milton and the women writers of the era. Other research interests include 
fandom studies (secondary orality), comics studies (image-text dynamics, comparative 
study of postmodern and protomodern emblematics), and critical inquiries into Digital 
Humanities. Web designer of the TNT (Gender Research Group) and the technical edi-
tor of the TNTeF, the Interdisciplinary eJournal of Gender Studies. Contact: larisa@
ieas-szeged.hu
18. Kovács, Árpád 
Metafora és identitás—Northrop Frye időszerűsége 
Az írás elhelyezi Northrop Frye trópusfelfogását a retorikai gondolkodás rend-
szerében, valamint bemutatja a metaforikus megnyilatkozás jelentőségét az 
elbeszélő történetmondás és a mimézis között fennálló korreláció megterem-
tésében. Értelmezi a prózanyelvi és versnyelvi tagolásnak kitett metaforikus 
megnyilatkozás jelentésújító szerepét, továbbá ennek hatását a mű világának 
megértésében. Harmadik témaként felveti a szemantikai innováción átesett sza-
vak és a szövegegész összefüggését a műalkotáson kívüli valósággal, a személyes 
tapasztalat feldolgozásával és értelmezhetőségével.
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Metaphor and Identity—The Timeliness of Northrop Frye
The paper places Northrop Frye’s concept of trope in the system of rhetori-
cal thought, and demonstrates the significance of metaphoric utterance in the 
creation of the correlation between narrative story-telling and mimesis. It inter-
prets the meaning-renewing role of metaphoric utterances exposed to prose- 
and verse-language articulation. As a third theme, it proposes a relationship of 
semantically renewed words and the textual whole with the reality outside the 
artwork, the elaboration and interpretability of personal experience.
Árpád Kovács, Doctor of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, taught at Eötvös Loránd 
University, Budapest, and is currently Professor at the Institute of Literary and Cultural 
Studies at Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church, Budapest; he is the head 
of the editorial board of the academic journal Filológiai Közlöny, he edits the series 
entitled Diszkurzívák (Discursives); he has been counsel for over a dozen PhD students; 
he is a Master Teacher. He researches span literary scholarship, history of scholarship, 
linguistic philosophy, semiotics, hermeneutics, and poetics. His books published at home 
and abroad treat mostly novel and prose theory. His book on personal narrative was 
published in Germany. His latest books include Diszkurzív poétika (Discursive Poetics; 
2004), Prózanyelv és elbeszélés. Regénypoétikai írások (Prose Language and Narrative; 
2011), Versbe írt szavak (Words Written in Verse; 2012).
Kovács Árpád az MTA Doktora, korábban az ELTE, jelenleg a Károli Gáspár Református 
Egyetem Irodalom- és Kultúratudományi Intézetének professzora, a Nemzetközi Dosz-
tojevszkij Társaság regionális képviselője, a Filológiai Közlöny szerkesztőbizottságának 
elnöke, A Diszkurzívák című könyvsorozat szerkesztője; tizenhárom végzett 
doktorandusz témavezetője; Mestertanár. Kutatásai kiterjednek az irodalomtudomány 
és tudománytörténet, a nyelvbölcselet és a szemiotika, a hermeneutika és a poétika 
területére. Külföldön és itthon publikált könyvei, tanulmányai elsősorban a regény- 
és a prózaelmélet kérdéseivel foglalkoznak. A perszonális elbeszélésről írott könyve 
Németországban látott napvilágot. Három legutóbb megjelent könyve: Diszkurzív poé-
tika (2004), Prózanyelv és elbeszélés. Regénypoétikai írások (2011), Versbe írt szavak 
(2012).
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19. Le Fustec, Claude
The Kerygmatic Mode in Fiction: Three Examples from the United States 
The aim of this contribution is to use Frye’s notion of “the kerygmatic” as a 
critical tool in the study of literature. The project itself seems amply supported 
by Frye’s own vision of the responsibility of the critic. In O’Grady’s terms, Frye 
seems to have envisioned “a role for the critic in connection with kerygma”. In 
“The Responsibilities of the Critic”, he focused on the prophetic authority of 
literature and suggested that the critic’s task was to identify it. In this paper, I 
am examining three canonical novels: Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter 
(1850), John Steinbeck’s Grapes of Wrath (1939) and Toni Morrison’s Beloved 
(1988). Indeed, each of these novels seems to manifest what might arguably be 
considered as three aspects of kerygma.
As critics have pointed out, kerygma is a particularly elusive concept when it 
comes to its being applied to literature. Northrop Frye himself seems to have 
been hesitant about applying it to secular works, though he did come to recog-
nize that “every work of art is a possible medium for kerygma”. Concerning US 
fiction, the considerable power that Puritan imagination has wielded over it 
makes it a particularly interesting field of study. When considered in a sequence, 
the afore-mentioned novels reveal an increasingly internalized relationship to 
kerygma. In the process of studying this evolution, I am discussing the romantic 
dramatization of kerygma in The Scarlet Letter, prophecy in The Grapes of Wrath 
and the principle of interpenetration in Beloved as three manifestations of the 
“kerygmatic mode” in US fiction. My hope is to shed light on the multifaceted 
literary manifestations of what remains the essential mystery of man’s relation-
ship to transcendence.
Claude Le Fustec is Assistant Professor in American Literature at Rennes 2 University 
(France) and has conducted research oriented by her interest in literature and spirituality. 
After her PhD thesis on Toni Cade Bambara’s and Toni Morrison’s fiction, she published 
a monograph on Toni Cade Bambara (Toni Cade Bambara: entre militantisme et 
fiction. Paris: Belin, 2003) as well as several contributions bearing both on American 
and African American fiction. She has also edited a collection of essays on Steinbeck’s 
Grapes of Wrath (Lectures de Steinbeck: Les raisins de la colère. Rennes: PU de Rennes, 
2007) as well as a volume dealing with gender in the literature and the arts of the English 
speaking world (Fustec, Claude Le, and Sophie Marret, eds. La fabrique du genre, (dé)
constructions du féminin et du masculin dans les arts et la littérature anglophones. 
Rennes: PU de Rennes, 2009). Her book, Northrop Frye and American Fiction, which 
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deals with US fiction and its relationship to transcendence via Frye’s studies of the Bible 
and literature, will be published by the University of Toronto Press in 2014.
20. Nyilasy, Balázs 
Northrop Frye és a romance
Előadásom a legeltökéltebb és leghatékonyabb romance-apologéta elképzeléseit 
ismerteti és azok fölött meditál, elsősorban az összefoglaló Frye-mű, az 1976-ban 
megjelent The Secular Scripture alapján.
Az előadás első részében röviden felvázolom Frye művészetantropológiai 
elképzeléseit. Számba veszem a tudós irodalmár legfontosabb fogalmait (imagi-
nation, displacement), s ezután kerítek sort a displacement fogalom segítségév-
el megalkotott fikcióelméleti okfejtések taglalására. A Frye-i fikció- és regé-
nyelmélet pillérét alkotó romance-fogalom bemutatásakor kitérek a kanadai 
tudós realizmusbírálatára, és felvázolom azokat az elbeszéléspoétikai, 
irodalomtörténeti szinteket, amelyekre e kritika indokoltan s meggyőzően kit-
erjed.
Előadásom második része a Frye-i gondolatok kritikai vizsgálatát adja. 
Mindenekelőtt kifejezem, kifejtem meggyőződésemet—a felvázolt elmélet hoza-
dékát és problematikusságait latoló mérleg evidensen pozitív túlsúlyt mutat. 
Mindazonáltal a teória gyengeségeiről, problematikusságairól sem hallgatok. 
Kritikával illetem a displacement-fogalom túlértelmezéseit (az ekképpen meg-
alkotott regényelmélet hiányosságait), nehezményezem a Northrop Frye-i sze-
mlélet szkémaközpontúságát, univerzáliaelvét, és nem hallgatok azokról az 
értékelési anomáliákról, történeti hiátusokról, kidolgozatlanságokról sem, ame-
lyek a szkémaközpontú, struktúrakereső szemlélet túlhajtásából következnek. 
Nyilasy Balázs (Budapest, 1950) a debreceni egyetemen végzett magyar-orosz szakon. 
1980: egyetemi doktor, 1989: az irodalomtudomány kandidátusa, 1999: az ELTE habilitált 
doktora. Fő kutatási területei: tizenkilencedik és huszadik századi magyar irodalom, 
műfajtörténet, irodalomelmélet. Könyvei: A fiatalember mindennapjai (verseskötet, 
Kozmosz, Bp.,1977.), Rés és kaland (verseskötet, Magvető, Bp., 1985.), A szó társadalmi 
lelke”(esszékötet, Cserépfalvi, Bp., 1996.), Arany János (kismonográfia, Korona, Bp., 
1998.), A konzervatív-modern költő. Arany János verses epikája (műfaji monográfia, 
Eötvös József Könyvkiadó Bp., 2001.), A románc és Jókai Mór (műfaji monográfia, Eöt-
vös József Könyvkiadó, Bp., 2005), Arany János balladái (műfaji kismonográfia, Savaria 
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University Press, 2011), A 19. századi modern magyar románc (műfaji monográfia, 
Argumentum, Bp., 2011.)
Frye and Romance
The paper reviews and meditates over the ideas of the most intent and efficient 
apologue of romance, primarily on the basis of the summing-up work, The Secu-
lar Scripture (1976). 
It, first, gives a brief outline of Frye’s art anthropological concepts. Then sum-
marizes his most important terms (imagination, displacement), and so goes on 
to discuss his theory of fiction based on displacement. Expounding his concept 
of romance, the pillar of his theory of the novel and fiction, the paper touches 
upon his critique of realism, and outlines those levels of narrative poetics and 
literary history where this critique convincingly holds.
In its second part, the paper takes a critical stance towards Frye’s ideas. It 
primarily points out that, the on the balance, the positive yield of the theory 
outlined convincingly prevails over its problems. It criticizes the over-wrought 
interpretations of the term displacement (and the resulting wants of the theory 
of the novel), it disapproves of the schematicism of Frye’s approach, its universal 
principles, and it does not keep silent about those anomalies of evaluation, his-
torical hiatuses, and crudenesses that are a result of a schematicism overdone.
Balázs Nyilasy (b. 1950, Budapest), graduated in Hungarian and Russian literature 
at the University. He received his PhD in 1980, his university doctorate in 1989, his 
habilitated doctorate in 1999. His research fields span nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
Hungarian literature, generic history, and literary theory. His books include: A fiatalem-
ber mindennapjai (The Young Man’s Daily Life, verse; Budapest: Kozmosz, 1977 ); Rés 
és kaland (Gap and Adventure, verse; Budapest: Magvető, 1985); A szó társadalmi 
lelke (The Social Spirit of the Word, essays; Budapest: Cserépfalvi, 1996); Arany János 
(monograph; Budapest: Korona, 1998); A konzervatív-modern költő. Arany János verses 
epikája (The Conservative-modern Poet: The Verse Epic of János Arany; Budapest: Eöt-
vös, 2001); A románc és Jókai Mór (Romance and Mór Jókai; Budapest: Eötvös, 2005); 
Arany János balladái (The Ballads of János Arany; Szombathely: Savaria UP, 2011); and 
A 19. századi modern magyar románc (Modern Hungarian Romance in the nineteenth 
century; Budapest: Argumentum, 2011).
Northrop Frye 100: A Danubian Perspective
• 318 •
21. Ana-Magdalena Petraru 
This paper aims to give an overview of the reception of the Canadian scholar’s 
work in translations and critical studies in Romania. It will outline both com-
munist and post-communist perspectives on Northrop Frye. Also, it will try to 
account for translations of Frye’s works from the communist era to the present 
day and the possible criteria that might have operated in the selection of his 
works for translation. Moreover, the paper will sketch how far Frye influences 
today’s Romanian university curricula. 
Ana-Magdalena Petraru  is an associate assistant of English at Alexandru Ioan 
Cuza University of Iasi since 2008 and she holds a PhD on a Canadian-related topic 
(The English Canadian Novel in Romania. Translations and Critical Studies) awarded in 
2011 by “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iasi, Romania. During her doctoral studies 
she participated in a SSHRC-based project (The Contribution of Literary Translation 
to Intercultural Understanding: Developing a Model for Reciprocal Exchange) and 
disseminated the results of her research at national and international conferences on 
British and American Studies, in general and Canadian Studies in particular.
22. Sinding, Michael
The Shaping Spirit and Rousseau: Literary Cosmology, Cognition and Culture 
Frye’s approach to culture integrates bodily, cognitive, semiotic, social, and 
historical factors. Yet productive dialogue with other approaches is challeng-
ing: sympathizers may get stuck “inside” his capacious thinking, while sceptics 
remain “outside”—today, typically emphasizing contextual factors shaping cul-
tural texts (e.g., ideology). I explore an integrative approach via Frye’s account 
of the inversion of the axis mundi. 
Frye’s principle that thought and meaning are structured by metaphor and 
narrative is central to cognitive science today (Lakoff and Johnson, Turner, 
Hogan). Studies of cultural and cognitive change and stability (e.g. Greenblatt, 
Zunshine) can therefore profit from his vision of intertwined imaginative-cul-
tural processes. 
Frye sees early cultures as rooted in mythologies (canonical narratives 
addressing “primary concerns”), which mentally crystallize into cosmologies. 
These world-pictures are organized by spatial metaphors based on the orienta-
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tion of the human body (e.g. the axis mundi). Cosmologies become frameworks 
for later literary and theoretical structures. 
Changes in cosmology, then, affect all of human experience. The most pro-
found change in Western cultural history was the eighteenth-century inversion 
of the axis mundi: the locus of value and power shifted from God (above and 
outside) to humanity (below and within). To develop this account, I examine 
how cosmological structures inform Rousseau’s revolutionary early Discourse 
on the Arts and Sciences (Words 239-43), and therein mediate historical change. 
I identify key spatial metaphors and myths, and assess how they embody and 
manipulate “image-schemas” such as the vertical scale (up/down) and container 
(in/out). Analysis indicates that the language of Rousseau’s argument reorgan-
izing the traditional cosmology focuses on the inner/ outer contrast more than 
on an axial above/ below contrast. Causal relations among souls depend primar-
ily on the attachment or detachment of inner substance to outer surfaces: 
attached soul-substances get pulled apart, weaken, decline, and dissolve; while 
the detached soul, contained in and oriented to itself, remains solid (integrity) 
and (if ordinary) attends to words within, or (if extraordinary) rises up strongly 
and attaches to great things above and beyond.
 
Michael Sinding is a Marie Curie Fellow in the Department of Language and Com-
munication at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. His current project “Framing the World: 
Genre as Worldview” is a study of how metaphor and narrative interact in structuring 
moral and political worldviews, particularly during the formation of modern liberalism 
and conservatism in the eighteenth century debate over the French Revolution. He also 
studies cognitive approaches to literary and cultural forms, including genre, narrative, 
metaphor, and allegory, especially genre mixture as conceptual blending. He received 
his PhD from McMaster University and has held postdoctoral fellowships in Canada, 
Germany and the Netherlands. He is the author of Body of Vision: Northrop Frye and 
the Poetics of Mind (Frye Studies, University of Toronto Press, 2014). He has published 
articles and reviews in the Wallace Stevens Journal, Genre, New Literary History, 
SubStance, Style, Poetics Today, Postmodern Culture, Cognitive Linguistics, and the 
Journal of Literary Theory, and in edited collections Northrop Frye: New Directions 
from Old, Beyond Cognitive Metaphor Theory, The Cognition of Literature, and 
Blending and Narrative. 
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23. Sinka, Judit Erzsébet
A „balladisztikus novella” mint archaikus tapasztalatok megjelenítője 
a modernségben – a „balladisztikus novella” a frye-i tengelyen
A 19. századi magyar irodalomtörténet-írás sokszor visszatér a novella műfajában 
tapasztalható poétikai interferenciák kérdésére. A balladisztikus novella meg-
nevezéssel illetett interferencia a 19. század második felének irodalmában jelent 
meg. Több irodalomkritikus megfigyelte a ballada hatását a novellairodalomra 
ebben a korban, s foglalkoztak novella és ballada ötvöződésével. A „klasszikus 
műfajtipológia” által azonban eddig még nem sikerült magyarázatot találni a 
„balladisztikus novella” létezésére, hiszen az elsősorban az Arisztotelésznek 
tulajdonított „műnemi hármasság” felől közelíti meg ballada és novella össze-
függéseit. A ballada azonban nem arisztotelészi műfaj, a benne található „lírai”, 
„drámai jegyek” elkülöníthetetlen részei, összetevői e formának. Northrop Frye 
irodalomelméleti megközelítése által azonban felfejthető a ballada és novella 
kapcsolata, s feltárható e formák ötvöződése – előadásomban konkrétan Petelei 
István elbeszélései által. Frye elsődleges célja nem a műfajok osztályozása, hanem 
a műfajok kapcsolatainak megvilágítása. Alapvetően megkülönböztet epikát és 
fikciót, ezzel megteszi a szóbeli, orális költészet és a nyomtatáson alapuló írott 
irodalom elkülönítését. Az epika szót alkalmazza minden olyan műre, amely-
nek előadásformája szóbeli, s a fikció szót használja a nyomtatott betűn alapuló 
műfaj jelölésére. A fikciót azonban meg kell különböztetni a többi olyan műfajtól, 
melynek létezése pusztán gyakorlati okokból „könyvhöz kötött”. Frye ezt egy 
történeti példával illusztrálja: „A beszélő költő és az őt hallgató közönség közötti 
kapcsolat még valóságosan fennállhatott Homérosz vagy Chaucer esetében, de 
hamarosan mindinkább elméletivé vált, s ezzel párhuzamosan az epika észrevé-
tlenül átment fikcióba.” S ez a felvetés az, amely által megfogható a balladisztikus 
novella léte: a ballada epikus, azaz szóbeli jellegének átváltása a novella fikciójába 
adhat alapot az elnevezésre, a műfaji változat megjelölésére. Ennek tükrében 
nem is a két műfaj keveredésének, hanem egy meglévő tapasztalat (a ballada) új 
felhasználásának, új formába öntésének lehetünk tanúi: a szóbeli formák (csodás) 
elemei displacement módon áthelyeződnek a reális világ keretei közé. A szóbeli 
struktúrák beépülése az írott irodalomba pedig olyan poétikai változatokat hoz 
létre, mint például a balladisztikus novella a 19. század második felében.
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The „Balladic Short Story” as Representing Archaic Experience—
A Frygian Grounding
Literary histories of the nineteenth century recurrently discuss the issue poeti-
cal interferences in the short story genre. The interference called “balladic short 
story” appeared in the literature of the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Several critics noted the effect of the ballad on short story writing at the time, 
as there were many attempts at blending ballad and short story. On the basis of 
classical generic typology however, no explanation has been given to the exist-
ence of “balladic short story”, because that approaches the relationship between 
ballad and short story on the basis of the “generic trinity” attributed to Aristotle. 
The ballad is not an Aristotelian genre, its “lyrical” and “dramatic” features are 
inseparable and constitutive parts of this form. On the basis of Northrop Frye’s 
approach to literary history, the relationship between ballad and short story can 
be accounted for, and the blending of these forms can be explained—particularly 
in the short stories of István Petelei the paper discusses. Frye’s primary aim 
was not to classify genres, but to shed light on the relationship between them. 
Fundamentally, he distinguishes epos and fiction, whereby he separates verbal 
and oral poetry from printed literature. He applies epos to all works performed 
orally, and fiction to the genres based on print. Fiction however has to be dif-
ferentiated from all the genres that are “bound to a book” for mere practicality. 
Frye illustrates this on a historical example: “The connection between speaking 
poet and listening audience which may be actual in Homer or Chaucer soon 
becomes increasingly theoretical, and as it does so epos passes insensibly into 
fiction” (AC 248). It is this suggestion the helps to account for the existence of 
the balladic short story. The naming, the generic variant, can be grounded on 
the passing of the epic, i.e. oral, quality of the ballad into the fiction of the short 
story. In this light, it is not the blending of two genres that we are witnesses to but 
the fact the an existing experience (ballad) is used again and given a new shape: 
the (marvellous) elements of the verbal forms are displaced into the framework 
of a realistic world. The integration of verbal structures into written literature 
brings into being a poetic variant like the balladic short story in the second half 
of the nineteenth century. 
Sinka Judit Erzsébet (Debrecen 1981) első diplomáját a Kölcsey Ferenc Református 
Tanítóképző Főiskolán szerezte tanító-kommunikáció szakon, újságírás szakiránnyal. A 
Debreceni Egyetemen magyar szakos bölcsészként végzett, majd 2010-ben a Debreceni 
Egyetem Irodalomtudományok Doktori Iskolájába nyert felvételt, jelenleg másodéves 
PhD-hallgató. Témavezetője Dr. S. Varga Pál, kutatási területe a 19. századi magyar novel-
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lairodalom, ezen belül is a novellában fellépő poétikai interferenciák vizsgálata. Szin-
tén 2010-től a Debreceni Egyetem Kutatóegyetemi program Magyar Emlékezethelyek 
kutatócsoportjának tagja.
Judit Erzsébet Sinka (b. 1981 Debrecen), she graduated in communication, journal-
ism and pedagogy at Kölcsey Ferenc Teacher Training College of the Reformed Church, 
Debrecen, then in Hungarian literature at the University of Debrecen, and started her 
PhD programme there in 2010, with Pál S. Varga as her consultant. Since 2010, she has 
also been on the staff of the research project Locations of Hungarian Memory.
24. Tóth, Sára
A Frygian Perspective on European Irony: The Green Butchers
In my paper I will apply Frye’s perspective on one decisive feature of European 
élite culture, namely, the presence of extreme irony, or rather, the tendency of 
interpretation to overlook textual data pointing away from irony. Influential 
thinkers of the twentieth century such as Paul de Man or Jacques Lacan tend to 
essentialize irony by turning it into the ultimate condition of human existence. 
In contrast, Northrop Frye is known to be a critic with a preference for comedy 
and romance as opposed to tragedy and irony. In his vision of the whole of litera-
ture, Frye relativizes the mythos of irony and satire by turning it into one of the 
four pregeneric narratives and by opposing its demonic imagery to the paradisal 
or apocalyptic group of images. In his strongest statement on the relativity of 
irony Frye, associating it with hell, states that “it is the paradisal pole that gives 
us a perspective on the hell world […] provides the norm that makes irony ironic” 
(WP 88). This means that a narrative of the most extreme tragical or ironical 
descent can conjure up its opposite, the comic assent, thus echoing the entire 
U shaped story of loss and recovery, of alienation and redemption. In a brief 
discussion of Anders Thomas Jensen’s film, my aim is to apply Frye’s archetypal 
perspective and show that while the majority of online reviews essentialize the 
murderously dark satire of the two cannibal butchers who sacrifice others to 
feed themselves, they overlook strong visual and narrative hints of the opposite, 
paradisal pole, an Eucharistic vision of love nurtured by sacrifice.
Sára Tóth (1967) teaches courses in English literature, religion studies, and translation 
studies at Károli Gáspár University. Her main interest is the interplay between Christian-
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ity and the arts, particularly literature and Christian belief, literature and the Bible. She 
completed her doctorate in 2003 with a dissertation on the religious aspects of the work 
of Northrop Frye. She has published papers on Northrop Frye in English (in the volume 
New Directions from Old published by University of Ottawa Press, and in the journal 
English Studies in Canada) as well as in Hungarian (Pannonhalmi Szemle, Holmi 
among others). Her first book, so far the only book-length study of Northrop Frye in the 
Hungarian was published in September 2012. 
25. Zwanzig, Rebekah
Anagnorisis in Northrop Frye and the Qur’ān
In the Introduction to Words with Power Frye states that a large portion of his 
critical thinking has revolved around the double meaning of the Aristotelian 
term anagnorisis. The paper will explore the Quranic imagery of mountains, spe-
cifically Mt. ‚Arafat, and the etymological connection to the Arabic verb ‘arafa 
(to recognize, to know) as the framework for understanding a larger Quranic 
narrative of recognition. This narrative begins on the Day of the Covenant 
(Q7:172 ), continues with the Quranic imperative to recognize the signs of God, 
and culminates on the Day of Judgment. The play between the double meaning 
of ‘recognition’ and ‘discovery’ can be found throughout Frye’s work, and is 
perhaps most apparent in his articulation of the interplay between identity and 
metaphor starting in The Great Code and carrying through to The Double Vision. 
Frye’s concept of the existential metaphor hinges on the reader’s discovery of 
and subsequent recognition of a “that’s for me” element in the text. The paper 
will explore this framework in Frye’s reading of the Qur’ān by analyzing some 
of the annotations in two Qur’āns from his personal collection. It will look at 
the annotations related to mountain imagery and the concepts associated with 
recognition in his Qur’āns and how they can be understood in the context of 
Frye’s broader inquiry into anagnorisis. 
Rebekah Zwanzig is a Research Assistant at the University of Toronto. Her current 
research interests focus on studying the Qur’ān as literature and the creative and trans-
formative effects reading has on the individual. She holds a M.A. in Religion from the 
University of Toronto and a M.A. in Philosophy from Brock University. Her previous 
research focused on the French philosopher and Islamic Studies scholar Henry Corbin’s 
concept of philosophy, and the role of the Perfect Human (al-isan al-kamil) in Ibn 
‘Arabi’s thought.





The simultaneist poem teaches a sense of the merry-go-round 
of all things; while Herr Schulze reads his paper, the Balkan Express 
crosses the bridge at Nish; a pig squeals in Butcher Nuttke’s cellar.
Richard Huelsenbeck
“First German Dada Manifesto”, Berlin 1918
The Theatre is anatomical by nature because within it the twentieth century is 
placed on a dissection table; the people, the events and the phenomena therefore 
do not wear costumes or masks; on the contrary, even the skin is torn off, tissue 
is cut, bone and muscle are revealed, and the nervous, blood and lymph systems 
are observed. The walls of the Theatre remind us of the walls of a biological lab 
surrounded by glass showcases filled with neatly arranged bottles in which, 
floating in a 40% formaldehyde solution, the body parts of world’s history await 
their curious observer.
Eroticism, which often appears in the scenes of Das Anatomische Theater 
many times bordering on obscenity, and which is deeply rooted in the depths of 
the age-old traditions of Eros and Thanatos, is evoked to counterbalance the 
tragic events and the totalitarian systems that brought doom to the twentieth 
century. The civilized nations have long forgotten that, in more primitive stages 
of their existence, they too used erotic art to expel the evil spirits. With the help 
of its irony and eroticism, Das Anatomische Theater banishes the evil powers of 
the twentieth century.
Milorad Krstić is a Central-European artist born in the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia, 
in 1952. He took a degree in law. Since 1989 he has been living and working in Budapest, 
Hungary, as a painter and multimedia artist. He hass tried his hand at different genres of 
visual art, painting, drawing, sculpture, animation, documentary film, stage design, set 
design, photography, interactive CD-ROM, and picture books for children, comics, and 
animation films. His animated film My Baby Left Me was awarded the Silver Bear Prize 
at the Berlin Film Festival in 1995. He put up a major one-man show, Das Anatomische 
Theater, at the Műcsarnok (Kunsthalle), Budapest, in December 2011 and January 2012.
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Publications by Milorad Krstić
Budapest. Budapest: Magyar Könyvklub, 2003. (Photo album)
Das Anatomische Theater. Ljubljana: Strip CoreForum and Budapest: Roczkov 
Studio, 2007. (Album of paintings, drawings and prints)
Websites: www.milorad.eu; www.dasanatomischetheater.com
